个人所得税纳税遵从与税收征管
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摘要
个人所得税是直接对个人(自然人)各项所得所征收的一种所得税,它是政府稳定经济、缩小贫富差距、组织财政收入的方式与手段。特别地,伴随着我国经济的发展水平、税收的征管水平和全社会的纳税意识的不断提高,我国个人所得税的收入规模及其所占比重也在不断提高,但是在征管实践中,仍然存在着许多不容忽视的影响和制约征管个人所得税的因素和问题。
在不断的发展变化过程中,我国的税收征管模式经历了专门管理、征收管理稽查三者相分离、征收管理稽查三位一体模式和现行征管模式这四种各具特色的模式。同时,我国还应积极主动的借鉴国外的相关经验来发展和完善我国的税收征管模式。本文从个人所得税征管模式及个税的纳税遵从的角度进行研究,对解决个人所得税征管存在的问题进行分析,并提出提高个人纳税遵从水平和适合我国国情的个人所得税征管的政策建议。
首先,本文在对选题的背景、目的及意义进行阐述的基础上,提出本研究的理论研究框架和可能存在的创新点与不足点；同时本文还将归纳和梳理在经典偷逃税模型中所涉及到的有关税率、稽查率、罚款率、收入以及会对税收遵从产生影响作用的税收道德、税制公平认知、纳税人的自然属性、公共产品的供给以及税收遵从成本等这些理论文献。(本文从选题的背景、意义和目的出发,明确了本研究的理论框架,提出了本研究可能的创新和不足)；同时将经典偷逃税模型所涉及到的税率、稽查率、罚款率、收入,以及影响税收遵从的税收道德、税制公平认知、纳税人自然属性、公共产品供给和税收遵从成本等理论文献进行了归纳和梳理。)
其次,本文对最优税理论的发展进历程进行了回顾,本文归纳整理了最优税从最优商品税到最优个人所得税的理论研究,并归纳了国内学者对个税问题的探讨,指明了我国个税研究的发展方向。本文将我国改革开放后个人所得税的发展阶段进行归纳,同时还对中西方的征管模式进行分类,以及分析了我国个人所得税征管的制约因素。
再次,本文在有限理性人的假设下,对我国现有的个人所得税纳税征管体系进行实证研究。一方面,本文基于框架效应利用实验研究的方法探究了纳税人的纳税遵从行为，另一方面，同时用数据包络分析法(Data Envelopment Analysis，DEA)，对税收征管效率进行研究，并以武汉市为对象进行数据收集和探讨。
最后，本文从完善个税征管模式与提高税收遵从等方面提出政策建议，并从建立综合与分类相结合的课税模式、合理设置税率、优化税制结构和建立个人“一户式”收入档案登记制度等方面提出相应的政策建议。
在研究的过程当中，本文跳出了传统纳税遵从理论下完全理性纳税人的假设，将框架效应这个非理性特征纳入纳税遵从行为的研究，剖析了纳税人决策时的心理规律，并运用更加贴近现实纳税行为的前景理论进行了解释。为了系统地研究框架效应对纳税决策行为的影响，本文将框架效应分为风险选择框架效应和目标框架效应，分别进行研究。本文通过研究发现，当税率较低时，纳税人的遵从决策中不存在显著的风险选择框架效应，但随着税率的升高，风险决策框架效应逐渐显著存在于纳税人的纳税决策行为中，且显著性越来越强。本文通过DEA分析法研究发现，人力资本因素显著地影响着税收征管效率，其中较高地征纳服务水平和税务人员的较高素质等因素对税收征管体系的整体效率有着重要影响，它们在DEA模型分析中能够获得较高地产出效应。此外，税务机关在不断推进税收信息化工作，逐渐完善税收缴纳手段的同时，也应当注意推行柔性执法，贯彻为纳税人服务的理念，这样才能协调好征纳双方的关系，有助于提高纳税人的遵从水平。
Personal income tax, as a direct taxes levied from person, plays very important rolein organization financial income and the income distribution adjustment. Actually,with thegrowth of economic, the levels of tax collection is increasing, especially, the furtherenhancement of tax consciousness of the whole society, and also the income scale andproportion of the personal income tax has improved. But in taxation, because of thecollection and management of personal income tax is affected by many factors andconstraints, many aspects of the problem can not be ignored.
