西部地区农村公共品投入保障机制研究
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摘要
党的十六届五中全会提出了建设社会主义新农村的重大历史任务,但社会主义新农村建设的难点在西部地区。西部地区农村公共品投入不足、波动和效率低下,已严重影响了西部地区农业生产水平提高、农村经济发展和农民收入增长。学者们也意识到了农村公共品供给问题的重要性,并从农村公共品供给主体与供给方式、制度变迁、筹融资体制等方面进行了诸多研究,试图解决农村公共品供给不足的问题。本文从农村公共品投入主体的权利划分与行为选择的视角,运用公共品供给、公共财政、公共选择和博弈论等理论对西部地区农村公共品投入保障机制进行研究,以期达到以下目的:第一,探讨西部地区农村公共品投入不足、波动和低效率的制度根源;第二,揭示西部地区农村公共品投入主体的权利划分及其行为选择,阐释投入决策机制和监督机制的运行方式及其存在的问题;第三,评价西部地区农村公共品投入的绩效,寻求提高西部地区农村公共品投入效率的新机制和新途径,为促进西部地区农村公共品供给以及新农村建设提供政策依据。
一、主要研究结果
1、农村公共品存在着复杂的动态性和地域性特征。
农村公共品是相对于城市公共品而言的,是公共品的一种分类方式。在不同的历史发展时期,同一农村物品具有不同的属性,即农村公共品具有动态变化性。随着经济的发展、国家财力的增强、科学技术的进步以及政府发展观的转变等因素的变化,农村公共品和私人品之间可以相互转化;同时,不同地理位置和消费偏好的差异也会导致不同地域人们的消费差异,即产生消费的地域性特征。农村公共品种类繁多及其动态变化性和地域性特征,是难以明确界定其投入主体的重要原因。
2、西部地区农村公共品投入主体多元化的格局尚未形成。
公共品固有特性和“搭便车”问题的存在,使政府必须承担起提供公共品的责任。但我国在建国以来,在至高无上的工业化目标导向下,受长期的城市投入偏向的“路径依赖”的影响,西部地区农村公共品政府投入一直不足;而且,伴随着财政体制改革和农村税费改革的逐步深入,基层政府负债严重。在财力有限的前提下,西部地区基层政府对农村公共品的投入“力不能及”;同时,对于农户来说,由于农民收入水平低,农民组织化程度低以及大量农村精英的流失,农民对农村公共品的投入也是“力不从心”。所以,西部地区农村公共品投入仍然是政府单一投入主体,多元化投入的格局尚未形成。
3、在政府主导的农村公共品投入框架下,政府间财权和事权划分的“逆向化”是西部地区农村公共品投入不足的重要制度根源。
在财政体制变迁过程中,政府间存在着财权上移和事权下移的明显趋向。这种财权和事权划分的“逆向化”,使基层政府承担了许多本不该由其承担的事权,而且,西部地区还要承担诸如边疆稳定、民族团结、生态安全等特有的事权。对于经济状况和财政实力本来就十分薄弱的西部地区基层政府来说,已无力承担众多的农村公共品投入责任。尽管西部大开发战略实施以后,以及近年来连续“五个中央一号文件”的出台,政府加大了对西部地区的投入,但是农村公共品投入不足的局面仍然普遍存在,“吃饭财政”的格局仍然没有改变。从一定意义上说,政府间权利和义务配置不均衡,以及乡镇基层政府财权的萎缩和事权的扩张,是西部地区农村公共品投入不足的重要制度根源。
4、集权式“自上而下”的农村公共品投入决策机制以及农民对农村公共品偏好显示不足是决策机制不完善的重要表现。
目前的农村公共品投入决策机制仍然是人民公社时期决策机制的延续,带有明显的集权性质。在“强政府弱社会”的格局下,这种“自上而下”的集权式投入决策机制,使决策结果被更多的“政绩”和“利益”替代,而农民作为弱势群体,缺少公共品消费偏好的诉求渠道,使决策结果偏离了农村的现实情况和农民的现实需求。这是农村公共品投入决策机制不完善的重要表现。
5、“一事一议”决策制度的泛化有可能造成新一轮农民负担的反弹。
“一事一议”作为一种民主决策形式和农村公共品供给的筹资方式和表决形式,在解决村级重大事务、农村公共品供给方面起到了重大推动作用。但是,在缺乏“一事一议”严格而规范的操作程序情况下,“一事一议”制度经常存在着“议而不决、决而不行”的难题。同时,加上受某些村干部认识上的影响,容易引起“一事一议”制度的泛化,从而导致超出政策规定的议事范围和筹资标准,造成新一轮农民负担反弹的隐患。所以,“一事一议”并没有从根本上解决农村公共品投入决策的困境。
6、投入监督机制不完善是造成农村公共品投入效率低下的重要原因。
在西部地区农村公共品投入有限的情况下,完善投入资金的监督使用机制是提高投入效率的重要因素。但是,在现有农村公共品投入监督机制框架下,人大的预算和法律监督不足、审计机关的审计监督不力和社会监督乏力,使现有的监督机制存在诸多问题。农村公共品投入资金被挪用、滥用以及投入方向偏差、建设项目质量偏低的现象普遍存在,造成了投入效率损失,使本就不足的农村公共品投入更加匮乏。
二、主要创新点
1、研究视角的转换。已有的研究更多集中于农村公共品供给制度研究、农村公共品筹融资体制研究、农村公共品供给与农民负担研究等方面,虽然研究中涉及到了一些农村公共品投入方面的内容,但还没有直接从政府间权利划分和行为选择的角度对农村公共品投入问题进行研究,更没有直接对西部地区农村公共品投入保障机制的研究。实际上,政府间的权利划分和行为选择对农村公共品投入起着决定性影响,西部地区尤其如此。
2、构建了一个西部地区农村公共品投入的理论分析框架。本文对爱伦·斯密德的“SSP”分析框架进行了拓展,提出了“物品属性—主体权利划分—行为选择—绩效分析”的分析框架,较为系统地研究了农村公共品投入的主体结构、政府间权力划分以及农村公共品投入的决策和监督机制,并对西部地区农村公共品投入的绩效进行了评价。
3、揭示了西部地区农村公共品投入不足的制度根源。长期以来,我国在城乡二元结构的制度安排下,实行的是城市偏向的公共品供给制度。由于政府存在着城市偏向的公共品投入的“路径依赖”,加之由于财政体制变迁过程中形成的政府间财权和事权的“逆向化”,是农村公共品投入不足的重要制度根源。
4、探讨了西部地区农村公共品投入决策的优先序列。在西部地区农村公共品投入不足的前提下,明确农村公共品投入决策的优先序列是提高农村公共品投入效率的重要问题。本文在农村公共品分类的基础上,结合对四川省一些农村地区的调查,探讨了西部地区农村公共品投入的优先序列,提出了第一位序和第二位序的公共品供给序列。
三、政策建议
1、明确西部地区农村对公共品的现实需求。
充分的农村公共品需求偏好表露是投入决策的重要依据,而且,建立完善的农村公共品投入“瞄准机制”,“瞄准”投入项目是满足西部地区农村公共品现实需求、提高投入效率的重要内容。西部地区农村面积广大,条件各异,对农村公共品的需求状况也会有较大差异。所以,建议对西部地区农村公共品的现实需求和潜在需求状况进行全面调查,针对不同的农村公共品需求,制定合理的投入计划,确定投入的优先序,分步骤、分阶段对西部地区农村进行公共品投入。
2、培育西部地区农村公共品投入主体。
政府是农村公共品投入的重要责权主体,但鉴于乡镇政府的财力状况,建议乡镇政府退出农村公共品投入主体序列,改为执行主体。除了加大政府投入力度以外,还要培育更多的农村公共品投入主体。对于大量的农村准公共品,可以通过加强基础设施建设和制订优惠政策,改善西部地区农村公共品投入的市场环境和政策环境,通过多种方式培育和吸引更多的市场主体参与农村公共品投入。但是,在培育和吸引市场主体参与农村公共品投入的过程中,要加强政府管制和实行准入制度,对于适合市场主体介入的农村公共品项目可由其进行投入和运营。同时,要加强对农村专业合作组织的扶持和农村精英的培育,使其尽快成为农村公共品投入的私人主体或私人合作主体。还可以考虑恢复“两工”制度,对于需要大量进行劳动力投入的农村公共品项目,可对其进行组织动员,以劳动替代资本的方式进行投入。
3、通过法律形式明确各级政府的财权和事权。
就中央和地方的事权划分而言,属于全国性、全局性的事权应划归中央;对于跨地区的农村公共品项目,也应主要由中央财政负责,但鉴于中央财政的收支状况,受益地区也可作一定程度的负担。就中央和地方的财权划分而言,应在税收立法权主要集中于中央的前提下,赋予地方一定的税收立法权。要调整目前税种的划分方法,合理划分中央税与地方税,减少共(分)享税种,完善中央税体系和地方税体系。为了避免中央政府与地方政府以及地方政府之间事权的交叉和财权划分不明,对各级政府事权和财权的划分,应当由国家最高权力机关以法律形式进行规范。
