转移支付、一体化与区域协调发展
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摘要
改革开放后,中国经济整体上取得了有目共睹的进步,然而不同区域的经济增长绩效存在差异,这种整体经济高速增长以及增长的区域差异都令人关注。因此,如何实现区域协调发展已经成为我国政府宏观经济管理中迫切需要解决的重大问题。一个可行的做法是：充分发挥转移支付的均等化效应,最终在宏观地区层面实现产业分布和收入分布的平衡,在微观个体层面实现福利水平的地区间均等。
基于这样的思路,本文尝试在新经济地理学视角下探讨转移支付的宏观效应、区位效应以及福利效应。这不仅是因为新经济地理学构建了具有微观基础和空间维度的一般均衡分析框架,便于将转移支付置于整个经济系统中考虑其作用机理和相关效应；而且还因为转移支付能够成为解决我国区域差异问题的有力政策手段,转移支付的规模和分配方式将关系着我国未来的经济发展效益和全民福利水平。具体而言,本文将着重探讨三个问题：不同类型的转移支付面临着什么样的“效率”和“公平”权衡?基于不同计算方式的转移支付会对落后地区产生什么样的综合经济效应?基于不同资金来源的转移支付又会对不同地区不同要素所有者以及全社会产生什么样的福利影响?旨在进一步增进人们对如何实现区域协调发展的理解。
有鉴于此,本文主要进行了如下四项工作,并得到了一系列有意义的结论。
首先,我们基于局部溢出模型构建了一个关于经济增长、产业分布和转移支付三者相互影响的综合分析框架,用于考察不同类型转移支付所面临的“效率”和“公平”权衡。我们发现,如果中央政府实施影响经济活动空间分布的措施,如通过转移支付实现了资本向落后地区转移或改善了落后地区基础设施,那么在缩小区际产业和收入差距的同时,还有可能降低整体经济的增长率。当然我们也发现了多种可以实现“效率”和“公平”兼得的转移支付方式,例如将转移支付用于提升创新能力、扩大有效需求、发展商贸活动以及提振市场信心。这些措施要么降低了创新成本,要么提高了有效需求,从而推动经济的高速增长。同时,地区市场拥挤效应的增强将导致当地资本利润水平的下降,最终获得更公平的产业和收入分布。
其次,我们基于自由资本模型,在一般均衡框架下重点考察了三种补贴落后地区企业生产过程的转移支付——利润补贴、固定投入补贴和产量补贴,并通过解析的形式展示了这三种生产型转移支付的综合经济效应。我们发现：首先,转移支付的效应会随着一体化程度的深入而增强。其次,上述三种转移支付虽然都能起到缩小区际产业分布差距的作用,但是在改善区际收入差距方面的效果却不同。具体而言,产量补贴因为提高了落后地区工人的收入水平,所以可以缩小区际收入差距；而有悖于一般认识,利润补贴和固定投入补贴反而会扩大区际收入差距。最后,利润补贴和固定投入补贴对落后地区工业劳动力需求的影响难以确定。补贴所引致的企业进入并没有如人所愿地创造出更多的就业岗位,原因可能是新企业的进入导致了原有企业的生产萎缩或倒闭。
再次,我们将消费异质性和局部知识溢出纳入自由企业家模型中,考察了不同转移支付的福利效应。分析表明,转移支付的福利效应除了取决于交易成本水平(一体化程度)、消费异质化程度、溢出效应强度这些等客观因素,还取决于社会价值观这一主观因素。具体而言,在一体化程度和消费异质化程度比较低并且溢出效应不太显著的情况下,产业转移型转移支付在福利改善方面相对较优；反之,则收入型转移支付相对较优。另外,如果社会大众对公平的重视程度越高,那么他们越会倾向于支持政府干预市场结果。由此,追求公平的政府应该在一体化程度比较低的情况下采取产业转移型转移支付,在一体化程度比较高的情况下采取收入型转移支付,而当一体化程度处于中间水平时,政府应放任市场自由运作。
最后,我们结合西部大开发的现实背景和相应的政策模拟结果,提出：政府在设计一个具体的转移支付措施时,思考不能局限于转移支付的直接效应和短期效应,还应该深入探讨其可能的间接效应和长期效应,最重要的是一定要考虑转移支付与其作用区域的匹配性,因为不同转移支付对不同经济变量的作用机理和影响程度是不同的。
本文的主题是：通过拓展新经济地理学模型,考察了不同类型转移支付所面临的“效率”和“公平”权衡、转移支付对落后地区所产生的综合经济效应以及对不同个体和整体社会的福利影响,进一步增进了人们对如何利用转移支付推动区域协调发展的理解。在新经济地理学框架内研究转移支付在区域协调发展中的作用,几乎是一个全新的研究方向,还有很大的可扩展空间。
Since reform and opening up, China's overall economy makes obvious progress. However, the performances of economic growth are quite different in different regions of China. The rapid growth of the whole country's economic, as well as the difference of regions, are so remarkable that it has becomes an urgent and major problem for the government's macroeconomic administrative authority to achieve the coordinated development of regions. One possible approach is to make full use of the effect of the transfer payments on equalization of public services. And ultimately, it will come true both the equality of industrial distribution and income at the macro-regional level and the equality of welfare at the micro-individual level among regions.
Based on this view, this paper try to discuss the macro effect, the location effect and the welfare effect of transfer payments from the perspective of New Economic Geography. On the one hand, New Economic Geography has some special micro-foundations so that we can easily put the space dimension into the general equilibrium framework. New Economic Geography facilitates us to put the transfer payment into an entire economic system to consider the mechanism and the related effects. On the other