企业集团内部资本市场有效性研究
|
摘要
资本配置是资源配置的核心。对于资本配置,人们首先联想到的一般是股票、债券市场或银行信贷市场等外部资本市场,而忽视了另一类市场——内部资本市场的存在。近年来,伴随着大量兼并、收购行为发生,企业集团涌现以及多元化浪潮,关于内部资本市场的研究也越来越多。
我国对内部资本市场的研究起步较晚。从20世纪80年代中期开始,我国开始推动企业集团组建,上市公司中企业集团大量涌现。同时,我国证券市场建设初期,上市公司多以分拆上市的形式进入资本市场,形成复杂的母子公司结构,子公司与母公司进行大量的关联交易行为,形成了相关的内部资本市场。此外,近十多年来,我国出现大量系族企业,使得内部资本市场运作更加普遍。
我国对于内部资本市场的研究结论也是各不一致,理论界存在着“有效论”和“无效论”之争,实践界也处在摸索求证的阶段。那么,内部资本市场究竟有没有效率?在什么情况下内部资本市场有效,什么情况下无效?如果内部资本市场的有效性弱,我们应该采取什么措施对其改进?这些问题都亟待我们研究解决,这也正是本文研究的出发点。
本文引入内部化理论、委托代理、融资优序等理论的核心思想,立足中国内部资本市场环境,采用规范研究、实证研究和案例研究相结合的方法,系统深入地研究了中国内部资本市场的有效性及其影响因素,并针对研究结论,提出了相关政策建议。具体的说,本文总体上分为三大部分：第一部分为理论与制度背景分析,在对内部资本市场概念、特征、功能等基础理论、运行机制等方面进行探讨的基础上,基于我国特殊的制度背景分析了内部资本市场在我国产生的条件、发展历程和现状,包括第二章和第三章。第二部分为实证研究,采用Jeffrey Wurgler分析方法、Q敏感性分析方法和现金流敏感性分析方法研究2008年我国民营系族企业内部资本市场的有效性,并进一步通过实证方法研究内部资本市场效率受哪些因素影响,最后通过案例分析,得出关于内部资本市场有效性的充分证据,包括第四章、第五章和第六章。第三部分为政策建议。各章内容如下：
第一章,导论。主要阐述了本文的研究背景、研究目的及意义,同时说明本文的研究内容和逻辑思路,指出了本文的创新点及可能存在的不足。
第二章,内部资本市场的理论基础及其运行机制。主要分析内部资本市场的特征及功能、内外部资本市场的关系、内部资本市场的运行机制,以及内部资本市场的理论基础以期对内部资本市场的基本理论进行系统研究。
第三章,我国内部资本市场的制度背景分析。结合我国实际情况,分析我国内部资本市场产生和发展的特殊制度背景,同时进一步描述我国内部资本市场发展的现状,如集团公司、财务公司数量的变化,关联交易的普遍性等。
第四章,我国内部资本市场效率的实证研究——基于民营上市公司。首先,对样本选取的原因、数据来源与处理以及样本选择的情况进行说明。接着,分别采用Jeffrey Wurgler分析方法、Q敏感性分析方法和现金流敏感性分析方法,对我国民营系族企业内部资本市场效率进行了研究。
第五章,我国内部资本市场效率影响因素分析。分析我国特殊制度背景下内部资本市场的影响因素,主要是从公司治理、股权结构以及多元化等方面进行分析,并通过Logistic模型进行回归分析,找出我国系族企业内部资本市场有效性的影响因素。
第六章,内部资本市场的案例研究——以“万向系”为例。该部分将选取“万向系”为案例对内部资本市场的实证研究结果进行检验。首先,对案例的选取来源及该集团公司进行介绍；其次,分析内部资本市场的运作方式；最后,分析内部资本市场对企业价值的影响以及其内部资本市场的有效性。
第七章,研究结论及建议。首先,基于全文的研究,概括总结研究结论。接着,分析我国内部资本市场发展的制约因素。最后,根据我国内部资本市场发展存在的问题和实际情况,提出若干建议。
本文的研究得出以下结论：
第一,我国内部资本市场存在和发展有其特殊的背景。巨大的融资需求、银行信贷配给和信贷歧视问题的存在,加之股票市场不够完善,使得内部资本市场是一种比较理想的选择。我国内部资本市场近年来发展迅速,主要表现在企业集团和财务公司大量涌现、系族企业出现并快速发展以及关联交易越来越频繁。
第二,我国民营系族企业内部资本市场的总体效率较低。采用Jeffrey Wurgler分析方法、Q敏感性分析方法以及现金流敏感性分析方法的研究结果均表明,选取的31个民营系族66家上市公司内部资本市场的效率总体低下。
第三,我国部分民营系族上市公司的内部资本市场是有效的。从单个公司的Q敏感性和现金流敏感性来看,部分企业的内部资本市场运作是有效的。但这部分企业内部资本市场的有效性被另一部分企业内部资本市场的无效性所中和,使得我国系族企业内部资本市场从样本总体来看效率低下。同时,案例企业的研究也发现其内部资本市场运作存在效率。
第四,内部资本市场效率受到多种因素的影响。内部资本市场有效性与引进外资的程度、年度内董事会的会议次数、董事会持股比例、高管人员持股比例显著地正向相关,而与独立董事比例、是否多元化以及控制权与现金流权的分离程度显著负相关。
Capital allocation is the core of the allocation of resources. As regard to the allocation of capital, people generally think of the stock, the bond or the bank credit market and other external capital markets at first, but ignore the existence of another market-the internal capital market. In recent years, with a large number of Mergers&Acquisitions occuring and the wave of emergence for enterprise groups and the diversity, the research on Internal Capital Market is also increasing.
The research for Internal Capital Market started relatively late in China.From the mid of1980's, China promoted to the formation of the Groups,and a large number of enterprise groups emergenced between listed companies.Meanwhile,at the early construction of China's securities market, listed companies and more to split the form into the capital markets, the formation of a large number of parent-subsidiary structure.There were a large number of related transactions between subsidiaries and parent company,which formed the related internal capital market.Otherwise, in the last ten years, a large number of departments of family businesses appeared in China, making the operation of the internal capital market more generally.
