影响大股东非经营性占资的因素研究
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摘要
关于大股东占资的现象在世界各地都有发生,目前我国证券市场上,大股东占资行为的现象比较普遍且尤其严重,大股东凭借自身在上市公司所拥有的控制权利,无偿对上市公司资金进行占用,侵害上市公司、中小股东以及债权人的利益的现象频频出现。
大股东对上市公司进行非经营性占资带来了严重的损害性。例如,大股东的控制地位很显著,在很大程度上比其他股东有优先获知信息的权利及优势,这样就为大股东占资带来便利条件,再者,大股东利用手段转移上市公司的资产为自己所用,这些行为在很大程度上对上市公司的经营业绩造成损害,而且还扰乱了证券市场的发展秩序等,因此对大股东占资行为的研究,及时有效地遏制大股东占资行为的发生是一个亟待解决的问题。
本文通过对大股东占资行为的研究,分析了大股东占资行为的影响因素,并通过实证分析方法进行相关性分析、回归分析,得出结论并对上市公司大股东占资行为的控制提出可行的建议。
论文的主要结构是:绪论部分阐述了研究的背景及选题意义、文献综述、研究的思路与方法、主要创新点。正文部分介绍了大股东占资的相关理论、论述了大股东非经营性占资的现状及影响大股东非经营性占资因素、对影响大股东占资行为的因素的进行实证分析、基于前面研究得出结论并提出建议。
本论文在实证部分主要分析了大股东持股比例、上市公司的董事会规模、大股东自身经营业绩、大股东的筹资渠道、上市公司的独立董事比例等对大股东非经营性占资的影响,通过对样本数据的分析,得出大股东持股比例、上市公司的董事会规模、大股东自身经营业绩、大股东的筹资渠道这几个因素都对大股东非经营性占资都有影响,而且得出大股东自身经营业绩、大股东的筹资渠道的影响程度相对比较显著。这些因素作为大股东非经营性占资的导火索,也是我们国家对大股东非经营性占资的遏制工作进行的重点方向。另外在关于政策法规方面,也要不断进行加强改善。论文的研究希望能够为进一步遏制大股东的占资行为,保护投资者和债权人及规范我国的证券市场提供一定的理论支持,有利于为进一步完善我国上市公司的治理结构做出贡献。
On the phenomenon of major shareholder's capital occupying is seen everywhere in the world,now in our country's securities market, Major Shareholder's Capital Occupying is more and more serious.About Listed companies in China, the major shareholders of listed companies to use their control of the position occupied by listed company funds,and damage the company, and encroach the interests of minority shareholders or creditors.
Major shareholders' capital occupying in listed companies must make a lot of harm .For example,the controlling shareholders use their control status or information superiority to invade and occupy the company, or transfer out the property and profits,dragging down the performance of listed companies, and undermine the basis of development of securities markets, as well as the large shareholder occupy the assets,damaged the normal operations of listed companies severely.Therefore, the study on the large shareholders' Capital Occupying in a timely and effective to curb
the incidence is an urgent need. Based on study of the major shareholders' capital occupying of listed companies in China,this paper analysis the factors of,by positive analysis and the correlation analysis,and get some advices to control major shareholder's non-business capital occupying.
The main structure of this paper:in the part of the introduction,it describes the background and significance of the topic,literature summary,research ideas and methods, and the innovation and the shortcomings.The major part introduce the theory about major shareholder's capital occupying, this part discusses situation and influencing factors of the major shareholders of listed companies capital occupying,and do positive analysis to influencing factors,and get the conclusion and give suggestion.
In the empirical part of this paper analysis the influence of major shareholding ratio,board size,and operating results of major shareholder,and financing channels,The proportion of independent directors to major shareholders' capital occupying.Through the analysis to the sample data , the proportion of large shareholders, board size, operating results of large shareholders , the company's sources of funding, these factors are to large shareholders to do a non-operating impact of capital account, Operating results, the company's funding sources relatively are more significant.As a major shareholder of these factors account for funding non-operating fuse, but also our largest shareholder of the state-owned non-operating accounts for the focus of the containment work direction. country also must improve the law and policy.The study hope to further curb the behavior of large shareholders occupying, protecting investors and creditors and standardizing China's securities market to provide some theoretical support, and to contribute to conducive to further improve the governance structure of listed companies in China.