hand, the transfer payments will be effective policy instruments to achieve the coordinated development of regions. The scale and distribution of transfer payments will be related to China's future development performance and the whole country welfare. Specifically, this paper focuses on three issues. What kind of "efficient" and "fair" trade-off will be faced by different types of transfer payments? What kind of comprehensive economic effects will come true by different methods of transfer payments calculation methods in the backward region? To owners of different factors and the whole society, what kind of welfare effects will be faced by using different methods to finance transfer payments? The aim of this paper is to further enhance the understanding of the coordinated development of regions.
For these, this paper carries the following four tasks, and draws some meaningful conclusions.
Firstly, basing on the local spillover model, we construct a comprehensive analysis framework about economic growth, spatial distribution and transfer payments, in order to investigate "efficiency" and "fair" tradeoff of transfer payments. We find that if we try to implement some measures to influence economic spatial distribution, such as a general transfer payments or improvement of infrastructure facilities in the backward region, the cost may be lower overall economic growth rate. Of course, we also found a variety of transfer payment methods that can achieve both "efficiency" and "equity". For example, the transfer payments which can enhance innovation capacity, expand effective demand, develop business activities and boost market confidence will either reduce the innovation cost or increase effective demand in the market, so that they can push economic growth rapidly. Thereby profits decrease by enhancing crowding effect, while income and economic activity achieve a more equitable space distribution.
Secondly, basing on the footloose capital model, we focused on three types of transfer payments to subsidize production process of firms in the backward region, profit subsidies, fixed input subsidies and output subsidies. We discuss the overall economic effect of these three production transfers by analytical derivation. We find: Firstly, the economic effects of transfer payments will strengthen with the increasing integration level. Secondly, the three transfers can reverse the unequal distribution of industry, but they are different effect on reversing interregional income inequality. In detail, contrary to the general understanding, profit subsidies and fixed input subsidies will exacerbate income inequality between different regions. Production subsidies reduce income gap between regions because of increasing income levels of workers in the backward region. Finally, there is uncertain effect of profit subsidies and fixed inputs subsidies on labor demand of industrial sectors in the backward region. Not as we usually think that the entry enterprise can create more jobs, possibly because the entry of new firms will lead to the production shrink of the original enterprise or close down.