The research findings of internal capital market in China is inconsistent.In theory, the struggle of "effective" and "void" exists.While,while in practice there is still in exploration and confirmation. So, whether the Internal Capital Market is efficient or not? The Internal Capital Market is effective under what circumstances, and what circumstances is invalid? If the Internal Capital Market were inefficient, what measures should we take for its improvement? These problems should be solved, which is the starting point of this paper.
This paper provides further systematic research on Internal Capital Market issues, with theoretical analysis, logical reasoning, empirical research and case study method. Based on the disscussion of the basic theory on the concept, features, functions of Internal Capital Markets and mechanisms,the paper analysis the condition, history and present situation of the Internal Capital Market in China,with the background of China's special system.
Chapter I, Introduction. Elaborate the background, purpose and meaning of this paper.Meanwhile, explain the contents of this study and the article structure.Then, present innovation of the article based on preceding research and possible shortcomings.
Chapter Ⅱ, the basic theory and the mechanism of internal capital markets.Mainly analyze the concepts,characteristics,theoretical basis and functions of internal capital market.Then idendifine the relationship and the difference between Internal Capital Market and Exernal Capital Market,in order to systemically study the basic theory of internal capital markets. Then, make clear what are the elements and vectors of the Internal Capital Market System and analyze the the process and the way in which Internal Capital Market operates.
Chapter III, the development process and the current situation of the internal capital market in China. Analyze the special systematical background in which the internal capital market emerged and develops, combing with the actual situation in China.Meanwhile, further describe the current situation of the internal capital market in China,such as Groups, changes in the number of financial companies, the universality of related party transactions.
Chapter IV, the empirical research on Internal Capital Marke efficiency-based on Listed Private Companies in China.explain the reason for the sample choosen, discribe the data sources and processing. Then, empirically research on the ICM efficiency of the private companies with J-W method, Q sensitivity analytical method and cash flow sensitivity analytical method respectively.
