北方新一轮集体林权制度改革：动因、路径与绩效
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摘要
林业是我国国民经济的重要产业,它不仅为人们提供各类林业产品,更是生态环境的保护屏障,林业对于山区经济的发展起到至关重要的作用。长期以来,林业制度改革严重滞后于同期的农业制度改革,北方集体林区“责、权、利”不明晰,林业经营机制不健全,利益分配不合理等问题普遍存在,农民的林业生产经营积极性不高、林业收益低,抑制了林业生产力的进一步发展。为了解决林权不明晰等问题,满足农民对林权制度的需求,北方集体林区于2005年3月首先在辽宁省进行新一轮集体林权制度改革的试点工作,并于2008年全面展开。那么,新一轮集体林权制度改革的动因是什么?路径有哪些?不同改革路径下,林权制度改革的绩效如何?即林权制度改革是否通过不同的改革路径,提高了农民的林业生产积极性,改变其林业生产行为,增加了林业收入?等问题亟待解决。因此,研究先行省份的林权制度变迁动因与路径,客观评价改革绩效,总结改革过程中的经验与不足就显得尤为迫切和必要。
本研究以制度经济学、博弈论为基础,构建“林改路径——农户行为——经济绩效”的分析框架,揭示集体林权制度改革通过不同的改革路径对农户行为及微观经济绩效影响的过程。从积极型、从众型、被动型三个方面分析农户林业生产的决策模式与过程,试图探讨集体林权制度改革对农户生产决策的影响机理。构建改革的动因模型,分析新一轮集体林权制度改革的动因。总结新一轮集体林权制度改革路径,依据路径依赖理论,探讨其形成机理,并利用调研数据,对路径选择的影响因素进行实证分析。在上述分析框架下,运用Hechmann二阶段决策模型、Faustman林木收益模型和Cobb-Douglas生产函数模型等,从实证角度探讨集体林权制度改革的绩效。
运用集体林权制度改革双层次互动进化博弈模型分析表明：集体林权制度改革是在中央政府与地方政府的宏观层次博弈、地方政府与农民的微观层次博弈以及两个层次互动进化博弈过程中不断向前推进的。集体林权制度改革方案的制定要同时考虑三方博弈主体的利益。从林权供需角度分析林权制度改革成因表明：经济利益的刺激和诱导、森林资源的稀缺性以及林业生产效率的提高成为林权改革的重要动因。
按照辽宁省实际的林权制度改革以及调研的具体情况,对改革的路径进行总结和分类,不同改革路径选择的影响因素也有所不同。承包期、地块与农户家庭的距离、林龄、地块面积、户主受教育年限等对于农户选择改革路径起到显著的影响。不同的改革路径,对农户的生产行为影响不一。从生产意愿的角度：农户更愿意对商品林进行生产；家庭经营的农户比联户经营的农户生产积极性更高；相较于其他几种林权获取途径,农户更愿意在自留山上进行林业生产。从林业生产投劳角度：商品林和家庭经营的改革路径对农户林业生产投劳具有显著的正向影响；相较于承包这种林权获取途径,自留山、竞价拍卖获得林权的途径对林业生产投劳影响更为显著。从农户林业管护投劳行为角度：公益林确权和联户经营的方式对管护投劳具有显著的正向影响；相较于流转这种林权获取途径,自留山、竞价拍卖以及承包方式对农户进行林业管护投劳具有正向影响。从农户林业生产投资角度：家庭经营对农户生产投资决策有显著的正向影响,家庭经营的地块投资规模要大于联户经营。
集体林权制度改革的微观经济绩效分析表明：农户林业收入差距较大,主要由于集体林权制度改革路径不同,给农户带来的林权组合有所差异,导致农户林业生产行为不同,部分农户积极的进行生产,部分农户仍处于观望态度,使得农户的林业总收入产生显著差异。农户林业生产行为对林业收入影响的实证分析表明,无论对于现期收入还是潜在收入,管护投劳对林业收入产生显著的负向影响；生产投劳、林地面积、农户林业生产投资与林业收入呈显著的正相关关系。
根据研究结论,本文提出在集体林权制度配套改革的推进过程中,应建立科学的采伐限额制度和良好的林权流转体制,促使农户合理流转林地,规模经营,按期获取林业收益；要加大生态公益林的补偿和开发力度,提高农户进行管护和林下多种经营的积极性；拓宽林区金融产品,增加农户筹融资渠道,增强农户投资积极性与可能性,从而提高农户林业收入,进一步完善北方地区集体林权制度改革。
Forestry is an important industryof national economy in China, not only provides all kinds of forest products to people, but also is the protective barrier of ecological environment, who plays a crucial role in economy development of mountainous area. For a long time, forest tenure reform lags behind synchronous agriculture tenure reform seriously, and interests, rights, responsibilities and are not clear, forest management mechanism is not perfect, and distribution of interests is not reasonable in collective forest area of North China, which causes farmers' forestry production and operation enthusiasm is not high, forest income is low, and becomes the shackles of the forestry productivity further development. In order to solve such problem and comply with the forest right's requirements for farmers, North collective forest area began the pilot work of the new round of collective forest tenure reform in Liaoning province in March 2005, and then started in full swing in 2008. So, what's the motivation of new round of collective forest tenure reform? How about the paths? In different paths, how is the performance of reform? Whether the collective forest tenure reform increases farmers'forestry production enthusiasm, changes their behavior, and increases their forest income under different paths? These questions are demanding prompt solution. Therefore, it is very important that research collective forest tenure reform's motivation, path of pilot province, appraise the performance of reform and summarize the experience and shortage in reform process.
