我国上市公司大股东占款与相关财务指标研究
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摘要
在我国,企业的股权集中度非常高,在保护中小股东利益的法律体系不完善的情况下,大股东利用其控制性地位,占用上市公司资金的现象比较多,而且占款金额巨大,严重威胁我国上市公司的生存及成长能力。大股东占款,不仅影响了上市公司的正常经营,损害了广大中小股东的利益,而且阻碍了证券市场的健康发展。
本文首先介绍了论文的选题意义和背景,综述国内外关于大股东资金占用的研究成果。介绍了大股东资金占用的动机、占款的模式、账目表现以及大股东利用控股地位占用上市公司资金对上市公司造成的财务危害。从盈利能力、偿债能力和经营活动现金流量三方面对财务指标进行分析。在此基础上对我国上市公司大股东占款的现状以及相关财务指标进行了描述性分析。
本文以上海和深圳证券交易所公布的上市公司2006年6月30日的大股东资金占用额为样本数据,对上市公司大股东的资金占用情况进行了实证研究。通过线性回归的实证方法研究发现:大股东资金占用与资产收益率负相关;大股东资金占用与流动比率负相关;大股东资金占用与每股经营活动现金流量负相关。通过实证方法得出结论:大股东占款对上市公司盈利能力、偿债能力和经营活动现金流量产生了消极的影响。以上市公司五粮液为例,分析了大股东占款的具体方式,通过对财务指标的分析验证了本文实证研究的结论。
本文最后在总结全文的基础上,提出了解决大股东占款问题的措施,尤其是采取一定的措施防止新的占款现象的发生。包括优化股权结构、健全和完善独立董事制度、加强信息披露以及加强对小股东的法律保护等等。
In China, the ratio of shares concentration is very high. When the legal system about the protection for the interest of minority shareholders is imperfect, the majority shareholders usually occupy founds of the listed companies using their power of control, and the amount of occupying capital is very huge, which is listed on the fatal risk of corporate governance, capital occupying by major shareholders has been a serious threat to the survival of our country's listed companies and the sustainable development capacity of listed companies. Majority shareholders of listed companies capital occupying not only affect the management of listed companies and impair the interests of minority shareholders, but also impede the healthy development of the securities market.
Firstly, this paper introduces the significance of the topic selection and the background, makes a summary on the achievements about the majority shareholders of listed companies occupy capital from the domestic and overseas, and studied on the patterns of behavior, the harm of the capital occupying by major shareholders in our country’s listed companies, and analyzes on the financial targets from the three aspects of earning ability、repayment capability and operating cash flow per share. Then it statistically analyzes the present situations of the capital occupying companies by the major shareholders and related Financial Targets.
The paper use the data of listed company of A-share announced by Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange on June30, 2006, empirical analyzed the major shareholders’capital occupying. We draw the following conclusion through statistical method examination: the rate of capital occupying and the financial targets of return on asserts is negatively correlated; the rate of capital occupying and the financial targets of current ratio is negatively correlated; so is the relation between the operating cash flow per share and the rate of capital occupying. Through empirical research methods, the study draws a conclusion that the majority shareholders of listed companies capital occupying has negative impact to profit ability、repayment capability and operating cash flow. The paper describes the case of listed company of Wuliangye, which has been tunneled by majority shareholders. The specific causes and the patterns of behavior of capital occupying are analyzed, through the analysis of financial indicators validated empirical conclusions of the front Part.
Finally on the basis of summing up the paper, it gives the suggestions on how to prevent the major shareholders from occupying the capital of the listed companies, Including improving the governance of listed company’s structure,strengthening supervision and strengthening the legal protection on minority shareholders, perfecting and improving the system of independent directors and so on.
本文首先介绍了论文的选题意义和背景,综述国内外关于大股东资金占用的研究成果。介绍了大股东资金占用的动机、占款的模式、账目表现以及大股东利用控股地位占用上市公司资金对上市公司造成的财务危害。从盈利能力、偿债能力和经营活动现金流量三方面对财务指标进行分析。在此基础上对我国上市公司大股东占款的现状以及相关财务指标进行了描述性分析。
本文以上海和深圳证券交易所公布的上市公司2006年6月30日的大股东资金占用额为样本数据,对上市公司大股东的资金占用情况进行了实证研究。通过线性回归的实证方法研究发现:大股东资金占用与资产收益率负相关;大股东资金占用与流动比率负相关;大股东资金占用与每股经营活动现金流量负相关。通过实证方法得出结论:大股东占款对上市公司盈利能力、偿债能力和经营活动现金流量产生了消极的影响。以上市公司五粮液为例,分析了大股东占款的具体方式,通过对财务指标的分析验证了本文实证研究的结论。
本文最后在总结全文的基础上,提出了解决大股东占款问题的措施,尤其是采取一定的措施防止新的占款现象的发生。包括优化股权结构、健全和完善独立董事制度、加强信息披露以及加强对小股东的法律保护等等。
In China, the ratio of shares concentration is very high. When the legal system about the protection for the interest of minority shareholders is imperfect, the majority shareholders usually occupy founds of the listed companies using their power of control, and the amount of occupying capital is very huge, which is listed on the fatal risk of corporate governance, capital occupying by major shareholders has been a serious threat to the survival of our country's listed companies and the sustainable development capacity of listed companies. Majority shareholders of listed companies capital occupying not only affect the management of listed companies and impair the interests of minority shareholders, but also impede the healthy development of the securities market.
