全流通背景下上市公司大股东占款行为研究
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摘要
我国资本市场既正处于经济转轨阶段，也处于一个矛盾的凸显期，即我国资本市场还不成熟。证劵市场的不断完善和发展推动了国民经济不断向前发展，它的不断发展与完善为我国经济的发展发挥了积极作用。但是，由于制度背景等因素造成了我国资本市场上仍有不少不和谐的因素，这些因素的存在严重制约了资本市场的发展。如：本文所研究的主题——上市公司大股东占款问题。它是长期存在资本市场上的一颗“毒瘤”，严重阻碍了资本市场的健康发展。上市公司大股东占款问题得不到解决，广大中小股东利益就得不到保护。投资者对资本市场失去信心，就会影响资本市场各项功能及效率的发挥。以往的研究往往是在股权分置的背景下，以控制权溢价为切入点，认为我国上市公司内部存在大额的控制权溢价，损害了中小股东的利益。本文正是从一个新的背景——全流通，以上海证劵交易所、深圳证劵交易所上市并存在大股东占款行为的公司为例，采用大股东占款率为切入点来揭示大股东占款问题的严重性，从而提出中小股东的利益亟需保护。
随着股权分置改革的不断推进，我国资本市场逐步迈入全流通时代，即逐步摆脱因流通股与非流通股股权分置而导致的他们利益分置的局面。随着2010年11月8日中国石油的1579.22亿股限售股的解禁，沪市流通市值接近总市值的80%，宣告沪深股市正式迈入全流通时代。全流通时代的到来给不完善的资本市场打了一次“镇定剂”，非流通股股东通过支付一定对价获得流通权。因此，全流通的到来将逐步解决股权分置带来的各种弊端。大股东通过挪用等直接方式侵占广大中小股东的利益的局面将得以缓解。但是，股改是一项长期、艰巨的系统工程，目前资本市场刚基本实现全流通，股改还需进一步推进，我国上市公司股权结构中的“一股独大”的局面未得以缓解。上市公司存在严重的“内部人控制”现象。大股东通过关联方交易、资产的非法抵押等更加隐秘、间接的方式侵占中小股东的利益。近几年，资本市场上不断爆出上市公司挪用、非法占用大额资金，使上市公司陷入财务困境，不少看似经营状况良好的上市公司却因此面临停牌、退市的风险。这严重动摇了中小投资者的信心，不利于资本市场的有效运行。因此，全流通背景下，基于股东利益保护的视角，通过分析大股东占款的形式和流程、形成机制及危害等方面分析大股东占款问题的严重性，并为新时期大股东占款问题的解决、中小股东利益保护水平的提高提出有效对策及建议。
本文在现有研究的基础上，笔者以我国上市公司为研究对象，结合全流通背景，从股东利益保护的角度来研究大股东占款行为。在理论上，本文在相关理论的基础上，对全流通背景前后大股东与中小股东利益的异质进行对比分析，发现全流通并没有根本改变股东谋利倾向。正是由于大股东动机未改，才会通过大股东占款的方式为自身谋取利益。通过分析大股东占款的模式的基础上，本文进一步论述了大股东占款的原因及危害。在实证研究部分主要是通过数量角度分析大股东占款的存在及危害性。实证分析主要是在相关研究假设的基础上选取沪深交易所2002年至2010年存在大股东占款的上市公司为研究样本，剔除缺失样本后，共计4751个全样本。通过借助Eviews3.1软件，从股权结构、股权流通性及公司规模三个方面进行研究。实证分析首先构建简单回归模型，从第一大股东的持股比例及第二大至第十大股东持股比例的角度研究股权结构对大股东的影响。由于第一大股东持股比例的高低及股权分置改革可能会对大股东占款行为产生影响，因此本文将第一大股东比例为50%和实行股权分置改革的2005年为分界点来进行分段研究。在简单回归分析的基础上，本文通过构建多元回归分析，从股权流通性、股权结构及公司规模三个方面进行研究。通过对回归结果进行t检验的基础上得到以下几个结论：一、我国上市公司存在着严重的大股东占款问题；二、大股东占款与第一大股东持股比例呈现倒“U”型关系；三、股东间互相制衡效果越明显，大股东占款行为也就能得到控制；四、股权分置改革的实施对大股东占款问题的解决提供了有利的政策环境；五、大股东持股股本性质也对大股东占款行为产生影响。
最后在相关理论分析及实证研究结论的基础上，再结合我国特殊的国情以及资本市场的实际情况，提出了相应的建议：一、建立对大股东权力的制衡机制，完善公司治理结构；二、完善相关法律法规规定，加大违法成本；三、加强信息披露，加大对虚假信息披露的惩罚和监管；四、加大对大股东控制权的补偿机制。
Chinese capital market is not only in the phase of economic transition,but also ina stage of highlighting contradiction,in other words, Chinese capital market is stillimmature. Securities market’s improvements and promotions are pushing forward thedevelopment of national economy. It is playing an active role in the developmentChinese economic.However,because the institutional background and other factors,there are still a lot of disharmonious factors in Chinese capital market, these factorshas seriously hampered the development of capital markets. For example, the themeof this study is the problem of the largest shareholder of listed companies occupyingfunds. It is a "cancer" long-term existence on the capital market, it seriouslyimpediment the healthy development of capital markets. If the problem of largestshareholder of listed companies occupying funds remains unresolved, the middle andsmall shareholders' interests can not protected well. If investors lost confidence, it willaffect the exertion of the function and efficiency of capital markets. Previous studiesare in the background of the split share structure, with control premium as the startingpoint that Chinese listed companies exist large control premium. It damages theinterests of small shareholders. This article is in a new background that is circulation.This study will take some listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange or inShenzhen Securities Exchange for example from the rate of occupying funds of largeshareholder to reveal large shareholders' occupying funds seriousness of the problem,which put forward the interests of small shareholders in need of protection.
