宏观审慎监管理论与实证分析
|
摘要
宏观审慎为金融监管部门治理金融市场风险提供了一个全新的方向，将监管视角从微观审慎转向宏观审慎，能够有效的针对本次金融危机暴露出的监管空白进行补充。随着金融市场的深化与发展，金融衍生品种类的增加，金融机构之间和金融机构与金融市场之间的关联性不断增强，金融风险在金融网络中的分散和积累也变得越发复杂，针对单个金融机构稳健运营进行监管的传统措施已经不能保障整个金融系统处于稳定状态。经过各国金融监管机构的共同探讨，宏观审慎监管被赋予防范系统性风险、维护金融体系稳定以及确保金融市场对宏观经济发展提供正常服务的责任，成为金融监管制度改革的核心内容。
虽然宏观审慎不是一个新的概念，但作为一项新施行的金融监管政策，宏观审慎监管无论在理论层面还是在实践层面都存在许多问题需要进一步探讨并形成共识，包括监管目标、工具、有效性、作用机制以及政策协调性等方面。基于这样的逻辑脉络，本文从宏观审慎监管理念的提出和监管框架的建立入手，探讨金融市场系统性风险的度量，尤其是金融机构对市场风险的贡献作用，给出了对我国系统性风险的初步判断。随后分别从截面维度和时间维度出发，跟踪评价了我国系统重要性金融机构，分析了逆周期宏观审慎监管工具的优缺点与实用性，并对宏观审慎监管在实施过程中与货币政策的协调性问题进行了必要的研究，为我国宏观审慎监管框架建立过程中遇到的部分问题提供参考。
首先，本文使用资本充足率、不良资产比率、银行信贷与GDP比率、股票交易额与GDP比率、利差、征信信息深度指数、征信体系覆盖率、法律权利指数8个指标构建金融监管综合指数对我国金融监管有效性进行检验，实证结果显示我国金融监管有效性近年来呈逐步提升趋势，这是对我国政府和监管部门多年来工作的肯定，但是在与发达国家的横向比较中我国金融监管综合指数的得分明显偏低，表明仍然存在较大提升空间。面对此次危机中传统监管措施的失效，以美国为首的发达国家纷纷采取引入宏观审慎监管政策，并实施监管体制改革，从金融监管综合指数的得分来看宏观审慎措施的引入有效的提高了美国金融监管目标的实现程度和监管的有效性，作为未来国际金融监管的发展趋势，我国有必要结合客观情况适当的借鉴并引入宏观审慎监管。
其次，针对宏观审慎监管关注的系统性风险问题进行了分析，本文所述的系统性风险为因某一触发因素引起并导致不稳定性在整个金融体系内扩散，最终对金融市场和实体经济造成严重损害的整体风险，在对系统性风险的概念及度量方法进行分析梳理的基础上，从金融机构对整体风险贡献的角度出发，采用边际期望损失为系统性风险的代理变量，使用上市银行数据对我国系统性风险进行了度量。实证结果显示在2008年1月至12月期间我国系统性风险明显高于平常时期，这与金融危机爆发的实际情况相吻合。从边际期望损失排名情况看，金融机构的规模与杠杆率水平与金融机构的系统性风险贡献度呈负相关关系，即规模较小、杠杆率较低的银行对系统性风险的贡献较大，这主要是由于中小型金融机构往往在风险管理和风险处置能力上弱于大型金融机构。此外，宏观经济环境也是影响系统性风险的因素之一，表现为宏观经济环境好时，金融系统性风险低。
随后，文章从宏观审慎监管的截面维度和时间维度分别对系统重要性金融机构的识别与逆周期监管工具及适用性进行了研究。采用系统重要性指数SII和附加伤害指数CDI对系统重要性机构进行量化分析，结果显示SII对我国银行业机构的系统重要性解释能力明显弱于CDI，附加伤害指数更符合我国实际市场表现，金融机构的系统重要性与其规模的大小有明显的正相关性，中国银行、农业银行、工商银行、建设银行和交通银行在金融系统中占据更重要的位置，是我国金融网络中的主要“节点”，它们对金融体系稳定性的影响显著高于其他中小股份制商业银行。在对逆周期监管工具的研究中发现，我国银行业的缓冲资本策略存在明显的惯性，资产回报率不能显著影响缓冲资本规模，经济波动与缓冲资本的计提具有较强的正相关关系，资本充足率的变动存在对宏观经济波动的放大效用，我国具有实时逆周期监管的客观需求，国外先进监管模型和技术可以通过修改而应用于我国实践，但监管措施的实施仍面临诸多挑战，对经济周期所处阶段的判断、对逆周期监管工具“度”的掌握都会对宏观审慎监管的执行效果产生重要影响。
最后，文章对宏观审慎监管与货币政策在实现金融稳定这一目标过程中的交互作用情况进行了分析，使用动态随机一般均衡模型进行模拟，实证结果表明当经济波动由供给冲击引起时，宏观审慎监管与货币政策存在冲突，表现为宏观审慎监管会因仅关注金融稳定而加剧宏观经济的波动；当经济波动由金融冲击或房地产冲击引起时，宏观审慎监管与货币政策可以有效协调，且宏观审慎监管的执行效果优于货币政策，货币政策由于需要兼顾金融稳定，其原有政策目标的执行效果受到影响，表现为通货膨胀率的波动变大。从宏观经济层面看来，宏观审慎监管是为减少金融冲击和特殊部门冲击对经济整体造成影响的工具，它是货币政策的补充而非替代，对宏观审慎监管措施的执行需要十分谨慎，在一般时期不正当的使用宏观审慎监管对经济环境的损害远大于帮助。此外，文章在结尾处对建立符合我国国情的宏观审慎监管框架进行了进一步思考，结合实证中获得的结论和我国金融市场的客观情况给出了对现有监管政策改进和新监管工具设计的建议。
Macroprudential supervision supplies a new direction to the financial regulator for thefinancial risk management, turning the regulatory perspective from the micro-prudential tomacroprudential. It can supplement the supervision blank which has exposed in the financial crisis.With the deepening and development of financial markets, the correlation between the financialinstitutions and financial markets, financial institutions and financial institutions are constantlyreinforcing. The dispersion and accumulation of financial risks in the financial network has becomemore and more complex, the traditional supervisions which for the stable operation of individualfinancial institutions are not able to protect the financial system as a whole is in a stable state. Afterthe discussion of the financial regulator, macroprudential supervision is given to keep watch thesystemic risk, maintain the stability of the financial system, ensure that the financial marketsprovide normal services to the macroeconomic development as well as the responsibility, itbecomes the core content of the financial regulatory reform.
Although the macroprudential is not a new concept, but as a newly introduced financialregulatory policy, there are many problems that need to be further explored and discuss both at thetheoretical level and a practical level about macroprudential supervision, including the regulatoryobjectives, tools, effectiveness, mechanism of action and policy coordination aspects. Based on thelogical context, we start from the establishment of the proposed concept of macroprudentialsupervision and regulatory framework, to explore the measure of systemic risk in the financialmarkets, especially the role of financial institutions to market risk contribution, given the systemicrisk of preliminary judgment. Subsequent departure from the cross-sectional dimensions and thetime dimension, tracking and evaluation of systemically important financial institutions,counter-cyclical macroprudential regulatory tools advantages, disadvantages and practical, thecoordination about macroprudential supervision and monetary policy in the implementation processof financial stability, provide a reference for dealing some of the problems encountered in theprocess China's macroprudential regulatory framework establishing.
First, we use the capital adequacy ratio, the ratio of non-performing assets, bank credit to GDPratio, stock trading to GDP ratio, spreads, depth of credit information index, credit informationsystem coverage of legal rights index of eight indicators to build Financial Regulatory Comprehensive Index to test the effectiveness of financial supervision in China, the empiricalresults show that effectiveness of financial supervision in China in recent years was increasedgradually trend, which is an affirmation of the hard work of our government and regulatoryauthorities over the years, but in the horizontal comparison with the developed countries China'sFRCI score is significantly lower, indicating that there are still large room for improvement. Failureof traditional regulatory measures in the face of this crisis, the US-led developed countries havetaken the introduction of macroprudential policies, and the implementation of the reform of theregulatory system, the introduction of macroprudential measures from the financial regulatoryComposite Index score of view effectively improve the U.S. financial regulatory objectives arebeing met and the effectiveness of regulation, as the development trend of the future internationalfinancial regulation, China is necessary to combine the objective appropriate reference and theintroduction of macroprudential supervision.
Second, we make a research on systemic risk, in this article systemic risk has been defined asa certain trigger factors and lead to the spread of instability in the financial system as a whole, andit is the finally causes of the serious damage in financial markets and the real economy to theoverall risk, based on the concepts and methods of the measurement of systemic risk analysiscombing, from the perspective of financial institutions contribution to the overall risk, the use ofmarginal expected short for the systemic risk proxy variables, using the data of listed banksmeasure of systemic risk. The empirical results show that during the period January2008toDecember, China`s systemic risk is significantly higher than the usual period, just like the actualsituation of the financial crisis coincides. Ranking from the marginal expected short, the size offinancial institutions and the level of leverage was negatively correlated with the systemic riskcontribution of financial institutions, that is, the smaller banks with lower leverage ratio get ahigher contribution to the systemic risk, This is mainly due to the small and medium-sized financialinstitutions tend to be weaker than large financial institutions in risk management and the ability todeal with the risk. In addition, the macroeconomic environment is also one of the factors affectingthe systemic risk, better macroeconomic environment lead to lower financial systemic risk.
