产业组织理论视角下的我国银行业进入博弈分析
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摘要
在产业组织理论中,“市场进入”指的是企业受利益诱导,以其所拥有的资本、劳动或技术等要素资源,在不同市场、地域或行业之间的转移。当前,我国银行改革的一个重要方面就是放松银行业进入的管制。引入外资的目的,是为了提高国有银行内部管理水平、引进先进的管理与金融产品创新、引进现代管理人才等。但外资银行进入的目的并不是将先进的管理与产品引入中资银行,而是要追求利益最大化,这就要求我们对外资应该辨证、全面地分析研究。在经济金融全球化以及我国经济高速发展的大背景下,经济市场化过程中发育出来的民间力量对融资的需求,也对银行业的改革起到了推动作用。
银行业的市场进入对我国的银行业改革乃至整个经济体制改革的推进都具有重要的影响。在近几年的产业组织研究中,博弈论已经成为研究市场进入问题的重要方法,本文在产业组织理论基础之上,运用博弈论的研究方法,对我国银行业的市场进入进行系统、动态的分析。论文将一些经典博弈模型与我国银行业市场进入的博弈行为相结合,对我国银行业的市场进入博弈行为分为“进入时、进入后”两阶段进行分析,在研究“进入时”的博弈行为时,作者主要分析了“进入一容纳”博弈。认为我国政府在设置银行业市场进入壁垒时,太高或太低都不可能使全社会整体效益最大化,即银行业的开放应该是“适度”的,要考虑到我国银行业的承受能力,控制好放开市场进入的速度和力度。在外资进入我国银行业后用产品差异化模型和重复博弈模型分析了内资银行和外资银行的竞合关系。对于以民间资本为主而成立的民营银行,对其准入进行了分析。最后在整个经济发展的框架内,提出了对国有银行、民营银行、尤其政府有针对性的建议。
In the theory of industry organization,the market entry means with benefit induction,the possession of factor resource,such as capital,labor,technical etc, enterprises transfer between different market、region or industry.Presently,an important aspect of China's bank reform is to relax the control in banking industry.The purpose of the foreign investment introduction is to improve the internal management in the state-owned banks and to introduce the advanced management,the innovation of financial products and the talants of medern management.But the purpose of the foreign bank's entry is to pursue benefit maximization instead of introducing the advanced management and products to chinese funded banks,so we should have a dialectical and comprehensive analysis on foreign investment.In the context of the econimic and financial globalisation and China's rapid economic development,the demands of the folk strength for fianacing which growing from the process of market oriented are also promoting the reform of bank.
The market entry of bank industry has an important influence on China's bank reform even the promotion for the reform of the whole economic syetem.In research of recent years on the industrial organiszation,the Game Theroy has already became an important method for the market entry issue.This article is based on the theory of industrial organization with using the research methed of the Game Theroy to systemic dynamic analysis on the market entry in China's bank industry.The thesis combines the classic game model with the game behavior of the market entry in Chian's bank industry,and to analyse the game behavior of the market entry in China's banking industry in two stages,the time of entry,and after entering.At the research of the game behavior at the time of entry,the author gives the main analysis of the entry-contain game.It is thought that when government set up barriers against the market entry in banking industry,it can't be too high or too low for maximizing the benefits of the whole society.So the open of the banking industry should be moderate,it should be accord with the affordability of China's banking industry,and control the speed and efforts of the liberallisation of market entry.After the entry of foreign investment to China's banking industry,it analyse the competitive cooperative relationship between the domestic banks and foreign banks with the product differentiation model and the repeated game model.For private banks which established most on private capital,the thesis gives analysis on its admittance.At last,in the whole frame of economic development,the thesis puts forward the targeted proposals to the state-owned banks,the private banks and even the govemment.
