基于动态建模的网络联盟企业协同创新研究
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摘要
网络联盟企业是由若干相对独立的具有不同核心能力的企业和单元，通过信息和网络技术构成，能以最少的投资、最快的速度对市场机遇做出反应，取得最大竞争优势和最大利润的相互依赖、信任、合作的动态组织。由于构成联盟的各个企业是独立的经济实体，在借助协同创新提高联盟整体经营效率的同时必然要求提高企业自身的经济收益，所以如何选择联盟伙伴、选择创新任务、分配创新收益及投入创新资源成为联盟企业间成功高效实施协同创新所需面临的一系列关键问题。已有的研究成果，较少探讨环境、决策者态度及创新收益均不确定时联盟企业的具体协同行为及行为变化。本文基于不同的网络联盟组织和结构、创新资源的特性、合作企业的能力和行为特性，本着网络联盟构建-发展-稳定-发展的思路探讨联盟企业在各阶段的协同创新策略，为各种协同创新组织提供理论依据。
首先，探讨了不确定性环境下前景理论和累积前景理论在联盟伙伴选择模型中的应用及意义，构建了联盟伙伴选择的前景理论框架，分析了不同情境下不同决策者对待风险的态度，将创新合作风险视为选择联盟伙伴时的不确定性因素，从资源获取的角度构建决策者在多个存在风险的可替代战略伙伴之间进行选择的模型，为管理者某些决策行为提供了合理的解释。
其次，基于心理学的前景理论，通过与期望效应理论对比，以移动商务价值链为例，研究了网络联盟企业在创新任务决策中的选择差异。从主观风险偏好的视角解释了前景理论在决策中所起到的作用，分析了各个控制变量对决策者行为的影响。通过改变外部环境约束，模拟不同的决策环境和决策方案，判断基于前景理论的决策者的有限理性与各项内外部相关因素的关系。
再次，建立面向创新的网络产品渠道选择模型。假设决策者为具有损失厌恶特性的内容提供商，研究损失厌恶程度对决策变量和目标函数的影响，探讨了内容提供商最优基本建设投入水平决策。揭示出最优投入水平随着损失厌恶程度的增加而发生变化，比较分析内容分发网络采用基于数量折扣和收益共享两种不同定价政策下，内容提供商的最优渠道决策，总结损失厌恶程度对渠道决策的影响及模型中各参数与决策变量和目标函数的关系。
然后，运用博弈思想分析联盟协同创新收益分配机制的采纳行为。探讨了各种资源环境下联盟中各企业在独自创新或协同创新两种方式上的资源投入决策，引入组织间学习效用，计算不同资源环境中企业的期望效用值。发现收益分配机制的采纳会受资源创新权重的影响，拥有创新权重偏低的优势资源的联盟企业更倾向于接受基于投入资源成本风险的收益分配机制，而优势资源创新权重较高的联盟企业则偏好基于投入资源贡献率的收益分配机制，联盟企业会理性地选择合理的而不是最优的收益分配机制。
最后，指出联盟创新收益与企业投入资源是一种互相牵制的关系，建立了协同创新收益模型和各企业创新资源投入模型。通过改变资源保底收益率、创新风险和企业的损失厌恶程度，探讨了两种收益分配机制下具有不同特性的企业的资源投入决策行为，得到在两种基于资源投入的不同收益机制形式下，企业为了获取自身最大化利益的资源投入意愿都会随着风险的增加而下降，并会因各自所拥有的优势资源在创新所需资源中的权重大小而表现出不同的行为。
The network extended enterprise refers to a dynamic organization formed by someindependent enterprises and units with different core competences through informationand network technologies featuring interdependence, mutual trust and cooperation with aview to securing the quickest response to the market opportunities with the minimuminvestment and gaining the largest competitive advantage and maximum profit. Giventhat enterprises of the extended enterprise are independent economic entities, eachparticipating enterprise is required to improve economic benefits of its own while raisingthe overall operating efficiency of the extended enterprise through cooperativeinnovation. In this sense, how to choose partners and innovation tasks, how to distributeinnovation income and how to input innovation resources of the extended enterprise havebecome crucial challenges for participating enterprises to secure successful and efficientcooperative innovation. However, the existing research findings have hardly involved thespecific cooperative behaviors and behavioral changes of the enterprises while theenvironment, attitude of decision-makers and innovation income are uncertain. Thispaper, bases on different organizations and structures, features of innovation resourcesand network extended enterprises, abilities and behavioral characteristics of cooperativeenterprises, and in the light of its core vision ofconstruction-development-stability-development, aims to examine the behavioralstrategy of cooperative innovation of the extended enterprise with a view to providing atheoretical basis for various organizations engaging in cooperative innovation.