Thirdly, we put consume heterogeneity and the local knowledge spillover into footloose entrepreneurs model to study the welfare effects of various transfer payments. Our analysis shows that the welfare effects of transfer payments not only depend on the level of transaction costs (market integration), degree of consume heterogeneity, local spillover effects within industry and inter-industry and substitution elasticity between products, but also depend on social values as a main factor. In particular, if there is relatively low level of market integration, relatively low degree of consumption heterogeneity and less obvious local spillover effects, the transfer payment for industry transfer is optimum. On the contrary situation, income-based transfers are optimum. If people pay great attention to fair from the main social value, and if they incline to support government intervene market operations, the government which pursuit fair will implement industry type transfer payments. And vice versa, the income-based transfers will be taken.
Finally, with the background of China's western development and the corresponding simulation results, we design a specific measure of transfer payments. We should not only focus on indirect effect and short-term effect of policy, but also pay attention to its possible indirect effects and long-term effects. Most importantly, we must consider the fitness between transfer payments and the region which receive transfer payments, because the roles of transfer payments on different economic variables are through different mechanisms and turn out different impact.
In this paper, by developing New Economic Geography model, we study the "efficiency" and "fair" trade-off of transfer payment, the effect of transfer payment on the overall economic of the backward region and on the welfare effect of different individuals and the whole society. This paper can further enhance the understanding of how to use transfer payments to achieve the coordinated development of regions. It is almost a new research direction of studying the effect of transfer payments on the regional coordination development in new economic geography framework. There is still much space to explore.
基于这样的思路,本文尝试在新经济地理学视角下探讨转移支付的宏观效应、区位效应以及福利效应。这不仅是因为新经济地理学构建了具有微观基础和空间维度的一般均衡分析框架,便于将转移支付置于整个经济系统中考虑其作用机理和相关效应；而且还因为转移支付能够成为解决我国区域差异问题的有力政策手段,转移支付的规模和分配方式将关系着我国未来的经济发展效益和全民福利水平。具体而言,本文将着重探讨三个问题：不同类型的转移支付面临着什么样的“效率”和“公平”权衡?基于不同计算方式的转移支付会对落后地区产生什么样的综合经济效应?基于不同资金来源的转移支付又会对不同地区不同要素所有者以及全社会产生什么样的福利影响?旨在进一步增进人们对如何实现区域协调发展的理解。
有鉴于此,本文主要进行了如下四项工作,并得到了一系列有意义的结论。
首先,我们基于局部溢出模型构建了一个关于经济增长、产业分布和转移支付三者相互影响的综合分析框架,用于考察不同类型转移支付所面临的“效率”和“公平”权衡。我们发现,如果中央政府实施影响经济活动空间分布的措施,如通过转移支付实现了资本向落后地区转移或改善了落后地区基础设施,那么在缩小区际产业和收入差距的同时,还有可能降低整体经济的增长率。当然我们也发现了多种可以实现“效率”和“公平”兼得的转移支付方式,例如将转移支付用于提升创新能力、扩大有效需求、发展商贸活动以及提振市场信心。这些措施要么降低了创新成本,要么提高了有效需求,从而推动经济的高速增长。同时,地区市场拥挤效应的增强将导致当地资本利润水平的下降,最终获得更公平的产业和收入分布。
其次,我们基于自由资本模型,在一般均衡框架下重点考察了三种补贴落后地区企业生产过程的转移支付——利润补贴、固定投入补贴和产量补贴,并通过解析的形式展示了这三种生产型转移支付的综合经济效应。我们发现：首先,转移支付的效应会随着一体化程度的深入而增强。其次,上述三种转移支付虽然都能起到缩小区际产业分布差距的作用,但是在改善区际收入差距方面的效果却不同。具体而言,产量补贴因为提高了落后地区工人的收入水平,所以可以缩小区际收入差距；而有悖于一般认识,利润补贴和固定投入补贴反而会扩大区际收入差距。最后,利润补贴和固定投入补贴对落后地区工业劳动力需求的影响难以确定。补贴所引致的企业进入并没有如人所愿地创造出更多的就业岗位,原因可能是新企业的进入导致了原有企业的生产萎缩或倒闭。
再次,我们将消费异质性和局部知识溢出纳入自由企业家模型中,考察了不同转移支付的福利效应。分析表明,转移支付的福利效应除了取决于交易成本水平(一体化程度)、消费异质化程度、溢出效应强度这些等客观因素,还取决于社会价值观这一主观因素。具体而言,在一体化程度和消费异质化程度比较低并且溢出效应不太显著的情况下,产业转移型转移支付在福利改善方面相对较优；反之,则收入型转移支付相对较优。另外,如果社会大众对公平的重视程度越高,那么他们越会倾向于支持政府干预市场结果。由此,追求公平的政府应该在一体化程度比较低的情况下采取产业转移型转移支付,在一体化程度比较高的情况下采取收入型转移支付,而当一体化程度处于中间水平时,政府应放任市场自由运作。
