税收征管博弈与激励机制研究
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摘要
税收是随国家的产生而产生的,国家为了实现其职能,从古到今都是凭借其政治权力强制征收。国家与国民之间的各自利益是一种此消彼长的关系。正是对于各自利益的不懈追求,才导致了税收领域的多层博弈的存续。税收征管过程是由一系列不同层次的委托—代理关系组成的,形成了一条层层下移、环环相扣的委托—代理链。自1994年实施税制改革以来,我国税收收入实现了快速增长,平均增速达17.3%,并在2008年突破了60000亿元。但是,在税收征管实践中,税收不遵从行为、纳税服务层次低、纳税人激励错位等层出不穷,屡见不鲜。
在这一背景下,本文运用博弈论与激励机制设计理论分别研究税收征管中的事(逃税和避税)和人(征税人、纳税人和税务代理人),通过建立数学模型分析它们的贝叶斯纳什均衡或分离均衡,提出税收征管改革的建议。目的是要提高税收遵从度和征管效率,力图在理论研究上有所创新,并注重对实际工作起到一定的指导意义。
本研究全文共分10章:
第1章主要阐述本研究的背景与意义、研究思路、内容及框架、方法、特色与创新。
第2章作国内外相关文献综述,结果表明,国外的研究侧重于建立数学模型对现实中的税收问题进行分析,但这些模型普遍具有较严格的假设条件,这些假设条件与我国的实际情况具有较大的差异,因而直接把这些研究成果用于指导我国实践还有相当长的距离。由于受国情所限,他们的研究主要集中在所得税遵从方面。与国外相比,我国对税收征管的研究尚处于起步阶段。这些研究总体上还属于粗放型,无论从理论深度还是实践层次看都还有待于深入。
第3章回顾了我国税收征管模式的历史沿革和税收征管法的制度变迁,分析了税收收入变化和税收征管特点,指出税收征管机制的缺陷与不足以及税收征管工作中存在的问题,在借鉴发达国家税收征管经验基础上,提出完善我国税收征管制度的一些建议。
第4章对逃税进行概述,内容包括逃税的概念、特征、手法、危害、处罚以及我国逃税现象的严重性。从利益和文化以及税收法律制度方面剖析了逃税的深层次原因。通过建立和求解数学模型分析了征纳双方的博弈关系,并对优化税收征管提出若干对策建议。
第5章对税收筹划存在的风险进行分析,特别强调认定风险,即税收筹划主体制定出的税收筹划方案自认为是完全合理合法的,但却被税务机关认定为逃税。然后依此建立博弈模型,分析企业与税务机关在税收筹划博弈过程中的决策行为和均衡结果,并提出改善结果的具体措施。
第6章主要论述国际避税与反避税,指出转让定价是跨国公司在国际避税中最广泛采用的一种手段。为了对抗这种避税,大多数国家赋予税务机关根据“正常交易原则”对转让定价进行重新调整的权力。本章依此建立博弈模型,对跨国公司与税务机关的决策行为和均衡结果进行分析。并提出我国反国际避税的对策。
第7章分析税务机关与征税人之间的委托—代理关系,借鉴霍姆斯特姆和米尔格罗姆的做法,建立税务机关与征税人之间的委托—代理模型。提出完善我国征税人激励机制的建议。
第8章分析纳税人与税务代理人之间的委托—代理关系,选择纳税成本率作为反映代理人—税务代理人效率的变量,利用拉丰模型为不同能力的税务代理人设计激励契约。针对我国税务代理业存在的问题,提出完善我国税务代理制度的构想。
第9章分析我国在税收激励机制方面存在的错位、缺位等问题。借鉴日本和台湾的做法,设计了两种税收激励制度,并用博弈论的方法证明这些制度确实可以起到减少逃税的效果。提出我国实行所得税蓝色申报制度的设想。
第10章总结了本研究的主要结论,指出研究的局限和后续研究建议。
本文的研究特色是用博弈论和激励机制理论全面研究税收征管。创新点:一是将税收征管的博弈研究从国内拓展到国际税收领域。二是对税收筹划的博弈研究领域进行了探索。三是用博弈论的方法证明了有效的税收激励制度可以减少逃税现象的发生。
Taxation came into being with the eshtablishment of a country, in all ages, a compulsive liability of taxpayers imposed upon by the government. It is difficult for the government to banlance the economic benefits between the nation and the people. The unremitting efforts for respective interests lead to many levels game in the domain of tax in existence. The course of taxation levy and management consists of a series of principal-agent relations. It forms a principal-agent chain that moves downward from each level and in a link with one another. Since the tax system reforms in 1994, the tax revenue of our nation has achieved a high-speed growth by an average of 17.3% a year and topped 6000 billion RMB in 2008. However, the phenomenen of tax non-compliance, low level tax service, taxpayer incentive mechanism misplacement and so on emerge one after another in taxation levy and management practice.
