税收遵从研究
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摘要
最近50年来,大多数国家的“地下经济”规模迅速扩张。据统计,2011年欧洲的地下经济总量预计达到了2.2万亿欧元,地下经济占官方名义GDP的比重最少的国家有8%,最多的则超过了30%；我国“十一五”期间,税务稽查部门共查补税款3468亿元,比“十五”期间增加了2376亿元。据研究,地下经济主要是由税收不遵从导致的,税收不遵从始终是困绕世界各国政府的一道难题。为了揭开税收遵从之谜,国外学者们进行了大量艰苦而富有创造性的研究,并取得了效果显著的研究成果,主要基于的理论基础是预期效用理论和前景理论。
我国从90年代才开始从西方引进和研究税收遵从问题,研究的深度和广度与国外相比仍存在着一些差距。作为由联合国开发计划署资助并委托国际货币基金组织实施的援助中国税制改革与征管改革项目的组成部分,我国政府于2003年3月印发了《2002年-2006年中国税收征收管理战略规划纲要》,其中第一次正式提出了“税收遵从”的概念。
受西方发达国家税制结构和公司纳税人情况复杂等因素的影响,国内外学者对税收遵从问题的研究,日前主要集中在个人纳税人,而对公司纳税人研究的较少。但在我国,公司纳税人是纳税申报的主体,其税收遵从度会对我国财政收入产生较大的影响,所以值得深入研究。
委托-代理关系的存在为研究公司纳税人的税收遵从提供了一个视角。本文通过理论和实证研究,在关于个人纳税人已有研究成果的基础上,以个人代理人的税收遵从为突破口,最终实现研究公司纳税人税收遵从的目的,并为我国税收征管实践提供了一些政策建议。本文主要围绕以下儿方面展开。
本文第1章介绍了论文的研究背景、意义、对象、文献综述、论文框架、内容概要和创新点等。
本文第2章对委托-代理理论、预期效用理论和前景理论进行了概括和总结,为后文的研究提供了理论依据。
本文第3章分析了影响个人纳税人税收遵从的主要经济因素和非经济因素,包括稽查率、罚款率、税率、收入、税收遵从成本、公共产品供给、纳税服务、税制公平税收道德、自然属性等。2010年国家统计局苏州调查队组织的纳税人满意度、需求和税收遵从问卷调查显示,影响个人纳税人税收遵从的一些因素也会影响个人代理人,并最终影响到公司纳税人；中小企业的个人代理人对影响因素更敏感,对公司税收遵从产生的影响也更大。
本文第4章在A—S—Y模型的基础上,对收入、处罚等作为影响因素的参数做了重大修改,构建了委托-代理关系中基于预期效用理论的税收遵从模型,并分别在个人代理人取得固定收入和比例收入的框架下按照三种情况分别进行了讨论,同时还介绍了模型的应用情况。结论是必须对个人代理人进行处罚才能约束其导致的公司逃税行为；在取得固定收入时,代理人倾向于税收遵从；而在取得比例收入时,需要区分讨论,本文建议通过提高代理人的罚款系数并使之大于等于1来解决问题。
本文第5章通过控制实验研究了个人代理人在税收遵从决策过程中的心理变化。实验结果表明其中存在框架效应,并且与预测实现了吻合,证实了前景理论能较好地描述决策者的决策过程,而且可以将依法纳税后的税后所得位置作为个人代理人选择的参照点。
本文第6章在前一章控制实验结论和Dhami和al-Nowaihi(2006)基于前景理论的个人所得税逃税模型的基础上,对收入、处罚等作为影响因索的参数做了重大修改,构建了委托-代理关系中基于前景理论的税收遵从模型。并通过数学推导,得出实际申报税基与个人代理人收入、个人代理人所受处罚、税率以及风险厌恶系数之间的关系。同时还介绍了模型的应用情况。结论表明,实际申报税基与个人代理人收入和¨税率之间的负相关的关系,而与个人代理人所受处罚和风险厌恶系数之间是正相关的关系。
本文第7章在前几章研究的基础上,分别从税收管理角度以及政府和社会环境角度两大方面,为提高个人代理人和公司纳税人的税收遵从度提供了一些政策建议,同时指出了,今后研究中需要努力的方向。
In recent50years, the scale of "Shadow economy" in most countries expanded rapidly. According to statistics, the amount of Europe's shadow economy estimated has reached2.2trillion Euro in year2011, which took up official GDP of different countries at least8%, and at most exceeded30%. During our "Eleventh Five-Year Plan" period, tax audit department checked and collected evaded tax for346.8billion, which increased237.6billion compared with the figures in "Ten Five-year Plan" period. According to research, the main reason for shadow economy is tax incompliance, which is a long-time difficult lesson for all governments in the world. In order to reveal the secret of tax compliance, foreign scholars have done hard and innovative research abundantly, and gained some remarkable results, whose theoretical basis are Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory.
