制造商视角的供应链激励合约设计
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摘要
作为一个跨企业组织,供应链由多个具有不同利益的利益主体所构成。这些主体之间的利益不一致性导致了供应链激励与协调问题,而信息不对称更是增加了该问题的解决难度。针对这一问题,本文站在制造商的角度,采取理论研究、对比研究相结合的方法,研究了针对供应商、分销商的激励合约设计问题。论文研究工作体现在以下几个主要方面：
第一,针对如何促进供应商提高原材料或零部件供应质量的激励合约设计问题,考虑到固定支付机制、奖励机制、惩罚机制等三种不同的激励机制,构建了多机制融合下的供应商质量激励模型。结果显示：信息非对称条件下最优激励合约应为以上三种机制的适当组合；且上述三种机制存在如下匹配关系：高固定支付与高惩罚、低奖励机制相匹配;而低固定支付与低惩罚、高奖励机制相匹配。
第二,针对如何促进供应商提高产品质量与准时交货率的双目标激励合约设计问题,考虑到固定支付机制、奖励机制和惩罚机制,构建了质量与交货期联合激励模型。结果表明：最优合约仍为上述三种机制的适当组合,并且这些机制之间存在着一定的相互匹配关系。进一步地,本文还阐明了质量合格率、准时交货率之间的任务替代性对最优激励合约的影响机理。
第三,针对供应商生产成本信息隐瞒问题,采用显示原理,构建了相应的成本信息甄别模型,得到了能够“自我实施”的合约菜单。结果显示：经过适当设计的最优合约菜单(而不是单一合约)可以促进供应商如实共享成本信息,实现信息甄别——这为制造商控制采购成本、增加产品利润提供了决策理论和决策支持。进一步地,本文还给出了合约菜单的设计原理,并对其有效性进行了理论分析与仿真验证。
第四,针对不同风险偏好假设下的分销商服务水平激励合约设计问题,基于线性分享合约,构建了四种不同风险偏好组合下的统一模型。结果表明：分销商越是风险规避,制造商收益越低。这表明制造商在选择分销商时对其风险偏好的考察是重要的。
第五,针对具有外部竞争的分销商服务水平激励合约设计问题,构建了基于线性分享机制的激励模型,阐明了最优激励合约的配置机理。结果表明：外部竞争始终是促进分销商提高服务水平的强大驱动力量。同时,信息非对称条件下,分销商之间适当的市场竞争将降低制造商由于信息缺乏所导致的损失,从而使制造商坐收“渔翁之利”。
第六,针对分销商服务水平激励与需求信息共享双目标激励合约设计问题,采用线性分享机制,构建了相应的双目标激励模型,得到了最优合约并对其进行了特征刻画。结果显示：双目标激励环境下经过适当设计的合约菜单(而不是单一合约)可以同时实现以上两个目标。进一步地,本文还给出了双目标激励环境下该合约菜单的设计原理、设计模型及其算法。
本文的研究结果,可以为制造商与供应商、分销商开展业务合作提供相应的决策理论、模型和算法支持。
As across enterprise organization, supply chain consists of multiple different interest subjects. Interest inconsistency between these different subjects yields the issue of how to motivate and coordinate the different members of supply chain to efficiently cooperate. Further, information asymmetry adds difficulty to the settlement of the issue of supply chain coordination. From the manufacturer's perspective, the issue of how to design incentive contract to motivate the supplier and the retailer to efficiently cooperate with the manufacturer are discussed using theoretical research and comparative study. The main works in the paper are presented as follows.
(1) For the issue of the supplier's quality incentive contract design, considering fixed-transfer mechanism, incentive scheme and punishment mechanism, the supplier's quality incentive model with the merged multiple mechanisms is proposed. The results show the optimal incentive contract concludes the above three mechanisms and the matching relationship among the three mechanisms are as follows. High fixed-transfer matches with high punishment and low bonus; low transfer matches with low punishment and high bonus.
