考虑溢出效应的互补品企业广告决策研究
|
摘要
随着经济的持续高速增长,企业广告投入逐年上升。但是,由于企业在进行广告决策时仅从企业自身角度出发,使得广告促销往往不能达到预期的效果。因此,企业制定广告策略时应该在充分认识广告对产品销售额影响的基本规律的基础上,考虑其它市场力量对实现本企业广告目标的影响。互补品企业便是一个影响企业广告决策的重要市场力量。由于互补品之间存在的互补性需求关系使得互补品企业间的广告促销存在一定的溢出效应,会对企业双方的广告决策以及广告促销投入的预期收益造成一定的影响,因此,如何在广告促销决策中充分考虑互补品企业间广告促销存在的溢出效应,从而保证企业的广告促销投入能够有效地增加产品销量、发现潜在顾客,进一步使企业在当前激烈的竞争环境中获得竞争优势,是一个具有重要理论意义及现实意义的研究问题。
在国内外研究成果的基础上,本文综合运用博弈论和信息经济学等理论对互补品企业的广告决策问题进行深入地研究。
首先,针对企业为了降低广告促销费用及风险,选择“搭便车”的方式,利用广告溢出效应从其互补品企业的广告促销中获得促销成果,从而损害了企业广告投入积极性的现象,研究了互补品企业间广告投入决策和价格决策完全非合作、部分合作和完全合作方式下企业双方的最优决策,并且考察了不同合作情形下广告溢出效应对企业双方的广告促销投入和收益的影响作用,对企业通过广告促销获得的收益进行了对比分析,并在上述研究基础上,提出了互补品企业合作广告的实施策略。
其次,针对互补品需求关联性造成互补品企业广告促销存在溢出效应的现象,构建了基于广告分担率的互补品企业合作广告博弈模型,研究了斯坦克尔伯格博弈和纳什合作博弈两种合作情形下互补品企业双方的最优广告决策、最优广告分担率、最优收益以及互补品销售系统的最优收益,对比分析了不同合作形式下的均衡结果,进一步论证了纳什合作博弈均衡具有帕累托优势,并在此基础上利用鲁宾斯坦恩——斯塔尔讨价还价模型对增加的收益进行了分配,得到了一种帕累托最优合作广告方案,实现了互补品销售系统的协调。
再次,考虑到不对称信息下具有需求信息优势的企业利用拥有的信息优势,将广告投入作为市场需求的信号,有选择地向其互补品企业传递需求信息,以刺激其互补品企业增加广告投入的问题,建立了考虑溢出效应的互补品企业广告决策的信号博弈模型,得到了分离均衡和混同均衡的存在条件,并对不同均衡状态下企业双方的最优广告决策和最优收益进行了分析。在此基础上,进一步讨论了互补品企业双方的广告策略选择问题。
最后,针对不对称信息下互补品企业合作广告中具有信息优势的企业的理性背叛行为,分析了互补品企业基于广告分担率的合作广告关系中逆向选择的发生条件;从互补品企业中不具有需求信息优势企业的视角,采用机制设计理论和显示原理构建了该企业如何诱导其互补品企业报告自己真实需求信息的逆向选择模型,设计了逆向选择条件下考虑溢出效应的互补品企业最优合作广告合约。结果表明,该合约能够达到诱导具有信息优势的企业讲真话的目的,由此保证互补品企业基于广告分担率的合作广告关系的建立,解决互补品企业合作广告中产生的逆向选择问题。
With the sustained and rapid growth of economy, enterprise’s advertising investment increased year by year. But, enterprises make advertising decision only from their own point and this makes advertising promotions often fail to achieve the desired effects. So, enterprise should make advertising dicision by considering the impact of other market forces on advertising objectives and based on the full awareness of the impact of advertising on product sales. Complementary goods enterprise is an important market forces which impacts enterprise’s advertising decisions. The spillover effects in sales promotion between complementary goods enterprises arising from the interrelated nature of complementary good can impact advertising decisions and expected prfits on advertising promotion investment of enterprises. So how to take full consideration of advertising spillover effects in the process of making advertising promotion decisions is a profound theoretical and realistic problem of ensuring advertising promotions invest to increase product sales and find potential customers and gaining competitive advantage in the intense competition environment.
Based on the previous research works, we pursued an in-depth research on advertising decision between complementary goods enterprises by using game theory and economics of information theory.
Firstly, acoording to the problem that enterprise selects free-riding behavior to obtain promotion results by using the advertising spillover effects of complementary enterprise in order to decrease advertising investment and risk and which will decrease complementary enterprise's advertising investment enthusiasm, the complementary goods enterprises’optimal strategies of total non-cooperative, partly cooperative and total cooperative cases were researched respectively. Additionally, the impact of advertising spillover effects on complementary goods enterprises sales promotion investment and profits was discussed, and the enterprises’profits from the sales promotion were compared. On the base of these, the implementation strategies of cooperative advertising were proposed.
Secondly, Aimed at the spillover effects in advertising sales promotion between complementary goods enterprises arising from the interrelated nature of complementary goods, the cooperative advertising game model based on participate rate between the complementary goods enterprises was based. Based on the model, the complementary goods enterprises’optimal strategies and participate rate and profits and system benefits of Stackelberg game and Nash cooperative game were researched respectively. Additionally, the optimal advertising strategies and profits of complementary enterprises under two equilibriums were compared. The cooperative game equilibrium having more Pareto advantage than Stackelberg equilibrium was proved. Further, the surplus in advertising cooperation was distributed by Rubinstein bargaining model and obtained a Pareto cooperate scheme which can realize coordination of marketing system.
Thirdly, considering the enterprise with demand information priority would use its priority send demand information selectively in order to stimulate complementary enterprise's advertising investment by using advertising investment as demand signal, signaling game theory model on advertising decision-making between complementary goods enterprises considering spillover effects was established. Based on the model, the condition of separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium were obtained, and the optimal advertising strategies and profits of complementary enterprises under these two equilibriums were analyzed. Additionally, the advertising strategy choices of complementary enterprises were discussed.
Lastly, Aimed at the rational betray problem of the enterprise with information superior in the process of cooperative advertising, the occurrence conditions of adverse selection of cooperative advertising relationship based on advertising participation rate were analyzed. On the base of these, by using mechanism design theory and revelation principle, in order to induce the manufacturer with information priority show its true demand information, an adverse selection model was constructed from the perspective of the manufacturer without information priority, and the cooperative advertising contract was designed. The results show that the contract can induce the manufacturer with information priority show its true demand information and can ensure the cooperative advertising relationship based on advertising participation rate between complementary enterprises and solve adverse selection problems in the process of complementary goods enterprises cooperative advertising.
