基于博弈论的营销渠道协作研究
摘要
问题的提出
在激烈的市场竞争中,企业都想建立自己的核心竞争优势。然而,同行业中的技术、产品与价格的差异正变得越来越小,大量营销实践表明:企业的发展仅仅在技术、产品与价格上具有优势是远远不够的。产品能否成功销售在一定程度上还依赖于企业之间高效率的协作分销渠道,渠道协作优势已成为不可复制的核心竞争优势。
事实上,制造商、中间商、消费者等共同构成了渠道系统,形成一个松散的利益共同体。在这个渠道系统中,渠道成员同时也存在着各自不同的自身利益,他们在选择渠道系统的整体利润最大化或成员个体利润最大化必然导致渠道冲突。这种冲突对产品的价格、品牌和利润会造成严重负面影响。如何促使渠道稳定和高效的协作运行是营销管理的一项重要任务,更是营销渠道管理中的热点问题,也是作者选题的背景。
本文从定性和定量相结合的方式研究了渠道系统协作问题。作者采用了渠道研究专家Shugan(1983,1986),Moorthy(1987,1997),Staelin(1983)等的研究假设,在研究渠道协作时,主要研究制造商、零售商之间的协作问题。
本文重点是渠道成员协作能带来什么好处?如何设计协作机制,来减少渠道内部的不和谐,尽可能实现渠道成员(包括制造商、零售商)之间的协作。
研究设计与方法
本文采用规范的理论分析,定性和定量研究相结合的研究方法,侧重于渠道协作的微观层面。在理论模型上,主要方法是博弈论(实际上,本文涉及了博弈论与信息经济学的分析方法,本文将这两方面的知识统称为博弈论)。在设计论文的整体框架时,本文采用系统分析方法,保证严密的逻辑性与内容的整体性。全文主题是营销管理中的渠道协作。
论文逻辑框架结构与基本内容
根据研究设计,其逻辑框架和逻辑思路如下图,本文各章如下:
第1章绪论
第2章渠道、渠道协作与渠道协作机制
第3章渠道成员的选择和甑别
第4章不同类型营销努力下的渠道微分协作机制
第5章基于顾客满意的渠道协作机制
第6章信息不对称条件下的渠道协作激励问题
第7章基于进化博弈理论的渠道协作分析研究
第8章结论与研究展望
第1章:是问题的提出和文献综述。
第2章:主要根据5种常见的渠道结构,建立博弈模型,研究5种渠道结构、对应的渠道行为(渠道决策)以及与渠道协作的关系。希望从定性和定量两个方面探讨渠道系统为什么要协作。重点利用博弈模型研究渠道结构、渠道行为与渠道协作三者之间的关系。
第3章:认为选择具有协作精神的渠道成员十分重要,“高素质”的渠道成员(包括制造商和零售商)是实现亲密协作的基础。于是建立不对称信息博弈模型,研究选择渠道成员的双向逆向选择问题,对造成逆向选择的原因进行分析。建立信息甑别模型,使具有“高素质”的、具有协作精神的渠道成员(作者称为“协作型”渠道成员)成为协作伙伴,而不与“低素质”的、不具有协作精神的渠道成员进行协作。
第4章:选择了渠道成员之后,希望探索一些渠道协作机制,考虑到产品“声誉”的累积是一个动态累积过程,于是利用微分博弈方法,研究了实现协作的条件,并用该结论指导营销渠道实践。
第5章:结合顾客满意探讨了基于顾客满意的渠道协作问题。作者认为充分考虑顾客的特点和顾客的需求,根据消费者的特点和消费者的需求来制定渠道成员的策略。如何让顾客满意?这需要考虑第三个博弈方——顾客。当考虑渠道三方博弈时,无论是协作机制和激励机制可能具有一定的分析难度,为此作者做了探讨。
第6章:探讨了信息不对称条件下渠道协作激励机制问题。渠道中更多表现为不完全信息问题。处于信息弱势的一方需要设计合理的激励机制,来激励具有信息优势的一方努力营销产品或进行建立品牌建设。因此,需要引入渠道委托—代理基本模型(即:一个制造商和一个零售商的委托—代理关系),研究渠道中“道德风险”出现的原因及其解决方法。最后为了体现一般性,作者扩展了基本的委托—代理模型:建立营销渠道多委托人—代理模型(即:多个制造商和一个零售商的委托—代理关系)和营销渠道委托—多代理人模型(即:一个制造商和多个零售商的委托—代理关系)。
第7章:前面的研究都是基于一个基本假设——完全理性,如果在有限理性下如何实现渠道协作呢?作者采用了进化博弈理论方法进行建模分析。假设“协作”型渠道成员的比例与“协作”精神、协作能力是成正比的,作者的研究指出渠道成员的“协作”精神对实现有限理性的协作显得十分重要。本章在逻辑上也回到第3章。
第8章:是全文的总结和研究展望。
本文的创新之处