4、改革农村公共品投入决策机制。
建立农村公共品的需求表达机制,加大农村基层民主制度建设的力度,充分实行村民自治,通过村民委员会制度和乡(镇)人民代表大会制度,使农民通过直接或间接的渠道充分表达自己对公共品的意见,实现农村公共品投入决策程序由“自上而下”向“自下而上”的转变;同时,加强财政预算的科学性,建立合理有效的投入决策运行机制;坚决落实中央的各项政策,按照科学发展观和统筹城乡发展的要求,坚持工业反哺农业、城市支持农村的方针,加大财政支农资金以及财政转移支付的力度,确保农村公共品投入资金的稳定增长。充分发挥各级人民代表大会的作用,加强人大与人民群众的联系,加强人大的审批权和监督权,同时还要保证全体村民对农村公共品投入决策的知情权,并将农村公共品投入决策置于村民的有效监督之下。
(5)进一步改革与完善“一事一议”制度。
加大宣传力度,让广大干部群众加深对“一事一议”制度对农村公益事业建设重要意义的认识;通过明确界定“一事一议”的议事范围,完善议事程序,探索多种实现形式,切实提高“一事一议”的效率;加强上级政府及有关职能部门对“一事一议”的监督与管理,根据农民的收入水平和农村公益事业的现状合理确定融资数量,使“一事一议”真正做到在尊重广大村民意愿的基础上量力而行,以适应农村社会经济发展对公共品的需求特点;完善相关政策法规,做到“一事一议”有法可依,并使其逐步走上法制化轨道。
(6)完善农村公共品投入的监督机制。
提高国家预算的透明度,并做到专款专用。加强财政部门和审计机关对财政预算支出的监督和检查,尤其是加强对预算外资金的监督与管理;强化各级人大的公共选择作用和各级人民政府的监督作用,完善我国财政决策中作为权力机构的各级人代会与其执行机构的各级政府间相互制衡和约束机制;改革现行的干部考核机制和任免机制,建立地方政府内部的自我约束机制;结合村民自治制度建设,建立村务公开和民主理财的长效机制,充分发挥广大农民在涉及村民利益的公共品筹资过程中的民主监督主体地位与作用,还要建立和完善能够充分发挥包括政府职能部门在内的外部监督机构作用的有效制度,特别是有利于发挥专业审计监督机构独立监督职能方面的制度建设。
The Fifth Plenary Session of the 16th proposed the major historical task building a new socialist countryside, whose most challenging part is found in the western region. The insufficiency, volatility and inefficiency of public goods investment in western rural have seriously affected the level of agricultural production, rural economic development as well as the income growth for farmers. Realizing the significance of this problem, many scholars have conducted extensive research on it from several aspects, such as the supply subjects of public goods and supply pattern, system changes, and financing system. This paper focuses on the study of the public goods investment protection mechanism in western rural areas, using public goods supply theory, public finance theory, public choice theory, and game theory from the perspective of appropriate allocation and behavior choice of public goods investment subjects, in hope to achieve three main goals: First, to probe into the system root causes on public goods investment insufficiency, fluctuations and the low efficiency in western rural. Second, to reveal the appropriate allocation and behavior choices of public goods investment subjects in western rural, and to explain the operation mode and existing problems in the investment decision-making mechanism and supervision mechanism. Third, to evaluate the performance of the public goods investment in western rural, to look for a new approach and a new mechanism to improve the investment efficiency of public goods, and to provide a policy basis for promoting public goods supply and new socialist countryside in western region.
Main Research Results
1. Public goods in rural areas have the complex dynamic and regional characteristics
Public goods in rural areas are so called only relative to the public goods in the city, it is a kind of classification of public goods. In different historical periods, the same goods in rural areas have different attributes that display dynamic change. With the development of economy, the strengthening of the state's financial ability, scientific and technological progress as well as the changing of governmental development concept, the public goods and private goods in rural areas can be transformed into each other. At the same time, different location and consumer preferences will lead to people's consumption differences in different geographical areas, that is, regional characteristics of consumption. Numerous varieties of public goods, the dynamic changes and geographical characteristics, are the important reasons that make it very difficult to clearly define the investment subjects.