在国内外研究成果的基础上,本文综合运用博弈论和信息经济学等理论对互补品企业的广告决策问题进行深入地研究。
首先,针对企业为了降低广告促销费用及风险,选择“搭便车”的方式,利用广告溢出效应从其互补品企业的广告促销中获得促销成果,从而损害了企业广告投入积极性的现象,研究了互补品企业间广告投入决策和价格决策完全非合作、部分合作和完全合作方式下企业双方的最优决策,并且考察了不同合作情形下广告溢出效应对企业双方的广告促销投入和收益的影响作用,对企业通过广告促销获得的收益进行了对比分析,并在上述研究基础上,提出了互补品企业合作广告的实施策略。
其次,针对互补品需求关联性造成互补品企业广告促销存在溢出效应的现象,构建了基于广告分担率的互补品企业合作广告博弈模型,研究了斯坦克尔伯格博弈和纳什合作博弈两种合作情形下互补品企业双方的最优广告决策、最优广告分担率、最优收益以及互补品销售系统的最优收益,对比分析了不同合作形式下的均衡结果,进一步论证了纳什合作博弈均衡具有帕累托优势,并在此基础上利用鲁宾斯坦恩——斯塔尔讨价还价模型对增加的收益进行了分配,得到了一种帕累托最优合作广告方案,实现了互补品销售系统的协调。
再次,考虑到不对称信息下具有需求信息优势的企业利用拥有的信息优势,将广告投入作为市场需求的信号,有选择地向其互补品企业传递需求信息,以刺激其互补品企业增加广告投入的问题,建立了考虑溢出效应的互补品企业广告决策的信号博弈模型,得到了分离均衡和混同均衡的存在条件,并对不同均衡状态下企业双方的最优广告决策和最优收益进行了分析。在此基础上,进一步讨论了互补品企业双方的广告策略选择问题。
最后,针对不对称信息下互补品企业合作广告中具有信息优势的企业的理性背叛行为,分析了互补品企业基于广告分担率的合作广告关系中逆向选择的发生条件;从互补品企业中不具有需求信息优势企业的视角,采用机制设计理论和显示原理构建了该企业如何诱导其互补品企业报告自己真实需求信息的逆向选择模型,设计了逆向选择条件下考虑溢出效应的互补品企业最优合作广告合约。结果表明,该合约能够达到诱导具有信息优势的企业讲真话的目的,由此保证互补品企业基于广告分担率的合作广告关系的建立,解决互补品企业合作广告中产生的逆向选择问题。
With the sustained and rapid growth of economy, enterprise’s advertising investment increased year by year. But, enterprises make advertising decision only from their own point and this makes advertising promotions often fail to achieve the desired effects. So, enterprise should make advertising dicision by considering the impact of other market forces on advertising objectives and based on the full awareness of the impact of advertising on product sales. Complementary goods enterprise is an important market forces which impacts enterprise’s advertising decisions. The spillover effects in sales promotion between complementary goods enterprises arising from the interrelated nature of complementary good can impact advertising decisions and expected prfits on advertising promotion investment of enterprises. So how to take full consideration of advertising spillover effects in the process of making advertising promotion decisions is a profound theoretical and realistic problem of ensuring advertising promotions invest to increase product sales and find potential customers and gaining competitive advantage in the intense competition environment.
Based on the previous research works, we pursued an in-depth research on advertising decision between complementary goods enterprises by using game theory and economics of information theory.
Firstly, acoording to the problem that enterprise selects free-riding behavior to obtain promotion results by using the advertising spillover effects of complementary enterprise in order to decrease advertising investment and risk and which will decrease complementary enterprise's advertising investment enthusiasm, the complementary goods enterprises’optimal strategies of total non-cooperative, partly cooperative and total cooperative cases were researched respectively. Additionally, the impact of advertising spillover effects on complementary goods enterprises sales promotion investment and profits was discussed, and the enterprises’profits from the sales promotion were compared. On the base of these, the implementation strategies of cooperative advertising were proposed.
Secondly, Aimed at the spillover effects in advertising sales promotion between complementary goods enterprises arising from the interrelated nature of complementary goods, the cooperative advertising game model based on participate rate between the complementary goods enterprises was based. Based on the model, the complementary goods enterprises’optimal strategies and participate rate and profits and system benefits of Stackelberg game and Nash cooperative game were researched respectively. Additionally, the optimal advertising strategies and profits of complementary enterprises under two equilibriums were compared. The cooperative game equilibrium having more Pareto advantage than Stackelberg equilibrium was proved. Further, the surplus in advertising cooperation was distributed by Rubinstein bargaining model and obtained a Pareto cooperate scheme which can realize coordination of marketing system.
Thirdly, considering the enterprise with demand information priority would use its priority send demand information selectively in order to stimulate complementary enterprise's advertising investment by using advertising investment as demand signal, signaling game theory model on advertising decision-making between complementary goods enterprises considering spillover effects was established. Based on the model, the condition of separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium were obtained, and the optimal advertising strategies and profits of complementary enterprises under these two equilibriums were analyzed. Additionally, the advertising strategy choices of complementary enterprises were discussed.
Lastly, Aimed at the rational betray problem of the enterprise with information superior in the process of cooperative advertising, the occurrence conditions of adverse selection of cooperative advertising relationship based on advertising participation rate were analyzed. On the base of these, by using mechanism design theory and revelation principle, in order to induce the manufacturer with information priority show its true demand information, an adverse selection model was constructed from the perspective of the manufacturer without information priority, and the cooperative advertising contract was designed. The results show that the contract can induce the manufacturer with information priority show its true demand information and can ensure the cooperative advertising relationship based on advertising participation rate between complementary enterprises and solve adverse selection problems in the process of complementary goods enterprises cooperative advertising.
引文
[1]新华网. 20多年来我国广告业年均增长速度接近40%[EB/OL]. http://news.sohu. om/2004/ 04/08/11/news 219781175.shtml, 2004-04-08.
[2]食品商务网.爱多和秦池:广告营销是与非[EB/OL]. http://www.21food.cn/html/news/13/ 179162.htm, 2007-06-19.
[3] Bhaskaran S R, Gilbert S M. Selling and leasing strategies for durable goods with complementary products[J].Management Science, 2005, 51(8): 1278-1290.
[4]孙兵.品牌联合,广告策略新风尚[EB/OL]. http://www.cmmo.cn/space.php?uid=5970&do= blog&id=66167, 2009-10-30.
[5] Cellini R, Lambertini L. Advertising with spillover effects in a differential oligopoly game with differentiated goods[J]. Central European Journal of Operations Research, 2003, 11(4): 409-423.
[6]天虹.促销成本增加2006财年NTT利润下降25.1%[EB/OL]. http://comm.ccidnet.com/ art/ 9181/20070429/1073239_1.html, 2007-04-29.
[7]计世网.中国电信打出组合拳3G手机大战升级[EB/OL]. http://mobile.ccw.com.cn/xpsd/ htm2009/20090610_637426.shtml, 2009-06-10.
[8]张庶萍.竞争环境下的广告策略研究[D].天津:天津大学, 2005.
[9]张纪康.广告经济学实用教程[M].上海:上海远东出版社, 1999: 147.
[10] Little J D C. Aggregate advertising models: The state of the art[J]. Operational Research, 1979, 27(4): 629-667.
[11] Lancaster K M, Stern J A. Computer-based advertising budgeting practices of leading U.S. consumer advertisers[J]. Journal of Advertising, 1983, 12(4): 4-9.
[12]蔡希杰,陈德棉.基于微分博弈理论的广告竞争研究综述[J].财贸研究, 2008, (2): 115-122.
[13] Colombo L, Lambertini L. Dynamic advertising under vertical product differentiation[J]. Joural of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2002, 15(2): 108-126.
[14] Qi J, Wang D, Ding Y, Wang Z. Dynamical analysis of a nonlinear competitive model with generic and brand advertising efforts[J]. Nonlinear Analysis: Real World Applications, 2007, 8(2): 664-679.
[15] Benchekroun H. A unifying differential game of advertising and promotion[J]. International Game Theory Review, 2007, 9(2): 183-197.
[16] Norman G, Pepall L, Richards D. Generic product advertising, spillovers, and market concentration[J]. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2008, 90(3): 719-732.
[17] Dockner E J, Jorgensen S, Long N V, Sorger G. Differential games in economics and management science[M]. Gerhard Sorger Published, 2000: 97-103.
[18] Erickson G M. Differential game models of advertising competition[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 1995, 83(3): 431-438.
[19] Erickson. Dynamic models of advertising competition[M]. Washington: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003: 15-18.
[20] J?rgensen S, Zaccour G. Differential games in marketing[M]. Boston/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004: 35.
[21] Prasad A, Sethi S P. Competitive advertising under uncertainty: A stochastic differential game approach [J]. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2004, 123(1): 163-185.
[22] Bass F M, Krishnamoorthy A, Prasad A, Sethi S P. Generic and brand advertising strategies in a dynamic duopoly[J]. Marketing Science, 2005, 24(4): 556-568.