第一、如果市场由不同类型的零售商组成,那么零售商的努力水平随市场中“协作型”零售商所占比例的增大而增大,而零售价格随市场中“协作型”零售商所占比例的增大而减小。制造商批发价格随“协作型”零售商所占比例的增大而增大。制造商和零售商的最优利润随“协作型”零售商所占比例的增大而增大。具体内容请参见第3章。
第二、在无限期动态条件下,和其他渠道关系(非协作静态渠道、制造商领导的Stackelberg渠道和零售商领导的Stackelberg渠道)相比,渠道协作时的最优零售价格最低,制造商的最优边际利润最大、最优品牌投资最大、最优营销努力最大与渠道最优总利润最大。同时,协作时制造商分享总利润的比例在一定范围内,制造商和零售商都愿意协作。进一步,如果将零售商的营销努力分为短期性努力(零售商偏好的)和长期性努力(制造商偏好的),并且制造商对零售商的长期性努力补偿激励时,那么当激励系数在不同的范围内,渠道协作时的总利润、制造商的利润和零售商的利润的增减性不同。具体内容请参见第4章。
第三、从信息对称的视角看,制造商希望零售商多付出基于顾客满意的营销努力。当零售商付出了基于顾客满意的营销努力时,如果制造商不给予零售商激励,那么零售商仍然会付出基于顾客满意的努力;如果制造商对零售商激励(努力成本补贴)时,零售商付出的基于顾客满意的努力会更大。进一步,如果零售商更看重渠道协作的未来收益,那么制造商对零售商的激励程度就应该减小。从信息不对称的视角看,零售商付出的最优努力(一般性营销努力)程度随激励系数、零售价格增大而增大,与批发价格无关。最优激励系数随渠道成员的风险规避度、产出不确定性增大而减小。具体内容请参见第5章、第6章。
第四、在有限理性的假设下,渠道协作的可能性与渠道超额利润成正比;当超额利润趋近无穷时,制造商和零售商完全协作。如果制造商(或零售商)协作,零售商(或制造商)不协作,制造商(或零售商)协作的损失越小,渠道关系趋近协作的可能性越大;渠道协作的可能性与各自的贴现因子成正比。具体内容请参见第7章。
本文的不足之处
第一、本文主要立足渠道成员的微观行为机制研究,采用定量分析方法得到了若干结论,而对营销实践层面的东西不多。例如:作者认为对零售商或对制造商应该采用适当激励机制,但营销实践中采用的激励措施十分多,这些措施作者没有剥离变量纳入模型中。
第二、通过博弈论方法作者得到了一些有用的结论。Holmstrom和Milgrom (1987)认为在现实中,往往简单的合约才是最优的。理论研究者作了大量的研究,设计出了十分复杂的渠道协作机制(包括本文设计的一些机制)。这些机制的实用性还没有讨论。比较理想的方式应该实证研究,来进步证明结论的实用性。由于研究经费和时间的限制,实证数据收集太难。目前只能对个别企业进行案例研究。
第三、为了实现渠道Pareto最优,例如,整合机制在一定的渠道环境中可能是最优的,数量折扣机制在一定条件下也是最优的。但作者发现为了实现协作,一些机制对零售商(或对制造商)是“强加的”,尽管实现了协作,但对渠道成员一方是“不公平”的。因此,渠道中的“公平”既是制造商关心的问题,也是零售商关心的问题,在本文中作者没有研究。
Introduction
In face of fierce market competition, all enterprises long to set up their core competitive advantage. However, differentiation in technologies, products and price in the same industry is narrowing. Substantial marketing practices show that advantages merely in technology, products and prices are far from enough for the development of the enterprises. Successful sales, to some extent, also depend on efficient coordination of distribution channels among enterprises. As a result, channel coordination has become the core competitive advantage which cannot be replicated.