Chapter V,the analysis on factors affecting China's internal capital market efficiency. Make comprehensive analysis on factors related to China's internal capital market efficiency from corporate governance, ownership structure and diversification perspectives, based on the special system background.Find out factors that affect internal capital market efficiency of private companies in china through Logistic Regression.
Chapter VI, case studies-based on the Wang Xiang System.The case of "Wang Xiang system" will be selected to test empirical results in this part. First,give the reason why Wang Xiang System is chose and introduce it briefly. Second, analyze the operation mode of the internal capital market in the system. Finally,analyze the effectiveness of internal capital market and influencing factors.
Chapter VIII, the conclusions and recommendations. First, summarize the research findings based on the full text studies,.Then, Analyze the constraints of the internal capital market in China.Finally, raise several suggestions according to the problems and the actual situation of China's internal capital market development.
The paper comes to the conclusion as following:
First, the existence and development of the Internal Capital Market in China had its special background. Huge financing needs and the existence of bank credit allocation and credit discrimination, with the imperfect of the stock market,made the internal capital market a comparative good choice. Internal Capital Market has developed rapidly in recent years in China, mainly showed by the emergency of large number of Groups and finance companies, the appearance of family business which are developping rapidly,and the frequency of the related party transactions.
Second, the Internal Capital Market of family enterprises in China was inefficient overall. With J-W method, Q sensitivity analytical method and cash flow sensitivity analytical method,the results show that the efficiency of Internal Capital Market of China's family enterprises in generally low.
Third, the Internal Capital Marke in private listed companies is partly efficient.From Q and cash flow sensitivity analysis of single company, some of their Internal Capital Markets is efficient.These companies could effectively make use of internal capital market to alleviate the financial pressure and optimize resource allocation.
Fourth, the internal capital market efficiency is affected by many factors.The efficiency of the internal capital market was significantly positively correlated with the extent of foreign investment, ownership of board and senior executives stake, while negatively correlated with the number of board meetings during the year, the proportion of independent directors, whether diversified and the separation degree of the control rights and cash flow separation.
我国对内部资本市场的研究起步较晚。从20世纪80年代中期开始,我国开始推动企业集团组建,上市公司中企业集团大量涌现。同时,我国证券市场建设初期,上市公司多以分拆上市的形式进入资本市场,形成复杂的母子公司结构,子公司与母公司进行大量的关联交易行为,形成了相关的内部资本市场。此外,近十多年来,我国出现大量系族企业,使得内部资本市场运作更加普遍。
我国对于内部资本市场的研究结论也是各不一致,理论界存在着“有效论”和“无效论”之争,实践界也处在摸索求证的阶段。那么,内部资本市场究竟有没有效率?在什么情况下内部资本市场有效,什么情况下无效?如果内部资本市场的有效性弱,我们应该采取什么措施对其改进?这些问题都亟待我们研究解决,这也正是本文研究的出发点。