银行业的市场进入对我国的银行业改革乃至整个经济体制改革的推进都具有重要的影响。在近几年的产业组织研究中,博弈论已经成为研究市场进入问题的重要方法,本文在产业组织理论基础之上,运用博弈论的研究方法,对我国银行业的市场进入进行系统、动态的分析。论文将一些经典博弈模型与我国银行业市场进入的博弈行为相结合,对我国银行业的市场进入博弈行为分为“进入时、进入后”两阶段进行分析,在研究“进入时”的博弈行为时,作者主要分析了“进入一容纳”博弈。认为我国政府在设置银行业市场进入壁垒时,太高或太低都不可能使全社会整体效益最大化,即银行业的开放应该是“适度”的,要考虑到我国银行业的承受能力,控制好放开市场进入的速度和力度。在外资进入我国银行业后用产品差异化模型和重复博弈模型分析了内资银行和外资银行的竞合关系。对于以民间资本为主而成立的民营银行,对其准入进行了分析。最后在整个经济发展的框架内,提出了对国有银行、民营银行、尤其政府有针对性的建议。
In the theory of industry organization,the market entry means with benefit induction,the possession of factor resource,such as capital,labor,technical etc, enterprises transfer between different market、region or industry.Presently,an important aspect of China's bank reform is to relax the control in banking industry.The purpose of the foreign investment introduction is to improve the internal management in the state-owned banks and to introduce the advanced management,the innovation of financial products and the talants of medern management.But the purpose of the foreign bank's entry is to pursue benefit maximization instead of introducing the advanced management and products to chinese funded banks,so we should have a dialectical and comprehensive analysis on foreign investment.In the context of the econimic and financial globalisation and China's rapid economic development,the demands of the folk strength for fianacing which growing from the process of market oriented are also promoting the reform of bank.
The market entry of bank industry has an important influence on China's bank reform even the promotion for the reform of the whole economic syetem.In research of recent years on the industrial organiszation,the Game Theroy has already became an important method for the market entry issue.This article is based on the theory of industrial organization with using the research methed of the Game Theroy to systemic dynamic analysis on the market entry in China's bank industry.The thesis combines the classic game model with the game behavior of the market entry in Chian's bank industry,and to analyse the game behavior of the market entry in China's banking industry in two stages,the time of entry,and after entering.At the research of the game behavior at the time of entry,the author gives the main analysis of the entry-contain game.It is thought that when government set up barriers against the market entry in banking industry,it can't be too high or too low for maximizing the benefits of the whole society.So the open of the banking industry should be moderate,it should be accord with the affordability of China's banking industry,and control the speed and efforts of the liberallisation of market entry.After the entry of foreign investment to China's banking industry,it analyse the competitive cooperative relationship between the domestic banks and foreign banks with the product differentiation model and the repeated game model.For private banks which established most on private capital,the thesis gives analysis on its admittance.At last,in the whole frame of economic development,the thesis puts forward the targeted proposals to the state-owned banks,the private banks and even the govemment.
引文
[1]厉以宁.民营资本进入银行的四大途径[J].经济研究参考,2002,71:18-19.
[2]杨晓光,卢授永.民营资本进入银行业--股权改造还是产权改造[J].金融究,2003,9:100-101.
[3]张杰.中国金融成长的经济分析[M].北京:中国经济出版社,1995.
[4]刘伟,黄桂田.中国银行业改革的侧重点:产权结构还是市场结构[J].经济研究,2002(8).
[5]吴凡,卢阳春.我国金融监管的帕累托改进[J].贵州财经学院学报,2002(2).
[6]江其务.论加入WTO后的中国金融发展问题[D],财贸经济.2002(3)
[7]黄宪、熊福平:[J]外资银行在中国发展的经营动机和经营策略分析《金融研究》2005年2期
[8]李长春.外资银行进入进程中的银行业适度保护(J).学术论坛,2006(11):
[9]泰勒尔.产业组织理论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,1997:400-462
[10]唐海燕.适度开放论[M].南昌:江西人民出版社,2000:.59-65.
[11]江叔夜,黄金老.当前在华外资银行的业务发展竞争战略分析[J].国际金融研究,2005(5).
[12]刘璞.国有商业银行股份制改造中的信息不对称及博弈分析.[J].金融理论与实践,2005(8)
[13]刘克逸.中国市场进入障碍问题研究[D]上海:复旦大学,2003.
[14]钱小安.金融民营化与金融基础设施建设-兼论发展民营金融的定位与对策[J],金融研究.2003(2)
[15]王稀 跨国银行进入中国决定因素的实证分析[J].金融研究,2005(8)
[16]王欣欣、张红梅.上海中外资银行竞争合作共同发展[J].中国金融2003(24)
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[18]张维迎.发展民营银行须打破垄断[J].当代经济,2002(12)
[19]朱.弗登博格,让.梯若尔.博弈论.[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2006:183-196219-223.