Third, the article learn about the macroprudential supervision from both cross-sectionaldimensions and time dimension of macroprudential, such as identify systemically importantfinancial institutions, discuss the counter-cyclical regulatory tools and applicability. Quantitativeanalysis the systemically important institutions with systemically important index SII and collateraldamage index CDI, the results show the SII of China's banking institutions systemically importantexplanatory power significantly weaker than the CDI, the collateral damage index more in line with actual market performance in China, financial significant positive correlation between the size ofthe institutions of systemic importance to their size, BOC, ABC, ICBC, CCB, BOCM in thefinancial system occupy a more important position in our Financial Network, their impact on thestability of the financial system was significantly higher than other small and medium-sizedcommercial banks. From the study of Counter-cyclical regulatory tools we found that there issignificant inertia of China`s capital conservation buffer strategy, return on assets does notsignificantly affect the size of the buffer capital, fluctuations in the economy and the provision ofbuffer capital has a strong positive correlation between capital adequacy ratio of the change in theeffectiveness of macroeconomic fluctuations zoom. It`s the real-time China take its counter-cyclicalregulatory with the advanced and techniques regulatory models from foreign country, but still facesmany challenges in the implementation of regulatory measures on the economy cycle stage ofjudgment, which has an important impact on the counter-cyclical regulatory tools.
Finally, we discuss the coordination between the macroprudential supervision and monetarypolicy in achieving financial stability, the goal of the process of interaction were analyzed usingdynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to simulate the empirical results show that when theeconomic fluctuations caused by supply shocks, macroprudential supervision and monetary policythere is a conflict, the performance of macroprudential supervision is concerned only with thefinancial stability exacerbate macroeconomic fluctuations; when economic fluctuations caused bythe financial shocks or real estate impact of macroprudential supervision and monetary policy canbe effective coordination and macroprudential The regulatory perform better than the monetarypolicy, monetary policy due to the need to take into account the financial stability, the effect of theimplementation of its policy objectives affected the performance of larger fluctuations in theinflation rate. From the macro-economic level, the macroprudential supervision is to reduce thefinancial shocks and special impact on the overall economic impact tool, it is not as a replacementof the monetary policy, the implementation of macroprudential measures need to be very cautious,in general, period of improper use of macroprudential supervision of the economic environmentdamage is much larger than help. In addition, the article at the end of the establishment ofmacroprudential regulatory framework in line with China's national conditions further reflection,combined with empirical conclusions and the objective of the country's financial market designrecommendations on the improvement of existing regulatory policies and regulatory tools.
虽然宏观审慎不是一个新的概念，但作为一项新施行的金融监管政策，宏观审慎监管无论在理论层面还是在实践层面都存在许多问题需要进一步探讨并形成共识，包括监管目标、工具、有效性、作用机制以及政策协调性等方面。基于这样的逻辑脉络，本文从宏观审慎监管理念的提出和监管框架的建立入手，探讨金融市场系统性风险的度量，尤其是金融机构对市场风险的贡献作用，给出了对我国系统性风险的初步判断。随后分别从截面维度和时间维度出发，跟踪评价了我国系统重要性金融机构，分析了逆周期宏观审慎监管工具的优缺点与实用性，并对宏观审慎监管在实施过程中与货币政策的协调性问题进行了必要的研究，为我国宏观审慎监管框架建立过程中遇到的部分问题提供参考。
首先，本文使用资本充足率、不良资产比率、银行信贷与GDP比率、股票交易额与GDP比率、利差、征信信息深度指数、征信体系覆盖率、法律权利指数8个指标构建金融监管综合指数对我国金融监管有效性进行检验，实证结果显示我国金融监管有效性近年来呈逐步提升趋势，这是对我国政府和监管部门多年来工作的肯定，但是在与发达国家的横向比较中我国金融监管综合指数的得分明显偏低，表明仍然存在较大提升空间。面对此次危机中传统监管措施的失效，以美国为首的发达国家纷纷采取引入宏观审慎监管政策，并实施监管体制改革，从金融监管综合指数的得分来看宏观审慎措施的引入有效的提高了美国金融监管目标的实现程度和监管的有效性，作为未来国际金融监管的发展趋势，我国有必要结合客观情况适当的借鉴并引入宏观审慎监管。
其次，针对宏观审慎监管关注的系统性风险问题进行了分析，本文所述的系统性风险为因某一触发因素引起并导致不稳定性在整个金融体系内扩散，最终对金融市场和实体经济造成严重损害的整体风险，在对系统性风险的概念及度量方法进行分析梳理的基础上，从金融机构对整体风险贡献的角度出发，采用边际期望损失为系统性风险的代理变量，使用上市银行数据对我国系统性风险进行了度量。实证结果显示在2008年1月至12月期间我国系统性风险明显高于平常时期，这与金融危机爆发的实际情况相吻合。从边际期望损失排名情况看，金融机构的规模与杠杆率水平与金融机构的系统性风险贡献度呈负相关关系，即规模较小、杠杆率较低的银行对系统性风险的贡献较大，这主要是由于中小型金融机构往往在风险管理和风险处置能力上弱于大型金融机构。此外，宏观经济环境也是影响系统性风险的因素之一，表现为宏观经济环境好时，金融系统性风险低。
随后，文章从宏观审慎监管的截面维度和时间维度分别对系统重要性金融机构的识别与逆周期监管工具及适用性进行了研究。采用系统重要性指数SII和附加伤害指数CDI对系统重要性机构进行量化分析，结果显示SII对我国银行业机构的系统重要性解释能力明显弱于CDI，附加伤害指数更符合我国实际市场表现，金融机构的系统重要性与其规模的大小有明显的正相关性，中国银行、农业银行、工商银行、建设银行和交通银行在金融系统中占据更重要的位置，是我国金融网络中的主要“节点”，它们对金融体系稳定性的影响显著高于其他中小股份制商业银行。在对逆周期监管工具的研究中发现，我国银行业的缓冲资本策略存在明显的惯性，资产回报率不能显著影响缓冲资本规模，经济波动与缓冲资本的计提具有较强的正相关关系，资本充足率的变动存在对宏观经济波动的放大效用，我国具有实时逆周期监管的客观需求，国外先进监管模型和技术可以通过修改而应用于我国实践，但监管措施的实施仍面临诸多挑战，对经济周期所处阶段的判断、对逆周期监管工具“度”的掌握都会对宏观审慎监管的执行效果产生重要影响。
最后，文章对宏观审慎监管与货币政策在实现金融稳定这一目标过程中的交互作用情况进行了分析，使用动态随机一般均衡模型进行模拟，实证结果表明当经济波动由供给冲击引起时，宏观审慎监管与货币政策存在冲突，表现为宏观审慎监管会因仅关注金融稳定而加剧宏观经济的波动；当经济波动由金融冲击或房地产冲击引起时，宏观审慎监管与货币政策可以有效协调，且宏观审慎监管的执行效果优于货币政策，货币政策由于需要兼顾金融稳定，其原有政策目标的执行效果受到影响，表现为通货膨胀率的波动变大。从宏观经济层面看来，宏观审慎监管是为减少金融冲击和特殊部门冲击对经济整体造成影响的工具，它是货币政策的补充而非替代，对宏观审慎监管措施的执行需要十分谨慎，在一般时期不正当的使用宏观审慎监管对经济环境的损害远大于帮助。此外，文章在结尾处对建立符合我国国情的宏观审慎监管框架进行了进一步思考，结合实证中获得的结论和我国金融市场的客观情况给出了对现有监管政策改进和新监管工具设计的建议。
Macroprudential supervision supplies a new direction to the financial regulator for thefinancial risk management, turning the regulatory perspective from the micro-prudential tomacroprudential. It can supplement the supervision blank which has exposed in the financial crisis.With the deepening and development of financial markets, the correlation between the financialinstitutions and financial markets, financial institutions and financial institutions are constantlyreinforcing. The dispersion and accumulation of financial risks in the financial network has becomemore and more complex, the traditional supervisions which for the stable operation of individualfinancial institutions are not able to protect the financial system as a whole is in a stable state. Afterthe discussion of the financial regulator, macroprudential supervision is given to keep watch thesystemic risk, maintain the stability of the financial system, ensure that the financial marketsprovide normal services to the macroeconomic development as well as the responsibility, itbecomes the core content of the financial regulatory reform.
Although the macroprudential is not a new concept, but as a newly introduced financialregulatory policy, there are many problems that need to be further explored and discuss both at thetheoretical level and a practical level about macroprudential supervision, including the regulatoryobjectives, tools, effectiveness, mechanism of action and policy coordination aspects. Based on thelogical context, we start from the establishment of the proposed concept of macroprudentialsupervision and regulatory framework, to explore the measure of systemic risk in the financialmarkets, especially the role of financial institutions to market risk contribution, given the systemicrisk of preliminary judgment. Subsequent departure from the cross-sectional dimensions and thetime dimension, tracking and evaluation of systemically important financial institutions,counter-cyclical macroprudential regulatory tools advantages, disadvantages and practical, thecoordination about macroprudential supervision and monetary policy in the implementation processof financial stability, provide a reference for dealing some of the problems encountered in theprocess China's macroprudential regulatory framework establishing.
First, we use the capital adequacy ratio, the ratio of non-performing assets, bank credit to GDPratio, stock trading to GDP ratio, spreads, depth of credit information index, credit informationsystem coverage of legal rights index of eight indicators to build Financial Regulatory Comprehensive Index to test the effectiveness of financial supervision in China, the empiricalresults show that effectiveness of financial supervision in China in recent years was increasedgradually trend, which is an affirmation of the hard work of our government and regulatoryauthorities over the years, but in the horizontal comparison with the developed countries China'sFRCI score is significantly lower, indicating that there are still large room for improvement. Failureof traditional regulatory measures in the face of this crisis, the US-led developed countries havetaken the introduction of macroprudential policies, and the implementation of the reform of theregulatory system, the introduction of macroprudential measures from the financial regulatoryComposite Index score of view effectively improve the U.S. financial regulatory objectives arebeing met and the effectiveness of regulation, as the development trend of the future internationalfinancial regulation, China is necessary to combine the objective appropriate reference and theintroduction of macroprudential supervision.