With the continuous advance of the split share structure reform, Chinese capitalmarket gradually entered circulation times. That is to say, Chinese capital marketgradually deals with different interests because of split situation of circle shares andnon-circle shares. November 8, 2010, with the lifting of the ban of 1579.22 hundredmillion restricted shares, the circle market capitalization of Shanghai stock market andShenzhen stock market nearly 80% of the total market value, declaring the Shanghaiand Shenzhen stock market has officially entered into circulation times. Circulationtimes of arrival plays a "downer" to imperfect capital markets. Non-circleshareholders pay a certain price to get the circulation right. Therefore, the arrival ofcirculation will gradually solve all the disadvantages of the split share structure. Thesituation of the largest shareholder encroaches the middle and small shareholders'interests by misappropriation and other direct occupation will alleviated. However,the share reform is long-term, arduous system engineering; the current capital market has just the basic realization of circulation, the share reform needed to further advance,due to the dominance of the situation in the ownership structure of listed companies inChina is not alleviated. There is a serious phenomenon of "internal control" in listedcompanies. Large shareholders encroach minority shareholders' interest by moresecret or indirect occupation. In recent years, the capital markets continue to burstmisappropriate or illegal occupation of large sums of money. This will let the listedcompanies fall in financial trouble. Some listed companies which seemingly operatingin good condition are facing suspension and the risk of delisting. This has seriouslyshaken the confidence of small investors and will not conducive to the effectiveoperation of capital markets. Therefore, under the background of circulation and theperspective of the protection of the interests of shareholders, by analyzing largeShareholders of forms, processes, the formation mechanism and hazards of occupyingfunds to reveal the seriousness of occupying funds. Then put forward effectivecountermeasures and suggestions to the solution of occupying funds and raising thelevel of the interests of minority shareholders protection.
On the basis of existing research, this artic uses Chinese listed companies asresearch, combined with the circulation background and from the perspective ofprotection of the interests of shareholders to study large Shareholders of behavior. Intheory, on the basis of the relevant theory, analyze the heterogeneity of the largeshareholder and minority shareholders' interests before and after the circulationbackground and found there is no fundamental change in shareholders' profittendencies. It is because that the motivation of seeking benefits of the largeshareholders unchanged. By analysis of large shareholders on the basis of paragraphmode, this paper discusses the causes and hazards of the big shareholders. In theempirical research part, I will analyze the existence and dangers of the bigshareholders by the number of point of view. The empirical analysis is mainlyselected base on the year of 2002 to 2010,the existence of large shareholdersoccupying funds in listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange forthe research sample, after excluding missing samples, a total of 4751 samples. Thisarticle will from three respects of ownership structure, equity liquidity and companysize by Eviews3.1 software. The empirical analysis first build a simple regressionmodel to study the impact of the ownership structure of large shareholders, from theperspective of the largest shareholding ratio and the second largest to tenth largestshareholder stake. As the level of the largest proportion of shareholding and equity division reform might be the impact of big shareholders of behavior, this article willbe the largest shareholder of the proportion of 50% and implementation of the splitshare structure reform in 2005 as a dividing point segmentation study. On the basis ofsimple regression analysis, by constructing multiple regression analysis, the studyfrom the equity liquidity, ownership structure and company size in three aspects. Byt-test on the regression results based on the following conclusions: first, there is aserious problem in Chinese listed companies that's occupying fund. second,occupying fund. is in the proportion of inverted U-section with the largest shareholderrelationship in Chinese listed companies; third, the more obvious effects in checksand balances between shareholders, the more big shareholders of behavior will also beable to be controlled; fourth the implementation of the split share structure reformprovided a favorable policy environment for the solution of the big shareholders; fifththe nature of large shareholders equity affects the behavior of big shareholders.
