排污权交易制度研究
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摘要
环境问题排污权交易作为解决环境问题的经济手段之一,其核心思想是:在满足环境质量的前提下,确立合法的污染物排污权利即排污权,并允许这种权利像商品那样交易,以此进行污染物的排放控制。排污权交易制度首先被美国用于大气污染源及河流污染管理,而后德国、澳大利亚、英国等国相继进行了排污权交易的实践。我国自20世纪80年代中后期开始探索建立排污权交易制度,经过多年的实践取得了一些经验。进入21世纪以来,我国对环境保护的重视程度越来越高,在科学发展观的指导下,建立和完善排污权交易制度成为节能减排、保护环境和实施可持续发展的重要手段。
Environmental issue is not only a social problem, but also an economic issue. From an economic point of view, the root causes of environmental problems are external. Since the market mechanism is based on the private property rights, environmental polluters (including businesses, organizations and individuals) seldom pay for their damage to the environment while using public resources, which leads to an inconsistency between the private cost and social cost. In order to solve environmental problems and to eliminate externalities, Pigou and Coase put forward two ways to solve environmental problems: Pigou propounding externalities are internalized through taxation in distribution so that private costs and social costs can be equal, therefore solutions to environmental problems can be found and a maximized welfare can be realized; Coase believing that property rights should be clearly defined to reduce transaction costs, so that externalities can be internalized in the transaction process between the two sides, therefore unclear property rights of "free-rider" and external issues can be resolved to the source.
As an economic means of resolving environmental problems, Emissions Trading was proposed by American economists—Dales in 1970s. The core idea is that emission rights should be established on the premise of good environmental quality, and allow such rights to be transacted as goods, by which way the emission process can be under control. The essence of Emissions trading aims to take pollution as a kind of property rights; through polluters transacting these rights, effectively achieve the total pollutant discharge control; encourage businesses to employ lower-cost and better-effect measures to control pollution. At the same time, it can also encourage enterprises to adopt new technologies and take the road of intensive production.
From a practical point of view, almost all countries have implemented a number of environmental economic instruments to protect the environment and control the pollution, which mainly includes sewage charges, sewage tax, emissions trading and so on. The idea of emissions trading, after it is raised up, was firstly implemented by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for air pollution control and river pollution management. In the United States, the emissions trading system is gradually developed from a compensation system, early policies of which include offset, bubble, banking and netting and other policies. Marked by the implement of "Acid Rain Program" in 1990, the United States established a nationwide institutionalized emissions trading system, forming a truly market-oriented mechanisms for emissions trading.
America is the first country to successfully implement the emissions trading system. America, with its sound legal system of emission trading, water-tight market mechanisms of emissions trading, different environmental policies, positive response from enterprise and the public set a good example for other countries and regions to follow. Later on, Germany, Australia, Britain and other countries have carried out the practice of emission trading.
Another successful application of Emissions trading theories and ideas is in the world's greenhouse gas emission reduction mechanisms. To cope with global warming, under the guidance of the principle of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol clearly defined the responsibility and aims of reducing emissions of greenhouse gas as well as three flexible mechanisms to fulfill the convention. They are Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and Emission Trade (ET). In essence, these three mechanisms are all in the scope of emissions trading, aiming to reduce the costs of greenhouse gas emission under the condition that total amount of greenhouse gas emission is clear. It can be said that the three flexible mechanisms of Kyoto are successful application of emissions trading system in the international multilateral environment, which not only provide a space for developed countries to cut greenhouse gas emissions, but also provide an effective way for developing countries with lower emission costs to get investment and technology.
Since 1980s, China has began to explore effective ways to solve environmental problems, such as the total amount control, sewage charges, emission permits, emissions trading to solve environmental problems. Through the easy-to-digest and repeated experiments and practice, China gradually made clear the scope, characteristics, the basic framework and the relevant policies of the application of emissions trading system to solve environmental problems. However, due to the constraints of the level of economic development, ideas, concepts, and the legal system, emissions trading system does not become a widely used means of solving environmental problems.
In the new century, with the socio-economic development in our country, our country is faced with an increasingly serious problem of resources and environmental in our developmental process, and the establishment of an emissions trading system in our country becomes an important direction to improve environmental protection policy systems and measure systems. In recent years, many provinces, regions and municipalities have realized that the active role of emissions trading system in environmental protection and governance. Local laws and regulations have been introduced to establish an emissions trading system. Especially, the exploration has been deepened in regional water pollution control and prevention and in treatment of sulfur dioxide pilot.