On the basis of this background, the thesis researches into and analyzes the affairs (tax evasion and tax avoidance) and peoples (tax-collector, taxpayer and certified tax agent) in taxation levy and management with the help of the theory and methods related to the game theory and incentive mechanism design. The concerned analyses of the Bayesian equilibrium and separating equilibrium are conducted by establishing the mathematical models in order to make suggestions for the reform of tax levy and management. The great effort is made to raise the tax compliance level and taxation levy and management efficiency, and bring forth new ideas to the theoretic researches and guidelines for the practice in taxation.
This thesis consists of ten chapters as follows:
The first chapter mainly sets forth the background and significance of this thesis, the research train of thought, content and frame, methods, characteristics and innovation in the thesis.
The second chapter mainly summarizes the achievements in research of the tax levy and management at home and abroad. The results reveal that the researches abroad lay special emphasis on the establishment of the mathematical models to analyze the problems in taxation practices. But those models are always based on some rigid supposed conditions, which are far from the reality in China. So it will take a long time to directly apply these achievements in research of the reality in our country. The researches abroad mainly concentrated on the income tax compliance because of the national conditions of the researchers. On the contrary, the researches for taxation levy and management at home are still in the early stage, totally in the extensive type, which remaines to be further studied regardless of the theory and practice.
The third chapter reviews the historical course of tax levy and management models and the system changes of tax levy and management law in China, and analyzes the changes of the tax revenue and the characteristics of taxation levy and management in our nation. The deficiency and problems in taxation levy and management work are pointed out. On the basis of the experience of developed countries for reference, some proposals about perfecting our country’s tax levy and management system are put forward.
The fourth chapter summarizes the tax evasions, concerning the concept, characteristics, techniques, harm, punishment and the bad effects of tax evasions in China. The deepest causes of tax evasion due to the interests, the culture and the tax law system are analyzed. The game relations between the taxpayers and the tax-collectors are analyzed by establishing the corresponding mathematical models and finding the solutions to the models. Some countermeasures about optimizing tax levy and management are put forward.
The fifth chapter analyzes the risks in tax planning and stresses the recognizing risks, which means that tax planning scheme is thought of as wholly rational and legal by the taxpayers, but is thought of as tax evasion by the tax authority. On this basis, the corresponding game models are established, the solutions found, the decision-making behaviors and the equilibrium results in the game course between the companies and tax authority analyzed, some specific measures for improving the results raised.
The sixth chapter mainly discusses the tax avoidance and anti-tax avoidance in the international scope. In order to resist such kind of tax avoidance, most countries authorise the taxation bureaus to adjust transfer pricing on arm’s length principle. As a result, corresponding game models are established to analyze the decision-making behaviors and the equilibrium results of multinational companies and taxation bureaus. Some countermeasures for anti-tax avoidance are put forwarded.
The seventh chapter analyzes the principal-agent relations between the taxation bureaus and tax-collectors. Using the Holmstrom and Milgrom model for reference, the principal-agent model between taxation bureaus and tax-collector is designed. Some suggests for perfecting our country’s tax-collector incentive mechanism are put forward.
The eighth chapter analyzes the principal-agent relations between taxpayers and certified tax agents, choosing the cost ratio of pay taxes as the variable reflecting certified tax agents efficiency, using the Laffont model to design the incentive contract for certified tax agents with different abilities. Against the problems in tax agent industry, a conception for perfecting our country’s tax agent system is formed.
The ninth chapter analyzes the problems of misplacements and gaps in terms of tax incentive mechanism. In view of the experience of Japan and Taiwan District, two tax incentive systems are designed and proved, by the method of game theory, to be effective for reducing tax evasions. A plan is advanced to carry out the blue report system in China.
The tenth chapter summarized the important conclusions of the whole thesis, pointing out the limits and suggestions in further researches.
This paper is characteristic of tax levy and management researches with the help of the game theory and incentive mechanism theory. Creative points: First, the game rearches of tax levy and management is extended from our country’s taxation domain to the international scope. Second, the area of the game rearches is explored in the tax planning. Third, the game theory proves that effective reduction of tax evasions be realized by effective taxpayer incentive mechanism.