[20]施蒂格勒.产业组织和政府管制[M1.上海:上海人民出版社和上海三联书店:1994
[21]泰勒尔.产业组织理论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社:1997
[22]王自力.民营银行准入,目前还益缓行-兼与部分呼吁开放民营银行的同志商榷.金融研究,2002(11):79-86
[23]王聪、邹朋飞.中国商业银行规模经济与范围经济的实证分析[.17.中国工业经济,2003(10):21-28
[24]徐滇庆,巴曙松.我们呼唤什么样的民营银行[J].中国改革,2002,(10):24-26.
[25]樊纲.发展资本市场不能排斥民营银行[EB/OL].http://www.hermes.com.cn/newfile/20010327c.asp#7.
[26]曾康霖.民营银行:敏感而需要讨论的金融热点话题[J].财经论坛,2003,(1):48-51.
[27]张玉风.动态博弈与中国商业银行竞争策略[J].重庆工商大学学报,2005(6):28-31.
[28]方兰.博弈论模型在商业银行同质竞争中的应用[J].中国房地产金融,2005(5):14-17.
[29]姚洪兴,王海平.商业银行竞争博弈模型的复杂性分析[J].佳木斯大学学报,2007(2):287-290
[30]吴良刚,刘亚斌,郑红.银行业完全开放后我国商业银行与外资银行的竞争策略博弈分析[J]浙江工商大学学报,2008(3)0080-05.
[1]Aaditya Marron,Marcelo Olarreaga,Kamal saggi.Model of foreign entry,technologytransfer,and FDI policy[J].Journal of development economics,2004(75):95一川.
[2]Anderson,Erin M,Hubert Gatignon:Models of Foreign Entry:A Transaction Costs Analysisand Propositions[J].Journal of International Business Studies,1986,Fall:1-26.
[3]Andersen O:Internationalization and Market Entry Model:^Review of Theories andConceptual Framework[J].Management International Review,1997,27(2).
[4]Allen,F.and Gale,D."Competition and Financial Stability."Paper prepared for the WorldBank and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Project on Bank Concentration,2003.
[5]Beamish Paul W.,John C.Banks Equity joint ventures and the theory of the multinational enterprise[月.Journal of International Business Studies,1987,18:1-16
[6]Berger,A.N.and Humphrey,D.B."The Dominance of Inefficiencies over Scale and ProductMix Economies in Banking." Journal of Monetary Economics,1991,28(1),pp.117-148.
[7]Buchley P J,Casson Mark C The Future of the multinational enterprise[M].Macmillan,19?6
[8]Demirguc-Kunt,A.and Detragiache,E."The Determinants of Banking Crises:Evidencefrom Devel 叩 ing and Developed Countries."IMF working paper,106,1997.
[9]Allen N.Berger,Loretta J.Mester.Inside the Black Box:What Explains Difference in the Efficiencies of Financial Institutions?.Journal of Banking&Finance,1997,Vol.21:895-947
[10]Dixit.The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence.The Economic Journal.,1981,95-106
[11]Doris Neuberger.Industrial Organization of Banking:A Review.International Journal of the Economics of Business,1998,Vol.5(1):97-118
[12]George J.Benston,George GKaufman.The Appropriate Role of Bank Regulation.The Economic Journal,1996,Vol.106(436):688-697
[2]杨晓光,卢授永.民营资本进入银行业--股权改造还是产权改造[J].金融究,2003,9:100-101.
[3]张杰.中国金融成长的经济分析[M].北京:中国经济出版社,1995.
[4]刘伟,黄桂田.中国银行业改革的侧重点:产权结构还是市场结构[J].经济研究,2002(8).
[5]吴凡,卢阳春.我国金融监管的帕累托改进[J].贵州财经学院学报,2002(2).
[6]江其务.论加入WTO后的中国金融发展问题[D],财贸经济.2002(3)
[7]黄宪、熊福平:[J]外资银行在中国发展的经营动机和经营策略分析《金融研究》2005年2期
[8]李长春.外资银行进入进程中的银行业适度保护(J).学术论坛,2006(11):
[9]泰勒尔.产业组织理论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,1997:400-462
[10]唐海燕.适度开放论[M].南昌:江西人民出版社,2000:.59-65.