Second, we make a research on systemic risk, in this article systemic risk has been defined asa certain trigger factors and lead to the spread of instability in the financial system as a whole, andit is the finally causes of the serious damage in financial markets and the real economy to theoverall risk, based on the concepts and methods of the measurement of systemic risk analysiscombing, from the perspective of financial institutions contribution to the overall risk, the use ofmarginal expected short for the systemic risk proxy variables, using the data of listed banksmeasure of systemic risk. The empirical results show that during the period January2008toDecember, China`s systemic risk is significantly higher than the usual period, just like the actualsituation of the financial crisis coincides. Ranking from the marginal expected short, the size offinancial institutions and the level of leverage was negatively correlated with the systemic riskcontribution of financial institutions, that is, the smaller banks with lower leverage ratio get ahigher contribution to the systemic risk, This is mainly due to the small and medium-sized financialinstitutions tend to be weaker than large financial institutions in risk management and the ability todeal with the risk. In addition, the macroeconomic environment is also one of the factors affectingthe systemic risk, better macroeconomic environment lead to lower financial systemic risk.
Third, the article learn about the macroprudential supervision from both cross-sectionaldimensions and time dimension of macroprudential, such as identify systemically importantfinancial institutions, discuss the counter-cyclical regulatory tools and applicability. Quantitativeanalysis the systemically important institutions with systemically important index SII and collateraldamage index CDI, the results show the SII of China's banking institutions systemically importantexplanatory power significantly weaker than the CDI, the collateral damage index more in line with actual market performance in China, financial significant positive correlation between the size ofthe institutions of systemic importance to their size, BOC, ABC, ICBC, CCB, BOCM in thefinancial system occupy a more important position in our Financial Network, their impact on thestability of the financial system was significantly higher than other small and medium-sizedcommercial banks. From the study of Counter-cyclical regulatory tools we found that there issignificant inertia of China`s capital conservation buffer strategy, return on assets does notsignificantly affect the size of the buffer capital, fluctuations in the economy and the provision ofbuffer capital has a strong positive correlation between capital adequacy ratio of the change in theeffectiveness of macroeconomic fluctuations zoom. It`s the real-time China take its counter-cyclicalregulatory with the advanced and techniques regulatory models from foreign country, but still facesmany challenges in the implementation of regulatory measures on the economy cycle stage ofjudgment, which has an important impact on the counter-cyclical regulatory tools.
Finally, we discuss the coordination between the macroprudential supervision and monetarypolicy in achieving financial stability, the goal of the process of interaction were analyzed usingdynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to simulate the empirical results show that when theeconomic fluctuations caused by supply shocks, macroprudential supervision and monetary policythere is a conflict, the performance of macroprudential supervision is concerned only with thefinancial stability exacerbate macroeconomic fluctuations; when economic fluctuations caused bythe financial shocks or real estate impact of macroprudential supervision and monetary policy canbe effective coordination and macroprudential The regulatory perform better than the monetarypolicy, monetary policy due to the need to take into account the financial stability, the effect of theimplementation of its policy objectives affected the performance of larger fluctuations in theinflation rate. From the macro-economic level, the macroprudential supervision is to reduce thefinancial shocks and special impact on the overall economic impact tool, it is not as a replacementof the monetary policy, the implementation of macroprudential measures need to be very cautious,in general, period of improper use of macroprudential supervision of the economic environmentdamage is much larger than help. In addition, the article at the end of the establishment ofmacroprudential regulatory framework in line with China's national conditions further reflection,combined with empirical conclusions and the objective of the country's financial market designrecommendations on the improvement of existing regulatory policies and regulatory tools.
引文
[1]巴曙松,高江健.基于指标法评估中国系统重要性银行[J].财经问题研究,2012(9):48-56.
[2]巴曙松等.从微观审慎到宏观审慎：危机下的银行监管启示[J].风险管理,2010(5):83-89.
[3]陈华,伍志文.银行体系脆弱性：理论及基于中国的实证分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2004(9):120-135.
[4]陈静.宏观审慎视角下的系统性金融风险评估研究[J].金融监管,2012(5):64-67.
[5]陈德球.政府治理、控制权结构与投资决策[J].金融研究,2012(3):124-138.
[6]陈雨露,马勇.宏观审慎监管：目标、工具与相关制度安排[J].经济理论与经济管理,2012(3):5-15.
[7]范小云等.我国金融机构的系统性风险贡献测度与监管——基于边际风险贡献与杠杆率的研究[J].南开经济研究,2011(4):3-20.
[8]高志勇.系统性风险与宏观审慎监管——基于美国银行业的实证研究[J].财经理论与实践,2010(5):12-18.
[9]何德旭等.美国金融监管制度改革的新趋势及启示[J].上海金融,2011(1):5-9.
[10]黄宪,熊启跃.银行资本缓冲、信贷行为与宏观经济波动——来自中国银行业的经验证据[J].国际金融研究,2013(1):52-65.
[11]黄亭亭.宏观审慎监管：原理、工具及应用难点[J].中国金融,2010(12):40-41.
[12]贾彦东.金融机构的系统重要性分析[J].金融研究,2011(10):17-33.
[13]江春,许立成.金融监管与金融发展：理论框架与实证检验[J].金融研究,2005(4):79-88.
[14]李成,徐永前.“后金融危机时代”我国金融监管体制的完善[J].南京审计学院学报,2011(1):21-26.
[15]李文泓,吴祖鸿.系统重要性金融机构监管：目标和政策框架[J].银行业监管,2011(3):45-47.
[16]李文泓.关于宏观审慎监管框架下逆周期政策的探讨[J].金融研究,2009(7):7-24.
[17]刘斌.资本充足率对我国贷款和经济影响的实证研究[J].金融研究,2005(11):18-30.
[18]刘广伟.金融危机、宏观审慎管理框架与中央银行的独立性[J].金融经济,2011(5):44-46.
[19]刘仁伍.构建宏观审慎管理新体系[J].中国金融,2010(13):37-39.
[20]马君潞等.中国银行间市场双边传染的风险估测及其系统性特征分析[J].经济研究,2007(1):68-78.
[21]毛奉君.系统重要性金融机构监管问题研究[J].国际金融研究,2011(9):78-84.
[22]赛博塔.宏观审慎政策的角色[J].金融发展研究,2010(5):9-14.
[23]沈坤荣,李莉.银行监管：防范危机还是促进发展？——基于跨国数据的实证研究及其对中国的启示[J].管理世界,2005(10):6-10.
[24]施华强.国有银行账面不良贷款、调整因素和严重程度：1994-2004[J].金融研究,2005(12):25-39.
[25]史建平,高宇.宏观审慎监管理论研究综述[J].国际金融研究,2011(8):66-74.
[26]孙连友.商业银行亲周期性与信用风险计量[J].上海金融,2005(3):28-30.
[27]王伟,李海平.中央银行在我国银行业宏观审慎监管体系中的角色研究[J].上海金融,2012(3):66-69.
[28]王海全,郭斯华.影子银行、货币政策传导与金融风险防控[J].金融与经济,2012(12):61-64.
[29]王靖国.顺周期行为机制下的系统性金融风险：理论与实证分析[D].北京:财政部财政科学研究所,2011.
[30]王兆旭.宏观审慎框架下货币政策与金融稳定的权衡及选择[J].金融与经济,2011(7):57-62.
[31]王紫薇,陈一稀.刍议我国宏观审慎管理框架下的货币政策体系优化[J].货币银行,2011(1):21-25.
[32]吴晓辉,吕炜.关于上市公司新型业绩考核体系的构想[J].中国保险,2004(11):61-64.
[33]夏斌.宏观审慎管理：框架及其完善[J].中国金融,2010(22):30-32.
[34]谢平,邹传伟.金融危机后有关金融监管改革的理论综述[J].金融研究,2010(2):1-17.
[35]徐超.系统重要性金融机构识别方法综述[J].国际金融研究,2011(11):57-64.
[36]徐根旺.发展中国家参与WTO争端解决机制的有效性及其对中国的启示[J].2005(6):71-75.
[37]徐明东,陈学彬.货币环境、资本充足率与商业银行风险承担[J].金融研究,2012(7):48-62.
[38]杨雨等.基于广义矩估计的商业银行资本亲周期性特征研究[J].中央财经大学学报,2010(8):39-43.
[39]张伟.当代美国金融监管制度实施效果的实证研究[J].国际金融研究,2012(7):39-48.
[40]张建华,贾彦东.宏观审慎政策的理论与实践进展[J].金融研究,2012(1):20-35.
[41]张世林.投资者保护、金融发展与经济增长[J].金融监管研究,2012(4):9-22.
[42]张晓朴.系统性金融风险研究:演进、成因与监管[J].国际金融研究,2010(7):58-67.
[43]张筱峰等.中国银行体系脆弱性的测度与实证研究[J].财经理论与实践,2008(1):31-35.
[44]张亦春,胡晓.宏观审慎视角下的最优货币政策框架[J].金融研究,2010(5):30-40.
[45]赵进文,韦文彬.基于MES测度我国银行业系统性风险[J].金融监管研究,2012(8):28-40.