本文引入内部化理论、委托代理、融资优序等理论的核心思想,立足中国内部资本市场环境,采用规范研究、实证研究和案例研究相结合的方法,系统深入地研究了中国内部资本市场的有效性及其影响因素,并针对研究结论,提出了相关政策建议。具体的说,本文总体上分为三大部分：第一部分为理论与制度背景分析,在对内部资本市场概念、特征、功能等基础理论、运行机制等方面进行探讨的基础上,基于我国特殊的制度背景分析了内部资本市场在我国产生的条件、发展历程和现状,包括第二章和第三章。第二部分为实证研究,采用Jeffrey Wurgler分析方法、Q敏感性分析方法和现金流敏感性分析方法研究2008年我国民营系族企业内部资本市场的有效性,并进一步通过实证方法研究内部资本市场效率受哪些因素影响,最后通过案例分析,得出关于内部资本市场有效性的充分证据,包括第四章、第五章和第六章。第三部分为政策建议。各章内容如下：
第一章,导论。主要阐述了本文的研究背景、研究目的及意义,同时说明本文的研究内容和逻辑思路,指出了本文的创新点及可能存在的不足。
第二章,内部资本市场的理论基础及其运行机制。主要分析内部资本市场的特征及功能、内外部资本市场的关系、内部资本市场的运行机制,以及内部资本市场的理论基础以期对内部资本市场的基本理论进行系统研究。
第三章,我国内部资本市场的制度背景分析。结合我国实际情况,分析我国内部资本市场产生和发展的特殊制度背景,同时进一步描述我国内部资本市场发展的现状,如集团公司、财务公司数量的变化,关联交易的普遍性等。
第四章,我国内部资本市场效率的实证研究——基于民营上市公司。首先,对样本选取的原因、数据来源与处理以及样本选择的情况进行说明。接着,分别采用Jeffrey Wurgler分析方法、Q敏感性分析方法和现金流敏感性分析方法,对我国民营系族企业内部资本市场效率进行了研究。
第五章,我国内部资本市场效率影响因素分析。分析我国特殊制度背景下内部资本市场的影响因素,主要是从公司治理、股权结构以及多元化等方面进行分析,并通过Logistic模型进行回归分析,找出我国系族企业内部资本市场有效性的影响因素。
第六章,内部资本市场的案例研究——以“万向系”为例。该部分将选取“万向系”为案例对内部资本市场的实证研究结果进行检验。首先,对案例的选取来源及该集团公司进行介绍；其次,分析内部资本市场的运作方式；最后,分析内部资本市场对企业价值的影响以及其内部资本市场的有效性。
第七章,研究结论及建议。首先,基于全文的研究,概括总结研究结论。接着,分析我国内部资本市场发展的制约因素。最后,根据我国内部资本市场发展存在的问题和实际情况,提出若干建议。
本文的研究得出以下结论：
第一,我国内部资本市场存在和发展有其特殊的背景。巨大的融资需求、银行信贷配给和信贷歧视问题的存在,加之股票市场不够完善,使得内部资本市场是一种比较理想的选择。我国内部资本市场近年来发展迅速,主要表现在企业集团和财务公司大量涌现、系族企业出现并快速发展以及关联交易越来越频繁。
第二,我国民营系族企业内部资本市场的总体效率较低。采用Jeffrey Wurgler分析方法、Q敏感性分析方法以及现金流敏感性分析方法的研究结果均表明,选取的31个民营系族66家上市公司内部资本市场的效率总体低下。
第三,我国部分民营系族上市公司的内部资本市场是有效的。从单个公司的Q敏感性和现金流敏感性来看,部分企业的内部资本市场运作是有效的。但这部分企业内部资本市场的有效性被另一部分企业内部资本市场的无效性所中和,使得我国系族企业内部资本市场从样本总体来看效率低下。同时,案例企业的研究也发现其内部资本市场运作存在效率。
第四,内部资本市场效率受到多种因素的影响。内部资本市场有效性与引进外资的程度、年度内董事会的会议次数、董事会持股比例、高管人员持股比例显著地正向相关,而与独立董事比例、是否多元化以及控制权与现金流权的分离程度显著负相关。
Capital allocation is the core of the allocation of resources. As regard to the allocation of capital, people generally think of the stock, the bond or the bank credit market and other external capital markets at first, but ignore the existence of another market-the internal capital market. In recent years, with a large number of Mergers&Acquisitions occuring and the wave of emergence for enterprise groups and the diversity, the research on Internal Capital Market is also increasing.
The research for Internal Capital Market started relatively late in China.From the mid of1980's, China promoted to the formation of the Groups,and a large number of enterprise groups emergenced between listed companies.Meanwhile,at the early construction of China's securities market, listed companies and more to split the form into the capital markets, the formation of a large number of parent-subsidiary structure.There were a large number of related transactions between subsidiaries and parent company,which formed the related internal capital market.Otherwise, in the last ten years, a large number of departments of family businesses appeared in China, making the operation of the internal capital market more generally.
The research findings of internal capital market in China is inconsistent.In theory, the struggle of "effective" and "void" exists.While,while in practice there is still in exploration and confirmation. So, whether the Internal Capital Market is efficient or not? The Internal Capital Market is effective under what circumstances, and what circumstances is invalid? If the Internal Capital Market were inefficient, what measures should we take for its improvement? These problems should be solved, which is the starting point of this paper.