[11]江叔夜,黄金老.当前在华外资银行的业务发展竞争战略分析[J].国际金融研究,2005(5).
[12]刘璞.国有商业银行股份制改造中的信息不对称及博弈分析.[J].金融理论与实践,2005(8)
[13]刘克逸.中国市场进入障碍问题研究[D]上海:复旦大学,2003.
[14]钱小安.金融民营化与金融基础设施建设-兼论发展民营金融的定位与对策[J],金融研究.2003(2)
[15]王稀 跨国银行进入中国决定因素的实证分析[J].金融研究,2005(8)
[16]王欣欣、张红梅.上海中外资银行竞争合作共同发展[J].中国金融2003(24)
[17]于良春、鞠源.垄断与竞争:中国银行业的改革和发展[J].经济研究,1999(8)
[18]张维迎.发展民营银行须打破垄断[J].当代经济,2002(12)
[19]朱.弗登博格,让.梯若尔.博弈论.[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2006:183-196219-223.
[20]施蒂格勒.产业组织和政府管制[M1.上海:上海人民出版社和上海三联书店:1994
[21]泰勒尔.产业组织理论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社:1997
[22]王自力.民营银行准入,目前还益缓行-兼与部分呼吁开放民营银行的同志商榷.金融研究,2002(11):79-86
[23]王聪、邹朋飞.中国商业银行规模经济与范围经济的实证分析[.17.中国工业经济,2003(10):21-28
[24]徐滇庆,巴曙松.我们呼唤什么样的民营银行[J].中国改革,2002,(10):24-26.
[25]樊纲.发展资本市场不能排斥民营银行[EB/OL].http://www.hermes.com.cn/newfile/20010327c.asp#7.
[26]曾康霖.民营银行:敏感而需要讨论的金融热点话题[J].财经论坛,2003,(1):48-51.
[27]张玉风.动态博弈与中国商业银行竞争策略[J].重庆工商大学学报,2005(6):28-31.
[28]方兰.博弈论模型在商业银行同质竞争中的应用[J].中国房地产金融,2005(5):14-17.
[29]姚洪兴,王海平.商业银行竞争博弈模型的复杂性分析[J].佳木斯大学学报,2007(2):287-290
[30]吴良刚,刘亚斌,郑红.银行业完全开放后我国商业银行与外资银行的竞争策略博弈分析[J]浙江工商大学学报,2008(3)0080-05.
[1]Aaditya Marron,Marcelo Olarreaga,Kamal saggi.Model of foreign entry,technologytransfer,and FDI policy[J].Journal of development economics,2004(75):95一川.
[2]Anderson,Erin M,Hubert Gatignon:Models of Foreign Entry:A Transaction Costs Analysisand Propositions[J].Journal of International Business Studies,1986,Fall:1-26.
[3]Andersen O:Internationalization and Market Entry Model:^Review of Theories andConceptual Framework[J].Management International Review,1997,27(2).
[4]Allen,F.and Gale,D."Competition and Financial Stability."Paper prepared for the WorldBank and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Project on Bank Concentration,2003.
[5]Beamish Paul W.,John C.Banks Equity joint ventures and the theory of the multinational enterprise[月.Journal of International Business Studies,1987,18:1-16
[6]Berger,A.N.and Humphrey,D.B."The Dominance of Inefficiencies over Scale and ProductMix Economies in Banking." Journal of Monetary Economics,1991,28(1),pp.117-148.
[7]Buchley P J,Casson Mark C The Future of the multinational enterprise[M].Macmillan,19?6
[8]Demirguc-Kunt,A.and Detragiache,E."The Determinants of Banking Crises:Evidencefrom Devel 叩 ing and Developed Countries."IMF working paper,106,1997.
[9]Allen N.Berger,Loretta J.Mester.Inside the Black Box:What Explains Difference in the Efficiencies of Financial Institutions?.Journal of Banking&Finance,1997,Vol.21:895-947
[10]Dixit.The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence.The Economic Journal.,1981,95-106
[11]Doris Neuberger.Industrial Organization of Banking:A Review.International Journal of the Economics of Business,1998,Vol.5(1):97-118
[12]George J.Benston,George GKaufman.The Appropriate Role of Bank Regulation.The Economic Journal,1996,Vol.106(436):688-697