[46]中国人民银行金融稳定分析小组.中国金融稳定报告（2012）[C].北京:中国金融出版社,2012.
[47]周小川.关于改变宏观和微观顺周期性的进一步探讨[EB/OL].新华网,2009-03-26.
[48]周小川.金融政策对金融危机的响应——宏观审慎政策框架的形成背景、内在逻辑和主要内容[J].金融研究,2011(1):1-14.
[49]周小川.五大国有银行都是系统重要性银行[N].华尔街日报(中文版),2011-1-4.
[50]朱小川.宏观审慎监管的国际趋势及对我国的启示[J].金融监管,2010(3):35-37.
[51]朱元倩.顺周期性下的银行风险管理与监管[D].合肥:中国科学技术大学,2010.
[52] ACHARYA V V. A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation [J].Journal of Financial Stability,2009,5(3):224-255.
[53] ACHARYA V, ENGLE R, RICHARDSON M. Capital Shortfall: A New Approach toRanking and Regulating Systemic Risks [J]. The American Economic Review,2012,102(3):59-64.
[54] ADRIAN T, BRUNNERMEIER M K. CoVaR [R]. National Bureau of Economic Research,2011.
[55] ADRIAN T, BRUNNERMEIER M K. CoVar: A Method for Macroprudential Regulation[J]. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report,2009,348.
[56] ADRIAN T, SHIN H S. Liquidity and Leverage [J]. Journal of Financial Intermediation,2010,19(3):418-437.
[57] AKERLOF G A, SHILLER R J. Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives theEconomy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism [M]. Campus,2010.
[58] ALESSANDRI P, GAI P, KAPADIA S, et al. Towards a Framework for QuantifyingSystemic Stability [J]. International Journal of Central Banking,2009,5(3):47-81.
[59] ANGELONI I, FAIA E. A Tale of Two Policies: Prudential Regulation and MonetaryPolicy with Fragile Banks [R]. Kiel Working Paper,2009.
[60] ASPACHS O, GOODHART C, SEGOVIANO M, et al. Searching for a Metric forFinancial Stability [J]. Special Paper-Lse Financial Markets Group,2006,167.
[61] AYUSO J, PEREZ D, SAURINA J. Are Capital Buffers Pro-cyclical?[M]. BaselCommittee on Banking Supervision,2002.
[62] BALOGH P. Macro Prudential Supervision Tools in the European Banking System [J].Procedia Economics and Finance,2012,3:642-647.
[63] BANERJEE S. Macro Prudential Supervision and the Financial Crisis of2007: the Aegisof the Central Banks [J]. Available at SSRN1827088,2011.
[64] BARBERIS N, THALER R. A Survey of Behavioral Finance [J]. Handbook of theEconomics of Finance,2003,1:1053-1128.
[65] BARRELL R, DAVIS E P, KARIM D, et al. Bank Regulation, Property Prices and EarlyWarning Systems for Banking Crises in OECD Countries[J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,2010,34(9):2255-2264.
[66] BARTH J R, CAPRIO G, LEVINE R. The Regulation and Supervision of Banks Aroundthe World: A New Database [M]. World Bank Publications,2001.
[67] BARTHOLOMEW P F, GUP B. A Survey of Bank Failures in Non-US G-10CountriesSince1980[J]. Research in International Banking and Finance,1999,14:45-88.
[68] BCBS. The Policy Implications of Transmission Channels Between the Financial Systemand the Real Economy [R]. Working Paper,2012,5.
[69] BEAN C, PAUSTIAN M, PENALVER A, et al. Monetary Policy After the Fall [J].Macroeconomic Challenges: The Decade Ahead,2010:26-28.
[70] BENIGNO G, CHEN H, OTROK C, et al. Financial Crises and Macroprudential Policies[J]. Journal of International Economics,2013,89(2):453-470.
[71] BERNANKE B S, LOWN C S, FRIEDMAN B M. The Credit Crunch [J]. BrookingsPapers on Economic Activity,1991(2):205-247.
[72] BERTRAND M, MULLAINATHAN S. Do People Mean What They Say? Implications forSubjective Survey Data [J]. The American Economic Review,2001,91(2):67-72.
[73] BIS. The Financial Stability Implications of Increased Capital Flows for Emerging MarketEconomies [J]. BIS Papers,2008,44:11-44.
[74] BORIO C E, WHITE W. Whither Monetary Policy and Financial Stability [J]. TheImplications of Evolving Policy RegimesV BIS Working Paper,2004(147).
[75] BORIO C, DREHMANN M. Assessing the Risk of Banking Crises–revisited [J]. BISQuarterly Review,2009,3.
[76] BORIO C, FURFINE C, LOWE P. Procyclicality of the Financial System and FinancialStability: Issues and Policy Options [J]. BIS Papers,2001,1:1-57.
[77] BORIO C, SHIM I. What Can (Macro-) Prudential Policy Do to Support Monetary Policy?
[R]. Bank for International Settlements,2007.
[78] BORIO C. Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial Supervision andRegulation?[J]. CES ifo Economic Studies,2003,49(2):181-215.
[79] BRAVE S, BUTTERS A. Diagnosing the Financial System: Financial Conditions andFinancial Stress [J]. International Journal of Central Banking,2012,8:191-239.
[80] BROWNLESS C, ENGLE R. Volatility, Correlation and Tails for Systemic RiskMeasurement [J]. Available at SSRN1611229,2011.
[81] BRUNNERMEIER M K, GOODHART C A E, PERSAUD A, et al. The FundamentalPrinciples of Financial Regulation [R]. Conference Draft,2009.
[82] CAPRIO JR G, KLINGEBIEL D. Episodes of Systemic and Borderline Financial Crises.World Bank, Washington [EB/OL]. DC Unpublished, http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php,2003.
[83] CARUANA J. Financial and Real Sector Interactions: Enter the Sovereign Ex Machine [C]//Speech Delivered at the CAFRAL/BIS Conference on “Financial sector regulation forgrowth, equity and stability in the post-crisis world”, Mumbai.2011,15.
[84] CARUANA J. Why Central Bank Balance Sheets Matter [C]//Keynote Address at the Bankof Thailand-BIS Research Conference entitled “Central bank balance sheets in Asia and thePacific: the policy challenges ahead”, Chiang Mai, Thailand.2011:12-13.
[85] CATARINEU-RABELL E, JACKSON P, TSOMOCOS D P. Procyclicality and the NewBasel Accord-banks’ Choice of Loan Rating System [J]. Economic Theory,2005,26(3):537-557.
[86] CHORTAREAS G E, GIRARDONE C, VENTOURI A. Financial Freedom and BankEfficiency: Evidence from the European Union [J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,2013,37(4):1223-1231.
[87] CHRISTIANO L, MOTTO R, ROSTAGNO M. Financial Factors in Business Cycles [J].Unpublished, Northwestern University,2007.
[88] CGFS. Macroprudential Instruments and Frameworks: a Stocktaking of Issues andExperiences [J]. CGFS Papers No.38,2010.
[89] CROCKETT A. Market Discipline and Financial Stability[J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,2002,26(5):977-987.
[90] CROCKETT A. Marrying the Micro-and Macroprudential Dimensions of FinancialStability [R]. BIS Speeches,2000,21.
[91] CURDIA V, WOODFORD M. Credit Spreads and Monetary Policy [J]. Journal of Money,Credit and Banking,2010,42(s1):3-35.
[92] DAVIES H, GREEN D. Global Financial Regulation: The Essential Guide (Now with aRevised Introduction)[M]. Polity,2008.
[93] DE NICOLO G, KWAST M L. Systemic Risk and Financial Consolidation: Are TheyRelated?[J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,2002,26(5):861-880.
[94] DEMIRG A. Inside the Crisis: An Empirical Analysis of Banking Systems in Distress [J].Journal of International Money and Finance,2006,25(5):702-718.
[95] DEMPSTER G, WELLS J M, WILLS D T. A Common‐Features Analysis of Amsterdamand London Financial Markets During the Eighteenth Century [J]. Economic inquiry,2000,38(1):19-33.
[96] DIXIT A, LAMBERTINI L. Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary andFiscal Policies [J]. American Economic Review,2003:1522-1542.
[97] DJANKOV S, MCLIESH C, SHLEIFER A. Private Credit in129Countries [J]. Journal ofFinancial Economics,2007,84(2):299-329.
[98] ECB. Recent Advances in Modeling Systemic Risk Using Network Analysis [EB/OL].http://www.ecb.europa.EU,2010a.
[99] EHRMANN M, SMETS F. Uncertain Potential Output: Implications for Monetary Policy[J]. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,2003,27(9):1611-1638.
[100] ENGLAND B O F. The Role of Macroprudential Policy [J]. Bank of England DiscussionPaper,2009.
[101] ENRIA A, CAPPOELLO L, DIERICK F, et al. Fair Value Accounting and FinancialStability [J].2005.
[102] ESTRELLA A. The Cyclical Behavior of Optimal Bank Capital, Forthcoming [J]. Journalof Banking and Finance,2004,28(6):1469-1498.
[103] EZEOHA A E. Banking Consolidation, Credit Crisis and Asset Quality in a FragileBanking System: Some Evidence from Nigerian Data [J]. Journal of Financial Regulationand Compliance,2011,19(1):33-44.
[104] FERNANDEZ D L S, GARCIA H A. The Spanish Approach. Dynamic Provisioning andOther Tools [R]. BBVA Bank, Economic Research Department,2009.
[105] FOLARDO A. Monetary Policy and Asset Price Bubbles: Calibrating the Monetary PolicyTrade-offs [J]. BIS Working Paper No.155,2004.