最后,我们结合西部大开发的现实背景和相应的政策模拟结果,提出：政府在设计一个具体的转移支付措施时,思考不能局限于转移支付的直接效应和短期效应,还应该深入探讨其可能的间接效应和长期效应,最重要的是一定要考虑转移支付与其作用区域的匹配性,因为不同转移支付对不同经济变量的作用机理和影响程度是不同的。
本文的主题是：通过拓展新经济地理学模型,考察了不同类型转移支付所面临的“效率”和“公平”权衡、转移支付对落后地区所产生的综合经济效应以及对不同个体和整体社会的福利影响,进一步增进了人们对如何利用转移支付推动区域协调发展的理解。在新经济地理学框架内研究转移支付在区域协调发展中的作用,几乎是一个全新的研究方向,还有很大的可扩展空间。
Since reform and opening up, China's overall economy makes obvious progress. However, the performances of economic growth are quite different in different regions of China. The rapid growth of the whole country's economic, as well as the difference of regions, are so remarkable that it has becomes an urgent and major problem for the government's macroeconomic administrative authority to achieve the coordinated development of regions. One possible approach is to make full use of the effect of the transfer payments on equalization of public services. And ultimately, it will come true both the equality of industrial distribution and income at the macro-regional level and the equality of welfare at the micro-individual level among regions.
Based on this view, this paper try to discuss the macro effect, the location effect and the welfare effect of transfer payments from the perspective of New Economic Geography. On the one hand, New Economic Geography has some special micro-foundations so that we can easily put the space dimension into the general equilibrium framework. New Economic Geography facilitates us to put the transfer payment into an entire economic system to consider the mechanism and the related effects. On the other hand, the transfer payments will be effective policy instruments to achieve the coordinated development of regions. The scale and distribution of transfer payments will be related to China's future development performance and the whole country welfare. Specifically, this paper focuses on three issues. What kind of "efficient" and "fair" trade-off will be faced by different types of transfer payments? What kind of comprehensive economic effects will come true by different methods of transfer payments calculation methods in the backward region? To owners of different factors and the whole society, what kind of welfare effects will be faced by using different methods to finance transfer payments? The aim of this paper is to further enhance the understanding of the coordinated development of regions.
For these, this paper carries the following four tasks, and draws some meaningful conclusions.
Firstly, basing on the local spillover model, we construct a comprehensive analysis framework about economic growth, spatial distribution and transfer payments, in order to investigate "efficiency" and "fair" tradeoff of transfer payments. We find that if we try to implement some measures to influence economic spatial distribution, such as a general transfer payments or improvement of infrastructure facilities in the backward region, the cost may be lower overall economic growth rate. Of course, we also found a variety of transfer payment methods that can achieve both "efficiency" and "equity". For example, the transfer payments which can enhance innovation capacity, expand effective demand, develop business activities and boost market confidence will either reduce the innovation cost or increase effective demand in the market, so that they can push economic growth rapidly. Thereby profits decrease by enhancing crowding effect, while income and economic activity achieve a more equitable space distribution.
