村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为研究
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摘要
我国是一个农业大国,“三农”问题近年来得到了社会各界的广泛关注,村镇基础设施建设是新农村建设的物质基础,符合村镇居民实际需求的村镇基础设施能够切实起到提高村镇居民生产、生活水平的作用,而现实的情况是在国家加大对村镇基础设施的投入力度,村镇基础设施建设水平不断提高的同时,村镇基础设施建设中也出现了一些专项资金被截留、挪用或占用,村镇居民被在排斥村镇基础设施建设项目选择决策之外,村镇基础设施建设项目供给脱离实际需要等现象。究其原因,主要是政府投资行为的异化导致投资资金的使用不符合资源优化配置要求,难以达到产出和效益的最大化,客观上造成稀缺的公共资源损失,而这一切都是以村镇居民的福利损失为代价的。因此,如何以高效规范的政府投资行为保证资源的合理配置,是摆在我们面前亟待解决的重要问题。
本文立足于我国国情,探讨村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为异化的深层次原因,系统研究村镇基础设施建设中政府投资行为,其研究主要目的在于探寻村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为异化机理,准确把握村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为动向,对异化的政府投资行为实施有效控制和优化,避免由于村镇基础设施建设中政府投资行为异化导致的资金损耗和资源配置不合理现象产生,为村镇基础设施建设有效实施提供理论依据,推动村镇基础设施的建设和发展。
在梳理既有研究成果的基础上,本文紧扣村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为这一主题,沿着村镇基础设施建设资金流向展开研究。建立了村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为的概念体系,为研究奠定基础。分别从成本——收益、动机——行为的角度阐述了政府投资行为异化的生成机制,使研究思路更加清晰。
根据政府投资行为异化的动机和产生阶段,将村镇基础设施建设政府异化的投资行为划分为两类:一是在分配资金过程中产生的嵌入经济理性的投资行为,二是在项目选择时产生的嵌入政治理性的投资行为,并遴选其中典型的行为,在定性分析其产生的制度基础上,运用博弈论的相关知识分别构建博弈模型,阐明了村镇基础设施建设中政府投资行为异化的形成机理,为实现村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为的控制与优化奠定基础。
在剖析村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为异化产生机理的基础上,运用委托代理理论,设计村镇基础设施建设中嵌入经济理性的政府投资行为控制合约与嵌入政治理性的政府投资行为优化合约,通过在控制合约中植入激励、惩罚参数、在优化合约中植入村镇居民满意度参数,全面分析各参数对政府投资行为的影响,从理论层面为实现村镇基础设施建设中政府投资行为异化的有效控制和优化提供可靠依据。
结合理论分析得出的基本结论,提出可行的政府投资行为的控制与优化模式。即提出从资金控制层面设立村镇基础设施建设专户,从资金使用层面成立专门的基础设施建设管理部门的构想,同时将村镇居民需求的表达、需求识别与需求响应模块整合到村镇基础设施建设的项目选择全面质量管理模式中,将现代质量工程中成熟的质量屋技术引入村镇基础设施建设项目选择过程中,为有效识别村镇居民需求提供具有可操作性的方法,从实践层面解决现实存在的村镇基础设施建设资金尚未有效整合和利用的问题。
为验证控制与优化合约中参数设计的有效性,运用元胞自动机的相关理论知识,对嵌入经济理性和嵌入政治理性行为进行仿真研究,通过建立仿真模型,设计仿真实验,实现了对政府投资行为的仿真,清晰直观地观察到了政府投资行为的演化过程,验证了各参数对村镇基础设施建设对政府投资行为的影响,有针对性地提出规范村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为的对策建议。
本文针对当前我国村镇基础设施建设方面存在的问题,围绕村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为进行研究,在理论上可以进一步丰富我国新农村建设的理论和方法,其中提出的对政府投资行为的控制与优化方法对城市基础设施建设也具有一定的借鉴意义。
China is a big agricultural country, and the problems of rural economy, rural development and rural demography recently have been broadly concerned by all circles of society .Rural infrastructure construction is the physical foundation of new rural construction, the rural infrastructure construction meeting the practical requirement of the rural resident could substantially improve the production and the standard of living of rural resident. However, in the process of rural infrastructure construction, the special funds are retained, embezzled or occupied. Rural resident is excluded from the decision-making of the project selection of rural infrastructure construction, which is decided by the requirement of department decision-maker of local government to promote the political performance and benefit. As a result, the supply of rural infrastructure construction always deviates from the real demand and the limited financing capital can not be utilized effectively. The main reason is that the dissimilation of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction leads to the mismatch of the utilization of investment capital and the requirement of optimizing the resource configuration, as a result, the maximization of the output and benefit is difficult to realize and induces the loss of the rare public resource. Hence, how to guarantee the reasonable configuration of resource by the effective and regular government investment behavior is a significant problem need to be solved immediately.