[106] FSA, Macroprudential Policy Tools and Frameworks Updata to G20Finance Ministers andCentral Bank Governors [R]. http://www.financialstabilityborad.org/publications/r_1103,2011.
[107] FRANKE J A, ROSE A K. Is EMU Justifiable Expost than Exante [J]. European EconomicReview,1997,41(3-5):753-760.
[108] FRIEDMAN M, SCHWARTZ A. A Monetary History of United States,1867-1960[J].Princeton University Press,1963.
[109] FUNKE M, PAETZ M. A DSGE-Based Assessment of Nonlinear Loan-to-Value Policies:Evidence from Hong Kong [J]. BOFIT Discussion Paper No.11,2012.
[110] G-20WORKING GROUP. Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency:Final Report [R].2009,3.
[111] GALATI G, MOESSNER R. Macroprudential Policy-a Literature Review [J]. Journal ofEconomic Surveys,2012.
[112] GAUTHIER C, LEHAR A, SOUISSI M. Macroprudential Regulation and SystemicCapital Requirements [R]. Bank of Canada, Working Paper,2010.
[113] GERALI A, NERI S, SESSA L, et al. Credit and Banking in a DSGE Model of the EuroArea [J]. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,2010,42(s1):107-141.
[114] GERTLER M, KARADI P. A Model of Unconventional Monetary Policy [J]. New YorkUniversity Working Paper,2009.
[115] GLOCKER C, TOWBIN P. Reserve Requirements for Price and Financial Stability: Whenare They Effective?[M]. Banque de France,2012.
[116] GONZALEZ-HERMOSILLO B. Determinants of Ex-ante Banking System Distress: AMacro-micro Empirical Exploration of Some Recent Episodes [M]. InternationalMonetary Fund,1999.
[117] GOODHART C A E. Some New Directions for Financial Stability?[M]. Bank forInternational Settlements,2004.
[118] GOODHART C, SCHOENMAKER D. Institutional Separation Between Supervisory andMonetary Agencies [J]. Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia,1992,51(9/12):353-439.
[119] HALDANE A G. Rethinking the Financial Network [J]. Speech delivered at the FinancialStudent Association, Amsterdam,2009,4.
[120] HANCOCK D, PASSMORE W. Financial Stability and the Capital Adequacy of Large USBanking Organizations: A VAR in VaR Approach [R]. Board of Governors of the FederalReserve System, Working Paper,2008.
[121] HANSON S, KASHYAP A, STEIN J. A Macroprudential Approach to FinancialRegulation [J]. Chicago Booth, Research Paper,2010(10-29).
[122] HOLMSTROM B, TIROLE J. Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the RealSector [J]. The Quarterly Journal of economics,1997,112(3):663-691.
[123] HOSHI T. Financial Regulation: Lessons from the Recent Financial Crises [J]. Journal ofEconomic Literature,2011,49(1):120-128.
[124] HOWITT P. What Have Central Bankers Learned from Modern Macroeconomic Theory?[J]. Journal of macroeconomics,2012,34(1):11-22.
[125] HUANG X, ZHOU H, ZHU H. Assessing the Systemic Risk of a Heterogeneous Portfolioof Banks During the Recent Financial Crisis [J]. Journal of Financial Stability,2012,8(3):193-205.
[126] HUANG X. Statistics of Bivariate Extreme Values [M]. Thesis Publishers,1991.
[127] ILBAS P. Revealing the Preferences of the US Federal Reserve [J]. Journal of AppliedEconometrics,2012,27(3):440-473.
[128] ILLING M, LIU Y. An Index of Financial Stress for Canada [M]. Bank of Canada,2003.
[129] IMF, World Economic Outlook (WEO): Crisis and Recovery [R].2009．
[130] JAPPELLI T, PAGANO M. Information Sharing in Credit Markets: A Survey [R]. CSEFWorking Paper,2000.
[131] JEANNENEY S G, HUA P, LIANG Z. Financial Development. Economic Efficiency andProductivity Growth: Evidence from China [J]. Developing Economies,2006(1):27-52.
[132] JIMENEZ G, SALAS V, SAURINA J. Determinants of Collateral [J]. Journal of FinancialEconomics,2006,81(2):255-281.
[133] KAMINSKY G, LIZONDO S, REINHART C M. Leading Indicators of Currency Crises[J]. Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund,1998:1-48.
[134] KANNAN P, RABANAL P, SCOTT A. Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Rules in aModel with House Price Booms [J]. IMF Working Papers,2009:1-36.
[135] KASHYAP A K, STEIN J C. Cyclical Implications of the Basel II Capital Standards [J].Economic Perspectives-Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,2004,28(1):18-33.
[136] KINDLEBERGER C P, ALIBER R. MANIAS, Panics and Crashes: A History of FinancialCrisis New York [J].2000.
[137] LA PORTA T, DI SCIOSCIO V, CANINI R, et al. Analisi Costo-Efficacia A ValutazioneDella Tecnologia in Radiologia [J]. Ospedali Della Vita,2006,18:1-11.
[138] LELYVELD I V, SCHILDER A. Risk in Financial Conglomerate: Measurement andSupervision [J]. Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services,2003,6:195-224.
[139] LOPEZ DE SILANES F, LA PORTA R, SHLEIFER A, et al. Law and Finance [J]. Journalof Political Economy,1998,106:1113-1155.
[140] MAS-COLLEL A, WHINSTON M D, GREEN J. Microeconomic Theory [J].1995.
[141] MELECKY M, BUNCIC D. Macroprudential Stress Testing of Credit Risk: A PracticalApproach for Policy Makers [J]. Policy Research Working Paper,2012.
[142] MERTON R C. Continuous-Time Finance [M].1990.
[143] MISHKIN F S. Financial Stability and the Macroeconomy [M]. Central Bank of Iceland,Economics Department,2000.
[144] MONTORO C, TOVAR C. Macroprudential Tools: Assessing the Implications of ReserveRequirements in a DSGE Model [J]. Yay mlanmam al ma,2010.
[145] MOSHIRIAN F. The Global Financial Crisis and the Evolution of Markets, Institutionsand Regulation [J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,2011,35(3):502-511.
[146] MULLER J. Interbank Credit Lines as a Channel of Contagion [J]. Journal of FinancialServices Research,2006,29(1):37-60.
[147] MULLER M A. SWOT Analysis of Bank Austria Creditanstalt Russia [J].2003.
[148] NGUYEN T. A Macroprudential Perspective of Financial Regulation [J]. Journal ofFinancial Regulation and Compliance,2011,19(3):289-297.
[149] OBSTFELD M. Financial Flows, Financial Crises and Global Imbalances [J]. Journal ofInternational Money and Finance,2012,31(3):469-480.
[150] OSTRY J D, GHOSH A R, CHAMON M, et al. Tools for Managing Financial-StabilityRisks from Capital Inflows [J]. Journal of International Economics,2012,88(2):407-421.
[151] OZLALE U. Price Stability vs. Output Stability: Tales of Federal Reserve Administrations[J]. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,2003,27(9):1595-1610.
[152] PEETERS R. Quantifying Systemic Importance [J].2011.
[153] PEROTTI E, SUAREZ J. Insurance Against Systemic Crises [J]. Equilibri,2009,13(3):391-396.
[154] PETIT M L. Fiscal and Monetary Policy Co-ordination: A Differential Game Approach [J].Journal of Applied Econometrics,1989,4(2):161-179.
[155] POOLE W. Rules-of-Thumb for Guiding Monetary Policy [J]. REVIEW,2008,1(4):447-97.
[156] SAMUELSON P A. Altruism as a Problem Involving Group Versus Individual Selection inEconomics and Biology [J]. The American Economic Review,1993,83(2):143-148.
[157] SAURINA J, TRUCHARTE C. An Assessment of Basel II Procyclicality in MortgagePortfolios [J]. Journal of Financial Services Research,2007,32(1-2):81-101.
[158] SAURINA J. Dynamic Provisioning: The Experience of Spain [R]. Crisis Response Note,2009,7.
[159] SCAILLET O. Nonparametric Estimation and Sensitivity Analysis of Expected Shortfall[J]. Mathematical Finance,2004,14(1):115-129.
[160] SCAILLET O. Nonparametric Estimation of Conditional Expected Shortfall [R].International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering,2004.
[161] SCHWERTER S. Basel III's Ability to Mitigate Systemic Risk [J]. Journal of FinancialRegulation and Compliance,2011,19(4):337-354.
[162] SEGOVIANO M, LOWE P. Internal Ratings, the Business Cycle and CapitalRequirements: Some Evidence from an Emerging Market Economy [J]. BIS WorkingPaper No.117,2002.
[163] SEGOVIANO M, GOODHART C. Banking Stability Measures [J]. IMF Working Papers,2009:1-54.
[164] SHARPE S A. Financial Market Imperfections, Firm Leverage, and the Cyclicality ofEmployment [J]. The American Economic Review,1994,84(4):1060-1074.
[165] SHIN H. Financial Intermediation and the Post-Crisis Financial System [J]. BIS WorkingPaper No.304,2010.
[166] SHLEIFER A, VISHNY R. Stock Market Driven Acquisitions [J]. NBER Working PaperNo. W8439,2001.
[167] SHRIEVES R E, DAHL D. Discretionary Accounting and the Behavior of Japanese BanksUnder Financial Duress [J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,2003,27(7):1219-1243.
[168] SIREGAR R. Macroprudential Approaches to Banking Regulation: Perspectives ofSelected Asian Central Banks [R]. ADBI Working Paper Series,2011.
[169] SMETS F, WOUTERS R. Comparing Shocks and Frictions in US and Euro Area BusinessCycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach [J]. Journal of Applied Econometrics,2005,20(2):161-183.