First, it discusses the application and significance of prospect theory and cumulativeprospect theory in the partner selection model of the extended enterprise under uncertainenvironment, establishes prospect theory framework for partner selection of the extendedenterprise and analyzes the attitudes of different decision-makes under differentsituations, regarding innovation cooperation risks as an uncertain factor in partnerselection. In addition, it provides a rational interpretation on some decision behaviors ofmanagers by establishing, from the perspective of resource access, a model fordecision-makers to make selection from many fungible strategic partners with potentialrisks.
Second, based on prospect theory in psychology and taking as an example valuechains for mobile businesses, this paper studies selection differences in network extended enterprise s decision making for innovation tasks by comparing it with expectation effecttheory. Moreover, it, from the perspective of subjective risk preference, expounds on therole of prospect theory in decision making and analyzes the influence of various controlvariables on decision-makers. It simulates different decision-making environments andschemes by changing the external environmental constrains to judge the relation betweenthe bounded rationality of the prospect-theory-based decision-maker and various internaland external factors.
Third, it establishes a channel decision model for content provider with loss aversion,studies the influence of the degree of loss aversion on decision-making variables andobjective function, and examines the content provider s decision on the overall input inoptimal capital construction. On the one hand, it finds out that optimal input changeswith the increase of loss aversion. On the other hand, it compares and analyzes theoptimal channel decision of the content provider while the content distribution network(as the intermediate) adopts two different pricing policies based on quantity discount andrevenue sharing and makes a summary on loss aversion s influence on channel decisionas well as the relation between parameters of the model and decision variables andobjective function.
Next, it, game theory is used to analyzes the adoption of income distributionmechanism of the extended enterprise cooperative innovation, studies decision makingof individual enterprise on resource input under various resource conditions in theirindependent innovation and cooperative innovation. Moreover, it calculates the expectedutility value of the enterprise under different resource environment by introducing theeffect of learning form each other. In addition, it discovers that the adoption of incomedistribution is influenced by resource innovation weight, that extended enterprises withadvantageous resources of lower innovation weight are more inclined to adopt theincome distribution mechanism based on input resource cost risks while extendedenterprises with advantageous resources of higher innovation weight prefer to the inputresource contribution-rate-oriented income distribution mechanism. Therefore, thenetwork extended enterprise will make a rational selection on a rational incomedistribution mechanism instead of an optimal one.
Finally, the paper， pointing out that innovation income of the extended enterpriseand its input resource constitute a relation featuring check and balance, establishes amodel of cooperative innovation income and a model of innovation resource input forparticipating enterprises. What s more, by changing resource minimum yield, the degree of innovation risks and enterprise s loss aversion, the paper studies the decisionbehaviors in resource input of enterprises with different characteristics under the twoincome distribution mechanisms. It comes to the conclusion that in the light of the tworesource input-based income mechanisms, the enterprise, in order to maximize its profit,its input intention will decrease with the increase of risks and behave differently with thechange of the size of weights of their advantageous resources in innovation resources.
首先，探讨了不确定性环境下前景理论和累积前景理论在联盟伙伴选择模型中的应用及意义，构建了联盟伙伴选择的前景理论框架，分析了不同情境下不同决策者对待风险的态度，将创新合作风险视为选择联盟伙伴时的不确定性因素，从资源获取的角度构建决策者在多个存在风险的可替代战略伙伴之间进行选择的模型，为管理者某些决策行为提供了合理的解释。
其次，基于心理学的前景理论，通过与期望效应理论对比，以移动商务价值链为例，研究了网络联盟企业在创新任务决策中的选择差异。从主观风险偏好的视角解释了前景理论在决策中所起到的作用，分析了各个控制变量对决策者行为的影响。通过改变外部环境约束，模拟不同的决策环境和决策方案，判断基于前景理论的决策者的有限理性与各项内外部相关因素的关系。
再次，建立面向创新的网络产品渠道选择模型。假设决策者为具有损失厌恶特性的内容提供商，研究损失厌恶程度对决策变量和目标函数的影响，探讨了内容提供商最优基本建设投入水平决策。揭示出最优投入水平随着损失厌恶程度的增加而发生变化，比较分析内容分发网络采用基于数量折扣和收益共享两种不同定价政策下，内容提供商的最优渠道决策，总结损失厌恶程度对渠道决策的影响及模型中各参数与决策变量和目标函数的关系。
然后，运用博弈思想分析联盟协同创新收益分配机制的采纳行为。探讨了各种资源环境下联盟中各企业在独自创新或协同创新两种方式上的资源投入决策，引入组织间学习效用，计算不同资源环境中企业的期望效用值。发现收益分配机制的采纳会受资源创新权重的影响，拥有创新权重偏低的优势资源的联盟企业更倾向于接受基于投入资源成本风险的收益分配机制，而优势资源创新权重较高的联盟企业则偏好基于投入资源贡献率的收益分配机制，联盟企业会理性地选择合理的而不是最优的收益分配机制。
最后，指出联盟创新收益与企业投入资源是一种互相牵制的关系，建立了协同创新收益模型和各企业创新资源投入模型。通过改变资源保底收益率、创新风险和企业的损失厌恶程度，探讨了两种收益分配机制下具有不同特性的企业的资源投入决策行为，得到在两种基于资源投入的不同收益机制形式下，企业为了获取自身最大化利益的资源投入意愿都会随着风险的增加而下降，并会因各自所拥有的优势资源在创新所需资源中的权重大小而表现出不同的行为。