In fact, channel system is constituted of manufacturers, middlemen, consumers and so on, who form a loose interest community altogether. As there exist various self-interests in this channel system, channel members are bound to trigger conflict when it comes to overall channel profits maximizing or individual profits maximizing. Such conflicts exert a serious negative impact on product prices, brands and profits. In this sense, it is an important task for manufacturers to guarantee that the distribution channels are stable and effectively operated. This task is not only a hot issue in marketing management, but also the context of the chosen subject.
The paper studies the channel system in a way combining qualitative and quantitative approaches. The author here applies the assumptions proposed by channel professors Shugan (1983, 1986), Moorthy (1987, 1997), and Staelin (1983), etc. Issues of coordination between manufacturers and retailers are primarily studied when it comes to the study of channel coordination.
The paper focuses on the advantages coordination brings for channel members. It studies the design of coordination mechanism to reduce intra-channel conflicts and discords, with a view to achieving collaboration between channel members (including manufacturers and retailers) as far as possible.
Research design and method
This paper uses normative theoretical analysis and adopts integrated qualitative and quantitative methodologies, emphasizing the micro-level of channel coordination. In the theoretical model, Game theory is the primary means in the paper. (In fact, the paper applies study approaches of both game theory and information economics, which two fields of knowledge is collectively referred to as Game theory methods in this paper). When it comes to the design of the overall framework, the paper presents systematic analysis method to ensure logical rigor and content integrity. The theme of the paper is channel coordination in channel management.
Logical structure and basic content
Based on research design and logical thinking, the paper is arranged as follows:
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Channels, channel coordination and channel coordination mechanism
Chapter 3 Selecting and screening of channel members
Chapter 4 Differential analysis of channel coordination dynamic mechanism under different types of marketing efforts
Chapter 5 Research of channel coordination based on customer satisfaction
Chapter 6 Incentives under information asymmetric coordination Mechanism
Chapter 7 Channel coordination analysis based on evolutionary game theory
Chapter 8 Conclusion and research prospect
Basic content of each chapter is presented below:
Chapter 1 is question presenting and literature review.
Chapter 2 establishes game theory model based on 5 common channel structures. The author explores structures of five channels, the corresponding behavior (channel decision-making) of each structure and their relations with channel coordination. From both qualitative and quantitative approaches, this part aims to probe into the reasons to coordinate in channel system. The focus of this part is to study channel structures, channel behaviors, channel coordination and their relations with the help of game models.
Chapter 3 believes that it is important to select channel members with collaboration spirit. High-quality channel members (manufacturers and retailers included) are the foundation to achieve close collaboration. In this part, asymmetric information game model is made to study bilateral and adverse member-selection problems, and to analyze the reasons of adverse selection. Furthermore, information screening model is built so that high-quality channel members with coordination spirit will become mutual partners without coping with channel members with low quality or less coordination spirit.
Chapter 4 is to quest some channel coordination mechanisms when the channel members are selected. Taking into account that product "reputation" is accumulated during a dynamic process; the author applies differential game methods to study coordination preconditions in hope of using this conclusion to guide marketing channel practice.
Chapter 5 discusses channel coordination using theories of customer satisfaction. The author believes that, when undertaking market activities and designing channel strategies, we should take full consideration of customers’characteristics and their demand. This moves to the problem that how we can satisfy our customers. In this framework, the third game play—customers, is added to our thinking box. With this involved, however, both cooperation mechanism and incentive mechanism turn difficult to some extent, and the author has made certain research in this part.
Chapter 6 mainly discusses incentive mechanism of channel coordination under asymmetric information. As incomplete information is the main form in the channel, disadvantaged party with less information needs to design reasonable incentive mechanism, which can encourage information advantageous party to sell their products or establish their own brand. Hence, basic principal—agent model, which is principal—agent relation between one manufacturer and one retailer, is introduced to analyze moral hazard problem and its solutions. Finally, to better display generality, the author expands the basic principal—agent model and establishes two advanced model of marketing channel. One is multi-principal—agent model, which is principal—agent relation between many manufacturers and one retailer; the other one is principle—multi-agent model, which is principal—agent relation between one manufacturer and many retailers.