[170] STOLZ S, WEDOW M. Banks' Regulatory Capital Buffer and the Business Cycle:Evidence for German Savings and Cooperative Banks [R]. Discussion Paper, Series2:Banking and Financial Supervision,2005.
[171] SUMMER M. Banking Regulation and Systemic Risk [J]. Open Economies Review,2003,14(1):43-70.
[172] TANAKA M. How Do Bank Capital and Capital Adequacy Regulation Affect theMonetary Rransmission Mechanism?[J]. CESifo Working Paper Series No.799,2002.
[173] TARASHEV N, BORIO C, TSATSARONIS K. The Systemic Importance of FinancialInstitutions [J]. BIS Quarterly Review,2009,9:75-87.
[174] TARASHEV N, DREHMANN M. Measuring the Systemic Importance of InterconnectedBanks [R]. Bank for International Settlements,2011.
[175] UPPER C, WERNER T, BUNDESBANK D. How Resilient are Financial Markets toStress? Bund Futures and Bonds During the1998Turbulence [J]. BIS Papers,2002,12:110-123.
[176] UPPER C. Using Counterfactual Simulations to Assess the Danger of Contagion inInterbank Markets [J]. BIS Working Paper No.234,2007.
[177] WANG P, WEN Y. Speculative Bubbles and Financial Crises [J]. American EconomicJournal: Macroeconomics,2012,4(3):184-221.
[178] WATANABE W. Prudential Regulation and the“Credit Crunch”: Evidence from Japan [J].Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,2007,39(2-3):639-665.
[179] WOODFORD M. Financial Intermediation and Macroeconomic Analysis [J]. The Journalof Economic Perspectives,2010,24(4):21-44.
[180] WOODFORD M. Optimal Interest-Rate Smoothing [J]. The Review of Economic Studies,2003,70(4):861-886.
[181] YAN M, HALL M J B, TURNER P. A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Basel III: Some Evidencefrom the UK [J]. International Review of Financial Analysis,2012,25:73-82.
[182] ZHOU C. Are Banks Too Big to Fail?[R]. DNB Working Paper,2011, No.232.
[2]巴曙松等.从微观审慎到宏观审慎：危机下的银行监管启示[J].风险管理,2010(5):83-89.
[3]陈华,伍志文.银行体系脆弱性：理论及基于中国的实证分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2004(9):120-135.
[4]陈静.宏观审慎视角下的系统性金融风险评估研究[J].金融监管,2012(5):64-67.
[5]陈德球.政府治理、控制权结构与投资决策[J].金融研究,2012(3):124-138.
[6]陈雨露,马勇.宏观审慎监管：目标、工具与相关制度安排[J].经济理论与经济管理,2012(3):5-15.
[7]范小云等.我国金融机构的系统性风险贡献测度与监管——基于边际风险贡献与杠杆率的研究[J].南开经济研究,2011(4):3-20.
[8]高志勇.系统性风险与宏观审慎监管——基于美国银行业的实证研究[J].财经理论与实践,2010(5):12-18.
[9]何德旭等.美国金融监管制度改革的新趋势及启示[J].上海金融,2011(1):5-9.
[10]黄宪,熊启跃.银行资本缓冲、信贷行为与宏观经济波动——来自中国银行业的经验证据[J].国际金融研究,2013(1):52-65.
[11]黄亭亭.宏观审慎监管：原理、工具及应用难点[J].中国金融,2010(12):40-41.
[12]贾彦东.金融机构的系统重要性分析[J].金融研究,2011(10):17-33.
[13]江春,许立成.金融监管与金融发展：理论框架与实证检验[J].金融研究,2005(4):79-88.
[14]李成,徐永前.“后金融危机时代”我国金融监管体制的完善[J].南京审计学院学报,2011(1):21-26.
[15]李文泓,吴祖鸿.系统重要性金融机构监管：目标和政策框架[J].银行业监管,2011(3):45-47.
[16]李文泓.关于宏观审慎监管框架下逆周期政策的探讨[J].金融研究,2009(7):7-24.
[17]刘斌.资本充足率对我国贷款和经济影响的实证研究[J].金融研究,2005(11):18-30.
[18]刘广伟.金融危机、宏观审慎管理框架与中央银行的独立性[J].金融经济,2011(5):44-46.
[19]刘仁伍.构建宏观审慎管理新体系[J].中国金融,2010(13):37-39.
[20]马君潞等.中国银行间市场双边传染的风险估测及其系统性特征分析[J].经济研究,2007(1):68-78.
[21]毛奉君.系统重要性金融机构监管问题研究[J].国际金融研究,2011(9):78-84.
[22]赛博塔.宏观审慎政策的角色[J].金融发展研究,2010(5):9-14.
[23]沈坤荣,李莉.银行监管：防范危机还是促进发展？——基于跨国数据的实证研究及其对中国的启示[J].管理世界,2005(10):6-10.
[24]施华强.国有银行账面不良贷款、调整因素和严重程度：1994-2004[J].金融研究,2005(12):25-39.
[25]史建平,高宇.宏观审慎监管理论研究综述[J].国际金融研究,2011(8):66-74.
[26]孙连友.商业银行亲周期性与信用风险计量[J].上海金融,2005(3):28-30.
[27]王伟,李海平.中央银行在我国银行业宏观审慎监管体系中的角色研究[J].上海金融,2012(3):66-69.
[28]王海全,郭斯华.影子银行、货币政策传导与金融风险防控[J].金融与经济,2012(12):61-64.
[29]王靖国.顺周期行为机制下的系统性金融风险：理论与实证分析[D].北京:财政部财政科学研究所,2011.
[30]王兆旭.宏观审慎框架下货币政策与金融稳定的权衡及选择[J].金融与经济,2011(7):57-62.
[31]王紫薇,陈一稀.刍议我国宏观审慎管理框架下的货币政策体系优化[J].货币银行,2011(1):21-25.
[32]吴晓辉,吕炜.关于上市公司新型业绩考核体系的构想[J].中国保险,2004(11):61-64.
[33]夏斌.宏观审慎管理：框架及其完善[J].中国金融,2010(22):30-32.
[34]谢平,邹传伟.金融危机后有关金融监管改革的理论综述[J].金融研究,2010(2):1-17.
[35]徐超.系统重要性金融机构识别方法综述[J].国际金融研究,2011(11):57-64.
[36]徐根旺.发展中国家参与WTO争端解决机制的有效性及其对中国的启示[J].2005(6):71-75.
[37]徐明东,陈学彬.货币环境、资本充足率与商业银行风险承担[J].金融研究,2012(7):48-62.
[38]杨雨等.基于广义矩估计的商业银行资本亲周期性特征研究[J].中央财经大学学报,2010(8):39-43.
[39]张伟.当代美国金融监管制度实施效果的实证研究[J].国际金融研究,2012(7):39-48.
[40]张建华,贾彦东.宏观审慎政策的理论与实践进展[J].金融研究,2012(1):20-35.
[41]张世林.投资者保护、金融发展与经济增长[J].金融监管研究,2012(4):9-22.
[42]张晓朴.系统性金融风险研究:演进、成因与监管[J].国际金融研究,2010(7):58-67.
[43]张筱峰等.中国银行体系脆弱性的测度与实证研究[J].财经理论与实践,2008(1):31-35.
[44]张亦春,胡晓.宏观审慎视角下的最优货币政策框架[J].金融研究,2010(5):30-40.
[45]赵进文,韦文彬.基于MES测度我国银行业系统性风险[J].金融监管研究,2012(8):28-40.
[46]中国人民银行金融稳定分析小组.中国金融稳定报告（2012）[C].北京:中国金融出版社,2012.
[47]周小川.关于改变宏观和微观顺周期性的进一步探讨[EB/OL].新华网,2009-03-26.
[48]周小川.金融政策对金融危机的响应——宏观审慎政策框架的形成背景、内在逻辑和主要内容[J].金融研究,2011(1):1-14.
[49]周小川.五大国有银行都是系统重要性银行[N].华尔街日报(中文版),2011-1-4.
[50]朱小川.宏观审慎监管的国际趋势及对我国的启示[J].金融监管,2010(3):35-37.
[51]朱元倩.顺周期性下的银行风险管理与监管[D].合肥:中国科学技术大学,2010.
[52] ACHARYA V V. A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation [J].Journal of Financial Stability,2009,5(3):224-255.
[53] ACHARYA V, ENGLE R, RICHARDSON M. Capital Shortfall: A New Approach toRanking and Regulating Systemic Risks [J]. The American Economic Review,2012,102(3):59-64.
[54] ADRIAN T, BRUNNERMEIER M K. CoVaR [R]. National Bureau of Economic Research,2011.
[55] ADRIAN T, BRUNNERMEIER M K. CoVar: A Method for Macroprudential Regulation[J]. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report,2009,348.
[56] ADRIAN T, SHIN H S. Liquidity and Leverage [J]. Journal of Financial Intermediation,2010,19(3):418-437.
[57] AKERLOF G A, SHILLER R J. Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives theEconomy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism [M]. Campus,2010.
[58] ALESSANDRI P, GAI P, KAPADIA S, et al. Towards a Framework for QuantifyingSystemic Stability [J]. International Journal of Central Banking,2009,5(3):47-81.
[59] ANGELONI I, FAIA E. A Tale of Two Policies: Prudential Regulation and MonetaryPolicy with Fragile Banks [R]. Kiel Working Paper,2009.
[60] ASPACHS O, GOODHART C, SEGOVIANO M, et al. Searching for a Metric forFinancial Stability [J]. Special Paper-Lse Financial Markets Group,2006,167.