在这一背景下,本文运用博弈论与激励机制设计理论分别研究税收征管中的事(逃税和避税)和人(征税人、纳税人和税务代理人),通过建立数学模型分析它们的贝叶斯纳什均衡或分离均衡,提出税收征管改革的建议。目的是要提高税收遵从度和征管效率,力图在理论研究上有所创新,并注重对实际工作起到一定的指导意义。
本研究全文共分10章:
第1章主要阐述本研究的背景与意义、研究思路、内容及框架、方法、特色与创新。
第2章作国内外相关文献综述,结果表明,国外的研究侧重于建立数学模型对现实中的税收问题进行分析,但这些模型普遍具有较严格的假设条件,这些假设条件与我国的实际情况具有较大的差异,因而直接把这些研究成果用于指导我国实践还有相当长的距离。由于受国情所限,他们的研究主要集中在所得税遵从方面。与国外相比,我国对税收征管的研究尚处于起步阶段。这些研究总体上还属于粗放型,无论从理论深度还是实践层次看都还有待于深入。
第3章回顾了我国税收征管模式的历史沿革和税收征管法的制度变迁,分析了税收收入变化和税收征管特点,指出税收征管机制的缺陷与不足以及税收征管工作中存在的问题,在借鉴发达国家税收征管经验基础上,提出完善我国税收征管制度的一些建议。
第4章对逃税进行概述,内容包括逃税的概念、特征、手法、危害、处罚以及我国逃税现象的严重性。从利益和文化以及税收法律制度方面剖析了逃税的深层次原因。通过建立和求解数学模型分析了征纳双方的博弈关系,并对优化税收征管提出若干对策建议。
第5章对税收筹划存在的风险进行分析,特别强调认定风险,即税收筹划主体制定出的税收筹划方案自认为是完全合理合法的,但却被税务机关认定为逃税。然后依此建立博弈模型,分析企业与税务机关在税收筹划博弈过程中的决策行为和均衡结果,并提出改善结果的具体措施。
第6章主要论述国际避税与反避税,指出转让定价是跨国公司在国际避税中最广泛采用的一种手段。为了对抗这种避税,大多数国家赋予税务机关根据“正常交易原则”对转让定价进行重新调整的权力。本章依此建立博弈模型,对跨国公司与税务机关的决策行为和均衡结果进行分析。并提出我国反国际避税的对策。
第7章分析税务机关与征税人之间的委托—代理关系,借鉴霍姆斯特姆和米尔格罗姆的做法,建立税务机关与征税人之间的委托—代理模型。提出完善我国征税人激励机制的建议。
第8章分析纳税人与税务代理人之间的委托—代理关系,选择纳税成本率作为反映代理人—税务代理人效率的变量,利用拉丰模型为不同能力的税务代理人设计激励契约。针对我国税务代理业存在的问题,提出完善我国税务代理制度的构想。
第9章分析我国在税收激励机制方面存在的错位、缺位等问题。借鉴日本和台湾的做法,设计了两种税收激励制度,并用博弈论的方法证明这些制度确实可以起到减少逃税的效果。提出我国实行所得税蓝色申报制度的设想。
第10章总结了本研究的主要结论,指出研究的局限和后续研究建议。
本文的研究特色是用博弈论和激励机制理论全面研究税收征管。创新点:一是将税收征管的博弈研究从国内拓展到国际税收领域。二是对税收筹划的博弈研究领域进行了探索。三是用博弈论的方法证明了有效的税收激励制度可以减少逃税现象的发生。
Taxation came into being with the eshtablishment of a country, in all ages, a compulsive liability of taxpayers imposed upon by the government. It is difficult for the government to banlance the economic benefits between the nation and the people. The unremitting efforts for respective interests lead to many levels game in the domain of tax in existence. The course of taxation levy and management consists of a series of principal-agent relations. It forms a principal-agent chain that moves downward from each level and in a link with one another. Since the tax system reforms in 1994, the tax revenue of our nation has achieved a high-speed growth by an average of 17.3% a year and topped 6000 billion RMB in 2008. However, the phenomenen of tax non-compliance, low level tax service, taxpayer incentive mechanism misplacement and so on emerge one after another in taxation levy and management practice.