Chapter 7: All previous research is based on the basic assumption of entire rationality. Different from the above, the seventh part enters into how to achieve channel coordination under bounded rationality. Adopting methods of evolutionary game theory, the author builds analyzing model, which indicate that the coordination spirit of the channel members is vitally important to achieve a bounded rational coordination. Here, it is hypothesized that coordinated channel members are directly proportional to coordination spirit and the ability to collaborate. Meanwhile, the organization of this chapter moves back to the third chapter in logics, echoing the paper as a whole. Chapter 8 is the summary and prospects of the paper.
Innovation of the paper
Firstly, if the market is made up of different kinds of retailers, with the proportion of collaborated retailers increasing, the level of retailers’effort will increase and retail price will fall. Meanwhile, wholesale price of manufacturers will go up. Accordingly, optimal profit of manufacturers and retailers will increase. (See more details in Chapter 3.)
Secondly, compared with other channel relations (including non-cooperative static channels, Stackelberg channels led by manufacturers and Stackelberg channels led by retailers), channel coordination achieves the optimization. Under this circumstance, optimal sales price is the lowest, optimal marginal profit of manufacturers reaches the peak; optimal brand investment is the highest, optimal marketing efforts of retailers are the largest, and optimal total profit of channel is the most profitable. Meanwhile, the profit shares of manufacturers are within certain scope when coordination, thus both manufacturers and retailers are willing to cooperate with each other. Furthermore, if we divide marketing effort of manufacturers into short-term effort( preferred by retailers) and long-term effort ( preferred by manufacturers), and if manufacturers compensate long-term effort of retailers, when the incentive coefficient changes, total profit of channel coordination, profit of manufacturers and profit of retailers will differ. (See more details in Chapter 4.)
Thirdly, from the perspective of information symmetry, manufacturers hope that retailers can make more effort in marketing to satisfy the customers. If retailers are making effort, with no incentives from the manufacturers, retailers will remain to make effort based on customers’satisfaction. However, if manufacturers encourage retailers (by ways of subsidies for the efforts cost), retailers will make more effort. Furthermore, if retailers pay more attention on future revenues of channel coordination, manufacturers should reduce incentives to retailers. From the perspective of information asymmetry, manufacturers’degree of optimal effort (general marketing effort) increases with the increase of incentive coefficient and retail price, and has nothing to do with wholesale price. Meanwhile, optimal incentive coefficient decreases with the increase of risk-avoiding of channel members and production uncertainty. (See more details in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.)
Fourthly, under the assumption of bounded rationality, the possibility of channel coordination is in positive proportion with excess profits. When the excess profits approach infinity, manufacturers and retailers are in full coordination. If the manufacturer (or retailer) is cooperative while the retailer (or manufacturer) is not, the loss of manufacturer (or retailer) to coordinate is smaller, and the possibility of channel relations approaching coordination is greater. The possibility of channel coordination is positively proportional to the respective discount factors. (See more details in Chapter 7.)
The drawbacks of the paper
First, the paper is based on the study of channel members’micro behavior mechanism, and draws some conclusions by applying quantitative methods. However, marketing practice is slightly lacking in the paper. For instance, the author believes that we should adopt appropriate incentives to retailers or manufacturers. While in reality, there are so many measures of incentives in marketing practice that the author does not include these measures divested of the variables into the model.
Second, the adoption of game theory has led to some useful conclusions. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) believe that a simple contract often turns out to be the optimal one in reality. Theory researchers have designed complicated mechanisms of channel coordination (including some mechanisms in this paper) by digging into a great deal of study. The practicality of these mechanisms is not yet studied. Nevertheless, a superior way is to make empirical analysis to prove the practicality of our conclusions. We can only go this far to study a few enterprises’cases as it is very difficult to accumulate empirical data constrained by research funding and limited time.
Third, in order to achieve Pareto Optimality of the channel, for example, the integration mechanism may be optimal in certain context while quantity discount mechanism may be optimal under another condition. In order to achieve collaboration, the author has noticed, a number of mechanisms are "imposed" to retailers (or manufacturers). Although collaboration is achieved, it is "unfair" for one party of the channel members. Therefore, "fairness”in channels is of great concern to both manufacturers and retailers, in which the author does not intensively study.