[23] Brady M. Advertising effectiveness and spillover: Simulating strategic interaction using advertising[J]. System Dynamics Review, 2009, 25(4): 281-307.
[24] Qi J, Wang D. Optimal control strategies for an advertising competing model[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2007, 27(1): 39-44.
[25] Piga C A G. Competition in a duopoly with sticky price and advertising[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2000, 18: 595-614.
[26] Wang Q, Wu Z. A duopolistic model of dynamic competitive advertising[J]. European Joumal of Operational Research, 2001, 128(2): 213-226.
[27] Case J H. Economics and the competetive process[M]. New York: New York University Press, 1979: 87.
[28] Deal K, Sethi S P. A bilinear-quadratic differential game in advertising[M]. New York: Marcel Dekker, 1979: 91-109.
[29]李克克,唐小我.广告竞争与市场进入壁垒[J].电子科技大学学报, 1999, 28(6): 652-654.
[30]任方旭,邵云飞,唐小我.寡头垄断市场下的广告竞争策略研究[J].河南科学, 2002, 20(4): 320-323.
[31]张玉林,仲伟俊,梅姝娥.企业间生产与广告投资分配的竞争分析[J].管理科学学报, 2002, 5: 34-38.
[32]汪定伟,叶伟雄,容启亮.两强竞争市场中的企业广告策略分析[J].控制工程, 2003, 10(1): 29-32.
[33]齐洁,汪定伟.广告竞争模型中的混沌同步特性分析[J].管理科学学报, 2004, 7(2): 27-31.
[34] Vidale M L, Wolfe H B. An operations research sutdy of sales response to advertising[J]. Operations Research, 1957, 5(3): 370-381.
[35]左小德.双寡头垄断市场下的企业广告竞争分析[J].暨南大学学报(自然科学版), 2006, 27(1): 43-49.
[36]朱启红,顾锋.存在消费者搜寻的双寡头企业广告竟争模型[J].上海管理科学, 2009, 31(3): 47-49.
[37]泰勒尔.产业组织理论[M].张维迎译.北京:中国人民大学出版, 1997: 157.
[38]王志凌,黎志成.双寡头广告竞争的定性模拟技术研究[J].武汉理工大学学报, 2002, 24(12): 91-94.
[39]李烃,盛昭翰,姚洪兴.一类广告竞争模型的延迟反馈混沌控制方法[J].预测, 2003, 22(1): 64-67.
[40]童纪新,裴明,李煌.两强市场广告竞争混沌的参数调节反馈控制方法[J].河海大学学报(自然科学版), 2004, 32(3): 328-331.
[41]姚洪兴,徐峰.双寡头有限理性广告竞争博弈模型的复杂性分析[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2005, (12): 32-37.
[42] Erickson G M. Empirical analysis of closed-loop advertising strategies[J]. Management Science, 1992, 38(9): 1732-1749.
[43] Chintagunta P K. Investigating the sensitivity of equilibrium: profit to advertising dynamics and competitive effects[J]. Management Science, 1993, 39(9): 1146-1162
[44] Chintagunta P K, Jain D. Empirical analysis of Dynamic Duopoly Model of Competition[J]. Journal of Economics and Management Scienc, 1995, 4(1): 109-131.
[45] Nguyen D, Shi L. Competitive advertising strategies and market-size dynamics-a research note on theory and evidence[J]. Management Scienc, 2006, 52(6): 965-973.
[46] Bass F M. A new product growth model for consumer durables[J]. Management Science, 2004, 50(12): 1825-1832.
[47] Dockner E J, J?gensen S. New product advertising in dynamic oligopolies[J]. Zeitschrift Fur Operations Research, 1992, 36(5): 459-473.
[48] Fruchter G E. The many-player advertising game[J]. Management Science, 1999, 145(11): 1609-1611.
[49] Fruchter G E, Kalish S. Closed-loop advertising strategies in a duoply[J]. Management Science, 1997, 43(1): 54-63.
[50] Prasad A, Sethi S. Dynamic optimization of an oligopoly model of advertising, working paper, UTD School of Management, America, 2003, 9.
[51] Naik P A, Prasad A, Sethi S P. Building brand awareness in dynamic oligopoly markets[J]. Management Scienc, 2008, 54(1): 129-138.
[52] Sethi S P. Deterministic and Stochastic Optimization of a Dynamic Advertising Model[J]. Optimal Control Applications and Methods, 1983, 4(2): 179-184.
[53] Erickson G M. An oligopoly model of dynamic advertising competition[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2009, 197(1): 374-388.
[54]经济导报.碧浪+海尔:合作广告事半功倍[EB/OL]. http://paper.dzwww.com/jjdb/data/2010 0303/html/7/content_1.html, 2010-03-03.
[55]文书生.试论品牌联合广告策略[J].商业研究, 2000, (7): 146-148.
[56] Grrossman R P. Co-branding in advertising[J]. Journal of Product and Brand Management, 1997, 6(3): 191-201.
[57] Leuthesser L, Kohli C, Suri R. 2+2=5?A framework for using co-branding to leverage a brand[J]. Brand Management, 2003, 11(1): 35-47.
[58]毛瑞锋.联合品牌一种新型的品牌经营策略[J].商业经济文荟, 2003, (2): 19-21.
[59]关忠诚,程刚.联合品牌战略研究[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版), 2006, 12(2): 38-43.
[60]原永丹,董大海,刘瑞明,金玉芳.品牌联合的研究进展[J].管理学报, 2007, 4(2): 243-248.
[61]周春元,陆娟,吴芳,范公广.基于消费者决策信息的不同行业品牌联合差异研究[J].管理学报, 2009, 6(3): 361-366.
[62] Samu S, Krishnan H S, Smith R E. Using advertising alliances for new product introduction: interactions between product complementarity and promotional strategies[J]. Journal of Marketing, 1999, 63(1): 57-74.
[63]李芫.宝洁与小天鹅借力打力[EB/OL]. http://jjdb.dzwww.com/lssj/200211/t20021120_573 117.htm, 2002-11-20.
[64]刘伟艺.艺眼看卫浴:卫浴品牌合作广告模式猜想[EB/OL]. http://info. bm.hc360.com/ 2010/03/301106145902.shtml, 2010-3-30.
[65] Varadarajan P R. Horizontal cooperative sales promotion: A framework for classification and additional perspectives [J]. Journal of Marketing, 1986, 50(2): 61-73.
[66] Young R F, Greyser S A. Managing cooperative advertising: A strategic approach[M]. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983: 67.
[67] Crimmins E C. Cooperative Advertising[M]. New York: Gene Wolf, 1984: 134.
[68] Roslow S, Laskey H A, Nicholls J A F. The enigma of cooperative advertising[J]. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 1993, 8(2): 70-79.
[69]吴文清,赵黎明,刘嘉焜.需求不确定下供应链合作广告的博弈分析[J].软科学, 2006, 20(2): 24-27.
[70] Brennan L. How retailers are putting it all together[J]. Sales and Marketing Management, 1988, 5(1): 62-65.
[71] Green J. Still pulling the strings, but locally too[J]. Brandweek, 2000, 41: 34-42.
[72] Elkin T. Intel inside at 10[J]. Advertising Age, 2001, 72: 4-6.
[73] Toys S W. Co-Op Dollars [EB/OL]. http://www.smallworldtoys.com/coop.php, 2008-01-01.
[74] Arett Sales[EB/OL]. http://www.arett.com/marketing/arett-co-op.asp, 2007.
[75] Berger P D. Vertical cooperative advertising ventures[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1972, 9(3): 309-312.
[76] Berger P D. Statistical decision analysis of cooperative advertising ventures[J]. Operational Research Quarterly, 1973, 24(2): 309-312.
[77] Berger P D, Magliozzi T. Optimal co-operative advertising decisions in direct-mail operations[J]. The Journal of the Operational Research Society, 1992, 43(11): 1079-1086.