(2) For the problem of the supplier's quality and punctual delivery incentive contract design, considering fixed-transfer mechanism, incentive scheme and punishment mechanism, the coalition incentive model for improving quality and punctual delivery is established. Then the solution of the model and the optimal contract are studied. The results show the optimal contract is also the combination of the above three mechanisms. Further, the influence of the substitutable relationship between the rate of quality and on-time delivery (OTD) on the optimal contract is explained.
(3) For the problem of how to motivate the supplier to disclose cost information, using revelation principle, information discrimination model is created and the solution leads to the self-enforcing contract menu. The contract menu designed appropriately can motivate the supplier to share his true cost information and realize information discrimination, which offer the manufacturer decision theory and decision support to control purchasing cost and increase profits. In addition, design theory of contract menu is given in the paper. Further, theory analysis and numerical simulation are conducted to verify the validity of the contract menu.
(4) For the issue of motivating the retailer to improve service level on different hypothesis of risk preference, the unite incentive model based on linear sharing contract under four different risk preference combination is proposed. The results indicate that the retailer's degree of risk aversion is higher, the manufacturer's profits is lower. Therefore, it is very important for the manufacturer to investigate the retailer's degree of risk aversion when selecting cooperative partner in supply chain.
(5) For the issue of motivating the retailer to improve service level with external competition, the incentive model based on linear sharing contract is proposed and the solution leads to the optimal incentive contract. The results show that the external competitive pressure is also a driving force to improve the retailer's service level. In addition, competition between the retailers weakens the impacts of asymmetric information on the manufacturers'profits. The manufacturers can make appropriate use of competition to decrease their losses due to asymmetric information.
(6) For the issue of motivating the retailer to improve service level and share true market demand information, the joint incentive model based on linear sharing contract is proposed and the solution leads to the optimal incentive contract menu. The results show the optimal contract menu designed properly under double objective incentive environment can realize the above two objectives at the same time. Further, design theory and the algorithms of the model are discussed under double objects incentive condition.
Decision theory, decision model and the algorithms are offered for the manufacturer to promote cooperation with the supplier and the retailer through the study of the paper.
第一,针对如何促进供应商提高原材料或零部件供应质量的激励合约设计问题,考虑到固定支付机制、奖励机制、惩罚机制等三种不同的激励机制,构建了多机制融合下的供应商质量激励模型。结果显示：信息非对称条件下最优激励合约应为以上三种机制的适当组合；且上述三种机制存在如下匹配关系：高固定支付与高惩罚、低奖励机制相匹配;而低固定支付与低惩罚、高奖励机制相匹配。
第二,针对如何促进供应商提高产品质量与准时交货率的双目标激励合约设计问题,考虑到固定支付机制、奖励机制和惩罚机制,构建了质量与交货期联合激励模型。结果表明：最优合约仍为上述三种机制的适当组合,并且这些机制之间存在着一定的相互匹配关系。进一步地,本文还阐明了质量合格率、准时交货率之间的任务替代性对最优激励合约的影响机理。
第三,针对供应商生产成本信息隐瞒问题,采用显示原理,构建了相应的成本信息甄别模型,得到了能够“自我实施”的合约菜单。结果显示：经过适当设计的最优合约菜单(而不是单一合约)可以促进供应商如实共享成本信息,实现信息甄别——这为制造商控制采购成本、增加产品利润提供了决策理论和决策支持。进一步地,本文还给出了合约菜单的设计原理,并对其有效性进行了理论分析与仿真验证。
第四,针对不同风险偏好假设下的分销商服务水平激励合约设计问题,基于线性分享合约,构建了四种不同风险偏好组合下的统一模型。结果表明：分销商越是风险规避,制造商收益越低。这表明制造商在选择分销商时对其风险偏好的考察是重要的。
第五,针对具有外部竞争的分销商服务水平激励合约设计问题,构建了基于线性分享机制的激励模型,阐明了最优激励合约的配置机理。结果表明：外部竞争始终是促进分销商提高服务水平的强大驱动力量。同时,信息非对称条件下,分销商之间适当的市场竞争将降低制造商由于信息缺乏所导致的损失,从而使制造商坐收“渔翁之利”。
第六,针对分销商服务水平激励与需求信息共享双目标激励合约设计问题,采用线性分享机制,构建了相应的双目标激励模型,得到了最优合约并对其进行了特征刻画。结果显示：双目标激励环境下经过适当设计的合约菜单(而不是单一合约)可以同时实现以上两个目标。进一步地,本文还给出了双目标激励环境下该合约菜单的设计原理、设计模型及其算法。
本文的研究结果,可以为制造商与供应商、分销商开展业务合作提供相应的决策理论、模型和算法支持。