在激烈的市场竞争中,企业都想建立自己的核心竞争优势。然而,同行业中的技术、产品与价格的差异正变得越来越小,大量营销实践表明:企业的发展仅仅在技术、产品与价格上具有优势是远远不够的。产品能否成功销售在一定程度上还依赖于企业之间高效率的协作分销渠道,渠道协作优势已成为不可复制的核心竞争优势。
事实上,制造商、中间商、消费者等共同构成了渠道系统,形成一个松散的利益共同体。在这个渠道系统中,渠道成员同时也存在着各自不同的自身利益,他们在选择渠道系统的整体利润最大化或成员个体利润最大化必然导致渠道冲突。这种冲突对产品的价格、品牌和利润会造成严重负面影响。如何促使渠道稳定和高效的协作运行是营销管理的一项重要任务,更是营销渠道管理中的热点问题,也是作者选题的背景。
本文从定性和定量相结合的方式研究了渠道系统协作问题。作者采用了渠道研究专家Shugan(1983,1986),Moorthy(1987,1997),Staelin(1983)等的研究假设,在研究渠道协作时,主要研究制造商、零售商之间的协作问题。
本文重点是渠道成员协作能带来什么好处?如何设计协作机制,来减少渠道内部的不和谐,尽可能实现渠道成员(包括制造商、零售商)之间的协作。
研究设计与方法
本文采用规范的理论分析,定性和定量研究相结合的研究方法,侧重于渠道协作的微观层面。在理论模型上,主要方法是博弈论(实际上,本文涉及了博弈论与信息经济学的分析方法,本文将这两方面的知识统称为博弈论)。在设计论文的整体框架时,本文采用系统分析方法,保证严密的逻辑性与内容的整体性。全文主题是营销管理中的渠道协作。
论文逻辑框架结构与基本内容
根据研究设计,其逻辑框架和逻辑思路如下图,本文各章如下:
第1章绪论
第2章渠道、渠道协作与渠道协作机制
第3章渠道成员的选择和甑别
第4章不同类型营销努力下的渠道微分协作机制
第5章基于顾客满意的渠道协作机制
第6章信息不对称条件下的渠道协作激励问题
第7章基于进化博弈理论的渠道协作分析研究
第8章结论与研究展望
第1章:是问题的提出和文献综述。
第2章:主要根据5种常见的渠道结构,建立博弈模型,研究5种渠道结构、对应的渠道行为(渠道决策)以及与渠道协作的关系。希望从定性和定量两个方面探讨渠道系统为什么要协作。重点利用博弈模型研究渠道结构、渠道行为与渠道协作三者之间的关系。
第3章:认为选择具有协作精神的渠道成员十分重要,“高素质”的渠道成员(包括制造商和零售商)是实现亲密协作的基础。于是建立不对称信息博弈模型,研究选择渠道成员的双向逆向选择问题,对造成逆向选择的原因进行分析。建立信息甑别模型,使具有“高素质”的、具有协作精神的渠道成员(作者称为“协作型”渠道成员)成为协作伙伴,而不与“低素质”的、不具有协作精神的渠道成员进行协作。
第4章:选择了渠道成员之后,希望探索一些渠道协作机制,考虑到产品“声誉”的累积是一个动态累积过程,于是利用微分博弈方法,研究了实现协作的条件,并用该结论指导营销渠道实践。
第5章:结合顾客满意探讨了基于顾客满意的渠道协作问题。作者认为充分考虑顾客的特点和顾客的需求,根据消费者的特点和消费者的需求来制定渠道成员的策略。如何让顾客满意?这需要考虑第三个博弈方——顾客。当考虑渠道三方博弈时,无论是协作机制和激励机制可能具有一定的分析难度,为此作者做了探讨。
第6章:探讨了信息不对称条件下渠道协作激励机制问题。渠道中更多表现为不完全信息问题。处于信息弱势的一方需要设计合理的激励机制,来激励具有信息优势的一方努力营销产品或进行建立品牌建设。因此,需要引入渠道委托—代理基本模型(即:一个制造商和一个零售商的委托—代理关系),研究渠道中“道德风险”出现的原因及其解决方法。最后为了体现一般性,作者扩展了基本的委托—代理模型:建立营销渠道多委托人—代理模型(即:多个制造商和一个零售商的委托—代理关系)和营销渠道委托—多代理人模型(即:一个制造商和多个零售商的委托—代理关系)。
第7章:前面的研究都是基于一个基本假设——完全理性,如果在有限理性下如何实现渠道协作呢?作者采用了进化博弈理论方法进行建模分析。假设“协作”型渠道成员的比例与“协作”精神、协作能力是成正比的,作者的研究指出渠道成员的“协作”精神对实现有限理性的协作显得十分重要。本章在逻辑上也回到第3章。
第8章:是全文的总结和研究展望。
本文的创新之处