[78] Dant R P, Berger P D. Modelling cooperative advertising decisions in franchising[J]. The Journal of the Operational Research Societ, 1996, 47(9): 1120-1136.
[79] Dutta S, Bergen M, John G. Variations in the contractual terms of cooperative advertising contracts: An empirical investigation[J]. Marketing Letters, 1995, 6(1): 15-22.
[80] Nagler M G. An exploratory analysis of the determinants of cooperative advertising participation rates[J]. MarketingLetter, 2006, 17(10): 91-102.
[81]罗卫,欧阳明,德张子刚.制造商-零售商供应链中的合作广告模型[J].统计与决策, 2003, (6): 20-21.
[82] Berger P, Lee J, Weinberg B. Optimal cooperative advertising integration strategy for organizations adding a direct online channel[J]. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2006, 57: 920-927.
[83]曹细玉,宁宣熙,覃艳华.易逝品供应链中的联合广告投入、订货策略与协调问题研究[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2006, (3): 102-107.
[84]王圣东,周永务.带有两种营销模式的供应链合作广告协调模型[J].系统工程学报, 2008, 23(6): 674-682.
[85] Kadiyali V, Chintagunta P, Vilcassim N. Manufacturer–retailer channel interactions and implications for channel power: An empirical investigation of pricing in a local market[J]. Marketing Science, 2000, 19(2): 127-148.
[86] Geylani T, Dukes A, Srinivasan K. Strategic manufacturer response to a dominant retailer[J]. Marketing Science, 2007, 26(2): 164-180.
[87] Huang Z, Li S X. Co-op advertising models in manufacturer-retailer supply chians: A game theory approach[J]. European Joumal of Operational Research, 2001, 135(1): 527-544.
[88] Li S X, Huang Z, Zhu J, Chau P Y K. Cooperative advertising, game theory and manufacturer-retailer supply chains[J]. Omega, 2002, 30(1): 347-357.
[89]梁樑,余雁.供应链中制造商与代理商广告合作的博弈[J].系统工程理论方法应用, 2004, 13(6): 490-494.
[90] Xie J, Ai S. A note on "Cooperative advertising, game theory and manufacturer-retailer supplychains"[J]. Omega, 2006, 34(5): 501-504.
[91] Xie J, Neyret A. Co-op advertising and pricing models in manufacturer–retailer supply chains[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2009, 56(4): 1375-1385.
[92] Huang Z, Li S X, Mahajan V. An analysis of manufacturer-retailer supply chain coordination in cooperative advertising[J]. Decision Sciences, 2002, 33(3): 469-494.
[93]钟宝嵩,李悝,李宏余.基于供应链的合作促销与定价问题[J].中国管理科学, 2004, 12(3): 69-74.
[94]傅强,曾顺秋.不确定需求下供应链合作广告与订货策略的博弈[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2008, (3): 56-63.
[95]傅强,曾顺秋.价格折扣下的纵向合作广告博弈分析[J].重庆大学学报(自然科学版). 2007, 30(9): 148-153.
[96] Yue J, Austin J, Wang M-C, Huang Z. Coordination of cooperative advertising in a two-level supply chain when manufacturer offers discount[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2006, 168(1): 65-85.
[97] Bergen M, John G. Understanding cooperative advertising participation rates in conventional channels[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1997, 34(8): 357-369.
[98]王磊,梁樑,吴德胜,熊立.零售商竞争下的垂直合作广告模型[J].中国管理科学, 2005, 13(2): 63-69.
[99] Karray S, Zaccour G. Could co-op advertising be a manufacturer's counterstrategy to store brands?[J]. Journal of Business Research, 2006, 59(9): 1008-1015.
[100] Esmaeili M, Aryanezhad M-B, Zeephongsekul P. A game theory approach in seller-buyer supply chain[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2009, 195: 442-448.
[101] Chintagunta P K, Jain D. A dynamic model of channel member strategies for marketing expenditures[J]. Marketing Science, 1992, 11(2): 168-188.
[102] J?rgensen S, siguéS P, Zaccour G. Dynamic cooperative advertising in a channel[J]. Journal of Retailing, 2000, 76(1): 71-92.
[103] Buratto A, Grosset L, Viscolani B. Advertising coordination games of a manufacturer and a retailer while introducing a new product[J].Top, 2007: 307-321.
[104] He X, Prasad A, Sethi S. Cooperative advertising and pricing in a dynamic stochastic supply chain: feedback stackelberg strategies[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2009 18(1): 78-94.
[105]张庶萍,张世英.供应链中合作广告策略的Stackelberg微分对策模型[J].西南交通大学学报, 2005, 40(4): 513-518.
[106]张庶萍,张世英.基于微分对策的供应链合作广告决策研究[J].控制与决策, 2006, 21(2): 153-157,162.
[107] J?rgensen S, Taboubi S, Zaccour G. Cooperative advertising in a marketing channel[J]. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2001, 110(1): 145-158.
[108] Neslin S A, Shoemaker R W. An alternative explanation for lower repeat rates after promotion purchases[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1989, 26: 205-213.
[109] Papatla P, Krishnamurthi L. Measuring the dynamic effects of promotions on brand choice[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1996, 33(1): 20-35.
[110] Raghubir P, Corfman K. When do price promotions affect pretrial brand evaluations?[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1999, 36(2): 211-222.
[111] J?rgensen S, Taboubi S, Zaccour G. Retail promotions with negative brand image effects: Is cooperation possible?[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2003, 150(2): 395-405.
[112]王正波,刘伟.合作促销的微分博弈模型及均衡比较分析[J].商业经济与管理, 2004, 158(12): 26-39.
[113]傅强,曾顺秋.纵向合作广告的微分对策模型研究[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2007, (11): 26-33.
[114]林英晖,屠梅曾.供应链企业间合作广告的博弈分析[J].上海大学学报(自然科学版), 2005, 11(4): 436-450.
[115]骆品亮.产业组织学[M].上海:复旦大学出版社, 2006: 266.
[116] Erdem T, Sun B. An empirical investigation of the spillover effects of advertising and sales promotions in umbrella branding[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 2002, 39(4): 408-420.
[117]吴昌南.产品同质下广告的横向外部性与供给机制[J].江苏商论, 2006, (2): 62-63.
[118]吴昌南.西方产业组织理论关于广告与同质产品的研究及启示[J].生产力研究, 2006, (11): 160-162.
[119]罗云辉.对存在广告溢出效应出口企业进行补贴的理论依据[J].产业经济研究, 2006, (6): 71-75.
[120] Lambertini L, Palestini A. Dynamic advertising with spillovers: Cartel vs competitive fringe[J]. Optimal Control Applications and Methods, 2009, 30(6): 562 - 572.
[121]约瑟夫·E·斯蒂格利茨.经济学[M].黄险峰,张帆译.北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2005: 102.
[122]别传武,陈丽珍.论互补商品对营销的影响[J].中国流通经济, 2001, (2): 47-50.
[123] Gabszewicz J, Sonnac N, Wauthy X. On price competition with complementary goods[J]. Economics Letters, 2001, 70(1): 431-437.
[124] Yue X, Mukhopadhyay S K, Zhu X. A Bertrand model of pricing of complementary goods under information asymmetry[J]. Journal of Business Research, 2006, 59(10-11): 1182-1192.
[125] Wang Y. Joint pricing-production decisions in supply chains of complementary products with uncertain demand[J]. Operations Research, 2006, 54(6): 1110-1127.
[126]迈克尔·波特.竞争优势[M].陈小悦译.北京:华夏出版社, 2005: 35.
[127] Sengupta S. Some approaches to complementary product strategy[J]. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 1998, 15(4): 352-367.
[128] Ende J, Jaspers F, Gerwin D. Involvement of system firms in the development of complementary products: The influence of novelty[J]. Technovation, 2008, 28(11): 726-738.
[129] Schilling M. Winning the standards race: Building installed base and the availability of complementary goods[J]. European Management Journal, 1999, 17(3): 265-274.