2007 American Ministry of Finance and the State Environmental Protection Administration launched a new round of experiments, which focused on two aspects: one is the establishment of a system of emission permits in order to control air pollution caused by sulfur dioxide emissions from electric power companies, and the other is emissions trading in the areas of water pollution caused by COD. In this paper, three typical cases of emissions trading scheme will be mainly analyzed. They are establishment of emissions trading platform in Jiaxing province, discussing the influence of emission trading system on COD reduction in a wide range of pollution, with a target to build the core of the Center for emissions trading; the case of Taihu Lake drainage basin, Jiangsu Province, COD emission reduction experimental unit, focusing on its management and operating mechanisms from the perspectives of relevant policies and regulations; the case of emissions trading about SO2 reduction in electric power industry, focusing on analysis of historical evolution in China’s SO2 control policies, as well as SO2 emissions permit trading system and its related issues in the thermal power sector.
Overall, China's emissions trading experimental unit has achieved positive results, basically establishing the general framework and different policies of emissions trading systems for different sources of pollution, different regions, and different industries. Especially in the regional water pollution control and prevention and treatment of sulfur dioxide in power industry, a prototype of emissions trading policy and system has been created. At the same time, there exist some problems in emissions trading pilot, mainly including the following: First, emissions trading policy and regulations are not sound; Second, the quota allocation of emission rights are imperfect with too much government intervention; Third, emissions monitoring and supervision capacity are inadequate; Forth, emissions trading market is in a small scale, the market mechanism has not fully play its role; Fifth deficient emission reduction technology and limited emission rights restricted the development of emissions trading market; Sixth, the relationship between current environmental policies and emission trading rights are unclear, in particular the right of sewage and sewage charges in the price formation mechanism has not straightened out.
In order to further establish and improve the emissions trading system, a framework with China’s characteristics of emissions trading system should be established. According to China's situation, determine the region of emissions trading, emissions trading targets, means of the initial allocation of emission permits, total emissions amount, emissions trading auditing and monitoring mechanisms. To achieve this goal, our country should take the following measures: First, to speed up the establishment of emission trading system; Second, fasten the establishment of law system of emission trading; Third, improve the management system of pollution sources and management ability; Fourth, establish a fair and reasonable mechanism for initial allocation of emission quotas; Fifth, strengthen the creation of technical supporting system such as the emissions trading platform; Sixth, establish a fair and reasonable allotment of emission quotas; Seventh, take effective measures to improve the growth of emission trading market and improve the efficiency of market allocation of environmental resources; Eighth, put forward the emission trading system in an orderly way, uphold the principles of easier coming first, active and steady progress and of a breakthrough in key part.
Environmental issue is not only a social problem, but also an economic issue. From an economic point of view, the root causes of environmental problems are external. Since the market mechanism is based on the private property rights, environmental polluters (including businesses, organizations and individuals) seldom pay for their damage to the environment while using public resources, which leads to an inconsistency between the private cost and social cost. In order to solve environmental problems and to eliminate externalities, Pigou and Coase put forward two ways to solve environmental problems: Pigou propounding externalities are internalized through taxation in distribution so that private costs and social costs can be equal, therefore solutions to environmental problems can be found and a maximized welfare can be realized; Coase believing that property rights should be clearly defined to reduce transaction costs, so that externalities can be internalized in the transaction process between the two sides, therefore unclear property rights of "free-rider" and external issues can be resolved to the source.
As an economic means of resolving environmental problems, Emissions Trading was proposed by American economists—Dales in 1970s. The core idea is that emission rights should be established on the premise of good environmental quality, and allow such rights to be transacted as goods, by which way the emission process can be under control. The essence of Emissions trading aims to take pollution as a kind of property rights; through polluters transacting these rights, effectively achieve the total pollutant discharge control; encourage businesses to employ lower-cost and better-effect measures to control pollution. At the same time, it can also encourage enterprises to adopt new technologies and take the road of intensive production.
From a practical point of view, almost all countries have implemented a number of environmental economic instruments to protect the environment and control the pollution, which mainly includes sewage charges, sewage tax, emissions trading and so on. The idea of emissions trading, after it is raised up, was firstly implemented by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for air pollution control and river pollution management. In the United States, the emissions trading system is gradually developed from a compensation system, early policies of which include offset, bubble, banking and netting and other policies. Marked by the implement of "Acid Rain Program" in 1990, the United States established a nationwide institutionalized emissions trading system, forming a truly market-oriented mechanisms for emissions trading.