This paper provides further systematic research on Internal Capital Market issues, with theoretical analysis, logical reasoning, empirical research and case study method. Based on the disscussion of the basic theory on the concept, features, functions of Internal Capital Markets and mechanisms,the paper analysis the condition, history and present situation of the Internal Capital Market in China,with the background of China's special system.
Chapter I, Introduction. Elaborate the background, purpose and meaning of this paper.Meanwhile, explain the contents of this study and the article structure.Then, present innovation of the article based on preceding research and possible shortcomings.
Chapter Ⅱ, the basic theory and the mechanism of internal capital markets.Mainly analyze the concepts,characteristics,theoretical basis and functions of internal capital market.Then idendifine the relationship and the difference between Internal Capital Market and Exernal Capital Market,in order to systemically study the basic theory of internal capital markets. Then, make clear what are the elements and vectors of the Internal Capital Market System and analyze the the process and the way in which Internal Capital Market operates.
Chapter III, the development process and the current situation of the internal capital market in China. Analyze the special systematical background in which the internal capital market emerged and develops, combing with the actual situation in China.Meanwhile, further describe the current situation of the internal capital market in China,such as Groups, changes in the number of financial companies, the universality of related party transactions.
Chapter IV, the empirical research on Internal Capital Marke efficiency-based on Listed Private Companies in China.explain the reason for the sample choosen, discribe the data sources and processing. Then, empirically research on the ICM efficiency of the private companies with J-W method, Q sensitivity analytical method and cash flow sensitivity analytical method respectively.
Chapter V,the analysis on factors affecting China's internal capital market efficiency. Make comprehensive analysis on factors related to China's internal capital market efficiency from corporate governance, ownership structure and diversification perspectives, based on the special system background.Find out factors that affect internal capital market efficiency of private companies in china through Logistic Regression.
Chapter VI, case studies-based on the Wang Xiang System.The case of "Wang Xiang system" will be selected to test empirical results in this part. First,give the reason why Wang Xiang System is chose and introduce it briefly. Second, analyze the operation mode of the internal capital market in the system. Finally,analyze the effectiveness of internal capital market and influencing factors.
Chapter VIII, the conclusions and recommendations. First, summarize the research findings based on the full text studies,.Then, Analyze the constraints of the internal capital market in China.Finally, raise several suggestions according to the problems and the actual situation of China's internal capital market development.
The paper comes to the conclusion as following:
First, the existence and development of the Internal Capital Market in China had its special background. Huge financing needs and the existence of bank credit allocation and credit discrimination, with the imperfect of the stock market,made the internal capital market a comparative good choice. Internal Capital Market has developed rapidly in recent years in China, mainly showed by the emergency of large number of Groups and finance companies, the appearance of family business which are developping rapidly,and the frequency of the related party transactions.
Second, the Internal Capital Market of family enterprises in China was inefficient overall. With J-W method, Q sensitivity analytical method and cash flow sensitivity analytical method,the results show that the efficiency of Internal Capital Market of China's family enterprises in generally low.
Third, the Internal Capital Marke in private listed companies is partly efficient.From Q and cash flow sensitivity analysis of single company, some of their Internal Capital Markets is efficient.These companies could effectively make use of internal capital market to alleviate the financial pressure and optimize resource allocation.
Fourth, the internal capital market efficiency is affected by many factors.The efficiency of the internal capital market was significantly positively correlated with the extent of foreign investment, ownership of board and senior executives stake, while negatively correlated with the number of board meetings during the year, the proportion of independent directors, whether diversified and the separation degree of the control rights and cash flow separation.
引文
1. Alchian, A. A., Corporate Management and Property Rights. Henry Manneed Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities, Washington, D. C.:American Enterprise Institute,1969:337-360.
2. Williamson, Oliver,1970, "Corporate Control and Business Behavior:An Inquiry into the Effects of Organization Form on Enterprise Behavior", New Jersey:Free Press
3. Akerlof,G., The Market for'Lemons':Quality Uncertainty and The Market Mechanism [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics.1970(84):488-500.
4. Alchian, Armen. Corporate Management and Property rights [J].Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities.1969 (60):787-794.