From Chinese situation, the deeply cause of dissimilation of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction is discussed, and the government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction is studied systematically. The objective of this research is to discover the mechanism of dissimilation of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction, and to recognize the pulse of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction so that the dissimilated government investment behavior could be effectively controlled and optimized and the phenomenon such as capital loss and unreasonable resource configuration led by government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction could be avoid. The research could provide theoretical support for the effective implementation of rural infrastructure construction and improve the construction and development of rural infrastructure construction.
On the basis of the review of the existing research result, this paper follows the topic of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction. the research is deployed with the capital flow direction of rural infrastructure construction. The conceptual system of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction is built as the basis of the research. The generating mechanism of dissimilation of government investment behavior is discussed from the angle of cost-benefit and motive-behavior separately, and the research idea is clearer.
According to the motive and generation stage, the dissimilated investment behavior of government of rural infrastructure construction can be divided into two kinds: the one is the investment behavior embedded economic rationality in the process of capital distribution, the other one is the investment behavior embedded political rationality in the process of project selection and the typical dissimilation behavior is chosen. The forming mechanism is analyzed by game theory and as a result, the dissimilation of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction is caused by the deep level reasons including the careless management of capital of rural infrastructure construction, weak constraint of financial budget and the lack of responsible mechanism of government investment project and the power of rural resident.
On this basis, using principle-agent theory, the control and optimization contract of government investment behavior are designed. By the parameters such as incentive, punishment and satisfaction degree of rural resident, the effective control and optimization contract of government investment behavior dissimilation could be realized, and the possible control and optimization mode of government investment behavior is presented to effectively control and optimize government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction.
To validate the effectiveness of the parameters in the control and optimization contract, by relative theory of Cellular Automata, the behavior embedded economic and political rationality is simulated. The evolutionary process of government investment behavior and the influence of each parameter to government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction are observed clearly and directly so that the suggestion to regulate the government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction is proposed pertinently.
For the problems of rural infrastructure construction in china, this paper is concentrated on government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction, which enriches the theory and method of new rural construction further and the control and optimization method of government investment behavior is meaningful to be learned by urban infrastructure construction at some extence.
本文立足于我国国情,探讨村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为异化的深层次原因,系统研究村镇基础设施建设中政府投资行为,其研究主要目的在于探寻村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为异化机理,准确把握村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为动向,对异化的政府投资行为实施有效控制和优化,避免由于村镇基础设施建设中政府投资行为异化导致的资金损耗和资源配置不合理现象产生,为村镇基础设施建设有效实施提供理论依据,推动村镇基础设施的建设和发展。
在梳理既有研究成果的基础上,本文紧扣村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为这一主题,沿着村镇基础设施建设资金流向展开研究。建立了村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为的概念体系,为研究奠定基础。分别从成本——收益、动机——行为的角度阐述了政府投资行为异化的生成机制,使研究思路更加清晰。
根据政府投资行为异化的动机和产生阶段,将村镇基础设施建设政府异化的投资行为划分为两类:一是在分配资金过程中产生的嵌入经济理性的投资行为,二是在项目选择时产生的嵌入政治理性的投资行为,并遴选其中典型的行为,在定性分析其产生的制度基础上,运用博弈论的相关知识分别构建博弈模型,阐明了村镇基础设施建设中政府投资行为异化的形成机理,为实现村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为的控制与优化奠定基础。
在剖析村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为异化产生机理的基础上,运用委托代理理论,设计村镇基础设施建设中嵌入经济理性的政府投资行为控制合约与嵌入政治理性的政府投资行为优化合约,通过在控制合约中植入激励、惩罚参数、在优化合约中植入村镇居民满意度参数,全面分析各参数对政府投资行为的影响,从理论层面为实现村镇基础设施建设中政府投资行为异化的有效控制和优化提供可靠依据。
结合理论分析得出的基本结论,提出可行的政府投资行为的控制与优化模式。即提出从资金控制层面设立村镇基础设施建设专户,从资金使用层面成立专门的基础设施建设管理部门的构想,同时将村镇居民需求的表达、需求识别与需求响应模块整合到村镇基础设施建设的项目选择全面质量管理模式中,将现代质量工程中成熟的质量屋技术引入村镇基础设施建设项目选择过程中,为有效识别村镇居民需求提供具有可操作性的方法,从实践层面解决现实存在的村镇基础设施建设资金尚未有效整合和利用的问题。
为验证控制与优化合约中参数设计的有效性,运用元胞自动机的相关理论知识,对嵌入经济理性和嵌入政治理性行为进行仿真研究,通过建立仿真模型,设计仿真实验,实现了对政府投资行为的仿真,清晰直观地观察到了政府投资行为的演化过程,验证了各参数对村镇基础设施建设对政府投资行为的影响,有针对性地提出规范村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为的对策建议。
本文针对当前我国村镇基础设施建设方面存在的问题,围绕村镇基础设施建设政府投资行为进行研究,在理论上可以进一步丰富我国新农村建设的理论和方法,其中提出的对政府投资行为的控制与优化方法对城市基础设施建设也具有一定的借鉴意义。