Finally, on the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical findings, combinedwith the actual situation of Chinese specific national conditions and capital markets,then point some corresponding recommendations: first, establish checks and balanceson the power of the largest shareholder and improve corporate governance structure;second, improve the relevant laws and regulations and increase the cost of illegal;third, strengthen information disclosure, and increase the punishment for falseinformation disclosure and regulatory; fourth, increase the compensation mechanismof the controlling shareholder.
随着股权分置改革的不断推进，我国资本市场逐步迈入全流通时代，即逐步摆脱因流通股与非流通股股权分置而导致的他们利益分置的局面。随着2010年11月8日中国石油的1579.22亿股限售股的解禁，沪市流通市值接近总市值的80%，宣告沪深股市正式迈入全流通时代。全流通时代的到来给不完善的资本市场打了一次“镇定剂”，非流通股股东通过支付一定对价获得流通权。因此，全流通的到来将逐步解决股权分置带来的各种弊端。大股东通过挪用等直接方式侵占广大中小股东的利益的局面将得以缓解。但是，股改是一项长期、艰巨的系统工程，目前资本市场刚基本实现全流通，股改还需进一步推进，我国上市公司股权结构中的“一股独大”的局面未得以缓解。上市公司存在严重的“内部人控制”现象。大股东通过关联方交易、资产的非法抵押等更加隐秘、间接的方式侵占中小股东的利益。近几年，资本市场上不断爆出上市公司挪用、非法占用大额资金，使上市公司陷入财务困境，不少看似经营状况良好的上市公司却因此面临停牌、退市的风险。这严重动摇了中小投资者的信心，不利于资本市场的有效运行。因此，全流通背景下，基于股东利益保护的视角，通过分析大股东占款的形式和流程、形成机制及危害等方面分析大股东占款问题的严重性，并为新时期大股东占款问题的解决、中小股东利益保护水平的提高提出有效对策及建议。
本文在现有研究的基础上，笔者以我国上市公司为研究对象，结合全流通背景，从股东利益保护的角度来研究大股东占款行为。在理论上，本文在相关理论的基础上，对全流通背景前后大股东与中小股东利益的异质进行对比分析，发现全流通并没有根本改变股东谋利倾向。正是由于大股东动机未改，才会通过大股东占款的方式为自身谋取利益。通过分析大股东占款的模式的基础上，本文进一步论述了大股东占款的原因及危害。在实证研究部分主要是通过数量角度分析大股东占款的存在及危害性。实证分析主要是在相关研究假设的基础上选取沪深交易所2002年至2010年存在大股东占款的上市公司为研究样本，剔除缺失样本后，共计4751个全样本。通过借助Eviews3.1软件，从股权结构、股权流通性及公司规模三个方面进行研究。实证分析首先构建简单回归模型，从第一大股东的持股比例及第二大至第十大股东持股比例的角度研究股权结构对大股东的影响。由于第一大股东持股比例的高低及股权分置改革可能会对大股东占款行为产生影响，因此本文将第一大股东比例为50%和实行股权分置改革的2005年为分界点来进行分段研究。在简单回归分析的基础上，本文通过构建多元回归分析，从股权流通性、股权结构及公司规模三个方面进行研究。通过对回归结果进行t检验的基础上得到以下几个结论：一、我国上市公司存在着严重的大股东占款问题；二、大股东占款与第一大股东持股比例呈现倒“U”型关系；三、股东间互相制衡效果越明显，大股东占款行为也就能得到控制；四、股权分置改革的实施对大股东占款问题的解决提供了有利的政策环境；五、大股东持股股本性质也对大股东占款行为产生影响。
最后在相关理论分析及实证研究结论的基础上，再结合我国特殊的国情以及资本市场的实际情况，提出了相应的建议：一、建立对大股东权力的制衡机制，完善公司治理结构；二、完善相关法律法规规定，加大违法成本；三、加强信息披露，加大对虚假信息披露的惩罚和监管；四、加大对大股东控制权的补偿机制。
Chinese capital market is not only in the phase of economic transition,but also ina stage of highlighting contradiction,in other words, Chinese capital market is stillimmature. Securities market’s improvements and promotions are pushing forward thedevelopment of national economy. It is playing an active role in the developmentChinese economic.However,because the institutional background and other factors,there are still a lot of disharmonious factors in Chinese capital market, these factorshas seriously hampered the development of capital markets. For example, the themeof this study is the problem of the largest shareholder of listed companies occupyingfunds. It is a "cancer" long-term existence on the capital market, it seriouslyimpediment the healthy development of capital markets. If the problem of largestshareholder of listed companies occupying funds remains unresolved, the middle andsmall shareholders' interests can not protected well. If investors lost confidence, it willaffect the exertion of the function and efficiency of capital markets. Previous studiesare in the background of the split share structure, with control premium as the startingpoint that Chinese listed companies exist large control premium. It damages theinterests of small shareholders. This article is in a new background that is circulation.This study will take some listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange or inShenzhen Securities Exchange for example from the rate of occupying funds of largeshareholder to reveal large shareholders' occupying funds seriousness of the problem,which put forward the interests of small shareholders in need of protection.
