房地产市场的博弈问题研究
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摘要
随着申奥成功、加入WTO以及国家继续实行积极的财政政策和稳健的货币政策，中国房地产这块“蛋糕”不仅国内众多房地产商要瓜分，来自港台和其他国家的房地产企业也会加入到这一竞争中来，原有的竞争格局将被打破，中国房地产业的“战国时代”已日益临近。
房地产业在我国毕竟是个新兴的行业，发展至今不过20多年，所以房地产市场中还存在很多的问题需要研究、解决。关于房地产市场的讨论很多，但大多仅停留在对现象的描述，不够全面。一方面，它们没有考虑到房地产市场中各个博弈方都是理性的个体，每个博弈方都会根据对方的策略选择而自主地调整自己的行动方案，并且这些博弈方之间的博弈极有可能是重复博弈；另一方面，它们大多仅仅是针对房地产市场的某个方面展开，不够系统全面。这样，提出的解决方案很难达到预期的效果，甚至可能适得其反。
房地产市场是个异常复杂的大系统。仔细分析，发现与房地产企业直接相关的博弈方主要有以下几个：其他房地产企业、金融机构、建筑承包商、房地产经纪公司、消费者等。每一个博弈方都与房地产企业存在若干个博弈焦点。
本文从博弈论和信息经济学的角度，分别讨论了房地产企业与各个博弈方的博弈焦点，双方所掌握的优劣势，然后根据问题的具体情况建模分析，最后结合模型分析的结果和我国房地产市场的具体实际，提出解决的措施。
希望通过本文的分析，使得各房地产企业能够在未来的竞争中，处惊不乱，安然应对。
With the successful application for Olympic Games, the entry into WTO, and China continues to practice the positive financial policy and steady currency policy. Under this kind of situation, "cake" of Chinese real estate market will not only be divided by the domestic real estate companies, but the companies from Taiwan , Hong Kong and other foreign countries will also enter the drastic competition and break the original competition structure. The steps of the "Kingdoms' War" for Chinese real estate industry are approaching.
Chinese real estate industry is a jumped-up industry, developing to now is not more than 20 years. Therefore a lot of problems still need to be solved. There are a lot of discussions concerning about the real estate market, but most of them just describe the phenomenon, not as comprehensive as need. On the one hand, every game sides in the market is rational individual, they are clever enough to adjust their strategy profile when they forecast opponents' strategy selection. More important, the games among them may well are repeated games. On the other hand, theses discussion are only aiming at a certain aspect of the problem, so it's not comprehensive and systemic enough. Therefore the solutions aiming at the problem are very hard to achieve the anticipate effect, maybe just the opposite to what one wishes.
The real estate market is a extraordinary complicated system. After careful investigation, game opponents relate to real estate company consists of other real estate companies > financial institutions , contractors, broker companies , consumers.
From the angle of game theory and information economics, this article intend to discuss the game focuses between the real estate company and its game opponents, and give out advantages and inferior position of every sides. Then modeling according to physical circumstance. Finally bring up the solution after linking the result of mold analysis and the fact of the real estate industry in our country.
I hope, through this textual analysis, every domestic real estate company can be calmness in the future's competition, and cope with them easily.
房地产业在我国毕竟是个新兴的行业，发展至今不过20多年，所以房地产市场中还存在很多的问题需要研究、解决。关于房地产市场的讨论很多，但大多仅停留在对现象的描述，不够全面。一方面，它们没有考虑到房地产市场中各个博弈方都是理性的个体，每个博弈方都会根据对方的策略选择而自主地调整自己的行动方案，并且这些博弈方之间的博弈极有可能是重复博弈；另一方面，它们大多仅仅是针对房地产市场的某个方面展开，不够系统全面。这样，提出的解决方案很难达到预期的效果，甚至可能适得其反。
房地产市场是个异常复杂的大系统。仔细分析，发现与房地产企业直接相关的博弈方主要有以下几个：其他房地产企业、金融机构、建筑承包商、房地产经纪公司、消费者等。每一个博弈方都与房地产企业存在若干个博弈焦点。
本文从博弈论和信息经济学的角度，分别讨论了房地产企业与各个博弈方的博弈焦点，双方所掌握的优劣势，然后根据问题的具体情况建模分析，最后结合模型分析的结果和我国房地产市场的具体实际，提出解决的措施。
希望通过本文的分析，使得各房地产企业能够在未来的竞争中，处惊不乱，安然应对。
With the successful application for Olympic Games, the entry into WTO, and China continues to practice the positive financial policy and steady currency policy. Under this kind of situation, "cake" of Chinese real estate market will not only be divided by the domestic real estate companies, but the companies from Taiwan , Hong Kong and other foreign countries will also enter the drastic competition and break the original competition structure. The steps of the "Kingdoms' War" for Chinese real estate industry are approaching.
Chinese real estate industry is a jumped-up industry, developing to now is not more than 20 years. Therefore a lot of problems still need to be solved. There are a lot of discussions concerning about the real estate market, but most of them just describe the phenomenon, not as comprehensive as need. On the one hand, every game sides in the market is rational individual, they are clever enough to adjust their strategy profile when they forecast opponents' strategy selection. More important, the games among them may well are repeated games. On the other hand, theses discussion are only aiming at a certain aspect of the problem, so it's not comprehensive and systemic enough. Therefore the solutions aiming at the problem are very hard to achieve the anticipate effect, maybe just the opposite to what one wishes.