China is a big agricultural country, and the problems of rural economy, rural development and rural demography recently have been broadly concerned by all circles of society .Rural infrastructure construction is the physical foundation of new rural construction, the rural infrastructure construction meeting the practical requirement of the rural resident could substantially improve the production and the standard of living of rural resident. However, in the process of rural infrastructure construction, the special funds are retained, embezzled or occupied. Rural resident is excluded from the decision-making of the project selection of rural infrastructure construction, which is decided by the requirement of department decision-maker of local government to promote the political performance and benefit. As a result, the supply of rural infrastructure construction always deviates from the real demand and the limited financing capital can not be utilized effectively. The main reason is that the dissimilation of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction leads to the mismatch of the utilization of investment capital and the requirement of optimizing the resource configuration, as a result, the maximization of the output and benefit is difficult to realize and induces the loss of the rare public resource. Hence, how to guarantee the reasonable configuration of resource by the effective and regular government investment behavior is a significant problem need to be solved immediately.
From Chinese situation, the deeply cause of dissimilation of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction is discussed, and the government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction is studied systematically. The objective of this research is to discover the mechanism of dissimilation of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction, and to recognize the pulse of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction so that the dissimilated government investment behavior could be effectively controlled and optimized and the phenomenon such as capital loss and unreasonable resource configuration led by government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction could be avoid. The research could provide theoretical support for the effective implementation of rural infrastructure construction and improve the construction and development of rural infrastructure construction.
On the basis of the review of the existing research result, this paper follows the topic of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction. the research is deployed with the capital flow direction of rural infrastructure construction. The conceptual system of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction is built as the basis of the research. The generating mechanism of dissimilation of government investment behavior is discussed from the angle of cost-benefit and motive-behavior separately, and the research idea is clearer.
According to the motive and generation stage, the dissimilated investment behavior of government of rural infrastructure construction can be divided into two kinds: the one is the investment behavior embedded economic rationality in the process of capital distribution, the other one is the investment behavior embedded political rationality in the process of project selection and the typical dissimilation behavior is chosen. The forming mechanism is analyzed by game theory and as a result, the dissimilation of government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction is caused by the deep level reasons including the careless management of capital of rural infrastructure construction, weak constraint of financial budget and the lack of responsible mechanism of government investment project and the power of rural resident.
On this basis, using principle-agent theory, the control and optimization contract of government investment behavior are designed. By the parameters such as incentive, punishment and satisfaction degree of rural resident, the effective control and optimization contract of government investment behavior dissimilation could be realized, and the possible control and optimization mode of government investment behavior is presented to effectively control and optimize government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction.
To validate the effectiveness of the parameters in the control and optimization contract, by relative theory of Cellular Automata, the behavior embedded economic and political rationality is simulated. The evolutionary process of government investment behavior and the influence of each parameter to government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction are observed clearly and directly so that the suggestion to regulate the government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction is proposed pertinently.
For the problems of rural infrastructure construction in china, this paper is concentrated on government investment behavior of rural infrastructure construction, which enriches the theory and method of new rural construction further and the control and optimization method of government investment behavior is meaningful to be learned by urban infrastructure construction at some extence.
引文
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