As across enterprise organization, supply chain consists of multiple different interest subjects. Interest inconsistency between these different subjects yields the issue of how to motivate and coordinate the different members of supply chain to efficiently cooperate. Further, information asymmetry adds difficulty to the settlement of the issue of supply chain coordination. From the manufacturer's perspective, the issue of how to design incentive contract to motivate the supplier and the retailer to efficiently cooperate with the manufacturer are discussed using theoretical research and comparative study. The main works in the paper are presented as follows.
(1) For the issue of the supplier's quality incentive contract design, considering fixed-transfer mechanism, incentive scheme and punishment mechanism, the supplier's quality incentive model with the merged multiple mechanisms is proposed. The results show the optimal incentive contract concludes the above three mechanisms and the matching relationship among the three mechanisms are as follows. High fixed-transfer matches with high punishment and low bonus; low transfer matches with low punishment and high bonus.
(2) For the problem of the supplier's quality and punctual delivery incentive contract design, considering fixed-transfer mechanism, incentive scheme and punishment mechanism, the coalition incentive model for improving quality and punctual delivery is established. Then the solution of the model and the optimal contract are studied. The results show the optimal contract is also the combination of the above three mechanisms. Further, the influence of the substitutable relationship between the rate of quality and on-time delivery (OTD) on the optimal contract is explained.
(3) For the problem of how to motivate the supplier to disclose cost information, using revelation principle, information discrimination model is created and the solution leads to the self-enforcing contract menu. The contract menu designed appropriately can motivate the supplier to share his true cost information and realize information discrimination, which offer the manufacturer decision theory and decision support to control purchasing cost and increase profits. In addition, design theory of contract menu is given in the paper. Further, theory analysis and numerical simulation are conducted to verify the validity of the contract menu.
(4) For the issue of motivating the retailer to improve service level on different hypothesis of risk preference, the unite incentive model based on linear sharing contract under four different risk preference combination is proposed. The results indicate that the retailer's degree of risk aversion is higher, the manufacturer's profits is lower. Therefore, it is very important for the manufacturer to investigate the retailer's degree of risk aversion when selecting cooperative partner in supply chain.
(5) For the issue of motivating the retailer to improve service level with external competition, the incentive model based on linear sharing contract is proposed and the solution leads to the optimal incentive contract. The results show that the external competitive pressure is also a driving force to improve the retailer's service level. In addition, competition between the retailers weakens the impacts of asymmetric information on the manufacturers'profits. The manufacturers can make appropriate use of competition to decrease their losses due to asymmetric information.
(6) For the issue of motivating the retailer to improve service level and share true market demand information, the joint incentive model based on linear sharing contract is proposed and the solution leads to the optimal incentive contract menu. The results show the optimal contract menu designed properly under double objective incentive environment can realize the above two objectives at the same time. Further, design theory and the algorithms of the model are discussed under double objects incentive condition.
Decision theory, decision model and the algorithms are offered for the manufacturer to promote cooperation with the supplier and the retailer through the study of the paper.
引文
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