大股东对上市公司进行非经营性占资带来了严重的损害性。例如,大股东的控制地位很显著,在很大程度上比其他股东有优先获知信息的权利及优势,这样就为大股东占资带来便利条件,再者,大股东利用手段转移上市公司的资产为自己所用,这些行为在很大程度上对上市公司的经营业绩造成损害,而且还扰乱了证券市场的发展秩序等,因此对大股东占资行为的研究,及时有效地遏制大股东占资行为的发生是一个亟待解决的问题。
本文通过对大股东占资行为的研究,分析了大股东占资行为的影响因素,并通过实证分析方法进行相关性分析、回归分析,得出结论并对上市公司大股东占资行为的控制提出可行的建议。
论文的主要结构是:绪论部分阐述了研究的背景及选题意义、文献综述、研究的思路与方法、主要创新点。正文部分介绍了大股东占资的相关理论、论述了大股东非经营性占资的现状及影响大股东非经营性占资因素、对影响大股东占资行为的因素的进行实证分析、基于前面研究得出结论并提出建议。
本论文在实证部分主要分析了大股东持股比例、上市公司的董事会规模、大股东自身经营业绩、大股东的筹资渠道、上市公司的独立董事比例等对大股东非经营性占资的影响,通过对样本数据的分析,得出大股东持股比例、上市公司的董事会规模、大股东自身经营业绩、大股东的筹资渠道这几个因素都对大股东非经营性占资都有影响,而且得出大股东自身经营业绩、大股东的筹资渠道的影响程度相对比较显著。这些因素作为大股东非经营性占资的导火索,也是我们国家对大股东非经营性占资的遏制工作进行的重点方向。另外在关于政策法规方面,也要不断进行加强改善。论文的研究希望能够为进一步遏制大股东的占资行为,保护投资者和债权人及规范我国的证券市场提供一定的理论支持,有利于为进一步完善我国上市公司的治理结构做出贡献。
On the phenomenon of major shareholder's capital occupying is seen everywhere in the world,now in our country's securities market, Major Shareholder's Capital Occupying is more and more serious.About Listed companies in China, the major shareholders of listed companies to use their control of the position occupied by listed company funds,and damage the company, and encroach the interests of minority shareholders or creditors.
Major shareholders' capital occupying in listed companies must make a lot of harm .For example,the controlling shareholders use their control status or information superiority to invade and occupy the company, or transfer out the property and profits,dragging down the performance of listed companies, and undermine the basis of development of securities markets, as well as the large shareholder occupy the assets,damaged the normal operations of listed companies severely.Therefore, the study on the large shareholders' Capital Occupying in a timely and effective to curb
the incidence is an urgent need. Based on study of the major shareholders' capital occupying of listed companies in China,this paper analysis the factors of,by positive analysis and the correlation analysis,and get some advices to control major shareholder's non-business capital occupying.
The main structure of this paper:in the part of the introduction,it describes the background and significance of the topic,literature summary,research ideas and methods, and the innovation and the shortcomings.The major part introduce the theory about major shareholder's capital occupying, this part discusses situation and influencing factors of the major shareholders of listed companies capital occupying,and do positive analysis to influencing factors,and get the conclusion and give suggestion.
In the empirical part of this paper analysis the influence of major shareholding ratio,board size,and operating results of major shareholder,and financing channels,The proportion of independent directors to major shareholders' capital occupying.Through the analysis to the sample data , the proportion of large shareholders, board size, operating results of large shareholders , the company's sources of funding, these factors are to large shareholders to do a non-operating impact of capital account, Operating results, the company's funding sources relatively are more significant.As a major shareholder of these factors account for funding non-operating fuse, but also our largest shareholder of the state-owned non-operating accounts for the focus of the containment work direction. country also must improve the law and policy.The study hope to further curb the behavior of large shareholders occupying, protecting investors and creditors and standardizing China's securities market to provide some theoretical support, and to contribute to conducive to further improve the governance structure of listed companies in China.
