大股东资金占用影响因素研究
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摘要
我国民营上市公司的控股股东普遍使用金字塔结构保持对上市公司的控制权,控制权和现金流权分离的程度很大,大股东以各种手段占用上市公司的资金,影响企业用于自身发展所需要的资金,不利于企业的发展也不利于整个市场的稳定有序。在我国证券市场上,民营上市公司大股东资金占用的现象很严重,已成为制约我国证券市场稳定运行和规范发展的一个难点和焦点问题。
本文在对理论进行分析的基础上,提出了研究的8个假设,以具备金字塔结构的371家民营上市公司为研究样本,结合描述性统计的分析结果,通过共线性检验和多元回归分析的研究方法,对假设进行了检验,对实证结果进行了解释和说明。结果表明,金字塔结构下的民营上市公司,大股东资金占用率与第一大股东的持股比例之间存在先上升后下降的非线性关系。分离系数与大股东资金占用率负相关,通过显著性检验。股权制衡度越高,大股东资金占用率越低。管理者持股比例与大股东资金占用率为负相关,通过显著性检验,表明管理者持股确实能够有效控制大股东的资金占用行为。董事会规模、独立董事比例以及两职分离情况对大股东资金占用行为并没有显著影响。资产负债率与大股东资金占用率负相关,通过显著性检验,说明债权人的存在一定程度上约束了大股东猖狂的资金侵占行为。控制变量公司上市年限与大股东资金占用率正相关,但未通过显著性检验。此外,分别对正常公司和ST公司进行了实证研究,发现第一大股东持股比例、股权制衡度、资产负债率和公司上市年限这四个变量对大股东资金占用率的影响因样本不同而不同。通过以上研究分析发现,必须要由全社会共同参与上市公司监管才能防范和解决大股东资金占用问题。
Chinese private listed companies'major shareholders generally use the pyramid shareholding structure to maintain control.The degree of control right and cash flow right is large.Major shareholders takes up the capital of the company by various means,as a result, enterprises will be in short of funds used to self-development,then affect the development of enterprise and will finally affect the stability of the entire market.On the security market of our country,the phenomenon that major shareholder's capital occupying is merging constantly,which has became a difficult problem that restrict the stable operation and standardize of the security market in our country.
The paper proposes eight assumptions based on the analysis of the theory. It Uses data for 371 private listed companies with pyramid structure as sample,combines with the analysis of descriptive,through collinear test and multiple regression analysis,tests on the hypothesis.and explains the empirical results.The results show that the majority shareholder capital occupying showed a non-linear relation with the first big shareholder's shareholding ratio.Separation factor is negative related to occupying and pass the test of significance.The higher the degree of checks and balances equity,the lower occupancy rate.Managers shareholders ratio is negative related to occupying and pass the test of significance.lt shows that the managers shareholders effectively control the behavior of funds used.The board members,proportion of independent directors,the separation between the large shareholder's occupation don't significantly effect on behavior.Debt rate are negatively related to major shareholders,by the significance test.Note the presence of the creditors bound to some extent large shareholders funds rampant encroachment acts.Control variable years with the company is positive related to major Shareholders'occupying behavior,but not by a significant test of significance.In addion,empirical research the normal company and ST company respectively,found that the impact of the first big shareholder's shareholding ratio,the degree of checks and balances equity,Debt rate and years are different in different samples.According to the previous analysis and research,I point out that if we want to solve the problem caused by major shareholders'capital occupying,we must call on the supervision and motoring from different aspects of our society.
本文在对理论进行分析的基础上,提出了研究的8个假设,以具备金字塔结构的371家民营上市公司为研究样本,结合描述性统计的分析结果,通过共线性检验和多元回归分析的研究方法,对假设进行了检验,对实证结果进行了解释和说明。结果表明,金字塔结构下的民营上市公司,大股东资金占用率与第一大股东的持股比例之间存在先上升后下降的非线性关系。分离系数与大股东资金占用率负相关,通过显著性检验。股权制衡度越高,大股东资金占用率越低。管理者持股比例与大股东资金占用率为负相关,通过显著性检验,表明管理者持股确实能够有效控制大股东的资金占用行为。董事会规模、独立董事比例以及两职分离情况对大股东资金占用行为并没有显著影响。资产负债率与大股东资金占用率负相关,通过显著性检验,说明债权人的存在一定程度上约束了大股东猖狂的资金侵占行为。控制变量公司上市年限与大股东资金占用率正相关,但未通过显著性检验。此外,分别对正常公司和ST公司进行了实证研究,发现第一大股东持股比例、股权制衡度、资产负债率和公司上市年限这四个变量对大股东资金占用率的影响因样本不同而不同。通过以上研究分析发现,必须要由全社会共同参与上市公司监管才能防范和解决大股东资金占用问题。
Chinese private listed companies'major shareholders generally use the pyramid shareholding structure to maintain control.The degree of control right and cash flow right is large.Major shareholders takes up the capital of the company by various means,as a result, enterprises will be in short of funds used to self-development,then affect the development of enterprise and will finally affect the stability of the entire market.On the security market of our country,the phenomenon that major shareholder's capital occupying is merging constantly,which has became a difficult problem that restrict the stable operation and standardize of the security market in our country.