China imported from western world and started the research of tax compliance just after the90's; but distance still exists between China and the western in width and depth. As a part of aiding China's tax reform and taxation management reform which funded by NUDP and entrust IMF to implement, our government issued "2002-2006China's strategic plan for tax collection and management" in Mar. of2003, which raised the conception of "tax compliance" officially for the first time.
Influenced by taxation structure in western developed countries and the complicated condition of company taxpayers, foreign scholars' research mainly focused on personal taxpayers, while seldom on company taxpayers. However, in China, company taxpayers--as the main part of tax declaration, whose tax compliance rate will have great influence on our state's revenue worth an in-depth study.
The existence of principal-agent relationship provides a visual angle for studying the tax compliance of company taxpayers. This article on the basis of existing research results for personal taxpayers, takes personal agential tax compliance as a breakthrough, and study the company taxpayer as a final goal, which provides several policy proposals for our taxation collection and administration practice through theoretical and empirical studies.
Section1introduces the background, meaning, target, summarization, frame, outline, and innovation of the thesis.
Section2summarizes the Principal-agent Theory. Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory, and provides the theory basis for following research.
Section3analyzes the main economical factors and non-economic factors that influence the tax compliance for personal taxpayer, including audit rate, penalty rate, tax rate, income, tax compliance cost, public goods supply, tax service, tax justice, tax morality, natural attribute. The questionnaire survey for taxpayer satisfaction, requirement and tax compliance organized by Suzhou survey group of NBS indicates that some factors which have influence on tax compliance of personal taxpayer will also on the (person) agent, and finally have influence on company taxpayers; agent of medium-sized and small enterprises are more sensitive to the factors and will cause more influence on company's tax compliance.
Section4builds a tax compliance model which on the basis of A-S-Y model with the significant modification of parameter such as the influence factors of income and penalty and on the basis of Expected Utility Theory in principal-agent relationship:analyzes the differences in three conditions based on the premise for stable income and proportion income, introduces the application of the model and comes to the conclusion that penalty is a must to personal agent in order to restrain the company's tax evasion; When in stable income condition, the agent tends to tax compliance; When in proportion income condition, it needs to be discussed in different situations. This article suggests to resolve the problem by increasing the penalty to agent and making the coefficient over1.
Section5studies the psychological change of personal agent in the tax compliance decision making process through controlling experiment. The result shows that framing effect existing, and realizes with the prediction, which proves that the Prospect Theory can better describes the decision making process for the decision makers, and the income location after the tax payment can be a reference point for personal agent to choose.
Section6on the basis of previous section builds a tax compliance model which based on the personal income evade tax model of Dhami and al-Nowaihi(2006) who relyed on Prospect theory with the significant modification of parameter such as the influence factors of income and penalty and based on Prospect theory in principal-agent relationship. The model clears the relationship between actual declared tax base and agent income, agent penalty, tax rate and risk aversion coefficient. Then it introduces the application of the model. The conclusion shows that correction between actual declared tax base and agent income, tax rate is negative, while the correction between actual declared tax base and agent penalty, risk aversion coefficient is positive.