This paper establishes analytical framework of "institution-behavior-performance" to make known that transmission mechanism of collective forest tenure reform, farmer's behavior and economic perforemance in the foundation of institutional economics and game theory. It constructs motivation model of reform analyzes the motivation of the new round of collective forest tenure reform. It probes the new round of collective forest tenure reform path and its formation mechanism based on path dependence theory and makes an empirical analysis on path selection influencing factors using investigation data. And then it analyzes farmer's forestry production decision mode and process from three parts of positive, conforming and passive types and probes the influence mechanism of reform on farmer's decision. Under the analytical framework, it uses Heckmann two-step decision model, Faustman trees revenue model and Cobb-Douglas production function to investigate the performance of reform from the perspective of empirical analysis.
The result of two-level evolutionary game model analyse shows that the collective forest tenure reform is constantly advancing through the macro-level game between central government and local government, the micro-level game between local government and farmers, and the game from the two-level interaction evolution. The reform scheme must consider the interests of the tripartite game subjects simultaneously. From the perspective of supplyment and demandment of forest rights, the reform's motivation are excitement and induction of economic interests, scarcity of forest resources and the elevation of forestry production efficiency.
According to the actual forest tenure reform in Liaoning province and the concrete conditions of investigation, it summarizes and classifies the reform paths, and discovers that different paths have different influencing factors. Contract period, the distance between forestland and farmer's house, age of stand, forestland area and householder's education year play a significant impact on farmer's selection to reform paths. Different paths have different influence on farmer's production behavior. In the perspective of production willing, farmer persues production in commercial forest; the farmer's production enthusiasm for household management is higher than group-household management's; compareing with other forest right acquirement ways, farmer enjoys production in hilly land allotted for private use. In the perspective of inputting labors in forestry production, farmer puts in more labors in commercial forest and forestland of household management; compareing with contract, more labors are input in forestland acquired by competitive auction or hilly land allotted for private use. In the perspective of inputting labors in forestry manage and protect, farmer puts in more labors in public welfare forest and forestland of household management; compareing with circulation, more labors are input in forestland acquired by competitive auction and contract and hilly land allotted for private use. In the perspective of investment, household management has positive effect on investment decision and scale.
Farmer's forestry production economic performance analysis shows that the reason of farmers'forestry income differential is different paths give different forest rights combination, which makes farmer's production behavior different. Some farmers are positive for production and others maintain wait-and-see attitude, causes the income of farmers different. The effect of farmer's production behavior on forestry income indicates that labors inputting in forestry manage and protect have a significant negative impact on either current income or potential income, and labors inputting in forestry production, forestland area and investment have positive influence.