The network extended enterprise refers to a dynamic organization formed by someindependent enterprises and units with different core competences through informationand network technologies featuring interdependence, mutual trust and cooperation with aview to securing the quickest response to the market opportunities with the minimuminvestment and gaining the largest competitive advantage and maximum profit. Giventhat enterprises of the extended enterprise are independent economic entities, eachparticipating enterprise is required to improve economic benefits of its own while raisingthe overall operating efficiency of the extended enterprise through cooperativeinnovation. In this sense, how to choose partners and innovation tasks, how to distributeinnovation income and how to input innovation resources of the extended enterprise havebecome crucial challenges for participating enterprises to secure successful and efficientcooperative innovation. However, the existing research findings have hardly involved thespecific cooperative behaviors and behavioral changes of the enterprises while theenvironment, attitude of decision-makers and innovation income are uncertain. Thispaper, bases on different organizations and structures, features of innovation resourcesand network extended enterprises, abilities and behavioral characteristics of cooperativeenterprises, and in the light of its core vision ofconstruction-development-stability-development, aims to examine the behavioralstrategy of cooperative innovation of the extended enterprise with a view to providing atheoretical basis for various organizations engaging in cooperative innovation.
First, it discusses the application and significance of prospect theory and cumulativeprospect theory in the partner selection model of the extended enterprise under uncertainenvironment, establishes prospect theory framework for partner selection of the extendedenterprise and analyzes the attitudes of different decision-makes under differentsituations, regarding innovation cooperation risks as an uncertain factor in partnerselection. In addition, it provides a rational interpretation on some decision behaviors ofmanagers by establishing, from the perspective of resource access, a model fordecision-makers to make selection from many fungible strategic partners with potentialrisks.
Second, based on prospect theory in psychology and taking as an example valuechains for mobile businesses, this paper studies selection differences in network extended enterprise s decision making for innovation tasks by comparing it with expectation effecttheory. Moreover, it, from the perspective of subjective risk preference, expounds on therole of prospect theory in decision making and analyzes the influence of various controlvariables on decision-makers. It simulates different decision-making environments andschemes by changing the external environmental constrains to judge the relation betweenthe bounded rationality of the prospect-theory-based decision-maker and various internaland external factors.
Third, it establishes a channel decision model for content provider with loss aversion,studies the influence of the degree of loss aversion on decision-making variables andobjective function, and examines the content provider s decision on the overall input inoptimal capital construction. On the one hand, it finds out that optimal input changeswith the increase of loss aversion. On the other hand, it compares and analyzes theoptimal channel decision of the content provider while the content distribution network(as the intermediate) adopts two different pricing policies based on quantity discount andrevenue sharing and makes a summary on loss aversion s influence on channel decisionas well as the relation between parameters of the model and decision variables andobjective function.
Next, it, game theory is used to analyzes the adoption of income distributionmechanism of the extended enterprise cooperative innovation, studies decision makingof individual enterprise on resource input under various resource conditions in theirindependent innovation and cooperative innovation. Moreover, it calculates the expectedutility value of the enterprise under different resource environment by introducing theeffect of learning form each other. In addition, it discovers that the adoption of incomedistribution is influenced by resource innovation weight, that extended enterprises withadvantageous resources of lower innovation weight are more inclined to adopt theincome distribution mechanism based on input resource cost risks while extendedenterprises with advantageous resources of higher innovation weight prefer to the inputresource contribution-rate-oriented income distribution mechanism. Therefore, thenetwork extended enterprise will make a rational selection on a rational incomedistribution mechanism instead of an optimal one.
Finally, the paper， pointing out that innovation income of the extended enterpriseand its input resource constitute a relation featuring check and balance, establishes amodel of cooperative innovation income and a model of innovation resource input forparticipating enterprises. What s more, by changing resource minimum yield, the degree of innovation risks and enterprise s loss aversion, the paper studies the decisionbehaviors in resource input of enterprises with different characteristics under the twoincome distribution mechanisms. It comes to the conclusion that in the light of the tworesource input-based income mechanisms, the enterprise, in order to maximize its profit,its input intention will decrease with the increase of risks and behave differently with thechange of the size of weights of their advantageous resources in innovation resources.
引文
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