Secondly, basing on the footloose capital model, we focused on three types of transfer payments to subsidize production process of firms in the backward region, profit subsidies, fixed input subsidies and output subsidies. We discuss the overall economic effect of these three production transfers by analytical derivation. We find: Firstly, the economic effects of transfer payments will strengthen with the increasing integration level. Secondly, the three transfers can reverse the unequal distribution of industry, but they are different effect on reversing interregional income inequality. In detail, contrary to the general understanding, profit subsidies and fixed input subsidies will exacerbate income inequality between different regions. Production subsidies reduce income gap between regions because of increasing income levels of workers in the backward region. Finally, there is uncertain effect of profit subsidies and fixed inputs subsidies on labor demand of industrial sectors in the backward region. Not as we usually think that the entry enterprise can create more jobs, possibly because the entry of new firms will lead to the production shrink of the original enterprise or close down.
Thirdly, we put consume heterogeneity and the local knowledge spillover into footloose entrepreneurs model to study the welfare effects of various transfer payments. Our analysis shows that the welfare effects of transfer payments not only depend on the level of transaction costs (market integration), degree of consume heterogeneity, local spillover effects within industry and inter-industry and substitution elasticity between products, but also depend on social values as a main factor. In particular, if there is relatively low level of market integration, relatively low degree of consumption heterogeneity and less obvious local spillover effects, the transfer payment for industry transfer is optimum. On the contrary situation, income-based transfers are optimum. If people pay great attention to fair from the main social value, and if they incline to support government intervene market operations, the government which pursuit fair will implement industry type transfer payments. And vice versa, the income-based transfers will be taken.
Finally, with the background of China's western development and the corresponding simulation results, we design a specific measure of transfer payments. We should not only focus on indirect effect and short-term effect of policy, but also pay attention to its possible indirect effects and long-term effects. Most importantly, we must consider the fitness between transfer payments and the region which receive transfer payments, because the roles of transfer payments on different economic variables are through different mechanisms and turn out different impact.
In this paper, by developing New Economic Geography model, we study the "efficiency" and "fair" trade-off of transfer payment, the effect of transfer payment on the overall economic of the backward region and on the welfare effect of different individuals and the whole society. This paper can further enhance the understanding of how to use transfer payments to achieve the coordinated development of regions. It is almost a new research direction of studying the effect of transfer payments on the regional coordination development in new economic geography framework. There is still much space to explore.
引文
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①转引自陈东琪,宋立等著.新一轮财政税收体制改革思路.北京：经济科学出版社,2009,第173页。
①本文将公共财政理论和财政学等同认识,不做细致区分。
②具体解释参见第三章第一节。
③一体化是指多个原来相互独立的主权实体通过某种方式逐步结合成为一个单一实体的过程。一体化过程既涉及国家间经济,也涉及政治、法律和文化,或整个社会的融合,是政治、经济、法律、社会、文化的一种全面互动过程。由于它涉及的主权实体间的相互融合,并最终成为一个在世界上具有主体资格的单一实体,因而它不同于一般意义上的国家间合作,涉及的也不仅仅是一般的国家间政治或经济关系。来自百度百科。
① Shah和沈春丽(2009)也提供了大量的世界范围内政府间转移支付体系的经验教训,与Bird和Smart(2002)的看法类似。
②传统公共财政理论对于区际互动的考虑局限于区际财政外部性,事实上对于转移支付或税收竞争所造成的区际经济互动的考虑还非常不够。
①参考龚六堂编著：公共财政理论.北京大学出版社,2009年1月第一版,第46页。
① Samulson在这两篇文章中,其实讨论的是转移支付(战争赔款或“马歇尔计划”中美国给予欧洲的无偿援助)对贸易的影响,冰山交易成本只不过是其中的一个分析工具。
②关于Fujita和Krugman模型关系的讨论见Fujita和Krugman (2004)。Krugman的分析还与Murphy、 Shleifer和Vishny (1989a.b)存在某些相似之处,他们通过多部门的同时扩展或某个收入充分广泛分布的主导型的扩张来分析市场的扩大,从而一个发展中国家可以通过采用收益递增技术提高盈利能力,构建工业化的“推动力量”。
①关于基础设施模型化的方法.更详细的解释见Martin和Rogers(1995).