Based on the conclusion, this paper suggests that in the process of collective forest tenure coordinated reform, it should establish scientific cutting quota system and nice forest right circulation system, promote farmers circulate forestland properly and scale management, and obtain forestry gains on schedule; increase compensation and development efforts on the ecological public welfare forest, and improve farmer's enthusiasm to manage and protect forest; widen forest financial products, increase farmers financing channels, enhance their enthusiasm and possibility of investing, thus improve farmer's forestry income and further perfect the collective forest tenure reform in North China.
本研究以制度经济学、博弈论为基础,构建“林改路径——农户行为——经济绩效”的分析框架,揭示集体林权制度改革通过不同的改革路径对农户行为及微观经济绩效影响的过程。从积极型、从众型、被动型三个方面分析农户林业生产的决策模式与过程,试图探讨集体林权制度改革对农户生产决策的影响机理。构建改革的动因模型,分析新一轮集体林权制度改革的动因。总结新一轮集体林权制度改革路径,依据路径依赖理论,探讨其形成机理,并利用调研数据,对路径选择的影响因素进行实证分析。在上述分析框架下,运用Hechmann二阶段决策模型、Faustman林木收益模型和Cobb-Douglas生产函数模型等,从实证角度探讨集体林权制度改革的绩效。
运用集体林权制度改革双层次互动进化博弈模型分析表明：集体林权制度改革是在中央政府与地方政府的宏观层次博弈、地方政府与农民的微观层次博弈以及两个层次互动进化博弈过程中不断向前推进的。集体林权制度改革方案的制定要同时考虑三方博弈主体的利益。从林权供需角度分析林权制度改革成因表明：经济利益的刺激和诱导、森林资源的稀缺性以及林业生产效率的提高成为林权改革的重要动因。
按照辽宁省实际的林权制度改革以及调研的具体情况,对改革的路径进行总结和分类,不同改革路径选择的影响因素也有所不同。承包期、地块与农户家庭的距离、林龄、地块面积、户主受教育年限等对于农户选择改革路径起到显著的影响。不同的改革路径,对农户的生产行为影响不一。从生产意愿的角度：农户更愿意对商品林进行生产；家庭经营的农户比联户经营的农户生产积极性更高；相较于其他几种林权获取途径,农户更愿意在自留山上进行林业生产。从林业生产投劳角度：商品林和家庭经营的改革路径对农户林业生产投劳具有显著的正向影响；相较于承包这种林权获取途径,自留山、竞价拍卖获得林权的途径对林业生产投劳影响更为显著。从农户林业管护投劳行为角度：公益林确权和联户经营的方式对管护投劳具有显著的正向影响；相较于流转这种林权获取途径,自留山、竞价拍卖以及承包方式对农户进行林业管护投劳具有正向影响。从农户林业生产投资角度：家庭经营对农户生产投资决策有显著的正向影响,家庭经营的地块投资规模要大于联户经营。
集体林权制度改革的微观经济绩效分析表明：农户林业收入差距较大,主要由于集体林权制度改革路径不同,给农户带来的林权组合有所差异,导致农户林业生产行为不同,部分农户积极的进行生产,部分农户仍处于观望态度,使得农户的林业总收入产生显著差异。农户林业生产行为对林业收入影响的实证分析表明,无论对于现期收入还是潜在收入,管护投劳对林业收入产生显著的负向影响；生产投劳、林地面积、农户林业生产投资与林业收入呈显著的正相关关系。
根据研究结论,本文提出在集体林权制度配套改革的推进过程中,应建立科学的采伐限额制度和良好的林权流转体制,促使农户合理流转林地,规模经营,按期获取林业收益；要加大生态公益林的补偿和开发力度,提高农户进行管护和林下多种经营的积极性；拓宽林区金融产品,增加农户筹融资渠道,增强农户投资积极性与可能性,从而提高农户林业收入,进一步完善北方地区集体林权制度改革。
Forestry is an important industryof national economy in China, not only provides all kinds of forest products to people, but also is the protective barrier of ecological environment, who plays a crucial role in economy development of mountainous area. For a long time, forest tenure reform lags behind synchronous agriculture tenure reform seriously, and interests, rights, responsibilities and are not clear, forest management mechanism is not perfect, and distribution of interests is not reasonable in collective forest area of North China, which causes farmers' forestry production and operation enthusiasm is not high, forest income is low, and becomes the shackles of the forestry productivity further development. In order to solve such problem and comply with the forest right's requirements for farmers, North collective forest area began the pilot work of the new round of collective forest tenure reform in Liaoning province in March 2005, and then started in full swing in 2008. So, what's the motivation of new round of collective forest tenure reform? How about the paths? In different paths, how is the performance of reform? Whether the collective forest tenure reform increases farmers'forestry production enthusiasm, changes their behavior, and increases their forest income under different paths? These questions are demanding prompt solution. Therefore, it is very important that research collective forest tenure reform's motivation, path of pilot province, appraise the performance of reform and summarize the experience and shortage in reform process.