[61] AYUSO J, PEREZ D, SAURINA J. Are Capital Buffers Pro-cyclical?[M]. BaselCommittee on Banking Supervision,2002.
[62] BALOGH P. Macro Prudential Supervision Tools in the European Banking System [J].Procedia Economics and Finance,2012,3:642-647.
[63] BANERJEE S. Macro Prudential Supervision and the Financial Crisis of2007: the Aegisof the Central Banks [J]. Available at SSRN1827088,2011.
[64] BARBERIS N, THALER R. A Survey of Behavioral Finance [J]. Handbook of theEconomics of Finance,2003,1:1053-1128.
[65] BARRELL R, DAVIS E P, KARIM D, et al. Bank Regulation, Property Prices and EarlyWarning Systems for Banking Crises in OECD Countries[J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,2010,34(9):2255-2264.
[66] BARTH J R, CAPRIO G, LEVINE R. The Regulation and Supervision of Banks Aroundthe World: A New Database [M]. World Bank Publications,2001.
[67] BARTHOLOMEW P F, GUP B. A Survey of Bank Failures in Non-US G-10CountriesSince1980[J]. Research in International Banking and Finance,1999,14:45-88.
[68] BCBS. The Policy Implications of Transmission Channels Between the Financial Systemand the Real Economy [R]. Working Paper,2012,5.
[69] BEAN C, PAUSTIAN M, PENALVER A, et al. Monetary Policy After the Fall [J].Macroeconomic Challenges: The Decade Ahead,2010:26-28.
[70] BENIGNO G, CHEN H, OTROK C, et al. Financial Crises and Macroprudential Policies[J]. Journal of International Economics,2013,89(2):453-470.
[71] BERNANKE B S, LOWN C S, FRIEDMAN B M. The Credit Crunch [J]. BrookingsPapers on Economic Activity,1991(2):205-247.
[72] BERTRAND M, MULLAINATHAN S. Do People Mean What They Say? Implications forSubjective Survey Data [J]. The American Economic Review,2001,91(2):67-72.
[73] BIS. The Financial Stability Implications of Increased Capital Flows for Emerging MarketEconomies [J]. BIS Papers,2008,44:11-44.
[74] BORIO C E, WHITE W. Whither Monetary Policy and Financial Stability [J]. TheImplications of Evolving Policy RegimesV BIS Working Paper,2004(147).
[75] BORIO C, DREHMANN M. Assessing the Risk of Banking Crises–revisited [J]. BISQuarterly Review,2009,3.
[76] BORIO C, FURFINE C, LOWE P. Procyclicality of the Financial System and FinancialStability: Issues and Policy Options [J]. BIS Papers,2001,1:1-57.
[77] BORIO C, SHIM I. What Can (Macro-) Prudential Policy Do to Support Monetary Policy?
[R]. Bank for International Settlements,2007.
[78] BORIO C. Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial Supervision andRegulation?[J]. CES ifo Economic Studies,2003,49(2):181-215.
[79] BRAVE S, BUTTERS A. Diagnosing the Financial System: Financial Conditions andFinancial Stress [J]. International Journal of Central Banking,2012,8:191-239.
[80] BROWNLESS C, ENGLE R. Volatility, Correlation and Tails for Systemic RiskMeasurement [J]. Available at SSRN1611229,2011.
[81] BRUNNERMEIER M K, GOODHART C A E, PERSAUD A, et al. The FundamentalPrinciples of Financial Regulation [R]. Conference Draft,2009.
[82] CAPRIO JR G, KLINGEBIEL D. Episodes of Systemic and Borderline Financial Crises.World Bank, Washington [EB/OL]. DC Unpublished, http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php,2003.
[83] CARUANA J. Financial and Real Sector Interactions: Enter the Sovereign Ex Machine [C]//Speech Delivered at the CAFRAL/BIS Conference on “Financial sector regulation forgrowth, equity and stability in the post-crisis world”, Mumbai.2011,15.
[84] CARUANA J. Why Central Bank Balance Sheets Matter [C]//Keynote Address at the Bankof Thailand-BIS Research Conference entitled “Central bank balance sheets in Asia and thePacific: the policy challenges ahead”, Chiang Mai, Thailand.2011:12-13.
[85] CATARINEU-RABELL E, JACKSON P, TSOMOCOS D P. Procyclicality and the NewBasel Accord-banks’ Choice of Loan Rating System [J]. Economic Theory,2005,26(3):537-557.
[86] CHORTAREAS G E, GIRARDONE C, VENTOURI A. Financial Freedom and BankEfficiency: Evidence from the European Union [J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,2013,37(4):1223-1231.
[87] CHRISTIANO L, MOTTO R, ROSTAGNO M. Financial Factors in Business Cycles [J].Unpublished, Northwestern University,2007.
[88] CGFS. Macroprudential Instruments and Frameworks: a Stocktaking of Issues andExperiences [J]. CGFS Papers No.38,2010.
[89] CROCKETT A. Market Discipline and Financial Stability[J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,2002,26(5):977-987.
[90] CROCKETT A. Marrying the Micro-and Macroprudential Dimensions of FinancialStability [R]. BIS Speeches,2000,21.
[91] CURDIA V, WOODFORD M. Credit Spreads and Monetary Policy [J]. Journal of Money,Credit and Banking,2010,42(s1):3-35.
[92] DAVIES H, GREEN D. Global Financial Regulation: The Essential Guide (Now with aRevised Introduction)[M]. Polity,2008.
[93] DE NICOLO G, KWAST M L. Systemic Risk and Financial Consolidation: Are TheyRelated?[J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,2002,26(5):861-880.
[94] DEMIRG A. Inside the Crisis: An Empirical Analysis of Banking Systems in Distress [J].Journal of International Money and Finance,2006,25(5):702-718.
[95] DEMPSTER G, WELLS J M, WILLS D T. A Common‐Features Analysis of Amsterdamand London Financial Markets During the Eighteenth Century [J]. Economic inquiry,2000,38(1):19-33.
[96] DIXIT A, LAMBERTINI L. Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary andFiscal Policies [J]. American Economic Review,2003:1522-1542.
[97] DJANKOV S, MCLIESH C, SHLEIFER A. Private Credit in129Countries [J]. Journal ofFinancial Economics,2007,84(2):299-329.
[98] ECB. Recent Advances in Modeling Systemic Risk Using Network Analysis [EB/OL].http://www.ecb.europa.EU,2010a.
[99] EHRMANN M, SMETS F. Uncertain Potential Output: Implications for Monetary Policy[J]. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,2003,27(9):1611-1638.
[100] ENGLAND B O F. The Role of Macroprudential Policy [J]. Bank of England DiscussionPaper,2009.
[101] ENRIA A, CAPPOELLO L, DIERICK F, et al. Fair Value Accounting and FinancialStability [J].2005.
[102] ESTRELLA A. The Cyclical Behavior of Optimal Bank Capital, Forthcoming [J]. Journalof Banking and Finance,2004,28(6):1469-1498.
[103] EZEOHA A E. Banking Consolidation, Credit Crisis and Asset Quality in a FragileBanking System: Some Evidence from Nigerian Data [J]. Journal of Financial Regulationand Compliance,2011,19(1):33-44.
[104] FERNANDEZ D L S, GARCIA H A. The Spanish Approach. Dynamic Provisioning andOther Tools [R]. BBVA Bank, Economic Research Department,2009.
[105] FOLARDO A. Monetary Policy and Asset Price Bubbles: Calibrating the Monetary PolicyTrade-offs [J]. BIS Working Paper No.155,2004.
[106] FSA, Macroprudential Policy Tools and Frameworks Updata to G20Finance Ministers andCentral Bank Governors [R]. http://www.financialstabilityborad.org/publications/r_1103,2011.
[107] FRANKE J A, ROSE A K. Is EMU Justifiable Expost than Exante [J]. European EconomicReview,1997,41(3-5):753-760.
[108] FRIEDMAN M, SCHWARTZ A. A Monetary History of United States,1867-1960[J].Princeton University Press,1963.
[109] FUNKE M, PAETZ M. A DSGE-Based Assessment of Nonlinear Loan-to-Value Policies:Evidence from Hong Kong [J]. BOFIT Discussion Paper No.11,2012.
[110] G-20WORKING GROUP. Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency:Final Report [R].2009,3.
[111] GALATI G, MOESSNER R. Macroprudential Policy-a Literature Review [J]. Journal ofEconomic Surveys,2012.
[112] GAUTHIER C, LEHAR A, SOUISSI M. Macroprudential Regulation and SystemicCapital Requirements [R]. Bank of Canada, Working Paper,2010.
[113] GERALI A, NERI S, SESSA L, et al. Credit and Banking in a DSGE Model of the EuroArea [J]. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,2010,42(s1):107-141.
[114] GERTLER M, KARADI P. A Model of Unconventional Monetary Policy [J]. New YorkUniversity Working Paper,2009.
[115] GLOCKER C, TOWBIN P. Reserve Requirements for Price and Financial Stability: Whenare They Effective?[M]. Banque de France,2012.
[116] GONZALEZ-HERMOSILLO B. Determinants of Ex-ante Banking System Distress: AMacro-micro Empirical Exploration of Some Recent Episodes [M]. InternationalMonetary Fund,1999.
[117] GOODHART C A E. Some New Directions for Financial Stability?[M]. Bank forInternational Settlements,2004.
[118] GOODHART C, SCHOENMAKER D. Institutional Separation Between Supervisory andMonetary Agencies [J]. Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia,1992,51(9/12):353-439.
[119] HALDANE A G. Rethinking the Financial Network [J]. Speech delivered at the FinancialStudent Association, Amsterdam,2009,4.