The real estate market is a extraordinary complicated system. After careful investigation, game opponents relate to real estate company consists of other real estate companies > financial institutions , contractors, broker companies , consumers.
From the angle of game theory and information economics, this article intend to discuss the game focuses between the real estate company and its game opponents, and give out advantages and inferior position of every sides. Then modeling according to physical circumstance. Finally bring up the solution after linking the result of mold analysis and the fact of the real estate industry in our country.
I hope, through this textual analysis, every domestic real estate company can be calmness in the future's competition, and cope with them easily.
引文
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[3]董藩等(2001)：《房地产经济概说》，辽宁省：东北财经大学出版社
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[2]安国良等(2001)：《现代产业经济分析》，南京：南京大学出版社
[3]董藩等(2001)：《房地产经济概说》，辽宁省：东北财经大学出版社
[4]王则柯(1999)：《信息经济学浅说》，北京：经济科学出版社
[5]谢识予(1997)：《经济博弈论》，上海：复旦大学出版社
[6]刘正周(1999)：《管理激励》，上海：上海财经大学出版社
[7]迈克·波特著，陈小悦译(1997)：《竞争战略》，北京：北京华夏出版社
[8]平狄克，鲁宾费尔德(1997)：《微观经济学》，北京：中国人民大学出版社
[9]泰勒尔(1997)：《产业组织理论》，北京：中国人民大学出版社
[10]哈尔·瓦里安(1997)：《微观经济学》，北京：经济科学出版社
[11]颜春梅等(2002)：“中国房地产业的发展现状与前景”，2002／7，《上海房地》
[12]张学颖(1999)：“房地产业发展现状及趋势分析”，山东农业信息网
[13]汪利娜(2002)：“房地产泡沫的生成机理与防范措施”，2002／12／31，《中华工商时报》
[14]史利明(2003)：“我国房地产业发展现状及前景”，2003／01／13，杭州网
[15]梁志超(2002)：“我国住宅占GDP增幅1％至1.5％”，2002／8／14，《房地产报》
[16]佘海峰(2002)：“房地产拉动83个产业”，2002／12／03，《新华日报》
[17]黄小彪(2002)：“住宅领域的市场失灵”，2002／18，《中外房地产导报》
[18]高炽海等(2002)：“中国房地产市场的制度创新——从信息经济学角度的考察”，2002／6，《中国房地产》
[19]国研网(2002／9)：“房地产开打价格战?”，2002／9／22，国研网
[20]国研网(2003／1)：“专家说：价格战商品房市场不会出现”，2003／1／3，国研网
[21]张中义(2002)：“商品房为啥不打价格战”，2002／11／7，《中华建筑报》
[22]魏灿秋(1999)：“博弈论模型对‘价格战’现象的分析和对策建议”，1999／3，《四川大学学报》
[23]曹震(2001)：“价格战的博弈分析”，2001／4，《技术经济与管理研究》
[24]深圳商报(2002／12)：“住房消费面临十二大困扰”，2002／12／3，《深圳商报》
[25]李炜等(2001)：“房地产交易中的委托——代理行为研究”，2001／12，《重庆建筑大学学报(社科版)》
[26]刘志峰(2002)：“物业管理存在的问题及其对策”，2002／1，《中国房地产信息》
[27]周芳(1999)：“对发展我国房地产经纪业的探析”，1999／12，《中国房地产金融》
[28]易军(2002)：“房地产经纪业需重视解决‘信用危机’问题”，2002／1，《中国房地信息》
[29]陶玉清(1999)：“对规范和发展房地产经纪业的思考”，1999／3，《连云港职业大学学报》
[30]刘长滨等(2000)：“中美房地产经纪业发展及管理制度比较”，华东北交换中心(www.cnki.net)
[31]董雪梅(1997)：“我国房地产经纪业的现状与发展”，1997／12，《经济问题》
[32]李晋宁等(2000)：“信息不对称下激励政策的制定”，2000／2，《南京理工大学学报》
[23]王效俐(2000)：“信息不对称下的委托代理激励模型”，2000／4，《太原理工大学学报》
[34]袁丁(2002)：“以信息经济学解释房地产金融风险”，2002／10，《香港地产》
[35]吴国栋(2002)：“个人住房抵押贷款中的道德风险及其防范”，2002／10，《中国房地产金融》
[36]刘华伟(2002)：“房地产市场中的信息不对称问题”，2002／11，《中国房地信息》
[37]中国建设报(2002／3)：“‘信息不对称’与楼市纠纷”，2002／3／20，《中国建设报》中国楼市
[38]杨昌(2002)：“房地产业的黑色生存”，2002／5／7，《江南时报》
[39]宋建成等(1999)：“剖析建筑施工企业承发包管理的不良因素”，1999／9，《黑龙江科技信息》
[40]中华建筑报(2002／4)：“规范建筑市场 也应管管业主”，2002／4／11，《中华建筑报》
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