企业合作创新的模式选择和组织设计研究
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摘要
长期以来,合作创新就是一个企业家和经济学家都十分关心的问题。合作创新有许多好处,例如:可以使企业获得规模经济效应,避免重复性的研究投入,内部化研发的溢出效应,学到合作伙伴的专有技术,克服研发的成本障碍等等。这些已经成为人们的共识。
然而,合作创新也存在不少风险,大量的实证研究表明,大约50%的合作创新的结果被成员企业认为是不满意的或失败的。成员企业之间的信息不对称,创新的不确定性和复杂性和因此造成的合同不完全性,使道德风险和逆向选择问题在合作中普遍存在,如成员间相互“搭便车”,这些风险是合作创新失败的主要原因。经济学家对合作创新的早期研究主要关注企业的合作动机而不是组织问题,回答的是“为什么合作”的问题;现在,“怎样合作”不仅是企业家关心的问题,也成为学术界的研究热点之一。
“怎样合作”包括两大问题:一、合作创新的模式选择问题;二、特定模式下的组织设计问题。合作创新的模式选择是本文研究的核心问题。本文研究基于企业合作创新中这样的典型事实:国内外众多学者的实证研究发现,以交叉许可协议为代表的非产权形式的合作模式占绝大多数(70%左右),而合资研究企业为代表的产权形式的合作模式所占比例较小(30%左右)。具体来说,本文主要研究以下问题:
(1)合作创新中有哪些成本和风险?
(2)有哪些合作模式?为什么非产权形式的合作模式要更为流行?
(3)什么样的条件下,企业选择非产权形式的合作模式?什么样的条件下,选择产权形式的合作模式?有哪些重要的影响企业合作创新的模式选择的因素?
(4)特定的合作模式下如何进行合适的组织设计,比如合资企业的股权比例设计、交叉许可费的版权设计、研发外包的报酬支付方式等,从而使各
For a long time cooperative innovation has become an important problem that firmer and economists focus on. There are many benefits of cooperation, such as realizing scale of economy, avoiding duplication of research efforts, internalizing spillovers of technology, accessing to partners’know-how, overcoming cost of R&D barriers. The idea of cooperation is widely accept by people.
But firms face many risks during cooperative innovation. A number of empirical evidences show that half of cooperative innovations are unsuccessful. Because of asymmetric information between member firms, uncertainty and complexity of innovation and incomplete contract, moral hazard and adverse selection problems, such as free ride of member firms, are very common during cooperation. These risks are main reasons why cooperative innovation end up a failure.
In the early days economists focus on firms’cooperative motives and explore the problem of“why to cooperate”; now,“how to cooperate”becomes a hot problem of economists are interested in.
“How to cooperate”includes two main problems: firstly, selection of cooperative mode; Secondly, designation of organizational mechanism under certain cooperative mode. Selection of cooperative mode is the core problem we study in this paper. Our study based the stylized fact: considerable empirical studies find that non-equity cooperative mode such as technology cross-licensing agreements are more used than equity mode such as research joint ventures. We have the following specific problems to study:
然而,合作创新也存在不少风险,大量的实证研究表明,大约50%的合作创新的结果被成员企业认为是不满意的或失败的。成员企业之间的信息不对称,创新的不确定性和复杂性和因此造成的合同不完全性,使道德风险和逆向选择问题在合作中普遍存在,如成员间相互“搭便车”,这些风险是合作创新失败的主要原因。经济学家对合作创新的早期研究主要关注企业的合作动机而不是组织问题,回答的是“为什么合作”的问题;现在,“怎样合作”不仅是企业家关心的问题,也成为学术界的研究热点之一。
“怎样合作”包括两大问题:一、合作创新的模式选择问题;二、特定模式下的组织设计问题。合作创新的模式选择是本文研究的核心问题。本文研究基于企业合作创新中这样的典型事实:国内外众多学者的实证研究发现,以交叉许可协议为代表的非产权形式的合作模式占绝大多数(70%左右),而合资研究企业为代表的产权形式的合作模式所占比例较小(30%左右)。具体来说,本文主要研究以下问题:
(1)合作创新中有哪些成本和风险?
(2)有哪些合作模式?为什么非产权形式的合作模式要更为流行?
(3)什么样的条件下,企业选择非产权形式的合作模式?什么样的条件下,选择产权形式的合作模式?有哪些重要的影响企业合作创新的模式选择的因素?
(4)特定的合作模式下如何进行合适的组织设计,比如合资企业的股权比例设计、交叉许可费的版权设计、研发外包的报酬支付方式等,从而使各
For a long time cooperative innovation has become an important problem that firmer and economists focus on. There are many benefits of cooperation, such as realizing scale of economy, avoiding duplication of research efforts, internalizing spillovers of technology, accessing to partners’know-how, overcoming cost of R&D barriers. The idea of cooperation is widely accept by people.
But firms face many risks during cooperative innovation. A number of empirical evidences show that half of cooperative innovations are unsuccessful. Because of asymmetric information between member firms, uncertainty and complexity of innovation and incomplete contract, moral hazard and adverse selection problems, such as free ride of member firms, are very common during cooperation. These risks are main reasons why cooperative innovation end up a failure.
In the early days economists focus on firms’cooperative motives and explore the problem of“why to cooperate”; now,“how to cooperate”becomes a hot problem of economists are interested in.
“How to cooperate”includes two main problems: firstly, selection of cooperative mode; Secondly, designation of organizational mechanism under certain cooperative mode. Selection of cooperative mode is the core problem we study in this paper. Our study based the stylized fact: considerable empirical studies find that non-equity cooperative mode such as technology cross-licensing agreements are more used than equity mode such as research joint ventures. We have the following specific problems to study:
引文
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