The paper proposes eight assumptions based on the analysis of the theory. It Uses data for 371 private listed companies with pyramid structure as sample,combines with the analysis of descriptive,through collinear test and multiple regression analysis,tests on the hypothesis.and explains the empirical results.The results show that the majority shareholder capital occupying showed a non-linear relation with the first big shareholder's shareholding ratio.Separation factor is negative related to occupying and pass the test of significance.The higher the degree of checks and balances equity,the lower occupancy rate.Managers shareholders ratio is negative related to occupying and pass the test of significance.lt shows that the managers shareholders effectively control the behavior of funds used.The board members,proportion of independent directors,the separation between the large shareholder's occupation don't significantly effect on behavior.Debt rate are negatively related to major shareholders,by the significance test.Note the presence of the creditors bound to some extent large shareholders funds rampant encroachment acts.Control variable years with the company is positive related to major Shareholders'occupying behavior,but not by a significant test of significance.In addion,empirical research the normal company and ST company respectively,found that the impact of the first big shareholder's shareholding ratio,the degree of checks and balances equity,Debt rate and years are different in different samples.According to the previous analysis and research,I point out that if we want to solve the problem caused by major shareholders'capital occupying,we must call on the supervision and motoring from different aspects of our society.
引文
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[2]La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei, Shleifer, Corporate Ownership around the world Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-517
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[4]Jae Seung, Jun Koo Kang and Inmoo Lee, Business groups and tunneling: evidence from private securities offerings by Korean Chaebols,2005
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[6]Holdeness, Clifford G, and Dennis P. Sheehan, "the role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations, " Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.20,1988; 317-346
[7]prowse, Stephen,''Institutional investment patters and corporate financial behaviour in the United Stales and Japan; Journal of Financial Economics, Vo127,1985,43-66
[8]Randall Morck, Bernard yeung, Wayneyu. The Information Content of Markets:Why Do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Movements? [J]2000,58:215-260
[9]Rosenstein, Stuart and Jeff:feW Wyatt.1990. Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 26(2),175-192
[10]Morck, R. Why some double taxation might make sense:the special Case of inter-corporate dividends[DB/OL], Working paper, University of Alberta,2003
[11]La Porta, Ragel, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrew Shleifer and RobertW. Vishny.2000. Investor Protection and Corporat Oovemancejoumal of Financial Economics,58(1),3-27
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[15]Pagano, Marco and Ailsa R ell.1998. The Choice of Stock Ownership Strncturc:Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision tO Go Public. Quarterly Journal of Economics,113(1),187-225
[16]Bennedsen, Morten and Daniel Wolfenzon.2000. The Balance of Power in Closely · Held Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics,58(1/ 2),113-139
[17]Zingales. The Value of the Voting Right:A Study of the Mi fan Stock Exchange Experience. The Review of Financial Studies,1999,1:125-148
[18]Johnson, S., R., La Po rta, F., Lopez-de-Sifanes and A. Shfeifer,2000, "Tunneling", American Economic Review 90,22-27
[19]Robert F, Braner. Does M & A Pay? A Survey of Evidence for the Decision-Maker, Darden Graduate School of Business Administration. Working Paper,2002
[20]Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and LEH., Lang.2000. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asia Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics,58.81-112
[21]Bertrand, Marianne Mehta, and Sendhil Mullainatham Ferreting out tunneling:an application to Indian business groups, Quarterly journal of economics 118:2002.121-148
[22]Bae, K., Kang, J., and Kim, J.. Tunneling or value added? Evidence from mergers by Koren business groups. Journal of Finance,2002, (57), pp2695-2740
[23]La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrew Shleifer and robert W. Vishny.2002
[24]Denis, Diane K and John J. McConnell.2003. Intemational Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,38(1),1-36
[25]Elizabeth A. Gordon, Elaine Henry and Darius Palia Related Party Transactions:Associations with Corporate Governance and Finn Value [J]. www.ssrn.comn,2004,8
[26]Maury, Benjamin and Anete Pajuste.2005. Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value. Journal of Banking and Finance,29(7),1813-1834
[27]La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny.1998
[28]Dyck, Alexander and Luigi Zingales.2004. Private Benefits of Control: an International Comparison. Journal of Finance,59(2):537-600
[29]Claessens S, Djankov S, Fan J, Lang E2002. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings. The Joumal of Finance, 57(6):2741-2771
[30]Bai, Chong-En, Qiao Liu, Joe Lu, Ming Song and Junxi Zhang。 2004. Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China. Journal of Comparative Economics,32(4):599-616
[31]Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling shareholders, working paper,2005
[32]段亚林.论大股东股权滥用及实例[M].经济管理出版社,2001年,146-151
[33]叶银华,柯承恩,李德冠.公司监理对于关系人交易的影响[R].辅仁大学金融研究所工作论文,2002
[34]唐宗明,奚俊芳,蒋位.大股东侵害小股东的原因及影响因素分析[J].上海交通大学学报,2003,4
[35]陈燕、廖冠民,大股东行为、公司治理与财务危机[J].当代财经,2006,第5期
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