②从博弈论的角度来看,这类似于囚徒困境中的纳什均衡,至于其中形成机理不在本文讨论之列。
①世界对农产品上的总支出(1-μ)Ew总大于任意区域的农产品产值pA(max{SL,1-SL})Lw.aA其中SL是北部劳动力在经济系统劳动力总量中所占份额。
②基础模型中的假设已说明,家庭同时扮演着消费者、劳动者和研究人员。并且将一个家庭看做一个消费主体。
①详见《剑桥欧洲经济史》第六卷《工业革命及以后：收入、人口以及技术革命》中的第一章和第五章。
① Baldwin (1999)所构建的资本创造(CC)模型描述了：在不存在要素区际流动的情况,产业份额的空间变动如何由资本的创造和耗费所引起。
①新增一单位资本就意味可以新建一个企业开始生产一种新的差异化产品。
②另外一种假设不存在技术溢出本地化而能得到相同结论的方法就是引入金钱外部性,正如Martin和Ottaviano(1996)所做的那样。模型中,创新部门需要制造产品,也会带来交易成本,因此如果产业集中度增加,创新部门中间投入品的成本将下降。
③ Audretsch和Feldman(1996)发现R&D活动比生产活动更易形成空间上的聚集,这与我们的模型一致。
①参见Baldwin (1998)和Baldwin等(1998)提出的经济增长和空间分布模型,由于资本不能自由流动,从而产生了突发性聚集。
①类似于前苏联和部分东欧国家采取的“休克疗法”：全民均分社会财富,至少是均分全民所有资产。
①这里我们假定新增企业的资本性收入在地区之间是平均分布的,因为东部地区、中西部地区以及全国资本的增长率都是一致的,见第三节第三部分的原理解释,关键在于资本创造部门是完全竞争、自由进出的。此原则在全章都成立。下文不再赘述。
①如果在模型中进一步引入消费异质性,即消费结构是收入水平的涵数,那么地区工业品支出份额就会存在差异.由此对区际实际收入差距就会产生影响,我们在第五章中加以了重点讨论。
②整理自郭鹏.我国居民消费结构升级的相关问题研究.江西社会科学,2007年第11期。
③在未来的研究中,我们将进一步拓展此系统模型的应用领域,并不断完善模型数值模拟的参数选择。
①因为创新能力、有效需求和市场信心这些概念,还没有非常合适的客观指标加以度量,而且数据难以收集,所以要对这些转移支付措施的政策效应进行评估是非常困难的,要对执行过程进行监控就更加困难了。
①政府层面的转移支付,最终将转变为落后地区政府对当地经济活动的补贴。
①在模型中,某一地区价格指数会随着本地企业数量的增加而下降,因为当地消费者可以更多地消费本地产品,从而节省了更多的运输成本。
②因为两个地区拥有不同的生产技术、消费者偏好或要素禀赋。
①具体推导过程见安虎森等编著：《新经济地理学原理》第四章的栏目2。
①详细分析参见安虎森等编著《新经济地理学原理》第一章第四节中的讨论。
①前文我们已经模型设定舍去了循环累积因果联系,也就排除了突发性集聚的情况,因此转移支付的实施史会影响内点均衡,所以不存在γ=1的情况。
①到目前为止,主要有如下三大类：CES、拟线性或对数线性。
①采用了对数线性效用函数,具体见本节第二部分。
②Glazer等(2003)在城市经济框架下讨论了两种不同类型消费者对城市聚集力的影响,给了本研究不少启示。
③因为在我们的模型设定,企业家和工人的收入水平是不同的,所以地区人口结构的变动将影响地区收入分配格局。