2. The diversification of investment subjects of public goods in western rural has yet to take shape.
The governments must assume responsibility for the provision of public goods because of the inherent characteristics and a“free rider”problem of public goods. However, since the founding of our country, in the supreme goal-oriented industrialization, the long-term bias in the city's“path dependence”, the government’s investment to the public goods in western rural has been inadequate. Moreover, with the reform gradually progressing, and higher taxes and fees, the local government became heavily indebted. In the premise of limited financial resources, local government’s investment for public goods in western rural is less than sufficient. Meanwhile, farmers’investment is also“insufficient”due to the low level of the farmers’income, low degree of farmers’organizations and the loss of a large number of rural elite. Therefore, the diversified investment of public goods in western rural has yet to take shape.
3. Under the framework of government-led public goods investment, the“reverse allocation”of intergovernmental fiscal authority and the implementation responsibility becomes the important institutional causes of inadequate investment to public goods in western rural areas.
In the process of financial institutional change, there is an obvious trend that the intergovernmental fiscal authority is“upward”and the implementation responsibility is“downward”. And the“reverse allocation”of intergovernmental fiscal authority and the implementation responsibility lead to that the local government undertake a lot of the implementation responsibility. Moreover, the western region also needs to undertake other unique implementation responsibility, such as stability in border areas, national unity, and ecological security, to name a few. The economic situation and the financial strength of the already very weak local governments of the western region has been unable to shoulder many responsibilities in public goods in rural areas, because the economic situation and the financial strength are very weak. Despite the implementation of the western development strategy and“Five Central No. 1 Document”issued in recent years, the government has increased the investment to the western areas, but inadequate input situation of public goods in rural areas still prevails,“Financial Budget for Basic Consumption”has not changed. In a certain sense, the in-equilibrium allocation of responsibilities and obligations among intergovernments, and shrinking financial authority and expanding implementation responsibility of township local governments are the important institutional causes for the lack of public goods investment in western rural areas.
4. Centralization decision-making mechanism of“top-down”of public goods in rural areas and the lack of farmers’preference results in important imperfect performance of decision-making mechanism.
The current decision-making mechanism of public goods in rural areas is still the continuation of the decision-making mechanism during the people's communes, with the obvious centralized nature. Under the pattern of“Strong Government, weak society”and the“top-down”centralization of investment decision-making mechanism, so that decision-making results were alternated by more“political achievements”and“interests”, and vulnerable farmers, because of the lack of public goods consumer preference for the demands of channels, the decision-making results deviate from the reality of the situation in the rural areas and farmers’needs. This is the imperfect performance of decision-making mechanism for public goods in rural areas.
5. The generalization of“One Issue, One Decision”decision-making mechanism may cause a new round rebound of the burden on farmers.
As a form of democratic decision-making and public financing mode for the supply of public goods in rural and voting forms, the decision-making of“One Issue, One Decision”has played a major role in resolving the major village affairs and the supply of public goods in rural areas. However, under the absence of strict and standardized operating procedures, the decision-making system of“One Issue, One Decision”often causes problems of“Discussions Without Decisions, and Decision Without Implementation”. At the same time, the generalization of“One Issue, One Decision”decision-making mechanism is easy because of the impact of certain village cadres’understanding, resulting in policies and regulations beyond the scope of procedure and funding standards, and resulting in the hidden danger of a new round rebound of the farmers’burden. Therefore, the decision-making mechanism of“One Issue, One Decision”has not fundamentally solved the difficulties on public goods investment in rural areas.
6. The imperfect supervisory mechanism is the important reasons for inefficiency of public goods investment in rural areas.
The perfect supervision mechanism is the important factor to improve the investment efficiency under the situation of limited investment of public goods in western rural areas. However, under the existing framework of the supervision mechanism on public goods in rural areas, the existing monitoring mechanism is plagued with many problems because of the inadequate legal supervision of the NPC's, inadequate financial and auditing supervision of financial auditing departments, as well as a lack of social supervision. The phenomenon that the investment funds of public goods in rural areas were misappropriated and abuse, the direction error and low quality of investment, is widespread, resulting in a loss of efficiency of investment, making the limited funds of public goods in rural areas become more scarce.
Main Arguments
1. Having changed the perspective in the study. Many researches hae studied the supply system of public goods in rural areas, financing system, supply of public goods in rural areas and farmers’burden. There is not a direct study from the perspective of intergovernment’s right allocation and behavior choice, nor is there a direct study to the investment protection mechanisms of public goods in western rural areas, although some studies involved in some content on investment of public goods in rural areas. In fact, the intergovernmental right allocation and the behavior choice to public goods in rural areas investment play a decisive impact, especially in the western region.
2. Having constructed a theoretic analyzing framework of the public goods investment in rural areas.
This paper expanded Ellen Smide’s“SSP”analytical framework, suggested the“goods attribution- subjects right allocation– behavior choice - performance analysis”framework, systematically studied the subjects’structure, the right allocation among governments, as well as investment decision-making mechanism and oversight mechanisms on the public goods in western rural areas, and evaluated the investment performance.
3. Having revealed the institutional root-causes of inadequate investment on public goods in western rural areas.
For a long time, under the arrangement of“urban and rural structure”of the system, our country implemented the public goods supply system with an urban bias. Because of the existence of the“path dependence”of urban bias of public goods supply, and the changes of the financial system, the“reverse allocation”of intergovernmental fiscal authority and the affairs right, that is the fundamental reason on the shortage for public goods in rural areas.
4. having approached the preferred order of ivestment decision-making of public goods in western rural. Making clear the preferred order is a improntant problem for improving the investment efficiency of public goods in western rural under the premise of shortage for public goods. This paper approached the preferred order of public goods investment in western rural and put forward the supply order of first and second order on the basis of classification of publid goods in rural area and connect with the investigation of Sichuan rural areas.
Suggestions for Policy Makers
1. To articulate clearly the practical needs on public goods in western rural areas.
Sufficient demand preference for public goods in rural areas is the basis and investment premise for decision-making, and, establish and improve the“targeting mechanism”on public goods in rural,“targeting”the investment projects is the important content to meet actual needs and improve the efficiency of public goods in the western rural region. However, the district of the western rural region is the majority, and the conditions are different, the demand for public goods in rural areas will also be quite different. It is therefore suggested that a full investigation on the reality and potential demand for public goods in rural areas must be designed and implemented, and a rational investment plan must be formulated in light of the different needs of public goods, and to identify the priority order, invest the public goods in western rural areas step-by-step.