On the basis of this background, the thesis researches into and analyzes the affairs (tax evasion and tax avoidance) and peoples (tax-collector, taxpayer and certified tax agent) in taxation levy and management with the help of the theory and methods related to the game theory and incentive mechanism design. The concerned analyses of the Bayesian equilibrium and separating equilibrium are conducted by establishing the mathematical models in order to make suggestions for the reform of tax levy and management. The great effort is made to raise the tax compliance level and taxation levy and management efficiency, and bring forth new ideas to the theoretic researches and guidelines for the practice in taxation.
This thesis consists of ten chapters as follows:
The first chapter mainly sets forth the background and significance of this thesis, the research train of thought, content and frame, methods, characteristics and innovation in the thesis.
The second chapter mainly summarizes the achievements in research of the tax levy and management at home and abroad. The results reveal that the researches abroad lay special emphasis on the establishment of the mathematical models to analyze the problems in taxation practices. But those models are always based on some rigid supposed conditions, which are far from the reality in China. So it will take a long time to directly apply these achievements in research of the reality in our country. The researches abroad mainly concentrated on the income tax compliance because of the national conditions of the researchers. On the contrary, the researches for taxation levy and management at home are still in the early stage, totally in the extensive type, which remaines to be further studied regardless of the theory and practice.
The third chapter reviews the historical course of tax levy and management models and the system changes of tax levy and management law in China, and analyzes the changes of the tax revenue and the characteristics of taxation levy and management in our nation. The deficiency and problems in taxation levy and management work are pointed out. On the basis of the experience of developed countries for reference, some proposals about perfecting our country’s tax levy and management system are put forward.
The fourth chapter summarizes the tax evasions, concerning the concept, characteristics, techniques, harm, punishment and the bad effects of tax evasions in China. The deepest causes of tax evasion due to the interests, the culture and the tax law system are analyzed. The game relations between the taxpayers and the tax-collectors are analyzed by establishing the corresponding mathematical models and finding the solutions to the models. Some countermeasures about optimizing tax levy and management are put forward.
The fifth chapter analyzes the risks in tax planning and stresses the recognizing risks, which means that tax planning scheme is thought of as wholly rational and legal by the taxpayers, but is thought of as tax evasion by the tax authority. On this basis, the corresponding game models are established, the solutions found, the decision-making behaviors and the equilibrium results in the game course between the companies and tax authority analyzed, some specific measures for improving the results raised.
The sixth chapter mainly discusses the tax avoidance and anti-tax avoidance in the international scope. In order to resist such kind of tax avoidance, most countries authorise the taxation bureaus to adjust transfer pricing on arm’s length principle. As a result, corresponding game models are established to analyze the decision-making behaviors and the equilibrium results of multinational companies and taxation bureaus. Some countermeasures for anti-tax avoidance are put forwarded.
The seventh chapter analyzes the principal-agent relations between the taxation bureaus and tax-collectors. Using the Holmstrom and Milgrom model for reference, the principal-agent model between taxation bureaus and tax-collector is designed. Some suggests for perfecting our country’s tax-collector incentive mechanism are put forward.
The eighth chapter analyzes the principal-agent relations between taxpayers and certified tax agents, choosing the cost ratio of pay taxes as the variable reflecting certified tax agents efficiency, using the Laffont model to design the incentive contract for certified tax agents with different abilities. Against the problems in tax agent industry, a conception for perfecting our country’s tax agent system is formed.
The ninth chapter analyzes the problems of misplacements and gaps in terms of tax incentive mechanism. In view of the experience of Japan and Taiwan District, two tax incentive systems are designed and proved, by the method of game theory, to be effective for reducing tax evasions. A plan is advanced to carry out the blue report system in China.
The tenth chapter summarized the important conclusions of the whole thesis, pointing out the limits and suggestions in further researches.
This paper is characteristic of tax levy and management researches with the help of the game theory and incentive mechanism theory. Creative points: First, the game rearches of tax levy and management is extended from our country’s taxation domain to the international scope. Second, the area of the game rearches is explored in the tax planning. Third, the game theory proves that effective reduction of tax evasions be realized by effective taxpayer incentive mechanism.
引文
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38盖地.税务筹划[M].首都经济贸易大学出版社,2002:13.
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40王兆高.税收筹划[M].复旦大学出版社,2003:1.
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42李传志.税收筹划的风险分析与防范[J].财政研究,2005,(6).
43该章核心部分已发表在《山西大学学报》(社会科学版)2008年第1期。
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63郝如玉.中国税务代理制度研究[M].经济管理出版社,2002:194～195.
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