第一、如果市场由不同类型的零售商组成,那么零售商的努力水平随市场中“协作型”零售商所占比例的增大而增大,而零售价格随市场中“协作型”零售商所占比例的增大而减小。制造商批发价格随“协作型”零售商所占比例的增大而增大。制造商和零售商的最优利润随“协作型”零售商所占比例的增大而增大。具体内容请参见第3章。
第二、在无限期动态条件下,和其他渠道关系(非协作静态渠道、制造商领导的Stackelberg渠道和零售商领导的Stackelberg渠道)相比,渠道协作时的最优零售价格最低,制造商的最优边际利润最大、最优品牌投资最大、最优营销努力最大与渠道最优总利润最大。同时,协作时制造商分享总利润的比例在一定范围内,制造商和零售商都愿意协作。进一步,如果将零售商的营销努力分为短期性努力(零售商偏好的)和长期性努力(制造商偏好的),并且制造商对零售商的长期性努力补偿激励时,那么当激励系数在不同的范围内,渠道协作时的总利润、制造商的利润和零售商的利润的增减性不同。具体内容请参见第4章。
第三、从信息对称的视角看,制造商希望零售商多付出基于顾客满意的营销努力。当零售商付出了基于顾客满意的营销努力时,如果制造商不给予零售商激励,那么零售商仍然会付出基于顾客满意的努力;如果制造商对零售商激励(努力成本补贴)时,零售商付出的基于顾客满意的努力会更大。进一步,如果零售商更看重渠道协作的未来收益,那么制造商对零售商的激励程度就应该减小。从信息不对称的视角看,零售商付出的最优努力(一般性营销努力)程度随激励系数、零售价格增大而增大,与批发价格无关。最优激励系数随渠道成员的风险规避度、产出不确定性增大而减小。具体内容请参见第5章、第6章。
第四、在有限理性的假设下,渠道协作的可能性与渠道超额利润成正比;当超额利润趋近无穷时,制造商和零售商完全协作。如果制造商(或零售商)协作,零售商(或制造商)不协作,制造商(或零售商)协作的损失越小,渠道关系趋近协作的可能性越大;渠道协作的可能性与各自的贴现因子成正比。具体内容请参见第7章。
本文的不足之处
第一、本文主要立足渠道成员的微观行为机制研究,采用定量分析方法得到了若干结论,而对营销实践层面的东西不多。例如:作者认为对零售商或对制造商应该采用适当激励机制,但营销实践中采用的激励措施十分多,这些措施作者没有剥离变量纳入模型中。
第二、通过博弈论方法作者得到了一些有用的结论。Holmstrom和Milgrom (1987)认为在现实中,往往简单的合约才是最优的。理论研究者作了大量的研究,设计出了十分复杂的渠道协作机制(包括本文设计的一些机制)。这些机制的实用性还没有讨论。比较理想的方式应该实证研究,来进步证明结论的实用性。由于研究经费和时间的限制,实证数据收集太难。目前只能对个别企业进行案例研究。
第三、为了实现渠道Pareto最优,例如,整合机制在一定的渠道环境中可能是最优的,数量折扣机制在一定条件下也是最优的。但作者发现为了实现协作,一些机制对零售商(或对制造商)是“强加的”,尽管实现了协作,但对渠道成员一方是“不公平”的。因此,渠道中的“公平”既是制造商关心的问题,也是零售商关心的问题,在本文中作者没有研究。
Introduction
In face of fierce market competition, all enterprises long to set up their core competitive advantage. However, differentiation in technologies, products and price in the same industry is narrowing. Substantial marketing practices show that advantages merely in technology, products and prices are far from enough for the development of the enterprises. Successful sales, to some extent, also depend on efficient coordination of distribution channels among enterprises. As a result, channel coordination has become the core competitive advantage which cannot be replicated.