2. To nurture the main bodies of public goods in western rural areas.
Governments are the important main bodies to invest the public goods in rural areas. But, in view of the financial situation of the township government, township government is proposed to withdraw from the main sequence of public goods in rural areas, to change into the implementation main body. Apart from the increase in government investment, there is a need to cultivate more the main bodies of public goods in rural areas. For a large number of quasi-public goods in rural areas, one can nurture and attract more market main bodies into the public goods investment in rural areas through strengthening the construction of infrastructure and formulating preferential policies, and improving the market and policy environment of public goods investment in western rural areas. However, in the process of nurturing and attracting the market main bodies for investment in public goods, the access control system must be strengthened and implemented; the suitable items of rural public goods can be carried out by investment and operations through the market main bodies. Meanwhile, the cooperation professional organizations in the rural areas and the rural elite must be strongly supported and nurtured, as soon as possible and make it become the private or private cooperation main bodies for investing public goods in rural areas.“Two labors”system can be reinstated to construct the public goods projects which are needed for a large number of labor input in the rural areas, through mobilizing and organizing.
3. To clarify the fiscal authority and the implementation responsibilities of governments through legal form.
On the implementation power division between central and local governments, which is a national and overall concept; it should also be under the jurisdiction of the central powers. On the trans-regional projects of public goods in rural areas, they should also be responsible by the central financial authorities, but in view of the central fiscal revenue and expenditure situation, the benefited regions should also take burden. On the financial authority between central and local governments, they should empower local governments in their tax legislative power under the premise of the tax legislative power mainly concentrated in the central government. They should make needed changes in the current tax division, reasonablly divide the taxes between the central and local governments, reduce total (minutes) to enjoy tax, and improve the central tax system and the local one. In order to avoid the intersection of implementation responsibilities between the central government and local governments, as well as the unknown of financial powers among local governments’powers, the division of financial authority and implementation responsibilities at all levels of governments, which should be decided by the nation's highest organ of power in the form of legal norms.
4. To reform the decision-making mechanism of public goods in rural areas.
Establishing the communication mechanisms of public goods in rural areas and intensifying the democratic system of rural grass-roots, fully implementing the villager autonomy, through the village committee system and township people's congress system, so that farmers can fully express their views to public goods in rural areas through direct or indirect channels, and make the change of decision-making process from the“top-down”to the“bottom-up”. At the same time, it is important to strengthen the scientific nature of the financial budget, and establishing a rational and effective operational mechanism for decision-making investment. Firmly implementing the central government's policies, in accordance with the requirements of the scientific development concept and coordinating urban and rural development, adhere to industry-financed agriculture and cities support rural policy, and strengthening the financial support for agriculture and the financial transfer payment of funds, and ensure the steady growth of the investment of public goods in rural areas. They should give full role to the people's congress at all levels, strengthening the ties between the people's congresses and the masses, and the power to approve and supervise the National People's Congress. Meanwhile, they also need to ensure all of the villager’s rights in their investment decision-making information on public goods in rural areas, and place the decision-making under the effective supervision of the villagers.
5. To further reform and improve“One Issue, One Decision”system.
Hey should make greater efforts to publicize and to deepen the understanding of the cadres and the masses about“One Issue, One Decision”system of rural public welfare undertakings. They should truly raise the efficiency of“One Issue, One Decision”through clearly defined scope of“One Issue, One Decision”, improve the procedures, and explore various communication channels. They should strengthen the supervision and management of higher level government and the relevant offices on the“One Issue, One Decision,”reasonably determine the status of financing volume according to the income level of farmers and rural public welfare undertakings, make the“One Issue, One Decision”accommodate the will of the majority of the villagers, improve relevant policies and regulations, to“One Issue, One Decision”law, and make it gradually a part of the legal system.
6. To improve the oversight mechanisms of public goods investment in rural areas.
They should enhance the transparency of the national budget, and strengthen the supervision and management to extra-budgetary funds. The role of public choice of the people's congresses at all levels and the supervisory role of governments at all levels should also be strengthened, along with the balances and mutual restraint mechanisms of the financial decision-making authority. Reforming the existing assessment of cadre’s mechanism and dismissal mechanism, establishing the self-restraint mechanisms within local governments, and establishing the long-term mechanism of village affairs and democratic financial management constructing of villager autonomy system will help give full play of the roles of democratic supervision and dominant position to the majority of farmers in the process of financing public goods involved in the interests of the villagers. Also they need to consider establishing and perfecting the system of the external oversight bodies to include the government sector, in particular the system construction advantaged to play the independent oversight functions for professional audit bodies.
