上市公司大股东非经营性资金占用问题实证研究
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摘要
大股东非经营性资金占用问题严重影响了我国上市公司与资本市场的发展。针对这一现象,在国内外研究的基础之上,以沪深证交所公布的具有非经营性资金占用问题的上市公司为样本,遵循理论-假说-检验的步骤,采用定量研究的方法,考察大股东非经营性资金占用问题与各指标的关系。主要内容包括:大股东资金非经营性资金占用的成因、特征及危害;大股东非经营性资金占用与其他应收账款等12个指标的关系研究。重点在于大股东非经营性资金占用与各指标的关系研究。从资金占用金额入手,设计资金占用率指标,通过多种统计方法检验得出如下结论:大股东非经营性资金占用与其他应收账款呈正相关;资金占用率与应收账款比率统计上不相关;对于国有上市公司,关联交易金额比例与资金占用率不存在显著关系,而对于民营上市公司关联交易金额比例与资金占用率正相关;资金占用率与总资产增长率负相关,资金占用率与总资产净利率负相关,大股东非经营性资金占用对上市公司的成长性、盈利能力具有显著的负面影响;大股东非经营性资金占用对民营控股上市公司偿债能力存在显著的负面影响;资金占用率与独立董事比例不存在显著相关关系;在大股东非经营性资金占用方面,民营控股上市公司比国有控股上市公司更为普遍,在大股东非经营资金占用程度方面,民营上市公司比国有上市公司更严重;在第一大股东不同的持股比例下,国有上市公司的资金占用率呈“U形曲线”,其拐点约为0.4,而民营上市公司的资金占用率呈“倒U形曲线”,拐点约为0.35;在大股东非经营性资金占用方面,东中西部地区不存在显著差异。
The problem of majority shareholder's non-business capital occupying has serious influence on the development of the capital market and the listed company. In view of this phenomenon, on the base of the domestic and foreign researches, we choose the listed companies that exist non-business capital occupying and announced by our country's securities exchange as the sample. According to theory - hypothesis - examination, this paper uses the quantitative investigation method to research the relationship between majority shareholder's non-business capital occupying and other factors. This paper mainly includes: the origin, characteristic and harm of majority shareholder's non-business capital occupying; the relationship between majority shareholder's non-business capital occupying and other twelve variables. Basing on the amount of non-business capital occupying, we design a variable named the rate of non-business capital occupying. We draw the following conclusion through many kinds of statistical method examination: the non-business capital occupying and other account receivables is positively correlated; the non-business capital occupying and other account receivables is non-correlated; to the state-owned listed companies, the rate of non-business capital occupying doesn't have remarkable relations with the connection transaction proportion, but regarding to the listed private companies, they are positively correlated; the rate of non-business capital occupying and the total assets rate of increment is negatively correlated, so is the relation between the total assets net profit rate and the rate of non-business capital occupying; to the listed private companies, the rate of non-business capital occupying exists remarkable negative influence; the rate of non-business capital occupying and the independent director proportion do not have remarkable relation; as to the problem of non-business capital occupying, the listed private companies are more serious than the state-owned; under the situation of different proportion of the largest shareholder, we find the rate of non-business capital occupying of the listed stated-owned companies assume "the U shape curve" and its inflection point approximately is 0.4, on the contrary , the listed private companies assume "the reversed U shape curve" and the inflection point approximately is 0.35; the rate of non-business capital occupying does not have remarkable difference among different areas.
The problem of majority shareholder's non-business capital occupying has serious influence on the development of the capital market and the listed company. In view of this phenomenon, on the base of the domestic and foreign researches, we choose the listed companies that exist non-business capital occupying and announced by our country's securities exchange as the sample. According to theory - hypothesis - examination, this paper uses the quantitative investigation method to research the relationship between majority shareholder's non-business capital occupying and other factors. This paper mainly includes: the origin, characteristic and harm of majority shareholder's non-business capital occupying; the relationship between majority shareholder's non-business capital occupying and other twelve variables. Basing on the amount of non-business capital occupying, we design a variable named the rate of non-business capital occupying. We draw the following conclusion through many kinds of statistical method examination: the non-business capital occupying and other account receivables is positively correlated; the non-business capital occupying and other account receivables is non-correlated; to the state-owned listed companies, the rate of non-business capital occupying doesn't have remarkable relations with the connection transaction proportion, but regarding to the listed private companies, they are positively correlated; the rate of non-business capital occupying and the total assets rate of increment is negatively correlated, so is the relation between the total assets net profit rate and the rate of non-business capital occupying; to the listed private companies, the rate of non-business capital occupying exists remarkable negative influence; the rate of non-business capital occupying and the independent director proportion do not have remarkable relation; as to the problem of non-business capital occupying, the listed private companies are more serious than the state-owned; under the situation of different proportion of the largest shareholder, we find the rate of non-business capital occupying of the listed stated-owned companies assume "the U shape curve" and its inflection point approximately is 0.4, on the contrary , the listed private companies assume "the reversed U shape curve" and the inflection point approximately is 0.35; the rate of non-business capital occupying does not have remarkable difference among different areas.