In fact, channel system is constituted of manufacturers, middlemen, consumers and so on, who form a loose interest community altogether. As there exist various self-interests in this channel system, channel members are bound to trigger conflict when it comes to overall channel profits maximizing or individual profits maximizing. Such conflicts exert a serious negative impact on product prices, brands and profits. In this sense, it is an important task for manufacturers to guarantee that the distribution channels are stable and effectively operated. This task is not only a hot issue in marketing management, but also the context of the chosen subject.
The paper studies the channel system in a way combining qualitative and quantitative approaches. The author here applies the assumptions proposed by channel professors Shugan (1983, 1986), Moorthy (1987, 1997), and Staelin (1983), etc. Issues of coordination between manufacturers and retailers are primarily studied when it comes to the study of channel coordination.
The paper focuses on the advantages coordination brings for channel members. It studies the design of coordination mechanism to reduce intra-channel conflicts and discords, with a view to achieving collaboration between channel members (including manufacturers and retailers) as far as possible.
Research design and method
This paper uses normative theoretical analysis and adopts integrated qualitative and quantitative methodologies, emphasizing the micro-level of channel coordination. In the theoretical model, Game theory is the primary means in the paper. (In fact, the paper applies study approaches of both game theory and information economics, which two fields of knowledge is collectively referred to as Game theory methods in this paper). When it comes to the design of the overall framework, the paper presents systematic analysis method to ensure logical rigor and content integrity. The theme of the paper is channel coordination in channel management.
Logical structure and basic content
Based on research design and logical thinking, the paper is arranged as follows:
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Channels, channel coordination and channel coordination mechanism
Chapter 3 Selecting and screening of channel members
Chapter 4 Differential analysis of channel coordination dynamic mechanism under different types of marketing efforts
Chapter 5 Research of channel coordination based on customer satisfaction
Chapter 6 Incentives under information asymmetric coordination Mechanism
Chapter 7 Channel coordination analysis based on evolutionary game theory
Chapter 8 Conclusion and research prospect
Basic content of each chapter is presented below:
Chapter 1 is question presenting and literature review.
Chapter 2 establishes game theory model based on 5 common channel structures. The author explores structures of five channels, the corresponding behavior (channel decision-making) of each structure and their relations with channel coordination. From both qualitative and quantitative approaches, this part aims to probe into the reasons to coordinate in channel system. The focus of this part is to study channel structures, channel behaviors, channel coordination and their relations with the help of game models.
Chapter 3 believes that it is important to select channel members with collaboration spirit. High-quality channel members (manufacturers and retailers included) are the foundation to achieve close collaboration. In this part, asymmetric information game model is made to study bilateral and adverse member-selection problems, and to analyze the reasons of adverse selection. Furthermore, information screening model is built so that high-quality channel members with coordination spirit will become mutual partners without coping with channel members with low quality or less coordination spirit.
Chapter 4 is to quest some channel coordination mechanisms when the channel members are selected. Taking into account that product "reputation" is accumulated during a dynamic process; the author applies differential game methods to study coordination preconditions in hope of using this conclusion to guide marketing channel practice.
Chapter 5 discusses channel coordination using theories of customer satisfaction. The author believes that, when undertaking market activities and designing channel strategies, we should take full consideration of customers’characteristics and their demand. This moves to the problem that how we can satisfy our customers. In this framework, the third game play—customers, is added to our thinking box. With this involved, however, both cooperation mechanism and incentive mechanism turn difficult to some extent, and the author has made certain research in this part.
Chapter 6 mainly discusses incentive mechanism of channel coordination under asymmetric information. As incomplete information is the main form in the channel, disadvantaged party with less information needs to design reasonable incentive mechanism, which can encourage information advantageous party to sell their products or establish their own brand. Hence, basic principal—agent model, which is principal—agent relation between one manufacturer and one retailer, is introduced to analyze moral hazard problem and its solutions. Finally, to better display generality, the author expands the basic principal—agent model and establishes two advanced model of marketing channel. One is multi-principal—agent model, which is principal—agent relation between many manufacturers and one retailer; the other one is principle—multi-agent model, which is principal—agent relation between one manufacturer and many retailers.