[120] HANCOCK D, PASSMORE W. Financial Stability and the Capital Adequacy of Large USBanking Organizations: A VAR in VaR Approach [R]. Board of Governors of the FederalReserve System, Working Paper,2008.
[121] HANSON S, KASHYAP A, STEIN J. A Macroprudential Approach to FinancialRegulation [J]. Chicago Booth, Research Paper,2010(10-29).
[122] HOLMSTROM B, TIROLE J. Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the RealSector [J]. The Quarterly Journal of economics,1997,112(3):663-691.
[123] HOSHI T. Financial Regulation: Lessons from the Recent Financial Crises [J]. Journal ofEconomic Literature,2011,49(1):120-128.
[124] HOWITT P. What Have Central Bankers Learned from Modern Macroeconomic Theory?[J]. Journal of macroeconomics,2012,34(1):11-22.
[125] HUANG X, ZHOU H, ZHU H. Assessing the Systemic Risk of a Heterogeneous Portfolioof Banks During the Recent Financial Crisis [J]. Journal of Financial Stability,2012,8(3):193-205.
[126] HUANG X. Statistics of Bivariate Extreme Values [M]. Thesis Publishers,1991.
[127] ILBAS P. Revealing the Preferences of the US Federal Reserve [J]. Journal of AppliedEconometrics,2012,27(3):440-473.
[128] ILLING M, LIU Y. An Index of Financial Stress for Canada [M]. Bank of Canada,2003.
[129] IMF, World Economic Outlook (WEO): Crisis and Recovery [R].2009．
[130] JAPPELLI T, PAGANO M. Information Sharing in Credit Markets: A Survey [R]. CSEFWorking Paper,2000.
[131] JEANNENEY S G, HUA P, LIANG Z. Financial Development. Economic Efficiency andProductivity Growth: Evidence from China [J]. Developing Economies,2006(1):27-52.
[132] JIMENEZ G, SALAS V, SAURINA J. Determinants of Collateral [J]. Journal of FinancialEconomics,2006,81(2):255-281.
[133] KAMINSKY G, LIZONDO S, REINHART C M. Leading Indicators of Currency Crises[J]. Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund,1998:1-48.
[134] KANNAN P, RABANAL P, SCOTT A. Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Rules in aModel with House Price Booms [J]. IMF Working Papers,2009:1-36.
[135] KASHYAP A K, STEIN J C. Cyclical Implications of the Basel II Capital Standards [J].Economic Perspectives-Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,2004,28(1):18-33.
[136] KINDLEBERGER C P, ALIBER R. MANIAS, Panics and Crashes: A History of FinancialCrisis New York [J].2000.
[137] LA PORTA T, DI SCIOSCIO V, CANINI R, et al. Analisi Costo-Efficacia A ValutazioneDella Tecnologia in Radiologia [J]. Ospedali Della Vita,2006,18:1-11.
[138] LELYVELD I V, SCHILDER A. Risk in Financial Conglomerate: Measurement andSupervision [J]. Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services,2003,6:195-224.
[139] LOPEZ DE SILANES F, LA PORTA R, SHLEIFER A, et al. Law and Finance [J]. Journalof Political Economy,1998,106:1113-1155.
[140] MAS-COLLEL A, WHINSTON M D, GREEN J. Microeconomic Theory [J].1995.
[141] MELECKY M, BUNCIC D. Macroprudential Stress Testing of Credit Risk: A PracticalApproach for Policy Makers [J]. Policy Research Working Paper,2012.
[142] MERTON R C. Continuous-Time Finance [M].1990.
[143] MISHKIN F S. Financial Stability and the Macroeconomy [M]. Central Bank of Iceland,Economics Department,2000.
[144] MONTORO C, TOVAR C. Macroprudential Tools: Assessing the Implications of ReserveRequirements in a DSGE Model [J]. Yay mlanmam al ma,2010.
[145] MOSHIRIAN F. The Global Financial Crisis and the Evolution of Markets, Institutionsand Regulation [J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,2011,35(3):502-511.
[146] MULLER J. Interbank Credit Lines as a Channel of Contagion [J]. Journal of FinancialServices Research,2006,29(1):37-60.
[147] MULLER M A. SWOT Analysis of Bank Austria Creditanstalt Russia [J].2003.
[148] NGUYEN T. A Macroprudential Perspective of Financial Regulation [J]. Journal ofFinancial Regulation and Compliance,2011,19(3):289-297.
[149] OBSTFELD M. Financial Flows, Financial Crises and Global Imbalances [J]. Journal ofInternational Money and Finance,2012,31(3):469-480.
[150] OSTRY J D, GHOSH A R, CHAMON M, et al. Tools for Managing Financial-StabilityRisks from Capital Inflows [J]. Journal of International Economics,2012,88(2):407-421.
[151] OZLALE U. Price Stability vs. Output Stability: Tales of Federal Reserve Administrations[J]. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,2003,27(9):1595-1610.
[152] PEETERS R. Quantifying Systemic Importance [J].2011.
[153] PEROTTI E, SUAREZ J. Insurance Against Systemic Crises [J]. Equilibri,2009,13(3):391-396.
[154] PETIT M L. Fiscal and Monetary Policy Co-ordination: A Differential Game Approach [J].Journal of Applied Econometrics,1989,4(2):161-179.
[155] POOLE W. Rules-of-Thumb for Guiding Monetary Policy [J]. REVIEW,2008,1(4):447-97.
[156] SAMUELSON P A. Altruism as a Problem Involving Group Versus Individual Selection inEconomics and Biology [J]. The American Economic Review,1993,83(2):143-148.
[157] SAURINA J, TRUCHARTE C. An Assessment of Basel II Procyclicality in MortgagePortfolios [J]. Journal of Financial Services Research,2007,32(1-2):81-101.
[158] SAURINA J. Dynamic Provisioning: The Experience of Spain [R]. Crisis Response Note,2009,7.
[159] SCAILLET O. Nonparametric Estimation and Sensitivity Analysis of Expected Shortfall[J]. Mathematical Finance,2004,14(1):115-129.
[160] SCAILLET O. Nonparametric Estimation of Conditional Expected Shortfall [R].International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering,2004.
[161] SCHWERTER S. Basel III's Ability to Mitigate Systemic Risk [J]. Journal of FinancialRegulation and Compliance,2011,19(4):337-354.
[162] SEGOVIANO M, LOWE P. Internal Ratings, the Business Cycle and CapitalRequirements: Some Evidence from an Emerging Market Economy [J]. BIS WorkingPaper No.117,2002.
[163] SEGOVIANO M, GOODHART C. Banking Stability Measures [J]. IMF Working Papers,2009:1-54.
[164] SHARPE S A. Financial Market Imperfections, Firm Leverage, and the Cyclicality ofEmployment [J]. The American Economic Review,1994,84(4):1060-1074.
[165] SHIN H. Financial Intermediation and the Post-Crisis Financial System [J]. BIS WorkingPaper No.304,2010.
[166] SHLEIFER A, VISHNY R. Stock Market Driven Acquisitions [J]. NBER Working PaperNo. W8439,2001.
[167] SHRIEVES R E, DAHL D. Discretionary Accounting and the Behavior of Japanese BanksUnder Financial Duress [J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,2003,27(7):1219-1243.
[168] SIREGAR R. Macroprudential Approaches to Banking Regulation: Perspectives ofSelected Asian Central Banks [R]. ADBI Working Paper Series,2011.
[169] SMETS F, WOUTERS R. Comparing Shocks and Frictions in US and Euro Area BusinessCycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach [J]. Journal of Applied Econometrics,2005,20(2):161-183.
[170] STOLZ S, WEDOW M. Banks' Regulatory Capital Buffer and the Business Cycle:Evidence for German Savings and Cooperative Banks [R]. Discussion Paper, Series2:Banking and Financial Supervision,2005.
[171] SUMMER M. Banking Regulation and Systemic Risk [J]. Open Economies Review,2003,14(1):43-70.
[172] TANAKA M. How Do Bank Capital and Capital Adequacy Regulation Affect theMonetary Rransmission Mechanism?[J]. CESifo Working Paper Series No.799,2002.
[173] TARASHEV N, BORIO C, TSATSARONIS K. The Systemic Importance of FinancialInstitutions [J]. BIS Quarterly Review,2009,9:75-87.
[174] TARASHEV N, DREHMANN M. Measuring the Systemic Importance of InterconnectedBanks [R]. Bank for International Settlements,2011.
[175] UPPER C, WERNER T, BUNDESBANK D. How Resilient are Financial Markets toStress? Bund Futures and Bonds During the1998Turbulence [J]. BIS Papers,2002,12:110-123.
[176] UPPER C. Using Counterfactual Simulations to Assess the Danger of Contagion inInterbank Markets [J]. BIS Working Paper No.234,2007.
[177] WANG P, WEN Y. Speculative Bubbles and Financial Crises [J]. American EconomicJournal: Macroeconomics,2012,4(3):184-221.
[178] WATANABE W. Prudential Regulation and the“Credit Crunch”: Evidence from Japan [J].Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,2007,39(2-3):639-665.
[179] WOODFORD M. Financial Intermediation and Macroeconomic Analysis [J]. The Journalof Economic Perspectives,2010,24(4):21-44.
[180] WOODFORD M. Optimal Interest-Rate Smoothing [J]. The Review of Economic Studies,2003,70(4):861-886.
[181] YAN M, HALL M J B, TURNER P. A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Basel III: Some Evidencefrom the UK [J]. International Review of Financial Analysis,2012,25:73-82.
[182] ZHOU C. Are Banks Too Big to Fail?[R]. DNB Working Paper,2011, No.232.