一、主要研究结果
1、农村公共品存在着复杂的动态性和地域性特征。
农村公共品是相对于城市公共品而言的,是公共品的一种分类方式。在不同的历史发展时期,同一农村物品具有不同的属性,即农村公共品具有动态变化性。随着经济的发展、国家财力的增强、科学技术的进步以及政府发展观的转变等因素的变化,农村公共品和私人品之间可以相互转化;同时,不同地理位置和消费偏好的差异也会导致不同地域人们的消费差异,即产生消费的地域性特征。农村公共品种类繁多及其动态变化性和地域性特征,是难以明确界定其投入主体的重要原因。
2、西部地区农村公共品投入主体多元化的格局尚未形成。
公共品固有特性和“搭便车”问题的存在,使政府必须承担起提供公共品的责任。但我国在建国以来,在至高无上的工业化目标导向下,受长期的城市投入偏向的“路径依赖”的影响,西部地区农村公共品政府投入一直不足;而且,伴随着财政体制改革和农村税费改革的逐步深入,基层政府负债严重。在财力有限的前提下,西部地区基层政府对农村公共品的投入“力不能及”;同时,对于农户来说,由于农民收入水平低,农民组织化程度低以及大量农村精英的流失,农民对农村公共品的投入也是“力不从心”。所以,西部地区农村公共品投入仍然是政府单一投入主体,多元化投入的格局尚未形成。
3、在政府主导的农村公共品投入框架下,政府间财权和事权划分的“逆向化”是西部地区农村公共品投入不足的重要制度根源。
在财政体制变迁过程中,政府间存在着财权上移和事权下移的明显趋向。这种财权和事权划分的“逆向化”,使基层政府承担了许多本不该由其承担的事权,而且,西部地区还要承担诸如边疆稳定、民族团结、生态安全等特有的事权。对于经济状况和财政实力本来就十分薄弱的西部地区基层政府来说,已无力承担众多的农村公共品投入责任。尽管西部大开发战略实施以后,以及近年来连续“五个中央一号文件”的出台,政府加大了对西部地区的投入,但是农村公共品投入不足的局面仍然普遍存在,“吃饭财政”的格局仍然没有改变。从一定意义上说,政府间权利和义务配置不均衡,以及乡镇基层政府财权的萎缩和事权的扩张,是西部地区农村公共品投入不足的重要制度根源。
4、集权式“自上而下”的农村公共品投入决策机制以及农民对农村公共品偏好显示不足是决策机制不完善的重要表现。
目前的农村公共品投入决策机制仍然是人民公社时期决策机制的延续,带有明显的集权性质。在“强政府弱社会”的格局下,这种“自上而下”的集权式投入决策机制,使决策结果被更多的“政绩”和“利益”替代,而农民作为弱势群体,缺少公共品消费偏好的诉求渠道,使决策结果偏离了农村的现实情况和农民的现实需求。这是农村公共品投入决策机制不完善的重要表现。
5、“一事一议”决策制度的泛化有可能造成新一轮农民负担的反弹。
“一事一议”作为一种民主决策形式和农村公共品供给的筹资方式和表决形式,在解决村级重大事务、农村公共品供给方面起到了重大推动作用。但是,在缺乏“一事一议”严格而规范的操作程序情况下,“一事一议”制度经常存在着“议而不决、决而不行”的难题。同时,加上受某些村干部认识上的影响,容易引起“一事一议”制度的泛化,从而导致超出政策规定的议事范围和筹资标准,造成新一轮农民负担反弹的隐患。所以,“一事一议”并没有从根本上解决农村公共品投入决策的困境。
6、投入监督机制不完善是造成农村公共品投入效率低下的重要原因。
在西部地区农村公共品投入有限的情况下,完善投入资金的监督使用机制是提高投入效率的重要因素。但是,在现有农村公共品投入监督机制框架下,人大的预算和法律监督不足、审计机关的审计监督不力和社会监督乏力,使现有的监督机制存在诸多问题。农村公共品投入资金被挪用、滥用以及投入方向偏差、建设项目质量偏低的现象普遍存在,造成了投入效率损失,使本就不足的农村公共品投入更加匮乏。
二、主要创新点
1、研究视角的转换。已有的研究更多集中于农村公共品供给制度研究、农村公共品筹融资体制研究、农村公共品供给与农民负担研究等方面,虽然研究中涉及到了一些农村公共品投入方面的内容,但还没有直接从政府间权利划分和行为选择的角度对农村公共品投入问题进行研究,更没有直接对西部地区农村公共品投入保障机制的研究。实际上,政府间的权利划分和行为选择对农村公共品投入起着决定性影响,西部地区尤其如此。
2、构建了一个西部地区农村公共品投入的理论分析框架。本文对爱伦·斯密德的“SSP”分析框架进行了拓展,提出了“物品属性—主体权利划分—行为选择—绩效分析”的分析框架,较为系统地研究了农村公共品投入的主体结构、政府间权力划分以及农村公共品投入的决策和监督机制,并对西部地区农村公共品投入的绩效进行了评价。
3、揭示了西部地区农村公共品投入不足的制度根源。长期以来,我国在城乡二元结构的制度安排下,实行的是城市偏向的公共品供给制度。由于政府存在着城市偏向的公共品投入的“路径依赖”,加之由于财政体制变迁过程中形成的政府间财权和事权的“逆向化”,是农村公共品投入不足的重要制度根源。
4、探讨了西部地区农村公共品投入决策的优先序列。在西部地区农村公共品投入不足的前提下,明确农村公共品投入决策的优先序列是提高农村公共品投入效率的重要问题。本文在农村公共品分类的基础上,结合对四川省一些农村地区的调查,探讨了西部地区农村公共品投入的优先序列,提出了第一位序和第二位序的公共品供给序列。
三、政策建议
1、明确西部地区农村对公共品的现实需求。
充分的农村公共品需求偏好表露是投入决策的重要依据,而且,建立完善的农村公共品投入“瞄准机制”,“瞄准”投入项目是满足西部地区农村公共品现实需求、提高投入效率的重要内容。西部地区农村面积广大,条件各异,对农村公共品的需求状况也会有较大差异。所以,建议对西部地区农村公共品的现实需求和潜在需求状况进行全面调查,针对不同的农村公共品需求,制定合理的投入计划,确定投入的优先序,分步骤、分阶段对西部地区农村进行公共品投入。
2、培育西部地区农村公共品投入主体。
政府是农村公共品投入的重要责权主体,但鉴于乡镇政府的财力状况,建议乡镇政府退出农村公共品投入主体序列,改为执行主体。除了加大政府投入力度以外,还要培育更多的农村公共品投入主体。对于大量的农村准公共品,可以通过加强基础设施建设和制订优惠政策,改善西部地区农村公共品投入的市场环境和政策环境,通过多种方式培育和吸引更多的市场主体参与农村公共品投入。但是,在培育和吸引市场主体参与农村公共品投入的过程中,要加强政府管制和实行准入制度,对于适合市场主体介入的农村公共品项目可由其进行投入和运营。同时,要加强对农村专业合作组织的扶持和农村精英的培育,使其尽快成为农村公共品投入的私人主体或私人合作主体。还可以考虑恢复“两工”制度,对于需要大量进行劳动力投入的农村公共品项目,可对其进行组织动员,以劳动替代资本的方式进行投入。
3、通过法律形式明确各级政府的财权和事权。
就中央和地方的事权划分而言,属于全国性、全局性的事权应划归中央;对于跨地区的农村公共品项目,也应主要由中央财政负责,但鉴于中央财政的收支状况,受益地区也可作一定程度的负担。就中央和地方的财权划分而言,应在税收立法权主要集中于中央的前提下,赋予地方一定的税收立法权。要调整目前税种的划分方法,合理划分中央税与地方税,减少共(分)享税种,完善中央税体系和地方税体系。为了避免中央政府与地方政府以及地方政府之间事权的交叉和财权划分不明,对各级政府事权和财权的划分,应当由国家最高权力机关以法律形式进行规范。
4、改革农村公共品投入决策机制。
建立农村公共品的需求表达机制,加大农村基层民主制度建设的力度,充分实行村民自治,通过村民委员会制度和乡(镇)人民代表大会制度,使农民通过直接或间接的渠道充分表达自己对公共品的意见,实现农村公共品投入决策程序由“自上而下”向“自下而上”的转变;同时,加强财政预算的科学性,建立合理有效的投入决策运行机制;坚决落实中央的各项政策,按照科学发展观和统筹城乡发展的要求,坚持工业反哺农业、城市支持农村的方针,加大财政支农资金以及财政转移支付的力度,确保农村公共品投入资金的稳定增长。充分发挥各级人民代表大会的作用,加强人大与人民群众的联系,加强人大的审批权和监督权,同时还要保证全体村民对农村公共品投入决策的知情权,并将农村公共品投入决策置于村民的有效监督之下。
(5)进一步改革与完善“一事一议”制度。
加大宣传力度,让广大干部群众加深对“一事一议”制度对农村公益事业建设重要意义的认识;通过明确界定“一事一议”的议事范围,完善议事程序,探索多种实现形式,切实提高“一事一议”的效率;加强上级政府及有关职能部门对“一事一议”的监督与管理,根据农民的收入水平和农村公益事业的现状合理确定融资数量,使“一事一议”真正做到在尊重广大村民意愿的基础上量力而行,以适应农村社会经济发展对公共品的需求特点;完善相关政策法规,做到“一事一议”有法可依,并使其逐步走上法制化轨道。
(6)完善农村公共品投入的监督机制。
提高国家预算的透明度,并做到专款专用。加强财政部门和审计机关对财政预算支出的监督和检查,尤其是加强对预算外资金的监督与管理;强化各级人大的公共选择作用和各级人民政府的监督作用,完善我国财政决策中作为权力机构的各级人代会与其执行机构的各级政府间相互制衡和约束机制;改革现行的干部考核机制和任免机制,建立地方政府内部的自我约束机制;结合村民自治制度建设,建立村务公开和民主理财的长效机制,充分发挥广大农民在涉及村民利益的公共品筹资过程中的民主监督主体地位与作用,还要建立和完善能够充分发挥包括政府职能部门在内的外部监督机构作用的有效制度,特别是有利于发挥专业审计监督机构独立监督职能方面的制度建设。
The Fifth Plenary Session of the 16th proposed the major historical task building a new socialist countryside, whose most challenging part is found in the western region. The insufficiency, volatility and inefficiency of public goods investment in western rural have seriously affected the level of agricultural production, rural economic development as well as the income growth for farmers. Realizing the significance of this problem, many scholars have conducted extensive research on it from several aspects, such as the supply subjects of public goods and supply pattern, system changes, and financing system. This paper focuses on the study of the public goods investment protection mechanism in western rural areas, using public goods supply theory, public finance theory, public choice theory, and game theory from the perspective of appropriate allocation and behavior choice of public goods investment subjects, in hope to achieve three main goals: First, to probe into the system root causes on public goods investment insufficiency, fluctuations and the low efficiency in western rural. Second, to reveal the appropriate allocation and behavior choices of public goods investment subjects in western rural, and to explain the operation mode and existing problems in the investment decision-making mechanism and supervision mechanism. Third, to evaluate the performance of the public goods investment in western rural, to look for a new approach and a new mechanism to improve the investment efficiency of public goods, and to provide a policy basis for promoting public goods supply and new socialist countryside in western region.