[130]周俊.关于互补产品战略的探讨[J].云南财贸学院学报, 2003, 19(4): 84-87.
[131] Nambisan S. Complementary product intergration by high-technology new ventures: the role of initial technology strategy[J]. Management Science, 2002, 48(3): 382-398.
[132]段文奇,郑文哲,惠淑敏.网络市场新产品互补战略实施研究[J].预测, 2007, 26(3): 15-20.
[133]王延飞.互补品制胜——基于互补品对联想集团竞争优势的影响分析[J].市场营销导刊, 2008, (5): 51-54.
[134]金晓亚.互补品战略竞争优势分析[J].中国外资, 2009, (191): 2-3,6.
[135] Church J, Gandal N. Strategic entry deterrence: Complementary products as installed base[J]. European Journal of Political Economy, 1996, 12(2): 331-354.
[136]李善民,曾昭灶.质量差异化与产品互补型企业兼并问题[J].管理科学学报, 2003, 6(6): 54-60.
[137]殷红,王先甲.互补性物品的最优拍卖机制[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2006, (9): 60-65.
[138] Palfrey T R. Bunding decisions by muli-product monopolist with incomplete information[J]. Econometrica, 1983, 51(2): 463-483.
[139] Kim H-S. Equilibrium and efficiency in auctions of complementary goods without bundling[J]. Economics Letters, 1996, 52(1): 49-54.
[140] Levin J. An optimal aution for complements[J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 1997, 18(2): 176-192.
[141] Cramton P C. The FCC spectrum autions: an early assessment[J]. Jounal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1997, 6(3): 431-495.
[142] Branco F. On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction[J]. Economics Letters, 2001, 70(2): 187-194.
[143]罗卫,张子刚,欧阳明德.基于一个博弈论方法的简单供应链合作广告模型[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2004, 2: 31-36.
[144]张帆,李垣.防降价均衡下的产品兼容性、网络效应和品牌效应[J].管理工程学报, 2005, 19(4): 26-30.
[145] Coughlan A T. Distribution channel choice in a market with complementary goods[J].International Journal of Research in Marketing, 1987, 4(2): 85-97.
[146] Zhang H. Vertical information exchange in a supply chain with duoply retailers[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2002, 11(4): 531-546.
[147]马西莫·莫塔.竞争政策—理论与实践[M].沈国华译.上海:上海财经大学出版社, 2006: 466.
[148] Chu W. Demand signalling and screening in channels of distribution[J]. Marketing Science, 1992, 11(4): 327-347.
[149] Xie J, Wei J C. Coordinating advertising and pricing in a manufacturer-retailer channel[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2009, 197(2): 785-791.
[150] Kadiyali V. Entry, its deterrence, and its accommodation: A study of the U.S. photographic film industry[J]. RAND Journal of Economics, 1996, 27(3): 452-478.
[151]弗登伯格,梯诺尔.博弈论[M].黄涛译.北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2002: 100-101.
[152]周永务,杨善林.最优均匀广告与订货策略的联合决策模型[J].系统工程学报, 2004, 19(3): 264-269.
[153] Bagwell K. The Economic Analysis of Advertising. In: Armstrong M, Porter R H, eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization: North Holland; 2007:1701–1844.
[154] Nelson P. Information and consumer behavior[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1970, 78: 311-329.
[155] Nelson P. Advertising as information[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1974, 82: 729-754.
[156] Kihlstrom R, Riordan M. Advertising as a signal[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1984, 92: 427-450.
[157] Horstmann I, MacDonald G. Is advertising a signal of product quality? Evidence from the compact disc player market, 1983-1992[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2003, 21(3): 317-345.
[158] Thomas L, Shane S, Weigelt K. An empirical examination of advertising as a signal of product quality[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1998, 37(4): 415-430.
[159] Fluet C, Garella P G. Advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2002, 20(7): 907-930.
[160] Hudson J. A Bayesian approach to the evaluation of stochastic signals of product quality[J]. Omega, 2000, 28(5): 599-607.
[161] Bagwell K, Riordan M H. High and declining prices signal product quality[J]. American Economic Review, 1991, 81(1): 224.
[162] Linnemer L. Price and advertising as signals of quality when some consumers are informed[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2002, 20(7): 931-947.
[163] K?nigbauer I. Advertising and generic market entry[J]. Journal of Health Economics, 2007,26(2): 286-305.
[164] Hertzendorf M N, Overgaard P B. Price competition and advertising signals: Signaling by competing senders[J]. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2001, 10(4): 621-662.
[165] Milgrom P, Roberts J. Price and advertising signals of product quality[J]. The Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94(4): 796.
[166] Linnemer L. Entry deterrence, product quality: price and advertising as signals[J]. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1998, 7: 615-645.
[167] Bagwell K. Signalling and entry deterrence: a multidimensignal analysis[J]. RAND Journal of Economics, 2007, 38(3): 670-697.
[168] Bagwell K, Ramey G. Advertising and limit pricing[J]. RAND Journal of Economics, 1988, 19(1): 59-71.
[169] Albak S, Overgaard P B. Upstream pricingand advertising signal downstream demand[J]. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1992, 1(4): 677-698.
[170] Bagwell K, Ramey G. Advertising and pricing to deter or accommodate entry when demand is unknown[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1990, 8(1): 93-113.
[171]斯蒂芬·马丁.高级产业经济学[M].史东辉译.上海:上海财经大学出版社, 2003: 295-296.
[172]帕特里克·博尔顿,马赛厄斯·德瓦特里庞.合同理论[M].费方域,蒋士成,郑育家译.上海:格致出版社,上海三联书店,上海人民出版社, 2008: 74.
[173] Akerlof G A. The market for 'Lemons': Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970, 84(30): 488-500.
[174]曾顺秋.供应链中的制造商-零售商合作广告博弈模型.重庆:重庆大学; 2007.
[175]梁樑,余雁.供应链中制造商与代理商广告合作的博弈[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2004, 13(6): 490-494.
[176]因内恩·马可-斯达德勒,大卫·佩雷斯-卡斯特里罗.信息经济学引论:激励与合约[M].管毅平译.上海:上海财经大学出版社, 2004: 160.
[177]易超琴,万建平.逆向选择下的委托—代理模型分析[J].数学的实践与认识, 2008, 38(1): 7-15.
[2]食品商务网.爱多和秦池:广告营销是与非[EB/OL]. http://www.21food.cn/html/news/13/ 179162.htm, 2007-06-19.
[3] Bhaskaran S R, Gilbert S M. Selling and leasing strategies for durable goods with complementary products[J].Management Science, 2005, 51(8): 1278-1290.
[4]孙兵.品牌联合,广告策略新风尚[EB/OL]. http://www.cmmo.cn/space.php?uid=5970&do= blog&id=66167, 2009-10-30.
[5] Cellini R, Lambertini L. Advertising with spillover effects in a differential oligopoly game with differentiated goods[J]. Central European Journal of Operations Research, 2003, 11(4): 409-423.
[6]天虹.促销成本增加2006财年NTT利润下降25.1%[EB/OL]. http://comm.ccidnet.com/ art/ 9181/20070429/1073239_1.html, 2007-04-29.
[7]计世网.中国电信打出组合拳3G手机大战升级[EB/OL]. http://mobile.ccw.com.cn/xpsd/ htm2009/20090610_637426.shtml, 2009-06-10.
[8]张庶萍.竞争环境下的广告策略研究[D].天津:天津大学, 2005.
[9]张纪康.广告经济学实用教程[M].上海:上海远东出版社, 1999: 147.
[10] Little J D C. Aggregate advertising models: The state of the art[J]. Operational Research, 1979, 27(4): 629-667.
[11] Lancaster K M, Stern J A. Computer-based advertising budgeting practices of leading U.S. consumer advertisers[J]. Journal of Advertising, 1983, 12(4): 4-9.