引文
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[17]陈晓红,戴静,曾洪波.大股东非经营性资金占用与中小上市公司成长危机实证研究[J].经济问题探索,2007,(1).
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[21]沪深证券交易所.关于上市公司大股东及其附属企业非经营性资金占用的通告,2006.
[22]江东瀚.股权结构对非经营性资金占用影响的实证分析——民营上市公司与.国有上市公司的比较[J].海南金融,2006,(11).
[23]姜国华,岳衡.上市公司大股东资金占用与上市公司股票回报率的实证研究[J].管理世界,2005,(9):119-126.
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[25]林乐芬.中国上市公司股权集中度研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2005.
[26]吕庆华.大股东治理的负面效应及其防范[J].山西财经大学学报,2003,(4).
[27]刘小玄.中国转轨过程中的产权和市场——关于市场、产权、行为和绩效的分析[M].上海:上海三联书店和上海人民出版社,2003.
[28]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004,(12).
[29]沈华珊,接管市场与上市公司治理——对我国上市公司兼并收购的实证研究[J].证券市场导报,2002,(11).
[30]苏启林.代理问题、公司治理与企业价值——以民营上市公司为例[J].中国工商经济,2004,(4).
[31]上海证券交易所研究中心.中国公司治理报告(2006):国有控股上市公司治理[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2006.
[32]田利辉.杠杆治理、预算软约束和中国上市公司绩效[J].经济学(季刊),2004第3卷增刊.
[33]唐宗明,蒋位.中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证分析[J].经济研究,2004,(4)
[34]吴斌.控制权收益的大股东与公司治理关系分析[J].世界经济文汇,2003,(02).
[35][美]小艾尔弗雷德#钱德勒.看得见的手[M].北京:商务印书馆,1994.
[36]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,(5).
[37]薛爽.亏损上市公司实证研究[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2005.
[38]徐晓东.第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析[J].经济研究,2003,(02).
[39]辛志红.上市公司大股东治理下的股权制衡与中小股东权益保护[J].经济体制改革,2003,(04).
[40]于颖.上市公司大股东占款探析[J].财经问题研究,2003,(07).
[41]张红兵、贾来喜、李潞.SPSS宝典[M].北京:电子工业出版社,2007.
[42]张胜芳.关于公司治理的思考[J],会计研究,2001,(10).
[43]章卫东.论我国上市公司大股东控制下的股权再融资问题[J].会计研究,2003,(1 1).
[44]张新、祝红梅.内幕交易的经济学分析[J]。经济学,2003,(10).
[45]张兆国,陈华东.试析我国上市公司资本结构的效应[J],会计研究.2001,(10).
[46]北京色诺芬数据库.
[47]大智慧证券.
[48]巨潮资讯网(http://www.szse.cn).
[49]全景网(http://www.p5w.net).
[50]上海证券交易所网站(http://www.sse.com.cn).
[51]深圳证券交易所网站(http://www.szse.cn).
[2] Mock,Randall,Shleifer and Vishny. Manageement ownship and market valuation: An eempirical analysis [J] Journal of Fnancial E conomics,1988, (20),pp294-315.
[3] Rajan,Raghuram. Insiders and outsiders:The choice between relationship and armlength debt[J]. Journal of Finance,1997, Vol.47,ppl367-1400.
[4] Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R.. A survey of corporate governancejournal of Finance, 1997, (52) ,pp737-783.
[5] Shliefer,A. and Vishny,R..Large shareholders and Corporate control[J]. Journal of Political Economics,1986, (16),ppl67-198.
[6] Weistein,D.E. and Eshay Yafeh. On the costd of a bank centersed financial system:Evidences from the changing main bank relations in Japan[M].1994,Manuscript,Havard University.
[7] Wang, K & Wong, T. J. Change of Large Shareholders and Performance Improvement: Is It Real Improvement or According Manipulation [D]. HKUST Working paper, 2003.