Type of model of tax collection in China is formed gradually and evolved in thedevelopment. Tax collection mode has experienced four stages: account managementmode, collection and management check separation mode, the Trinity model, the currentimposition and management model, they all have their own features. At the same time,with the development and advance of tax collection mode, the foreign experience isnecessary. The paper research from the personal income tax collection and managementmode and tax compliance, and it has important theoretical and practical meaning to dealwith the existing problems of individual income tax collection.
Firstly, elaborate the background, significance and aim of the topic, clearly thetheoretical framework of the research, innovation and deficiencies of this study are alsoproposed in this research; We summarized combing the tax rate, audit rate, penalty rates,income, and those factors affected tax compliance: tax moral, a fair tax system ofcognitive, taxpayers natural attributes, the supply of public goods, tax compliance costswhich all related in typical tax evasion model.
Secondly, the research retrospects the history of the development of optimal taxtheory, born from retrospective optimal commodity tax theory to the analysis thecharacteristics of the optimum personal income tax. Comprehensive carding the optimaltaxation theory, and summarize the research by Chinese scholars in the personal incometax, straighten out the main direction of China's personal income tax theory. Inductionstage of development of the personal income tax after the reform and opening up of newChina, classify the collection and management mode, and analysis of China's personalincome tax collection and management constraints.
Again, under the assumption of bounded rationality assumed by the previous text, thethesis makes empirical research on existing personal income tax collection and management system in our country. On the one hand, this thesis explores the taxpayer'stax compliance behavior based on the experimental study of framing effects. On the otherhand,it researches the efficiency of tax collection. by using Data Envelopment Analysis,and we use Wuhan as an object for data collection and discussion.
Finally, this thesis makes policy recommendations to improve the collection andmanagement mode of individual income tax and the tax compliance. Specifically, thisthesis makes appropriate policy recommendations from the aspects such as establishing acomprehensive and classified taxation model, setting the tax rate reasonably, optimizingthe tax structure and establishing a personal income registration system.
However, as the tax rate increases, the Framing effect in risk decision-makinggradually significantly presents in the taxpayer's decision-making behavior, and thesignificance increasingly strong. In order to promote personal tax compliance, the thesisjumped out of the assumptions of the complete reason under the traditional taxpayers' taxcompliance theory, irrational characteristics of the framing effect is included in the taxcompliance behavior analysis. The thesis analyses the psychological laws of taxpayerdecisions, and use more realistic tax behavior prospect theory explanation. in order tosystematically study the impact of the framing effects on the tax decision-making behavior,framing effects in the thesis are divided into framing effects of risk selection and goalframing effects. During the research process, the thesis gets the following conclusions:First, when the tax rate is lower, there is no significant framing effect in riskdecision-making in the taxpayer compliance decisions. Second, human capital factorssignificantly influence the efficiency of tax collection and management. The factors of ahigh level of service, tax staff with high quality and so on can obtain higher output effectin the DEA model. It has a great influence on the efficiency of tax collection andmanagement. Tax authorities not only need to continue to promote tax informatizationwork, and gradually improve the tax paid means, but also should pay attention to theimplementation of flexible enforcement, carry out for taxpayer service concept, so as tocoordinate relations between the two sides, help to improve taxpayer compliance level.