With the continuous advance of the split share structure reform, Chinese capitalmarket gradually entered circulation times. That is to say, Chinese capital marketgradually deals with different interests because of split situation of circle shares andnon-circle shares. November 8, 2010, with the lifting of the ban of 1579.22 hundredmillion restricted shares, the circle market capitalization of Shanghai stock market andShenzhen stock market nearly 80% of the total market value, declaring the Shanghaiand Shenzhen stock market has officially entered into circulation times. Circulationtimes of arrival plays a "downer" to imperfect capital markets. Non-circleshareholders pay a certain price to get the circulation right. Therefore, the arrival ofcirculation will gradually solve all the disadvantages of the split share structure. Thesituation of the largest shareholder encroaches the middle and small shareholders'interests by misappropriation and other direct occupation will alleviated. However,the share reform is long-term, arduous system engineering; the current capital market has just the basic realization of circulation, the share reform needed to further advance,due to the dominance of the situation in the ownership structure of listed companies inChina is not alleviated. There is a serious phenomenon of "internal control" in listedcompanies. Large shareholders encroach minority shareholders' interest by moresecret or indirect occupation. In recent years, the capital markets continue to burstmisappropriate or illegal occupation of large sums of money. This will let the listedcompanies fall in financial trouble. Some listed companies which seemingly operatingin good condition are facing suspension and the risk of delisting. This has seriouslyshaken the confidence of small investors and will not conducive to the effectiveoperation of capital markets. Therefore, under the background of circulation and theperspective of the protection of the interests of shareholders, by analyzing largeShareholders of forms, processes, the formation mechanism and hazards of occupyingfunds to reveal the seriousness of occupying funds. Then put forward effectivecountermeasures and suggestions to the solution of occupying funds and raising thelevel of the interests of minority shareholders protection.
On the basis of existing research, this artic uses Chinese listed companies asresearch, combined with the circulation background and from the perspective ofprotection of the interests of shareholders to study large Shareholders of behavior. Intheory, on the basis of the relevant theory, analyze the heterogeneity of the largeshareholder and minority shareholders' interests before and after the circulationbackground and found there is no fundamental change in shareholders' profittendencies. It is because that the motivation of seeking benefits of the largeshareholders unchanged. By analysis of large shareholders on the basis of paragraphmode, this paper discusses the causes and hazards of the big shareholders. In theempirical research part, I will analyze the existence and dangers of the bigshareholders by the number of point of view. The empirical analysis is mainlyselected base on the year of 2002 to 2010,the existence of large shareholdersoccupying funds in listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange forthe research sample, after excluding missing samples, a total of 4751 samples. Thisarticle will from three respects of ownership structure, equity liquidity and companysize by Eviews3.1 software. The empirical analysis first build a simple regressionmodel to study the impact of the ownership structure of large shareholders, from theperspective of the largest shareholding ratio and the second largest to tenth largestshareholder stake. As the level of the largest proportion of shareholding and equity division reform might be the impact of big shareholders of behavior, this article willbe the largest shareholder of the proportion of 50% and implementation of the splitshare structure reform in 2005 as a dividing point segmentation study. On the basis ofsimple regression analysis, by constructing multiple regression analysis, the studyfrom the equity liquidity, ownership structure and company size in three aspects. Byt-test on the regression results based on the following conclusions: first, there is aserious problem in Chinese listed companies that's occupying fund. second,occupying fund. is in the proportion of inverted U-section with the largest shareholderrelationship in Chinese listed companies; third, the more obvious effects in checksand balances between shareholders, the more big shareholders of behavior will also beable to be controlled; fourth the implementation of the split share structure reformprovided a favorable policy environment for the solution of the big shareholders; fifththe nature of large shareholders equity affects the behavior of big shareholders.