[12]蔡希杰,陈德棉.基于微分博弈理论的广告竞争研究综述[J].财贸研究, 2008, (2): 115-122.
[13] Colombo L, Lambertini L. Dynamic advertising under vertical product differentiation[J]. Joural of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2002, 15(2): 108-126.
[14] Qi J, Wang D, Ding Y, Wang Z. Dynamical analysis of a nonlinear competitive model with generic and brand advertising efforts[J]. Nonlinear Analysis: Real World Applications, 2007, 8(2): 664-679.
[15] Benchekroun H. A unifying differential game of advertising and promotion[J]. International Game Theory Review, 2007, 9(2): 183-197.
[16] Norman G, Pepall L, Richards D. Generic product advertising, spillovers, and market concentration[J]. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2008, 90(3): 719-732.
[17] Dockner E J, Jorgensen S, Long N V, Sorger G. Differential games in economics and management science[M]. Gerhard Sorger Published, 2000: 97-103.
[18] Erickson G M. Differential game models of advertising competition[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 1995, 83(3): 431-438.
[19] Erickson. Dynamic models of advertising competition[M]. Washington: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003: 15-18.
[20] J?rgensen S, Zaccour G. Differential games in marketing[M]. Boston/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004: 35.
[21] Prasad A, Sethi S P. Competitive advertising under uncertainty: A stochastic differential game approach [J]. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2004, 123(1): 163-185.
[22] Bass F M, Krishnamoorthy A, Prasad A, Sethi S P. Generic and brand advertising strategies in a dynamic duopoly[J]. Marketing Science, 2005, 24(4): 556-568.
[23] Brady M. Advertising effectiveness and spillover: Simulating strategic interaction using advertising[J]. System Dynamics Review, 2009, 25(4): 281-307.
[24] Qi J, Wang D. Optimal control strategies for an advertising competing model[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2007, 27(1): 39-44.
[25] Piga C A G. Competition in a duopoly with sticky price and advertising[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2000, 18: 595-614.
[26] Wang Q, Wu Z. A duopolistic model of dynamic competitive advertising[J]. European Joumal of Operational Research, 2001, 128(2): 213-226.
[27] Case J H. Economics and the competetive process[M]. New York: New York University Press, 1979: 87.
[28] Deal K, Sethi S P. A bilinear-quadratic differential game in advertising[M]. New York: Marcel Dekker, 1979: 91-109.
[29]李克克,唐小我.广告竞争与市场进入壁垒[J].电子科技大学学报, 1999, 28(6): 652-654.
[30]任方旭,邵云飞,唐小我.寡头垄断市场下的广告竞争策略研究[J].河南科学, 2002, 20(4): 320-323.
[31]张玉林,仲伟俊,梅姝娥.企业间生产与广告投资分配的竞争分析[J].管理科学学报, 2002, 5: 34-38.
[32]汪定伟,叶伟雄,容启亮.两强竞争市场中的企业广告策略分析[J].控制工程, 2003, 10(1): 29-32.
[33]齐洁,汪定伟.广告竞争模型中的混沌同步特性分析[J].管理科学学报, 2004, 7(2): 27-31.
[34] Vidale M L, Wolfe H B. An operations research sutdy of sales response to advertising[J]. Operations Research, 1957, 5(3): 370-381.
[35]左小德.双寡头垄断市场下的企业广告竞争分析[J].暨南大学学报(自然科学版), 2006, 27(1): 43-49.
[36]朱启红,顾锋.存在消费者搜寻的双寡头企业广告竟争模型[J].上海管理科学, 2009, 31(3): 47-49.
[37]泰勒尔.产业组织理论[M].张维迎译.北京:中国人民大学出版, 1997: 157.
[38]王志凌,黎志成.双寡头广告竞争的定性模拟技术研究[J].武汉理工大学学报, 2002, 24(12): 91-94.
[39]李烃,盛昭翰,姚洪兴.一类广告竞争模型的延迟反馈混沌控制方法[J].预测, 2003, 22(1): 64-67.
[40]童纪新,裴明,李煌.两强市场广告竞争混沌的参数调节反馈控制方法[J].河海大学学报(自然科学版), 2004, 32(3): 328-331.
[41]姚洪兴,徐峰.双寡头有限理性广告竞争博弈模型的复杂性分析[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2005, (12): 32-37.
[42] Erickson G M. Empirical analysis of closed-loop advertising strategies[J]. Management Science, 1992, 38(9): 1732-1749.
[43] Chintagunta P K. Investigating the sensitivity of equilibrium: profit to advertising dynamics and competitive effects[J]. Management Science, 1993, 39(9): 1146-1162
[44] Chintagunta P K, Jain D. Empirical analysis of Dynamic Duopoly Model of Competition[J]. Journal of Economics and Management Scienc, 1995, 4(1): 109-131.
[45] Nguyen D, Shi L. Competitive advertising strategies and market-size dynamics-a research note on theory and evidence[J]. Management Scienc, 2006, 52(6): 965-973.
[46] Bass F M. A new product growth model for consumer durables[J]. Management Science, 2004, 50(12): 1825-1832.
[47] Dockner E J, J?gensen S. New product advertising in dynamic oligopolies[J]. Zeitschrift Fur Operations Research, 1992, 36(5): 459-473.
[48] Fruchter G E. The many-player advertising game[J]. Management Science, 1999, 145(11): 1609-1611.
[49] Fruchter G E, Kalish S. Closed-loop advertising strategies in a duoply[J]. Management Science, 1997, 43(1): 54-63.
[50] Prasad A, Sethi S. Dynamic optimization of an oligopoly model of advertising, working paper, UTD School of Management, America, 2003, 9.
[51] Naik P A, Prasad A, Sethi S P. Building brand awareness in dynamic oligopoly markets[J]. Management Scienc, 2008, 54(1): 129-138.
[52] Sethi S P. Deterministic and Stochastic Optimization of a Dynamic Advertising Model[J]. Optimal Control Applications and Methods, 1983, 4(2): 179-184.
[53] Erickson G M. An oligopoly model of dynamic advertising competition[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2009, 197(1): 374-388.
[54]经济导报.碧浪+海尔:合作广告事半功倍[EB/OL]. http://paper.dzwww.com/jjdb/data/2010 0303/html/7/content_1.html, 2010-03-03.
[55]文书生.试论品牌联合广告策略[J].商业研究, 2000, (7): 146-148.
[56] Grrossman R P. Co-branding in advertising[J]. Journal of Product and Brand Management, 1997, 6(3): 191-201.
[57] Leuthesser L, Kohli C, Suri R. 2+2=5?A framework for using co-branding to leverage a brand[J]. Brand Management, 2003, 11(1): 35-47.
[58]毛瑞锋.联合品牌一种新型的品牌经营策略[J].商业经济文荟, 2003, (2): 19-21.
[59]关忠诚,程刚.联合品牌战略研究[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版), 2006, 12(2): 38-43.
[60]原永丹,董大海,刘瑞明,金玉芳.品牌联合的研究进展[J].管理学报, 2007, 4(2): 243-248.
[61]周春元,陆娟,吴芳,范公广.基于消费者决策信息的不同行业品牌联合差异研究[J].管理学报, 2009, 6(3): 361-366.
[62] Samu S, Krishnan H S, Smith R E. Using advertising alliances for new product introduction: interactions between product complementarity and promotional strategies[J]. Journal of Marketing, 1999, 63(1): 57-74.
[63]李芫.宝洁与小天鹅借力打力[EB/OL]. http://jjdb.dzwww.com/lssj/200211/t20021120_573 117.htm, 2002-11-20.
[64]刘伟艺.艺眼看卫浴:卫浴品牌合作广告模式猜想[EB/OL]. http://info. bm.hc360.com/ 2010/03/301106145902.shtml, 2010-3-30.
[65] Varadarajan P R. Horizontal cooperative sales promotion: A framework for classification and additional perspectives [J]. Journal of Marketing, 1986, 50(2): 61-73.