①参见Duranton和Puga(2004)对于生产聚集力的外部性的微观基础的讨论,主要区分为三种机制：共享机制、匹配机制和学习机制。
②技术外部性可以带来整个地区层面的规模收益递增,区别于企业层面的规模收益递增,它主要是源于一次性固定成本投资在生产中的永续性。
①当然前提是：此政策制定者深知并尊重市场经济运行的一系列必然率。
②这有可能是学习当年苏联的做法：政府以行政手段迫使生产向东部地区转移,将圣彼得堡等老工业区的经济比例从65%缩减到32%,以此提升东部地区的重要性,结果是在总体上造成了空间效率低下,削弱了国家的整体竞争力。
①其实我们可以在税率t前面增加一个大于l的新参数,参数的倒数形式就可以表征政府的财政效率.在未来的研究中,我们将做这方而的拓展。
①主要是税收优惠和特定补贴,最后的效果其实都形成了区际转移支付。
②本章的行文中,“西部地区“和“落后地区”是等同的。
③西部大开发十周年：财政支持西部大开发成效显著：http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2009-11/24/content_18944417.htm
①《中国统计年鉴2009》显示：1999年城镇和农村居民家庭恩格尔系数分别为42.1%和52.6%,而到了2008年分别下降到37.9%和43.7%。
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①转引自陈东琪,宋立等著.新一轮财政税收体制改革思路.北京：经济科学出版社,2009,第173页。
①本文将公共财政理论和财政学等同认识,不做细致区分。
②具体解释参见第三章第一节。
③一体化是指多个原来相互独立的主权实体通过某种方式逐步结合成为一个单一实体的过程。一体化过程既涉及国家间经济,也涉及政治、法律和文化,或整个社会的融合,是政治、经济、法律、社会、文化的一种全面互动过程。由于它涉及的主权实体间的相互融合,并最终成为一个在世界上具有主体资格的单一实体,因而它不同于一般意义上的国家间合作,涉及的也不仅仅是一般的国家间政治或经济关系。来自百度百科。
① Shah和沈春丽(2009)也提供了大量的世界范围内政府间转移支付体系的经验教训,与Bird和Smart(2002)的看法类似。
②传统公共财政理论对于区际互动的考虑局限于区际财政外部性,事实上对于转移支付或税收竞争所造成的区际经济互动的考虑还非常不够。
①参考龚六堂编著：公共财政理论.北京大学出版社,2009年1月第一版,第46页。
① Samulson在这两篇文章中,其实讨论的是转移支付(战争赔款或“马歇尔计划”中美国给予欧洲的无偿援助)对贸易的影响,冰山交易成本只不过是其中的一个分析工具。
②关于Fujita和Krugman模型关系的讨论见Fujita和Krugman (2004)。Krugman的分析还与Murphy、 Shleifer和Vishny (1989a.b)存在某些相似之处,他们通过多部门的同时扩展或某个收入充分广泛分布的主导型的扩张来分析市场的扩大,从而一个发展中国家可以通过采用收益递增技术提高盈利能力,构建工业化的“推动力量”。
①关于基础设施模型化的方法.更详细的解释见Martin和Rogers(1995).