引文
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③Buysschaert,Marc Deloof,Marc Jegers.Equity sales in Belgian corporate groups:expropriation of minority shareholders .The Journal of Corporate Finance,2004,(10):81-103
①CheungY.L.,P.R.Rau,and A.Stouraitis.Tunneling,Propping and Expropriation-Evidence from Connected Party Transactions in Hong Kong.Working paper,http://www.ssrn.com,2005
②何浚.上市公司治理结构的实证分析[J].经济研究,1998(05):50-57
③吴斌,翁恺宁.基于控制权收益的大股东与公司治理关系分析:文献综述[J].世界经济文汇.2005(02):71-78
④张秀梅.非公允关联交易的必然性、可能性与监管思路[J].财会通讯,2004(03):46-48
⑤林朝南,李玉宝,陶友会.控股股东利益转移及其防范机制分析[J].工业技术经济,2005(06)
⑥姜国华,岳衡.大股东占用上市公司资金与上市公司股票回报率关系的研究[J].管理世界,2005,(9):119-126
①李增泉,孙铮和王志伟.掏空与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验数据[J].会计研究,2004(12):3-14
②江东瀚.股权结构对非经营性资金占用影响的实证分析—民营上市公司与国有上市公司的比较[J].海南金融,2006,(11)
③叶康涛,陆正飞和张志华.独立董事能否抑制大股东的“掏空”[J].经济研究,2007,(4):101-111
④黎来芳,王化成和张伟华.控制权、资金占用与掏空—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2008,(8):121-127
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②Grossman,S.J,OD,Hart.One share-one vote and the market for corporate control[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:175-202
③Shleifer,Andrei and Robert Vishny.A survey of corporate governance,Journal of Finance,1997,52:737-783
①Laporta,R.,F.,Lopez-De-Silanes,A.,Shleifer,R.W.,Vishny.Corporate Ownership around the World[J].Journal of Political Economy,1998,106:1113-1155
②Johnson S,La Porta R,Lopezde Silanes F,et al.Tunneling[J].American Economic Review,2000, 90:22-27
③Buysschaert,Marc Deloof,Marc Jegers.Equity sales in Belgian corporate groups:expropriation of minority shareholders .The Journal of Corporate Finance,2004,(10):81-103
①CheungY.L.,P.R.Rau,and A.Stouraitis.Tunneling,Propping and Expropriation-Evidence from Connected Party Transactions in Hong Kong.Working paper,http://www.ssrn.com,2005
②何浚.上市公司治理结构的实证分析[J].经济研究,1998(05):50-57
③吴斌,翁恺宁.基于控制权收益的大股东与公司治理关系分析:文献综述[J].世界经济文汇.2005(02):71-78
④张秀梅.非公允关联交易的必然性、可能性与监管思路[J].财会通讯,2004(03):46-48
⑤林朝南,李玉宝,陶友会.控股股东利益转移及其防范机制分析[J].工业技术经济,2005(06)
⑥姜国华,岳衡.大股东占用上市公司资金与上市公司股票回报率关系的研究[J].管理世界,2005,(9):119-126
①李增泉,孙铮和王志伟.掏空与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验数据[J].会计研究,2004(12):3-14
②江东瀚.股权结构对非经营性资金占用影响的实证分析—民营上市公司与国有上市公司的比较[J].海南金融,2006,(11)
③叶康涛,陆正飞和张志华.独立董事能否抑制大股东的“掏空”[J].经济研究,2007,(4):101-111
④黎来芳,王化成和张伟华.控制权、资金占用与掏空—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2008,(8):121-127
[1] Bertrand,M.,Mehta,P.& Mullainathan,S.Ferreting out Tunneling:An Application to Indian Business Groups[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 117(1): 121-148
[2] Buysschaert,Marc Deloof & Marc Jegers.Equity sales in Belgian corporate groups:expropriation of minority shareholders[J]. The Journal of Corporate Finance, 2004,(10):81-103
[3] Chang,S.J. & J.Hong.Economic performance of group-affiliated companies in Korea:intra group resources sharing and internal business transaction[J].Academy of Management Journal,2000,43(3):429-448
[4] Cheung Y.L.,P.R.Rau,&A.Stouraitis.Tunneling,Propping and Expropriation- Evidence from Connected Party Transactions in Hong Kong[J].Working paper, http://www.ssrn.com,2005
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