Firstly, this paper introduces the significance of the topic selection and the background, makes a summary on the achievements about the majority shareholders of listed companies occupy capital from the domestic and overseas, and studied on the patterns of behavior, the harm of the capital occupying by major shareholders in our country’s listed companies, and analyzes on the financial targets from the three aspects of earning ability、repayment capability and operating cash flow per share. Then it statistically analyzes the present situations of the capital occupying companies by the major shareholders and related Financial Targets.
The paper use the data of listed company of A-share announced by Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange on June30, 2006, empirical analyzed the major shareholders’capital occupying. We draw the following conclusion through statistical method examination: the rate of capital occupying and the financial targets of return on asserts is negatively correlated; the rate of capital occupying and the financial targets of current ratio is negatively correlated; so is the relation between the operating cash flow per share and the rate of capital occupying. Through empirical research methods, the study draws a conclusion that the majority shareholders of listed companies capital occupying has negative impact to profit ability、repayment capability and operating cash flow. The paper describes the case of listed company of Wuliangye, which has been tunneled by majority shareholders. The specific causes and the patterns of behavior of capital occupying are analyzed, through the analysis of financial indicators validated empirical conclusions of the front Part.
Finally on the basis of summing up the paper, it gives the suggestions on how to prevent the major shareholders from occupying the capital of the listed companies, Including improving the governance of listed company’s structure,strengthening supervision and strengthening the legal protection on minority shareholders, perfecting and improving the system of independent directors and so on.
引文
[1]白重恩,路江涌,陶志刚.国有企业改制效果的实证研究[J].经济研究,2006(8)
[2]楚天舒.切实解决上市公司大股东占款问题[J].中国金融,2006(10)
[3]陈晓,仲娜.上市公司利用新会计准则进行盈余管理研究[J].财会月刊,2008 (5):50-56.
[4]段亚林.论大股东股权滥用及实例[M].经济管理出版社,2001,146-151.
[5]邓建平,曾勇,何佳.改制模式、资金占用与公司绩效[J].中国工业经济, 2007 (1)
[6]龚兴隆,杨明伟.从大股东占用上市公司资金谈上市公司治理结构的完善[J].新理财,2006(04)
[7]贺建刚,刘峰.大股东控制、利益输送与投资者保护—基于上市公司资产收购关联交易的实证研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2005(9):101-170
[8]惠男男.我国上市公司大股东资金占用问题研究[D].浙江大学硕士论文,2006
[9]江东瀚.股权结构对非经营性资金占用影响的实证研究—民营上市公司与国有上市公司的比较[J].海南金融,2006(11)
[10]姜国华,岳衡.大股东占用上市公司资金与上市公司股票回报率关系的研究[J].管理世界,2005(9)
[11]江伟.我国上市公司控制性股东掏空与支持行为的实证分析[J].经济科学,2005(2):77-85
[12]刘峰,贺建刚、魏明海.控制权、业绩与利益输送—基于五粮液的案例研究[J].管理世界,2004(8):102-108
[13]李增泉、孙铮,王志伟.掏空与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004(12)
[14]雷光勇,刘慧龙.大股东控制、融资规模与盈余操纵程度[J].管理世界,2006(l):29-136
[15]刘睿智,王向阳.我国上市公司控制权私有收益的规模研究[J].华中科技大学学报,2003(03)
[16]罗党论,唐清泉,大股东利益输送与投资者保护——一个分析框架,管理科学,2005年第18卷第5期
[17]马曙光,黄志忠,薛云奎.股权分置、资金侵占与上市公司现金股利政策[J].会计研究,2005(9):44-50
[18]马民伟,上市公司大股东占款财务问题研究[D].四川大学硕士论文,2007
[19]苏启林,朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究,2003 (8)
[20]唐宗明、蒋位.中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证研究[J].经济研究,2002(04)
[21]王家琪,孙玲玲.大股东占用上市公司的实证分析[J].统计与决策,2005(12) :115-117
[22]杨丽娟.上市公司大股东及关联方资金占用的现状与应对措施[J].经济论坛,2004(18)
[23]叶康涛,陆正飞,张志华.独立董事能否抑制大股东的掏空[J].经济研究,2007(4):101-111
[24]余明桂,夏新平.控股股东、代理问题与关联交易:对中国上市公司的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2004(6)
[25]朱武祥.一股独大与股权多元化[J].科学决策,2002 (3)
[26] Attig, N., Fong, W., Gadhoum, Y. et al. Effects of Large Shareholding on Information Asymmetry and Stock Liquidity [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,2006,30:2875-2892
[27] Bae, K.,Kang, J.K&KM, J.M. Tunneling or value-added: evidence from merger by Korean business groups[J]. Journal of Finance, 2002, 57:2695-2740
[28] Barclay,M.&Holderness, C. Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations [J].Journal of Financial Economies, 1989, 25:371-395
[29] Bertrand, M., P. Mehta, S. Mullainathan. 2002. Ferreting out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117:121-148.