[66] Young R F, Greyser S A. Managing cooperative advertising: A strategic approach[M]. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983: 67.
[67] Crimmins E C. Cooperative Advertising[M]. New York: Gene Wolf, 1984: 134.
[68] Roslow S, Laskey H A, Nicholls J A F. The enigma of cooperative advertising[J]. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 1993, 8(2): 70-79.
[69]吴文清,赵黎明,刘嘉焜.需求不确定下供应链合作广告的博弈分析[J].软科学, 2006, 20(2): 24-27.
[70] Brennan L. How retailers are putting it all together[J]. Sales and Marketing Management, 1988, 5(1): 62-65.
[71] Green J. Still pulling the strings, but locally too[J]. Brandweek, 2000, 41: 34-42.
[72] Elkin T. Intel inside at 10[J]. Advertising Age, 2001, 72: 4-6.
[73] Toys S W. Co-Op Dollars [EB/OL]. http://www.smallworldtoys.com/coop.php, 2008-01-01.
[74] Arett Sales[EB/OL]. http://www.arett.com/marketing/arett-co-op.asp, 2007.
[75] Berger P D. Vertical cooperative advertising ventures[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1972, 9(3): 309-312.
[76] Berger P D. Statistical decision analysis of cooperative advertising ventures[J]. Operational Research Quarterly, 1973, 24(2): 309-312.
[77] Berger P D, Magliozzi T. Optimal co-operative advertising decisions in direct-mail operations[J]. The Journal of the Operational Research Society, 1992, 43(11): 1079-1086.
[78] Dant R P, Berger P D. Modelling cooperative advertising decisions in franchising[J]. The Journal of the Operational Research Societ, 1996, 47(9): 1120-1136.
[79] Dutta S, Bergen M, John G. Variations in the contractual terms of cooperative advertising contracts: An empirical investigation[J]. Marketing Letters, 1995, 6(1): 15-22.
[80] Nagler M G. An exploratory analysis of the determinants of cooperative advertising participation rates[J]. MarketingLetter, 2006, 17(10): 91-102.
[81]罗卫,欧阳明,德张子刚.制造商-零售商供应链中的合作广告模型[J].统计与决策, 2003, (6): 20-21.
[82] Berger P, Lee J, Weinberg B. Optimal cooperative advertising integration strategy for organizations adding a direct online channel[J]. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2006, 57: 920-927.
[83]曹细玉,宁宣熙,覃艳华.易逝品供应链中的联合广告投入、订货策略与协调问题研究[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2006, (3): 102-107.
[84]王圣东,周永务.带有两种营销模式的供应链合作广告协调模型[J].系统工程学报, 2008, 23(6): 674-682.
[85] Kadiyali V, Chintagunta P, Vilcassim N. Manufacturer–retailer channel interactions and implications for channel power: An empirical investigation of pricing in a local market[J]. Marketing Science, 2000, 19(2): 127-148.
[86] Geylani T, Dukes A, Srinivasan K. Strategic manufacturer response to a dominant retailer[J]. Marketing Science, 2007, 26(2): 164-180.
[87] Huang Z, Li S X. Co-op advertising models in manufacturer-retailer supply chians: A game theory approach[J]. European Joumal of Operational Research, 2001, 135(1): 527-544.
[88] Li S X, Huang Z, Zhu J, Chau P Y K. Cooperative advertising, game theory and manufacturer-retailer supply chains[J]. Omega, 2002, 30(1): 347-357.
[89]梁樑,余雁.供应链中制造商与代理商广告合作的博弈[J].系统工程理论方法应用, 2004, 13(6): 490-494.
[90] Xie J, Ai S. A note on "Cooperative advertising, game theory and manufacturer-retailer supplychains"[J]. Omega, 2006, 34(5): 501-504.
[91] Xie J, Neyret A. Co-op advertising and pricing models in manufacturer–retailer supply chains[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2009, 56(4): 1375-1385.
[92] Huang Z, Li S X, Mahajan V. An analysis of manufacturer-retailer supply chain coordination in cooperative advertising[J]. Decision Sciences, 2002, 33(3): 469-494.
[93]钟宝嵩,李悝,李宏余.基于供应链的合作促销与定价问题[J].中国管理科学, 2004, 12(3): 69-74.
[94]傅强,曾顺秋.不确定需求下供应链合作广告与订货策略的博弈[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2008, (3): 56-63.
[95]傅强,曾顺秋.价格折扣下的纵向合作广告博弈分析[J].重庆大学学报(自然科学版). 2007, 30(9): 148-153.
[96] Yue J, Austin J, Wang M-C, Huang Z. Coordination of cooperative advertising in a two-level supply chain when manufacturer offers discount[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2006, 168(1): 65-85.
[97] Bergen M, John G. Understanding cooperative advertising participation rates in conventional channels[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1997, 34(8): 357-369.
[98]王磊,梁樑,吴德胜,熊立.零售商竞争下的垂直合作广告模型[J].中国管理科学, 2005, 13(2): 63-69.
[99] Karray S, Zaccour G. Could co-op advertising be a manufacturer's counterstrategy to store brands?[J]. Journal of Business Research, 2006, 59(9): 1008-1015.
[100] Esmaeili M, Aryanezhad M-B, Zeephongsekul P. A game theory approach in seller-buyer supply chain[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2009, 195: 442-448.
[101] Chintagunta P K, Jain D. A dynamic model of channel member strategies for marketing expenditures[J]. Marketing Science, 1992, 11(2): 168-188.
[102] J?rgensen S, siguéS P, Zaccour G. Dynamic cooperative advertising in a channel[J]. Journal of Retailing, 2000, 76(1): 71-92.
[103] Buratto A, Grosset L, Viscolani B. Advertising coordination games of a manufacturer and a retailer while introducing a new product[J].Top, 2007: 307-321.
[104] He X, Prasad A, Sethi S. Cooperative advertising and pricing in a dynamic stochastic supply chain: feedback stackelberg strategies[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2009 18(1): 78-94.
[105]张庶萍,张世英.供应链中合作广告策略的Stackelberg微分对策模型[J].西南交通大学学报, 2005, 40(4): 513-518.
[106]张庶萍,张世英.基于微分对策的供应链合作广告决策研究[J].控制与决策, 2006, 21(2): 153-157,162.
[107] J?rgensen S, Taboubi S, Zaccour G. Cooperative advertising in a marketing channel[J]. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2001, 110(1): 145-158.
[108] Neslin S A, Shoemaker R W. An alternative explanation for lower repeat rates after promotion purchases[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1989, 26: 205-213.
[109] Papatla P, Krishnamurthi L. Measuring the dynamic effects of promotions on brand choice[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1996, 33(1): 20-35.
[110] Raghubir P, Corfman K. When do price promotions affect pretrial brand evaluations?[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1999, 36(2): 211-222.
[111] J?rgensen S, Taboubi S, Zaccour G. Retail promotions with negative brand image effects: Is cooperation possible?[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2003, 150(2): 395-405.
[112]王正波,刘伟.合作促销的微分博弈模型及均衡比较分析[J].商业经济与管理, 2004, 158(12): 26-39.
[113]傅强,曾顺秋.纵向合作广告的微分对策模型研究[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2007, (11): 26-33.
[114]林英晖,屠梅曾.供应链企业间合作广告的博弈分析[J].上海大学学报(自然科学版), 2005, 11(4): 436-450.
[115]骆品亮.产业组织学[M].上海:复旦大学出版社, 2006: 266.
[116] Erdem T, Sun B. An empirical investigation of the spillover effects of advertising and sales promotions in umbrella branding[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 2002, 39(4): 408-420.
[117]吴昌南.产品同质下广告的横向外部性与供给机制[J].江苏商论, 2006, (2): 62-63.
[118]吴昌南.西方产业组织理论关于广告与同质产品的研究及启示[J].生产力研究, 2006, (11): 160-162.