在不断的发展变化过程中,我国的税收征管模式经历了专门管理、征收管理稽查三者相分离、征收管理稽查三位一体模式和现行征管模式这四种各具特色的模式。同时,我国还应积极主动的借鉴国外的相关经验来发展和完善我国的税收征管模式。本文从个人所得税征管模式及个税的纳税遵从的角度进行研究,对解决个人所得税征管存在的问题进行分析,并提出提高个人纳税遵从水平和适合我国国情的个人所得税征管的政策建议。
首先,本文在对选题的背景、目的及意义进行阐述的基础上,提出本研究的理论研究框架和可能存在的创新点与不足点；同时本文还将归纳和梳理在经典偷逃税模型中所涉及到的有关税率、稽查率、罚款率、收入以及会对税收遵从产生影响作用的税收道德、税制公平认知、纳税人的自然属性、公共产品的供给以及税收遵从成本等这些理论文献。(本文从选题的背景、意义和目的出发,明确了本研究的理论框架,提出了本研究可能的创新和不足)；同时将经典偷逃税模型所涉及到的税率、稽查率、罚款率、收入,以及影响税收遵从的税收道德、税制公平认知、纳税人自然属性、公共产品供给和税收遵从成本等理论文献进行了归纳和梳理。)
其次,本文对最优税理论的发展进历程进行了回顾,本文归纳整理了最优税从最优商品税到最优个人所得税的理论研究,并归纳了国内学者对个税问题的探讨,指明了我国个税研究的发展方向。本文将我国改革开放后个人所得税的发展阶段进行归纳,同时还对中西方的征管模式进行分类,以及分析了我国个人所得税征管的制约因素。
再次,本文在有限理性人的假设下,对我国现有的个人所得税纳税征管体系进行实证研究。一方面,本文基于框架效应利用实验研究的方法探究了纳税人的纳税遵从行为，另一方面，同时用数据包络分析法(Data Envelopment Analysis，DEA)，对税收征管效率进行研究，并以武汉市为对象进行数据收集和探讨。
最后，本文从完善个税征管模式与提高税收遵从等方面提出政策建议，并从建立综合与分类相结合的课税模式、合理设置税率、优化税制结构和建立个人“一户式”收入档案登记制度等方面提出相应的政策建议。
在研究的过程当中，本文跳出了传统纳税遵从理论下完全理性纳税人的假设，将框架效应这个非理性特征纳入纳税遵从行为的研究，剖析了纳税人决策时的心理规律，并运用更加贴近现实纳税行为的前景理论进行了解释。为了系统地研究框架效应对纳税决策行为的影响，本文将框架效应分为风险选择框架效应和目标框架效应，分别进行研究。本文通过研究发现，当税率较低时，纳税人的遵从决策中不存在显著的风险选择框架效应，但随着税率的升高，风险决策框架效应逐渐显著存在于纳税人的纳税决策行为中，且显著性越来越强。本文通过DEA分析法研究发现，人力资本因素显著地影响着税收征管效率，其中较高地征纳服务水平和税务人员的较高素质等因素对税收征管体系的整体效率有着重要影响，它们在DEA模型分析中能够获得较高地产出效应。此外，税务机关在不断推进税收信息化工作，逐渐完善税收缴纳手段的同时，也应当注意推行柔性执法，贯彻为纳税人服务的理念，这样才能协调好征纳双方的关系，有助于提高纳税人的遵从水平。
Personal income tax, as a direct taxes levied from person, plays very important rolein organization financial income and the income distribution adjustment. Actually,with thegrowth of economic, the levels of tax collection is increasing, especially, the furtherenhancement of tax consciousness of the whole society, and also the income scale andproportion of the personal income tax has improved. But in taxation, because of thecollection and management of personal income tax is affected by many factors andconstraints, many aspects of the problem can not be ignored.
Type of model of tax collection in China is formed gradually and evolved in thedevelopment. Tax collection mode has experienced four stages: account managementmode, collection and management check separation mode, the Trinity model, the currentimposition and management model, they all have their own features. At the same time,with the development and advance of tax collection mode, the foreign experience isnecessary. The paper research from the personal income tax collection and managementmode and tax compliance, and it has important theoretical and practical meaning to dealwith the existing problems of individual income tax collection.
Firstly, elaborate the background, significance and aim of the topic, clearly thetheoretical framework of the research, innovation and deficiencies of this study are alsoproposed in this research; We summarized combing the tax rate, audit rate, penalty rates,income, and those factors affected tax compliance: tax moral, a fair tax system ofcognitive, taxpayers natural attributes, the supply of public goods, tax compliance costswhich all related in typical tax evasion model.