Chapter 7: All previous research is based on the basic assumption of entire rationality. Different from the above, the seventh part enters into how to achieve channel coordination under bounded rationality. Adopting methods of evolutionary game theory, the author builds analyzing model, which indicate that the coordination spirit of the channel members is vitally important to achieve a bounded rational coordination. Here, it is hypothesized that coordinated channel members are directly proportional to coordination spirit and the ability to collaborate. Meanwhile, the organization of this chapter moves back to the third chapter in logics, echoing the paper as a whole. Chapter 8 is the summary and prospects of the paper.
Innovation of the paper
Firstly, if the market is made up of different kinds of retailers, with the proportion of collaborated retailers increasing, the level of retailers’effort will increase and retail price will fall. Meanwhile, wholesale price of manufacturers will go up. Accordingly, optimal profit of manufacturers and retailers will increase. (See more details in Chapter 3.)
Secondly, compared with other channel relations (including non-cooperative static channels, Stackelberg channels led by manufacturers and Stackelberg channels led by retailers), channel coordination achieves the optimization. Under this circumstance, optimal sales price is the lowest, optimal marginal profit of manufacturers reaches the peak; optimal brand investment is the highest, optimal marketing efforts of retailers are the largest, and optimal total profit of channel is the most profitable. Meanwhile, the profit shares of manufacturers are within certain scope when coordination, thus both manufacturers and retailers are willing to cooperate with each other. Furthermore, if we divide marketing effort of manufacturers into short-term effort( preferred by retailers) and long-term effort ( preferred by manufacturers), and if manufacturers compensate long-term effort of retailers, when the incentive coefficient changes, total profit of channel coordination, profit of manufacturers and profit of retailers will differ. (See more details in Chapter 4.)
Thirdly, from the perspective of information symmetry, manufacturers hope that retailers can make more effort in marketing to satisfy the customers. If retailers are making effort, with no incentives from the manufacturers, retailers will remain to make effort based on customers’satisfaction. However, if manufacturers encourage retailers (by ways of subsidies for the efforts cost), retailers will make more effort. Furthermore, if retailers pay more attention on future revenues of channel coordination, manufacturers should reduce incentives to retailers. From the perspective of information asymmetry, manufacturers’degree of optimal effort (general marketing effort) increases with the increase of incentive coefficient and retail price, and has nothing to do with wholesale price. Meanwhile, optimal incentive coefficient decreases with the increase of risk-avoiding of channel members and production uncertainty. (See more details in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.)
Fourthly, under the assumption of bounded rationality, the possibility of channel coordination is in positive proportion with excess profits. When the excess profits approach infinity, manufacturers and retailers are in full coordination. If the manufacturer (or retailer) is cooperative while the retailer (or manufacturer) is not, the loss of manufacturer (or retailer) to coordinate is smaller, and the possibility of channel relations approaching coordination is greater. The possibility of channel coordination is positively proportional to the respective discount factors. (See more details in Chapter 7.)
The drawbacks of the paper
First, the paper is based on the study of channel members’micro behavior mechanism, and draws some conclusions by applying quantitative methods. However, marketing practice is slightly lacking in the paper. For instance, the author believes that we should adopt appropriate incentives to retailers or manufacturers. While in reality, there are so many measures of incentives in marketing practice that the author does not include these measures divested of the variables into the model.
Second, the adoption of game theory has led to some useful conclusions. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) believe that a simple contract often turns out to be the optimal one in reality. Theory researchers have designed complicated mechanisms of channel coordination (including some mechanisms in this paper) by digging into a great deal of study. The practicality of these mechanisms is not yet studied. Nevertheless, a superior way is to make empirical analysis to prove the practicality of our conclusions. We can only go this far to study a few enterprises’cases as it is very difficult to accumulate empirical data constrained by research funding and limited time.
Third, in order to achieve Pareto Optimality of the channel, for example, the integration mechanism may be optimal in certain context while quantity discount mechanism may be optimal under another condition. In order to achieve collaboration, the author has noticed, a number of mechanisms are "imposed" to retailers (or manufacturers). Although collaboration is achieved, it is "unfair" for one party of the channel members. Therefore, "fairness”in channels is of great concern to both manufacturers and retailers, in which the author does not intensively study.
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[122] http://www.cb.com.cn/news/ShowNews.aspx?newsId=18551&classId=65,作者:郭斐2008-8-4 22:20:43。184