Main Research Results
1. Public goods in rural areas have the complex dynamic and regional characteristics
Public goods in rural areas are so called only relative to the public goods in the city, it is a kind of classification of public goods. In different historical periods, the same goods in rural areas have different attributes that display dynamic change. With the development of economy, the strengthening of the state's financial ability, scientific and technological progress as well as the changing of governmental development concept, the public goods and private goods in rural areas can be transformed into each other. At the same time, different location and consumer preferences will lead to people's consumption differences in different geographical areas, that is, regional characteristics of consumption. Numerous varieties of public goods, the dynamic changes and geographical characteristics, are the important reasons that make it very difficult to clearly define the investment subjects.
2. The diversification of investment subjects of public goods in western rural has yet to take shape.
The governments must assume responsibility for the provision of public goods because of the inherent characteristics and a“free rider”problem of public goods. However, since the founding of our country, in the supreme goal-oriented industrialization, the long-term bias in the city's“path dependence”, the government’s investment to the public goods in western rural has been inadequate. Moreover, with the reform gradually progressing, and higher taxes and fees, the local government became heavily indebted. In the premise of limited financial resources, local government’s investment for public goods in western rural is less than sufficient. Meanwhile, farmers’investment is also“insufficient”due to the low level of the farmers’income, low degree of farmers’organizations and the loss of a large number of rural elite. Therefore, the diversified investment of public goods in western rural has yet to take shape.
3. Under the framework of government-led public goods investment, the“reverse allocation”of intergovernmental fiscal authority and the implementation responsibility becomes the important institutional causes of inadequate investment to public goods in western rural areas.
In the process of financial institutional change, there is an obvious trend that the intergovernmental fiscal authority is“upward”and the implementation responsibility is“downward”. And the“reverse allocation”of intergovernmental fiscal authority and the implementation responsibility lead to that the local government undertake a lot of the implementation responsibility. Moreover, the western region also needs to undertake other unique implementation responsibility, such as stability in border areas, national unity, and ecological security, to name a few. The economic situation and the financial strength of the already very weak local governments of the western region has been unable to shoulder many responsibilities in public goods in rural areas, because the economic situation and the financial strength are very weak. Despite the implementation of the western development strategy and“Five Central No. 1 Document”issued in recent years, the government has increased the investment to the western areas, but inadequate input situation of public goods in rural areas still prevails,“Financial Budget for Basic Consumption”has not changed. In a certain sense, the in-equilibrium allocation of responsibilities and obligations among intergovernments, and shrinking financial authority and expanding implementation responsibility of township local governments are the important institutional causes for the lack of public goods investment in western rural areas.
4. Centralization decision-making mechanism of“top-down”of public goods in rural areas and the lack of farmers’preference results in important imperfect performance of decision-making mechanism.
The current decision-making mechanism of public goods in rural areas is still the continuation of the decision-making mechanism during the people's communes, with the obvious centralized nature. Under the pattern of“Strong Government, weak society”and the“top-down”centralization of investment decision-making mechanism, so that decision-making results were alternated by more“political achievements”and“interests”, and vulnerable farmers, because of the lack of public goods consumer preference for the demands of channels, the decision-making results deviate from the reality of the situation in the rural areas and farmers’needs. This is the imperfect performance of decision-making mechanism for public goods in rural areas.