[30] Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis, 2004, Tunneling, Propping and Expropriation Evidence from Connected Party Transactions in Hong Kong. Journal of Financial Economics forth coming.
[31] Classens, Stijin, Simeon, P.H. Fan, and Larry H.P. Lang, Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings, Journal of finance, 2002, 57:2741-2771
[32] Claessnes, S., Sirneon, D.&Lang, L. The separation of ownership and control of east Asia corporations [J].Joumal of Financial Economics, 2000, 58:81-112
[33] Demsetz, H., K. Lehn. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 1985, 93 (Dec.): 1155-1177.
[34] Dennis, and J. McConnell, International Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, March, 1-36, 2003
[35] Dyck, A.and L.Zingales. Private benefits of control: An International Comparison. Journal of Finance forthcoming, 2004
[36] Faccio. Mara, Larry H.P Lang and Young.Leslie, Dividends and expropriation, American economy review, 2001, Vol.91 (March):54-78.
[37] Grossman, 5.& Hart,O.One-share-one-vote and the Market for Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Financial Economies, 1988, 20:203-236
[38] Jian, Ming, and Wong, T.J., 2006, Propping and tunneling through related Party transactions, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
[39] Jiang, G.H., Charles, M.C.&Lee, H.Y. 2005 , Tunneling in China: The Surprisingly Pervasive Use of Corporate Loans to Extract Funds from Chinese Listed Companies.
[40] Jensen,M.C.and W.H.Meckling,1976,Theory of the Firm: Managemerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3:305-360
[41] Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J. Performance and top management incentives [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 98:225-264.
[42] Johnson, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes and A. Shleifer. 2000. Tunneling. American Economics Review [J].90:22-27.
[43] Joh, Sung Wook, 2003, Corporate Governance and Firm Profitability: Evidence From Korea before the Economic Crisis[J].Journal of Financial Ecnomics68(2),287-322.
[44] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer, R. Vishny. Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal of Finance [J].1999,54(2): 471-517.
[45] Liu, Qiao, and Lu, Zhou, 2003, Earnings management to tunnel: Evidence from China’s listed companies, University of Hong Kong.
[46] Lins, K. Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets [J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2003, 38:159-184
[47] Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio LoPez-De-Silanes, Andtei Shlerfer. Tunneling. The American Economic Review, 2000(5):22-27
[48] Shleifer, A., and R.Vishny.1997.A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance 52:737-783.
[49] Wolfenzon, Daniel, A theory of pyramidal structures, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1999
[2]楚天舒.切实解决上市公司大股东占款问题[J].中国金融,2006(10)
[3]陈晓,仲娜.上市公司利用新会计准则进行盈余管理研究[J].财会月刊,2008 (5):50-56.
[4]段亚林.论大股东股权滥用及实例[M].经济管理出版社,2001,146-151.