Section7provides some policy suggestions for increasing personal agents and company taxpayers' tax compliance level through the angel of taxpayer, tax administration, and government&social environment, which is based on the research of previous sections. At last,it also points out the direction of our efforts in future.
我国从90年代才开始从西方引进和研究税收遵从问题,研究的深度和广度与国外相比仍存在着一些差距。作为由联合国开发计划署资助并委托国际货币基金组织实施的援助中国税制改革与征管改革项目的组成部分,我国政府于2003年3月印发了《2002年-2006年中国税收征收管理战略规划纲要》,其中第一次正式提出了“税收遵从”的概念。
受西方发达国家税制结构和公司纳税人情况复杂等因素的影响,国内外学者对税收遵从问题的研究,日前主要集中在个人纳税人,而对公司纳税人研究的较少。但在我国,公司纳税人是纳税申报的主体,其税收遵从度会对我国财政收入产生较大的影响,所以值得深入研究。
委托-代理关系的存在为研究公司纳税人的税收遵从提供了一个视角。本文通过理论和实证研究,在关于个人纳税人已有研究成果的基础上,以个人代理人的税收遵从为突破口,最终实现研究公司纳税人税收遵从的目的,并为我国税收征管实践提供了一些政策建议。本文主要围绕以下儿方面展开。
本文第1章介绍了论文的研究背景、意义、对象、文献综述、论文框架、内容概要和创新点等。
本文第2章对委托-代理理论、预期效用理论和前景理论进行了概括和总结,为后文的研究提供了理论依据。
本文第3章分析了影响个人纳税人税收遵从的主要经济因素和非经济因素,包括稽查率、罚款率、税率、收入、税收遵从成本、公共产品供给、纳税服务、税制公平税收道德、自然属性等。2010年国家统计局苏州调查队组织的纳税人满意度、需求和税收遵从问卷调查显示,影响个人纳税人税收遵从的一些因素也会影响个人代理人,并最终影响到公司纳税人；中小企业的个人代理人对影响因素更敏感,对公司税收遵从产生的影响也更大。
本文第4章在A—S—Y模型的基础上,对收入、处罚等作为影响因素的参数做了重大修改,构建了委托-代理关系中基于预期效用理论的税收遵从模型,并分别在个人代理人取得固定收入和比例收入的框架下按照三种情况分别进行了讨论,同时还介绍了模型的应用情况。结论是必须对个人代理人进行处罚才能约束其导致的公司逃税行为；在取得固定收入时,代理人倾向于税收遵从；而在取得比例收入时,需要区分讨论,本文建议通过提高代理人的罚款系数并使之大于等于1来解决问题。
本文第5章通过控制实验研究了个人代理人在税收遵从决策过程中的心理变化。实验结果表明其中存在框架效应,并且与预测实现了吻合,证实了前景理论能较好地描述决策者的决策过程,而且可以将依法纳税后的税后所得位置作为个人代理人选择的参照点。
本文第6章在前一章控制实验结论和Dhami和al-Nowaihi(2006)基于前景理论的个人所得税逃税模型的基础上,对收入、处罚等作为影响因索的参数做了重大修改,构建了委托-代理关系中基于前景理论的税收遵从模型。并通过数学推导,得出实际申报税基与个人代理人收入、个人代理人所受处罚、税率以及风险厌恶系数之间的关系。同时还介绍了模型的应用情况。结论表明,实际申报税基与个人代理人收入和¨税率之间的负相关的关系,而与个人代理人所受处罚和风险厌恶系数之间是正相关的关系。
本文第7章在前几章研究的基础上,分别从税收管理角度以及政府和社会环境角度两大方面,为提高个人代理人和公司纳税人的税收遵从度提供了一些政策建议,同时指出了,今后研究中需要努力的方向。
In recent50years, the scale of "Shadow economy" in most countries expanded rapidly. According to statistics, the amount of Europe's shadow economy estimated has reached2.2trillion Euro in year2011, which took up official GDP of different countries at least8%, and at most exceeded30%. During our "Eleventh Five-Year Plan" period, tax audit department checked and collected evaded tax for346.8billion, which increased237.6billion compared with the figures in "Ten Five-year Plan" period. According to research, the main reason for shadow economy is tax incompliance, which is a long-time difficult lesson for all governments in the world. In order to reveal the secret of tax compliance, foreign scholars have done hard and innovative research abundantly, and gained some remarkable results, whose theoretical basis are Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory.