5. The generalization of“One Issue, One Decision”decision-making mechanism may cause a new round rebound of the burden on farmers.
As a form of democratic decision-making and public financing mode for the supply of public goods in rural and voting forms, the decision-making of“One Issue, One Decision”has played a major role in resolving the major village affairs and the supply of public goods in rural areas. However, under the absence of strict and standardized operating procedures, the decision-making system of“One Issue, One Decision”often causes problems of“Discussions Without Decisions, and Decision Without Implementation”. At the same time, the generalization of“One Issue, One Decision”decision-making mechanism is easy because of the impact of certain village cadres’understanding, resulting in policies and regulations beyond the scope of procedure and funding standards, and resulting in the hidden danger of a new round rebound of the farmers’burden. Therefore, the decision-making mechanism of“One Issue, One Decision”has not fundamentally solved the difficulties on public goods investment in rural areas.
6. The imperfect supervisory mechanism is the important reasons for inefficiency of public goods investment in rural areas.
The perfect supervision mechanism is the important factor to improve the investment efficiency under the situation of limited investment of public goods in western rural areas. However, under the existing framework of the supervision mechanism on public goods in rural areas, the existing monitoring mechanism is plagued with many problems because of the inadequate legal supervision of the NPC's, inadequate financial and auditing supervision of financial auditing departments, as well as a lack of social supervision. The phenomenon that the investment funds of public goods in rural areas were misappropriated and abuse, the direction error and low quality of investment, is widespread, resulting in a loss of efficiency of investment, making the limited funds of public goods in rural areas become more scarce.
Main Arguments
1. Having changed the perspective in the study. Many researches hae studied the supply system of public goods in rural areas, financing system, supply of public goods in rural areas and farmers’burden. There is not a direct study from the perspective of intergovernment’s right allocation and behavior choice, nor is there a direct study to the investment protection mechanisms of public goods in western rural areas, although some studies involved in some content on investment of public goods in rural areas. In fact, the intergovernmental right allocation and the behavior choice to public goods in rural areas investment play a decisive impact, especially in the western region.
2. Having constructed a theoretic analyzing framework of the public goods investment in rural areas.
This paper expanded Ellen Smide’s“SSP”analytical framework, suggested the“goods attribution- subjects right allocation– behavior choice - performance analysis”framework, systematically studied the subjects’structure, the right allocation among governments, as well as investment decision-making mechanism and oversight mechanisms on the public goods in western rural areas, and evaluated the investment performance.
3. Having revealed the institutional root-causes of inadequate investment on public goods in western rural areas.
For a long time, under the arrangement of“urban and rural structure”of the system, our country implemented the public goods supply system with an urban bias. Because of the existence of the“path dependence”of urban bias of public goods supply, and the changes of the financial system, the“reverse allocation”of intergovernmental fiscal authority and the affairs right, that is the fundamental reason on the shortage for public goods in rural areas.
4. having approached the preferred order of ivestment decision-making of public goods in western rural. Making clear the preferred order is a improntant problem for improving the investment efficiency of public goods in western rural under the premise of shortage for public goods. This paper approached the preferred order of public goods investment in western rural and put forward the supply order of first and second order on the basis of classification of publid goods in rural area and connect with the investigation of Sichuan rural areas.
Suggestions for Policy Makers
1. To articulate clearly the practical needs on public goods in western rural areas.
Sufficient demand preference for public goods in rural areas is the basis and investment premise for decision-making, and, establish and improve the“targeting mechanism”on public goods in rural,“targeting”the investment projects is the important content to meet actual needs and improve the efficiency of public goods in the western rural region. However, the district of the western rural region is the majority, and the conditions are different, the demand for public goods in rural areas will also be quite different. It is therefore suggested that a full investigation on the reality and potential demand for public goods in rural areas must be designed and implemented, and a rational investment plan must be formulated in light of the different needs of public goods, and to identify the priority order, invest the public goods in western rural areas step-by-step.
2. To nurture the main bodies of public goods in western rural areas.
Governments are the important main bodies to invest the public goods in rural areas. But, in view of the financial situation of the township government, township government is proposed to withdraw from the main sequence of public goods in rural areas, to change into the implementation main body. Apart from the increase in government investment, there is a need to cultivate more the main bodies of public goods in rural areas. For a large number of quasi-public goods in rural areas, one can nurture and attract more market main bodies into the public goods investment in rural areas through strengthening the construction of infrastructure and formulating preferential policies, and improving the market and policy environment of public goods investment in western rural areas. However, in the process of nurturing and attracting the market main bodies for investment in public goods, the access control system must be strengthened and implemented; the suitable items of rural public goods can be carried out by investment and operations through the market main bodies. Meanwhile, the cooperation professional organizations in the rural areas and the rural elite must be strongly supported and nurtured, as soon as possible and make it become the private or private cooperation main bodies for investing public goods in rural areas.“Two labors”system can be reinstated to construct the public goods projects which are needed for a large number of labor input in the rural areas, through mobilizing and organizing.
3. To clarify the fiscal authority and the implementation responsibilities of governments through legal form.
On the implementation power division between central and local governments, which is a national and overall concept; it should also be under the jurisdiction of the central powers. On the trans-regional projects of public goods in rural areas, they should also be responsible by the central financial authorities, but in view of the central fiscal revenue and expenditure situation, the benefited regions should also take burden. On the financial authority between central and local governments, they should empower local governments in their tax legislative power under the premise of the tax legislative power mainly concentrated in the central government. They should make needed changes in the current tax division, reasonablly divide the taxes between the central and local governments, reduce total (minutes) to enjoy tax, and improve the central tax system and the local one. In order to avoid the intersection of implementation responsibilities between the central government and local governments, as well as the unknown of financial powers among local governments’powers, the division of financial authority and implementation responsibilities at all levels of governments, which should be decided by the nation's highest organ of power in the form of legal norms.
4. To reform the decision-making mechanism of public goods in rural areas.
Establishing the communication mechanisms of public goods in rural areas and intensifying the democratic system of rural grass-roots, fully implementing the villager autonomy, through the village committee system and township people's congress system, so that farmers can fully express their views to public goods in rural areas through direct or indirect channels, and make the change of decision-making process from the“top-down”to the“bottom-up”. At the same time, it is important to strengthen the scientific nature of the financial budget, and establishing a rational and effective operational mechanism for decision-making investment. Firmly implementing the central government's policies, in accordance with the requirements of the scientific development concept and coordinating urban and rural development, adhere to industry-financed agriculture and cities support rural policy, and strengthening the financial support for agriculture and the financial transfer payment of funds, and ensure the steady growth of the investment of public goods in rural areas. They should give full role to the people's congress at all levels, strengthening the ties between the people's congresses and the masses, and the power to approve and supervise the National People's Congress. Meanwhile, they also need to ensure all of the villager’s rights in their investment decision-making information on public goods in rural areas, and place the decision-making under the effective supervision of the villagers.