[119]罗云辉.对存在广告溢出效应出口企业进行补贴的理论依据[J].产业经济研究, 2006, (6): 71-75.
[120] Lambertini L, Palestini A. Dynamic advertising with spillovers: Cartel vs competitive fringe[J]. Optimal Control Applications and Methods, 2009, 30(6): 562 - 572.
[121]约瑟夫·E·斯蒂格利茨.经济学[M].黄险峰,张帆译.北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2005: 102.
[122]别传武,陈丽珍.论互补商品对营销的影响[J].中国流通经济, 2001, (2): 47-50.
[123] Gabszewicz J, Sonnac N, Wauthy X. On price competition with complementary goods[J]. Economics Letters, 2001, 70(1): 431-437.
[124] Yue X, Mukhopadhyay S K, Zhu X. A Bertrand model of pricing of complementary goods under information asymmetry[J]. Journal of Business Research, 2006, 59(10-11): 1182-1192.
[125] Wang Y. Joint pricing-production decisions in supply chains of complementary products with uncertain demand[J]. Operations Research, 2006, 54(6): 1110-1127.
[126]迈克尔·波特.竞争优势[M].陈小悦译.北京:华夏出版社, 2005: 35.
[127] Sengupta S. Some approaches to complementary product strategy[J]. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 1998, 15(4): 352-367.
[128] Ende J, Jaspers F, Gerwin D. Involvement of system firms in the development of complementary products: The influence of novelty[J]. Technovation, 2008, 28(11): 726-738.
[129] Schilling M. Winning the standards race: Building installed base and the availability of complementary goods[J]. European Management Journal, 1999, 17(3): 265-274.
[130]周俊.关于互补产品战略的探讨[J].云南财贸学院学报, 2003, 19(4): 84-87.
[131] Nambisan S. Complementary product intergration by high-technology new ventures: the role of initial technology strategy[J]. Management Science, 2002, 48(3): 382-398.
[132]段文奇,郑文哲,惠淑敏.网络市场新产品互补战略实施研究[J].预测, 2007, 26(3): 15-20.
[133]王延飞.互补品制胜——基于互补品对联想集团竞争优势的影响分析[J].市场营销导刊, 2008, (5): 51-54.
[134]金晓亚.互补品战略竞争优势分析[J].中国外资, 2009, (191): 2-3,6.
[135] Church J, Gandal N. Strategic entry deterrence: Complementary products as installed base[J]. European Journal of Political Economy, 1996, 12(2): 331-354.
[136]李善民,曾昭灶.质量差异化与产品互补型企业兼并问题[J].管理科学学报, 2003, 6(6): 54-60.
[137]殷红,王先甲.互补性物品的最优拍卖机制[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2006, (9): 60-65.
[138] Palfrey T R. Bunding decisions by muli-product monopolist with incomplete information[J]. Econometrica, 1983, 51(2): 463-483.
[139] Kim H-S. Equilibrium and efficiency in auctions of complementary goods without bundling[J]. Economics Letters, 1996, 52(1): 49-54.
[140] Levin J. An optimal aution for complements[J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 1997, 18(2): 176-192.
[141] Cramton P C. The FCC spectrum autions: an early assessment[J]. Jounal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1997, 6(3): 431-495.
[142] Branco F. On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction[J]. Economics Letters, 2001, 70(2): 187-194.
[143]罗卫,张子刚,欧阳明德.基于一个博弈论方法的简单供应链合作广告模型[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2004, 2: 31-36.
[144]张帆,李垣.防降价均衡下的产品兼容性、网络效应和品牌效应[J].管理工程学报, 2005, 19(4): 26-30.
[145] Coughlan A T. Distribution channel choice in a market with complementary goods[J].International Journal of Research in Marketing, 1987, 4(2): 85-97.
[146] Zhang H. Vertical information exchange in a supply chain with duoply retailers[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2002, 11(4): 531-546.
[147]马西莫·莫塔.竞争政策—理论与实践[M].沈国华译.上海:上海财经大学出版社, 2006: 466.
[148] Chu W. Demand signalling and screening in channels of distribution[J]. Marketing Science, 1992, 11(4): 327-347.
[149] Xie J, Wei J C. Coordinating advertising and pricing in a manufacturer-retailer channel[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2009, 197(2): 785-791.
[150] Kadiyali V. Entry, its deterrence, and its accommodation: A study of the U.S. photographic film industry[J]. RAND Journal of Economics, 1996, 27(3): 452-478.
[151]弗登伯格,梯诺尔.博弈论[M].黄涛译.北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2002: 100-101.
[152]周永务,杨善林.最优均匀广告与订货策略的联合决策模型[J].系统工程学报, 2004, 19(3): 264-269.
[153] Bagwell K. The Economic Analysis of Advertising. In: Armstrong M, Porter R H, eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization: North Holland; 2007:1701–1844.
[154] Nelson P. Information and consumer behavior[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1970, 78: 311-329.
[155] Nelson P. Advertising as information[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1974, 82: 729-754.
[156] Kihlstrom R, Riordan M. Advertising as a signal[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1984, 92: 427-450.
[157] Horstmann I, MacDonald G. Is advertising a signal of product quality? Evidence from the compact disc player market, 1983-1992[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2003, 21(3): 317-345.
[158] Thomas L, Shane S, Weigelt K. An empirical examination of advertising as a signal of product quality[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1998, 37(4): 415-430.
[159] Fluet C, Garella P G. Advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2002, 20(7): 907-930.
[160] Hudson J. A Bayesian approach to the evaluation of stochastic signals of product quality[J]. Omega, 2000, 28(5): 599-607.
[161] Bagwell K, Riordan M H. High and declining prices signal product quality[J]. American Economic Review, 1991, 81(1): 224.
[162] Linnemer L. Price and advertising as signals of quality when some consumers are informed[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2002, 20(7): 931-947.
[163] K?nigbauer I. Advertising and generic market entry[J]. Journal of Health Economics, 2007,26(2): 286-305.
[164] Hertzendorf M N, Overgaard P B. Price competition and advertising signals: Signaling by competing senders[J]. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2001, 10(4): 621-662.
[165] Milgrom P, Roberts J. Price and advertising signals of product quality[J]. The Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94(4): 796.
[166] Linnemer L. Entry deterrence, product quality: price and advertising as signals[J]. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1998, 7: 615-645.
[167] Bagwell K. Signalling and entry deterrence: a multidimensignal analysis[J]. RAND Journal of Economics, 2007, 38(3): 670-697.
[168] Bagwell K, Ramey G. Advertising and limit pricing[J]. RAND Journal of Economics, 1988, 19(1): 59-71.
[169] Albak S, Overgaard P B. Upstream pricingand advertising signal downstream demand[J]. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1992, 1(4): 677-698.
[170] Bagwell K, Ramey G. Advertising and pricing to deter or accommodate entry when demand is unknown[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1990, 8(1): 93-113.
[171]斯蒂芬·马丁.高级产业经济学[M].史东辉译.上海:上海财经大学出版社, 2003: 295-296.
[172]帕特里克·博尔顿,马赛厄斯·德瓦特里庞.合同理论[M].费方域,蒋士成,郑育家译.上海:格致出版社,上海三联书店,上海人民出版社, 2008: 74.
[173] Akerlof G A. The market for 'Lemons': Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970, 84(30): 488-500.
[174]曾顺秋.供应链中的制造商-零售商合作广告博弈模型.重庆:重庆大学; 2007.
[175]梁樑,余雁.供应链中制造商与代理商广告合作的博弈[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2004, 13(6): 490-494.
[176]因内恩·马可-斯达德勒,大卫·佩雷斯-卡斯特里罗.信息经济学引论:激励与合约[M].管毅平译.上海:上海财经大学出版社, 2004: 160.
[177]易超琴,万建平.逆向选择下的委托—代理模型分析[J].数学的实践与认识, 2008, 38(1): 7-15.