[5]邓建平,曾勇,何佳.改制模式、资金占用与公司绩效[J].中国工业经济, 2007 (1)
[6]龚兴隆,杨明伟.从大股东占用上市公司资金谈上市公司治理结构的完善[J].新理财,2006(04)
[7]贺建刚,刘峰.大股东控制、利益输送与投资者保护—基于上市公司资产收购关联交易的实证研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2005(9):101-170
[8]惠男男.我国上市公司大股东资金占用问题研究[D].浙江大学硕士论文,2006
[9]江东瀚.股权结构对非经营性资金占用影响的实证研究—民营上市公司与国有上市公司的比较[J].海南金融,2006(11)
[10]姜国华,岳衡.大股东占用上市公司资金与上市公司股票回报率关系的研究[J].管理世界,2005(9)
[11]江伟.我国上市公司控制性股东掏空与支持行为的实证分析[J].经济科学,2005(2):77-85
[12]刘峰,贺建刚、魏明海.控制权、业绩与利益输送—基于五粮液的案例研究[J].管理世界,2004(8):102-108
[13]李增泉、孙铮,王志伟.掏空与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004(12)
[14]雷光勇,刘慧龙.大股东控制、融资规模与盈余操纵程度[J].管理世界,2006(l):29-136
[15]刘睿智,王向阳.我国上市公司控制权私有收益的规模研究[J].华中科技大学学报,2003(03)
[16]罗党论,唐清泉,大股东利益输送与投资者保护——一个分析框架,管理科学,2005年第18卷第5期
[17]马曙光,黄志忠,薛云奎.股权分置、资金侵占与上市公司现金股利政策[J].会计研究,2005(9):44-50
[18]马民伟,上市公司大股东占款财务问题研究[D].四川大学硕士论文,2007
[19]苏启林,朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究,2003 (8)
[20]唐宗明、蒋位.中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证研究[J].经济研究,2002(04)
[21]王家琪,孙玲玲.大股东占用上市公司的实证分析[J].统计与决策,2005(12) :115-117
[22]杨丽娟.上市公司大股东及关联方资金占用的现状与应对措施[J].经济论坛,2004(18)
[23]叶康涛,陆正飞,张志华.独立董事能否抑制大股东的掏空[J].经济研究,2007(4):101-111
[24]余明桂,夏新平.控股股东、代理问题与关联交易:对中国上市公司的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2004(6)
[25]朱武祥.一股独大与股权多元化[J].科学决策,2002 (3)
[26] Attig, N., Fong, W., Gadhoum, Y. et al. Effects of Large Shareholding on Information Asymmetry and Stock Liquidity [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,2006,30:2875-2892
[27] Bae, K.,Kang, J.K&KM, J.M. Tunneling or value-added: evidence from merger by Korean business groups[J]. Journal of Finance, 2002, 57:2695-2740
[28] Barclay,M.&Holderness, C. Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations [J].Journal of Financial Economies, 1989, 25:371-395
[29] Bertrand, M., P. Mehta, S. Mullainathan. 2002. Ferreting out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117:121-148.
[30] Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis, 2004, Tunneling, Propping and Expropriation Evidence from Connected Party Transactions in Hong Kong. Journal of Financial Economics forth coming.
[31] Classens, Stijin, Simeon, P.H. Fan, and Larry H.P. Lang, Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings, Journal of finance, 2002, 57:2741-2771
[32] Claessnes, S., Sirneon, D.&Lang, L. The separation of ownership and control of east Asia corporations [J].Joumal of Financial Economics, 2000, 58:81-112
[33] Demsetz, H., K. Lehn. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 1985, 93 (Dec.): 1155-1177.
[34] Dennis, and J. McConnell, International Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, March, 1-36, 2003
[35] Dyck, A.and L.Zingales. Private benefits of control: An International Comparison. Journal of Finance forthcoming, 2004
[36] Faccio. Mara, Larry H.P Lang and Young.Leslie, Dividends and expropriation, American economy review, 2001, Vol.91 (March):54-78.
[37] Grossman, 5.& Hart,O.One-share-one-vote and the Market for Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Financial Economies, 1988, 20:203-236
[38] Jian, Ming, and Wong, T.J., 2006, Propping and tunneling through related Party transactions, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
[39] Jiang, G.H., Charles, M.C.&Lee, H.Y. 2005 , Tunneling in China: The Surprisingly Pervasive Use of Corporate Loans to Extract Funds from Chinese Listed Companies.
[40] Jensen,M.C.and W.H.Meckling,1976,Theory of the Firm: Managemerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3:305-360
[41] Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J. Performance and top management incentives [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 98:225-264.
[42] Johnson, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes and A. Shleifer. 2000. Tunneling. American Economics Review [J].90:22-27.
[43] Joh, Sung Wook, 2003, Corporate Governance and Firm Profitability: Evidence From Korea before the Economic Crisis[J].Journal of Financial Ecnomics68(2),287-322.
[44] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer, R. Vishny. Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal of Finance [J].1999,54(2): 471-517.
[45] Liu, Qiao, and Lu, Zhou, 2003, Earnings management to tunnel: Evidence from China’s listed companies, University of Hong Kong.
[46] Lins, K. Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets [J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2003, 38:159-184
[47] Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio LoPez-De-Silanes, Andtei Shlerfer. Tunneling. The American Economic Review, 2000(5):22-27
[48] Shleifer, A., and R.Vishny.1997.A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance 52:737-783.
[49] Wolfenzon, Daniel, A theory of pyramidal structures, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1999