Finally, on the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical findings, combinedwith the actual situation of Chinese specific national conditions and capital markets,then point some corresponding recommendations: first, establish checks and balanceson the power of the largest shareholder and improve corporate governance structure;second, improve the relevant laws and regulations and increase the cost of illegal;third, strengthen information disclosure, and increase the punishment for falseinformation disclosure and regulatory; fourth, increase the compensation mechanismof the controlling shareholder.
引文
1申尊焕.中国上市公司大股东治理的理论和实证研究[M].北京:中国经济出版社，2009.
1王松华，杨晨.我国上市公司大股东占款问题研究[M].成都：西南财经大学出版社，2007.
1丁慧.我国上市公司中小股东权益保护研究[M].山西财经大学硕士学位论文,2007.
2王松华，杨晨.我国上市公司大股东占款问题研究[M].成都：西南财经大学出版社，2007.
1王松华，杨晨.我国上市公司大股东占款问题研究[M].成都：西南财经大学出版社，2007.
1杨松，王婧，王立彦.股东之间利益冲突研究——根源、作用和治理[M].北京：北京大学出版社，2007.
1汪裕川.公司治理、大股东资金占用与相关信息发现——基于莲花味精的案例研究[M].厦门大学硕士学位论文，2009
1惠男男.我国上市公司大股东资金占用问题研究[D].杭州：浙江大学管理学院，2004.
1惠男男.我国上市公司大股东资金占用问题研究[D].杭州：浙江大学管理学院，2004.
2惠男男.我国上市公司大股东资金占用问题研究[D].杭州：浙江大学管理学院，2004.
1惠男男.我国上市公司大股东资金占用问题研究[D].杭州：浙江大学管理学院，2004.
1东云.我国上市公司大股东占款问题的实证研究[M].山东农业大学硕士学位论文,2008
1侯晓红.我国上市公司大股东占款行为研究[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社.2009.
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1王松华，杨晨.我国上市公司大股东占款问题研究[M].成都：西南财经大学出版社，2007.
1丁慧.我国上市公司中小股东权益保护研究[M].山西财经大学硕士学位论文,2007.
2王松华，杨晨.我国上市公司大股东占款问题研究[M].成都：西南财经大学出版社，2007.
1王松华，杨晨.我国上市公司大股东占款问题研究[M].成都：西南财经大学出版社，2007.
1杨松，王婧，王立彦.股东之间利益冲突研究——根源、作用和治理[M].北京：北京大学出版社，2007.
1汪裕川.公司治理、大股东资金占用与相关信息发现——基于莲花味精的案例研究[M].厦门大学硕士学位论文，2009
1惠男男.我国上市公司大股东资金占用问题研究[D].杭州：浙江大学管理学院，2004.
1惠男男.我国上市公司大股东资金占用问题研究[D].杭州：浙江大学管理学院，2004.
2惠男男.我国上市公司大股东资金占用问题研究[D].杭州：浙江大学管理学院，2004.
1惠男男.我国上市公司大股东资金占用问题研究[D].杭州：浙江大学管理学院，2004.
1东云.我国上市公司大股东占款问题的实证研究[M].山东农业大学硕士学位论文,2008
1侯晓红.我国上市公司大股东占款行为研究[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社.2009.
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[22]傅欣.我国上市公司治理中的中小投资者保护问题研究[D].武汉：华中科技大学，2007.
[23]李庆玲.不同改制模式下控股股东掏空行为的实证研究[D].长沙：湖南大学会计学院，2008.
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[26]王敬党.控股股东资金占用行为与上市公司价值研究[D].沈阳工业大学管理学院，2008.
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[28]杨涛.全流通环境下中小投资者利益保护——基于市场势力非均衡的机制设计[D].天津：天津财经大学理工学院，2009.
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[35]甘培忠.公司控制权的正当行使[M].北京：法律出版社，2006.
[36]何丹.全流通背景下上市公司股权再融资研究——基于控制权的解释与证据[M].成都：西南财经大学出版,2009.
[37]Claessens,S.,Djankov,s.,Fan,J.P.H.,Lang,L.Disentangling theIncentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings[J].Journal ofFinance,2002.
[38] http://news.163.com/10/0529/00/67QHNVPV00014AED.html