This paper establishes analytical framework of "institution-behavior-performance" to make known that transmission mechanism of collective forest tenure reform, farmer's behavior and economic perforemance in the foundation of institutional economics and game theory. It constructs motivation model of reform analyzes the motivation of the new round of collective forest tenure reform. It probes the new round of collective forest tenure reform path and its formation mechanism based on path dependence theory and makes an empirical analysis on path selection influencing factors using investigation data. And then it analyzes farmer's forestry production decision mode and process from three parts of positive, conforming and passive types and probes the influence mechanism of reform on farmer's decision. Under the analytical framework, it uses Heckmann two-step decision model, Faustman trees revenue model and Cobb-Douglas production function to investigate the performance of reform from the perspective of empirical analysis.
The result of two-level evolutionary game model analyse shows that the collective forest tenure reform is constantly advancing through the macro-level game between central government and local government, the micro-level game between local government and farmers, and the game from the two-level interaction evolution. The reform scheme must consider the interests of the tripartite game subjects simultaneously. From the perspective of supplyment and demandment of forest rights, the reform's motivation are excitement and induction of economic interests, scarcity of forest resources and the elevation of forestry production efficiency.
According to the actual forest tenure reform in Liaoning province and the concrete conditions of investigation, it summarizes and classifies the reform paths, and discovers that different paths have different influencing factors. Contract period, the distance between forestland and farmer's house, age of stand, forestland area and householder's education year play a significant impact on farmer's selection to reform paths. Different paths have different influence on farmer's production behavior. In the perspective of production willing, farmer persues production in commercial forest; the farmer's production enthusiasm for household management is higher than group-household management's; compareing with other forest right acquirement ways, farmer enjoys production in hilly land allotted for private use. In the perspective of inputting labors in forestry production, farmer puts in more labors in commercial forest and forestland of household management; compareing with contract, more labors are input in forestland acquired by competitive auction or hilly land allotted for private use. In the perspective of inputting labors in forestry manage and protect, farmer puts in more labors in public welfare forest and forestland of household management; compareing with circulation, more labors are input in forestland acquired by competitive auction and contract and hilly land allotted for private use. In the perspective of investment, household management has positive effect on investment decision and scale.
Farmer's forestry production economic performance analysis shows that the reason of farmers'forestry income differential is different paths give different forest rights combination, which makes farmer's production behavior different. Some farmers are positive for production and others maintain wait-and-see attitude, causes the income of farmers different. The effect of farmer's production behavior on forestry income indicates that labors inputting in forestry manage and protect have a significant negative impact on either current income or potential income, and labors inputting in forestry production, forestland area and investment have positive influence.
Based on the conclusion, this paper suggests that in the process of collective forest tenure coordinated reform, it should establish scientific cutting quota system and nice forest right circulation system, promote farmers circulate forestland properly and scale management, and obtain forestry gains on schedule; increase compensation and development efforts on the ecological public welfare forest, and improve farmer's enthusiasm to manage and protect forest; widen forest financial products, increase farmers financing channels, enhance their enthusiasm and possibility of investing, thus improve farmer's forestry income and further perfect the collective forest tenure reform in North China.
引文
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