②从博弈论的角度来看,这类似于囚徒困境中的纳什均衡,至于其中形成机理不在本文讨论之列。
①世界对农产品上的总支出(1-μ)Ew总大于任意区域的农产品产值pA(max{SL,1-SL})Lw.aA其中SL是北部劳动力在经济系统劳动力总量中所占份额。
②基础模型中的假设已说明,家庭同时扮演着消费者、劳动者和研究人员。并且将一个家庭看做一个消费主体。
①详见《剑桥欧洲经济史》第六卷《工业革命及以后：收入、人口以及技术革命》中的第一章和第五章。
① Baldwin (1999)所构建的资本创造(CC)模型描述了：在不存在要素区际流动的情况,产业份额的空间变动如何由资本的创造和耗费所引起。
①新增一单位资本就意味可以新建一个企业开始生产一种新的差异化产品。
②另外一种假设不存在技术溢出本地化而能得到相同结论的方法就是引入金钱外部性,正如Martin和Ottaviano(1996)所做的那样。模型中,创新部门需要制造产品,也会带来交易成本,因此如果产业集中度增加,创新部门中间投入品的成本将下降。
③ Audretsch和Feldman(1996)发现R&D活动比生产活动更易形成空间上的聚集,这与我们的模型一致。
①参见Baldwin (1998)和Baldwin等(1998)提出的经济增长和空间分布模型,由于资本不能自由流动,从而产生了突发性聚集。
①类似于前苏联和部分东欧国家采取的“休克疗法”：全民均分社会财富,至少是均分全民所有资产。
①这里我们假定新增企业的资本性收入在地区之间是平均分布的,因为东部地区、中西部地区以及全国资本的增长率都是一致的,见第三节第三部分的原理解释,关键在于资本创造部门是完全竞争、自由进出的。此原则在全章都成立。下文不再赘述。
①如果在模型中进一步引入消费异质性,即消费结构是收入水平的涵数,那么地区工业品支出份额就会存在差异.由此对区际实际收入差距就会产生影响,我们在第五章中加以了重点讨论。
②整理自郭鹏.我国居民消费结构升级的相关问题研究.江西社会科学,2007年第11期。
③在未来的研究中,我们将进一步拓展此系统模型的应用领域,并不断完善模型数值模拟的参数选择。
①因为创新能力、有效需求和市场信心这些概念,还没有非常合适的客观指标加以度量,而且数据难以收集,所以要对这些转移支付措施的政策效应进行评估是非常困难的,要对执行过程进行监控就更加困难了。
①政府层面的转移支付,最终将转变为落后地区政府对当地经济活动的补贴。
①在模型中,某一地区价格指数会随着本地企业数量的增加而下降,因为当地消费者可以更多地消费本地产品,从而节省了更多的运输成本。
②因为两个地区拥有不同的生产技术、消费者偏好或要素禀赋。
①具体推导过程见安虎森等编著：《新经济地理学原理》第四章的栏目2。
①详细分析参见安虎森等编著《新经济地理学原理》第一章第四节中的讨论。
①前文我们已经模型设定舍去了循环累积因果联系,也就排除了突发性集聚的情况,因此转移支付的实施史会影响内点均衡,所以不存在γ=1的情况。
①到目前为止,主要有如下三大类：CES、拟线性或对数线性。
①采用了对数线性效用函数,具体见本节第二部分。
②Glazer等(2003)在城市经济框架下讨论了两种不同类型消费者对城市聚集力的影响,给了本研究不少启示。
③因为在我们的模型设定,企业家和工人的收入水平是不同的,所以地区人口结构的变动将影响地区收入分配格局。
①参见Duranton和Puga(2004)对于生产聚集力的外部性的微观基础的讨论,主要区分为三种机制：共享机制、匹配机制和学习机制。
②技术外部性可以带来整个地区层面的规模收益递增,区别于企业层面的规模收益递增,它主要是源于一次性固定成本投资在生产中的永续性。
①当然前提是：此政策制定者深知并尊重市场经济运行的一系列必然率。
②这有可能是学习当年苏联的做法：政府以行政手段迫使生产向东部地区转移,将圣彼得堡等老工业区的经济比例从65%缩减到32%,以此提升东部地区的重要性,结果是在总体上造成了空间效率低下,削弱了国家的整体竞争力。
①其实我们可以在税率t前面增加一个大于l的新参数,参数的倒数形式就可以表征政府的财政效率.在未来的研究中,我们将做这方而的拓展。
①主要是税收优惠和特定补贴,最后的效果其实都形成了区际转移支付。
②本章的行文中,“西部地区“和“落后地区”是等同的。
③西部大开发十周年：财政支持西部大开发成效显著：http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2009-11/24/content_18944417.htm
①《中国统计年鉴2009》显示：1999年城镇和农村居民家庭恩格尔系数分别为42.1%和52.6%,而到了2008年分别下降到37.9%和43.7%。
①萨缪尔森曾说过,过去40年来经济学的主要的令人失望之处是未能以经济计量的证据去解决争端。参见《新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典》第三卷第258页。
①图洛克(Tullock.G.)著.收入再分配的经济学.第二版.范飞.刘琨译.上海：上海人民出版社.2008,第5页。