America is the first country to successfully implement the emissions trading system. America, with its sound legal system of emission trading, water-tight market mechanisms of emissions trading, different environmental policies, positive response from enterprise and the public set a good example for other countries and regions to follow. Later on, Germany, Australia, Britain and other countries have carried out the practice of emission trading.
Another successful application of Emissions trading theories and ideas is in the world's greenhouse gas emission reduction mechanisms. To cope with global warming, under the guidance of the principle of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol clearly defined the responsibility and aims of reducing emissions of greenhouse gas as well as three flexible mechanisms to fulfill the convention. They are Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and Emission Trade (ET). In essence, these three mechanisms are all in the scope of emissions trading, aiming to reduce the costs of greenhouse gas emission under the condition that total amount of greenhouse gas emission is clear. It can be said that the three flexible mechanisms of Kyoto are successful application of emissions trading system in the international multilateral environment, which not only provide a space for developed countries to cut greenhouse gas emissions, but also provide an effective way for developing countries with lower emission costs to get investment and technology.
Since 1980s, China has began to explore effective ways to solve environmental problems, such as the total amount control, sewage charges, emission permits, emissions trading to solve environmental problems. Through the easy-to-digest and repeated experiments and practice, China gradually made clear the scope, characteristics, the basic framework and the relevant policies of the application of emissions trading system to solve environmental problems. However, due to the constraints of the level of economic development, ideas, concepts, and the legal system, emissions trading system does not become a widely used means of solving environmental problems.
In the new century, with the socio-economic development in our country, our country is faced with an increasingly serious problem of resources and environmental in our developmental process, and the establishment of an emissions trading system in our country becomes an important direction to improve environmental protection policy systems and measure systems. In recent years, many provinces, regions and municipalities have realized that the active role of emissions trading system in environmental protection and governance. Local laws and regulations have been introduced to establish an emissions trading system. Especially, the exploration has been deepened in regional water pollution control and prevention and in treatment of sulfur dioxide pilot.
2007 American Ministry of Finance and the State Environmental Protection Administration launched a new round of experiments, which focused on two aspects: one is the establishment of a system of emission permits in order to control air pollution caused by sulfur dioxide emissions from electric power companies, and the other is emissions trading in the areas of water pollution caused by COD. In this paper, three typical cases of emissions trading scheme will be mainly analyzed. They are establishment of emissions trading platform in Jiaxing province, discussing the influence of emission trading system on COD reduction in a wide range of pollution, with a target to build the core of the Center for emissions trading; the case of Taihu Lake drainage basin, Jiangsu Province, COD emission reduction experimental unit, focusing on its management and operating mechanisms from the perspectives of relevant policies and regulations; the case of emissions trading about SO2 reduction in electric power industry, focusing on analysis of historical evolution in China’s SO2 control policies, as well as SO2 emissions permit trading system and its related issues in the thermal power sector.
Overall, China's emissions trading experimental unit has achieved positive results, basically establishing the general framework and different policies of emissions trading systems for different sources of pollution, different regions, and different industries. Especially in the regional water pollution control and prevention and treatment of sulfur dioxide in power industry, a prototype of emissions trading policy and system has been created. At the same time, there exist some problems in emissions trading pilot, mainly including the following: First, emissions trading policy and regulations are not sound; Second, the quota allocation of emission rights are imperfect with too much government intervention; Third, emissions monitoring and supervision capacity are inadequate; Forth, emissions trading market is in a small scale, the market mechanism has not fully play its role; Fifth deficient emission reduction technology and limited emission rights restricted the development of emissions trading market; Sixth, the relationship between current environmental policies and emission trading rights are unclear, in particular the right of sewage and sewage charges in the price formation mechanism has not straightened out.
In order to further establish and improve the emissions trading system, a framework with China’s characteristics of emissions trading system should be established. According to China's situation, determine the region of emissions trading, emissions trading targets, means of the initial allocation of emission permits, total emissions amount, emissions trading auditing and monitoring mechanisms. To achieve this goal, our country should take the following measures: First, to speed up the establishment of emission trading system; Second, fasten the establishment of law system of emission trading; Third, improve the management system of pollution sources and management ability; Fourth, establish a fair and reasonable mechanism for initial allocation of emission quotas; Fifth, strengthen the creation of technical supporting system such as the emissions trading platform; Sixth, establish a fair and reasonable allotment of emission quotas; Seventh, take effective measures to improve the growth of emission trading market and improve the efficiency of market allocation of environmental resources; Eighth, put forward the emission trading system in an orderly way, uphold the principles of easier coming first, active and steady progress and of a breakthrough in key part.
引文
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