China imported from western world and started the research of tax compliance just after the90's; but distance still exists between China and the western in width and depth. As a part of aiding China's tax reform and taxation management reform which funded by NUDP and entrust IMF to implement, our government issued "2002-2006China's strategic plan for tax collection and management" in Mar. of2003, which raised the conception of "tax compliance" officially for the first time.
Influenced by taxation structure in western developed countries and the complicated condition of company taxpayers, foreign scholars' research mainly focused on personal taxpayers, while seldom on company taxpayers. However, in China, company taxpayers--as the main part of tax declaration, whose tax compliance rate will have great influence on our state's revenue worth an in-depth study.
The existence of principal-agent relationship provides a visual angle for studying the tax compliance of company taxpayers. This article on the basis of existing research results for personal taxpayers, takes personal agential tax compliance as a breakthrough, and study the company taxpayer as a final goal, which provides several policy proposals for our taxation collection and administration practice through theoretical and empirical studies.
Section1introduces the background, meaning, target, summarization, frame, outline, and innovation of the thesis.
Section2summarizes the Principal-agent Theory. Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory, and provides the theory basis for following research.
Section3analyzes the main economical factors and non-economic factors that influence the tax compliance for personal taxpayer, including audit rate, penalty rate, tax rate, income, tax compliance cost, public goods supply, tax service, tax justice, tax morality, natural attribute. The questionnaire survey for taxpayer satisfaction, requirement and tax compliance organized by Suzhou survey group of NBS indicates that some factors which have influence on tax compliance of personal taxpayer will also on the (person) agent, and finally have influence on company taxpayers; agent of medium-sized and small enterprises are more sensitive to the factors and will cause more influence on company's tax compliance.
Section4builds a tax compliance model which on the basis of A-S-Y model with the significant modification of parameter such as the influence factors of income and penalty and on the basis of Expected Utility Theory in principal-agent relationship:analyzes the differences in three conditions based on the premise for stable income and proportion income, introduces the application of the model and comes to the conclusion that penalty is a must to personal agent in order to restrain the company's tax evasion; When in stable income condition, the agent tends to tax compliance; When in proportion income condition, it needs to be discussed in different situations. This article suggests to resolve the problem by increasing the penalty to agent and making the coefficient over1.
Section5studies the psychological change of personal agent in the tax compliance decision making process through controlling experiment. The result shows that framing effect existing, and realizes with the prediction, which proves that the Prospect Theory can better describes the decision making process for the decision makers, and the income location after the tax payment can be a reference point for personal agent to choose.
Section6on the basis of previous section builds a tax compliance model which based on the personal income evade tax model of Dhami and al-Nowaihi(2006) who relyed on Prospect theory with the significant modification of parameter such as the influence factors of income and penalty and based on Prospect theory in principal-agent relationship. The model clears the relationship between actual declared tax base and agent income, agent penalty, tax rate and risk aversion coefficient. Then it introduces the application of the model. The conclusion shows that correction between actual declared tax base and agent income, tax rate is negative, while the correction between actual declared tax base and agent penalty, risk aversion coefficient is positive.
Section7provides some policy suggestions for increasing personal agents and company taxpayers' tax compliance level through the angel of taxpayer, tax administration, and government&social environment, which is based on the research of previous sections. At last,it also points out the direction of our efforts in future.
引文
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