[8] Bertrand,M.,Mehta,P. and Mullainathan,S..The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics ,2002, (58) ,pp81-112.
[9]Chong-en , Bai,Qiao , Liu, Frank.Song.The vaule of corporate-evidence from China's distressed firms[J].Working Paper Series,2002.
[10] Claessens, S. ,Djankov,S.and Lang,L.. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial
[11] Grossman,Hart.An analysis of the principal-agent problem[J].Econometrica, 1983, (51).
[12] Jensen, Meckling. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost Structure[J] Journal of Financial Econonmics, 1976, (3) .
[13] Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer.A.Tunneling. American Economic Review,2000,(90),pp22-27.
[14]La Porta,Rafeal,Lopez.de-Silanes,Florencio and Shleifer.Andrei.Investor Protection and Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Finance,1999,(54).
[15]Lins,V..K.Equity ownership and firm vaule in emerging market.Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,(38),pp159-184.Economics 58,2000,pp81-112.
[16]曹廷求.大股东治理与公司治理效率[J].改革,2003.(01).
[17]陈晓红,戴静,曾洪波.大股东非经营性资金占用与中小上市公司成长危机实证研究[J].经济问题探索,2007,(1).
[18]丁玉影,仲崇云.从委托—代理理论透视股权变化及其影响[J].贵州财经学院学报,2004,(6).
[19]樊纲,王小鲁,张立文,朱恒鹏.中国各地区市场化相对进程报告[J].经济.研究,2003.
[20]惠男男.我国上市公司大股东资金占用问题研究[D].浙江大学硕士论文,2006.
[21]沪深证券交易所.关于上市公司大股东及其附属企业非经营性资金占用的通告,2006.
[22]江东瀚.股权结构对非经营性资金占用影响的实证分析——民营上市公司与.国有上市公司的比较[J].海南金融,2006,(11).
[23]姜国华,岳衡.上市公司大股东资金占用与上市公司股票回报率的实证研究[J].管理世界,2005,(9):119-126.
[24]季建伟、邱菀华.基于“代理”问题和产权结构的企业并购研究[J].生产力研究,2004,(1).
[25]林乐芬.中国上市公司股权集中度研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2005.
[26]吕庆华.大股东治理的负面效应及其防范[J].山西财经大学学报,2003,(4).
[27]刘小玄.中国转轨过程中的产权和市场——关于市场、产权、行为和绩效的分析[M].上海:上海三联书店和上海人民出版社,2003.
[28]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004,(12).
[29]沈华珊,接管市场与上市公司治理——对我国上市公司兼并收购的实证研究[J].证券市场导报,2002,(11).
[30]苏启林.代理问题、公司治理与企业价值——以民营上市公司为例[J].中国工商经济,2004,(4).
[31]上海证券交易所研究中心.中国公司治理报告(2006):国有控股上市公司治理[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2006.
[32]田利辉.杠杆治理、预算软约束和中国上市公司绩效[J].经济学(季刊),2004第3卷增刊.
[33]唐宗明,蒋位.中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证分析[J].经济研究,2004,(4)
[34]吴斌.控制权收益的大股东与公司治理关系分析[J].世界经济文汇,2003,(02).
[35][美]小艾尔弗雷德#钱德勒.看得见的手[M].北京:商务印书馆,1994.
[36]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,(5).
[37]薛爽.亏损上市公司实证研究[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2005.
[38]徐晓东.第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析[J].经济研究,2003,(02).
[39]辛志红.上市公司大股东治理下的股权制衡与中小股东权益保护[J].经济体制改革,2003,(04).
[40]于颖.上市公司大股东占款探析[J].财经问题研究,2003,(07).
[41]张红兵、贾来喜、李潞.SPSS宝典[M].北京:电子工业出版社,2007.
[42]张胜芳.关于公司治理的思考[J],会计研究,2001,(10).
[43]章卫东.论我国上市公司大股东控制下的股权再融资问题[J].会计研究,2003,(1 1).
[44]张新、祝红梅.内幕交易的经济学分析[J]。经济学,2003,(10).
[45]张兆国,陈华东.试析我国上市公司资本结构的效应[J],会计研究.2001,(10).
[46]北京色诺芬数据库.
[47]大智慧证券.
[48]巨潮资讯网(http://www.szse.cn).
[49]全景网(http://www.p5w.net).
[50]上海证券交易所网站(http://www.sse.com.cn).
[51]深圳证券交易所网站(http://www.szse.cn).