Secondly, the research retrospects the history of the development of optimal taxtheory, born from retrospective optimal commodity tax theory to the analysis thecharacteristics of the optimum personal income tax. Comprehensive carding the optimaltaxation theory, and summarize the research by Chinese scholars in the personal incometax, straighten out the main direction of China's personal income tax theory. Inductionstage of development of the personal income tax after the reform and opening up of newChina, classify the collection and management mode, and analysis of China's personalincome tax collection and management constraints.
Again, under the assumption of bounded rationality assumed by the previous text, thethesis makes empirical research on existing personal income tax collection and management system in our country. On the one hand, this thesis explores the taxpayer'stax compliance behavior based on the experimental study of framing effects. On the otherhand,it researches the efficiency of tax collection. by using Data Envelopment Analysis,and we use Wuhan as an object for data collection and discussion.
Finally, this thesis makes policy recommendations to improve the collection andmanagement mode of individual income tax and the tax compliance. Specifically, thisthesis makes appropriate policy recommendations from the aspects such as establishing acomprehensive and classified taxation model, setting the tax rate reasonably, optimizingthe tax structure and establishing a personal income registration system.
However, as the tax rate increases, the Framing effect in risk decision-makinggradually significantly presents in the taxpayer's decision-making behavior, and thesignificance increasingly strong. In order to promote personal tax compliance, the thesisjumped out of the assumptions of the complete reason under the traditional taxpayers' taxcompliance theory, irrational characteristics of the framing effect is included in the taxcompliance behavior analysis. The thesis analyses the psychological laws of taxpayerdecisions, and use more realistic tax behavior prospect theory explanation. in order tosystematically study the impact of the framing effects on the tax decision-making behavior,framing effects in the thesis are divided into framing effects of risk selection and goalframing effects. During the research process, the thesis gets the following conclusions:First, when the tax rate is lower, there is no significant framing effect in riskdecision-making in the taxpayer compliance decisions. Second, human capital factorssignificantly influence the efficiency of tax collection and management. The factors of ahigh level of service, tax staff with high quality and so on can obtain higher output effectin the DEA model. It has a great influence on the efficiency of tax collection andmanagement. Tax authorities not only need to continue to promote tax informatizationwork, and gradually improve the tax paid means, but also should pay attention to theimplementation of flexible enforcement, carry out for taxpayer service concept, so as tocoordinate relations between the two sides, help to improve taxpayer compliance level.
引文
①刘华,应諲,阳尧.澳大利亚个人所得税代扣代缴制度简介.税务研究,2010(01)：92-94
①该三原则最基本的表述参见国家税务总局税收科学研究所编著：《西方税收理论》[M],中国财政经济出版社,1997,第3-4页。
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③国家税务总局税收科学研究所编著：《西方税收理论》[M],中国财政经济出版社,1997,第15页。
①亚当·斯密：《国富论》[M],商务印书馆,1974.
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②转引自郝春虹：《税收经济学》[M],南开大学出版社,2007,第148页。
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①转引自焚鼎压：《税收研究概论》[M],暨南大学出版社,2003,第259页。
①转引自甘行琼：《西方财税思想史》[M],中国财政经济出版社,2007,第155页。
②拉本德拉。贾：《现代公共经济学》[M],中国青年出版社,2004,第340页。
①亚当·斯密：《国富论(下卷)》[M],商务印书馆,1974,第425页。
①转引自毛程连：《西方财政思想史》[M],经济科学出版社,2003,第215页。
①转引自毛程连：《西方财政思想史》[M],经济科学出版社,2003,第216页.
①阿兰·J·奥尔巴克和马丁·费尔德斯坦：《公共经济学手册(第1卷)》[M],经济科学出版社,2005,第221页.
①余显才：《所得税劳动供给效应的实证研究》,管理世界,2006,(11).
①郭庆旺,苑新丽,夏文丽：《当代西方税收学》[M],东北财经大学出版社,1994,第32页。
②阿兰·J·奥尔巴克和马丁·费尔德斯坦：《公共经济学手册(第1卷)》[M],经济科学出版社,2005,第221页.
①加雷斯·D·迈尔斯：《公共经济学》[M],人民大学出版社,2001,第100页.
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①刘佐.中国税制概览[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2006,210-216
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