5. To further reform and improve“One Issue, One Decision”system.
Hey should make greater efforts to publicize and to deepen the understanding of the cadres and the masses about“One Issue, One Decision”system of rural public welfare undertakings. They should truly raise the efficiency of“One Issue, One Decision”through clearly defined scope of“One Issue, One Decision”, improve the procedures, and explore various communication channels. They should strengthen the supervision and management of higher level government and the relevant offices on the“One Issue, One Decision,”reasonably determine the status of financing volume according to the income level of farmers and rural public welfare undertakings, make the“One Issue, One Decision”accommodate the will of the majority of the villagers, improve relevant policies and regulations, to“One Issue, One Decision”law, and make it gradually a part of the legal system.
6. To improve the oversight mechanisms of public goods investment in rural areas.
They should enhance the transparency of the national budget, and strengthen the supervision and management to extra-budgetary funds. The role of public choice of the people's congresses at all levels and the supervisory role of governments at all levels should also be strengthened, along with the balances and mutual restraint mechanisms of the financial decision-making authority. Reforming the existing assessment of cadre’s mechanism and dismissal mechanism, establishing the self-restraint mechanisms within local governments, and establishing the long-term mechanism of village affairs and democratic financial management constructing of villager autonomy system will help give full play of the roles of democratic supervision and dominant position to the majority of farmers in the process of financing public goods involved in the interests of the villagers. Also they need to consider establishing and perfecting the system of the external oversight bodies to include the government sector, in particular the system construction advantaged to play the independent oversight functions for professional audit bodies.
引文
3转引自汪丁丁:序载Y·巴泽尔著(中译本):《产权的经济分析》,上海三联书店,1997,P2。
4 Hamel, Jacques. Case Study Method. Sage Publications, Inc.1993.p2.
10参见[英]霍布斯著,黎思复、黎廷弼译,杨昌裕校,《利维坦》,商务印书馆,1997年。
11 1968年12月13日,美国《科学》杂志发表了美国人类生态学家加勒特·哈丁的《公地的悲剧》一文,于是有人认为最早提出“公地悲剧”的是加勒特·哈丁。而早在1740年,大卫·休谟在其《人性论》中写道:两个邻人可能达成协议,共同在一片平地上排水,但在1000人之间却难以达成同样的协议,因为每个人都企图坐享其成。这可以看作是“公地悲剧”的起源。
12参见[英]亚当·斯密著,郭大力、王亚南译,《国民财富的性质和原因的研究》(《国富论》),商务印书馆,1981年。
14参见[美]阿图·埃克斯坦著,张愚山译,《公共财政学》,中国财政经济出版社,1983年。
27参见王绍光著,《分权的底线》,中国计划出版社,1997年。
37决策主体与投入主体有所不同。决策主体不一定就是投入主体。如对于西部地区的村民委员会自治组织和村民来说,不能成为投入主体(主要指投资),但从对公共品需求和民主决策的角度来说,应该成为决策主体。
38匡远配、汪三贵,《农村公共品供给的博弈分析》,北京电子科技学院学报,2004(9)。
39匡远配、汪三贵,《农村公共品供给的博弈分析》,北京电子科技学院学报,2004(9)。
40见方福前著,《公共选择理论—政治的经济学》,中国人民大学出版社,2000年,P50。
41在多数票规则下,还存在着虚假显示自己偏好的情况。
42见安东尼·B·阿特金森和约瑟夫·E·斯蒂格里茨著,《公共经济学》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994年版。
43 Green, J. R.. Laffont, J. J. 1979, Incentives in public decision- making. Amsterdam: North– Holland.
44见安东尼·B·阿特金森和约瑟夫·E·斯蒂格里茨著,《公共经济学》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994年版。
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4 Hamel, Jacques. Case Study Method. Sage Publications, Inc.1993.p2.
10参见[英]霍布斯著,黎思复、黎廷弼译,杨昌裕校,《利维坦》,商务印书馆,1997年。
11 1968年12月13日,美国《科学》杂志发表了美国人类生态学家加勒特·哈丁的《公地的悲剧》一文,于是有人认为最早提出“公地悲剧”的是加勒特·哈丁。而早在1740年,大卫·休谟在其《人性论》中写道:两个邻人可能达成协议,共同在一片平地上排水,但在1000人之间却难以达成同样的协议,因为每个人都企图坐享其成。这可以看作是“公地悲剧”的起源。
12参见[英]亚当·斯密著,郭大力、王亚南译,《国民财富的性质和原因的研究》(《国富论》),商务印书馆,1981年。
14参见[美]阿图·埃克斯坦著,张愚山译,《公共财政学》,中国财政经济出版社,1983年。
27参见王绍光著,《分权的底线》,中国计划出版社,1997年。
37决策主体与投入主体有所不同。决策主体不一定就是投入主体。如对于西部地区的村民委员会自治组织和村民来说,不能成为投入主体(主要指投资),但从对公共品需求和民主决策的角度来说,应该成为决策主体。
38匡远配、汪三贵,《农村公共品供给的博弈分析》,北京电子科技学院学报,2004(9)。
39匡远配、汪三贵,《农村公共品供给的博弈分析》,北京电子科技学院学报,2004(9)。
40见方福前著,《公共选择理论—政治的经济学》,中国人民大学出版社,2000年,P50。
41在多数票规则下,还存在着虚假显示自己偏好的情况。
42见安东尼·B·阿特金森和约瑟夫·E·斯蒂格里茨著,《公共经济学》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994年版。
43 Green, J. R.. Laffont, J. J. 1979, Incentives in public decision- making. Amsterdam: North– Holland.
44见安东尼·B·阿特金森和约瑟夫·E·斯蒂格里茨著,《公共经济学》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994年版。
45李成威著,《公共产品的需求与供给—评价与激励》,中国财政经济出版社,2005年。
48盛洪,“让农民自已代表自已”,《经济观察报》,2003年1月27日。
49李成贵,国家、利益集团与三农困境,《中国社会经济体制比较》,2004(5)
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