5. Berger, P. and E. Ofek, Diversification's Effect on firm value, Journal of Financial Economics,1995,37(1):39-65
6. Boys, B.K.,CEO Quality and Firm Performance:A Contingence Model [J].Strategic Management Journal,1995(16):301-312.
7. Chandler, A.D., Strategy and Structure:Chapters in the History of Industrial Enterprises, Cambridge Mass, MIT Press,1962
8. Claessens, S., S.Djankov, J.P.H.Fan and L.H.P.Lang, The Benefits and Costs of Internal Markets:Evidence From Asia Financial Crisis, working Paper, World Bank.1999.
9. Coase, R. The Natural of Firm[J]. Economica.1937(4):386-405.
10. Deloof M.Internal Capital Markets, Bank Borrowing, and Financing Constraints:Evidence from Belgian Firms[J]. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting.1998(25):945-968.
11. Donaldson, L.Davis J.,Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory:CEO Goverance and Shareholder Returns[J].The Academy of Management Review.1997,22(3):49-65.
12. Gertner, R.H, E.Powers and D.Scharsftein.Learning about Internal Capital Markets from Corporate Spin-offs [J].The Journal of Finance.2002(6)2479-2506.
13. Gertner, R.H.,D.Scharsftein and J.C.Stein. Internal Versus External Capital Markets [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economies,1994(109):1211-1230.
14. Granovetter, M.Busness Group,In N.Smelser and R.Swedberg.The Handbook of Economic Sociology [M].Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press, 1994:453-475.
15. Grant, R. M., A.P.Jammine and H. Thomas, Diversity, Diversification, and Profitability Among British Manufacturing Companies, Academy of Management of Journal,1988,31:771-801
16. Grossman, S.J. and O.D.Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration [J]. Journal of Political Economy. 1986 (94):691-719.
17. Harris, M., C.H.Kriebel and A.Raviv, Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation[J].Management Science.1982 (28):604-620.
18. Hart, O.and J.Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm [J].Journal of Political Economy.1990(98):1119-1158.
19. Hart, O.Corporate Goverance:Some Theory and Implications[J].The Economic Journal.1995(105):678-689.
20. Hermalin, B.,Weisbach, M, Boards of Directors as an Endogenous Determined Insititution:A Survey of the Economic Literature.Working Paper, University of California at Berkeley and University of Illinois.2000:154-162.
21. Hill, Charles, W.L. Internal Capital Market Controls and Financial Performance in Multidivisional Firms[J].The Journal of Industrial.1988(37):134-156.
22. Hubbard, R.G. and D.Palia, A Re-Examination of the Conglomerate Merger Wave in the 1960s:An Internal Capital Markets View [J].Journal of Finance.1999 (54):1131-1152
23. Islam, S. and A.Mozumdar., Financing Market Development and Importance of Internal Markets:Evidence from International Data.Working Paper.2002.
24. Jensen, M.C, The Model Industrial Revolution, Exit, Corporate Finance, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems [J] Journal of Finance.1993,46 (3): 831-880.
25. Jensen, M.C, W.H. Meckling. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers [J]. American Economies Review.1986 (76):323-329.
26. Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling. Theory of the firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and ownership Structure [J] Journal of Finance, 1976(3)308-342.
27. Khanna,.T, Palepu, K., Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets?An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Group, Journal of Finance,2000b,55(12):867-899
28. Khanna,.T, Palepu, K., The future of business groups in emerging markets Long-run evidence from Chile, Academy of Mamagement Journal,2000a, 1143(13):268-285
29. Khanna,.T, Palepu, K.,.Why focused strategies may be wrong of remerging markets:Long run evidence from Chile[J].Academy of Management Journal.1997,43(3):268-285.
30. Khanna, T. and S.Tice, The Bright Side of Internal Capital Markets [J].Journal of Finance.2001,56(5):1489-1527.
31. Khanna, T., and Rivkin, J.. Ties That Bind Business Groups:Evidence from an Emerging Economy. Harvard Business School Working Paper Series.2000(8):1-68.
32. Khanna, T., and Rivkin, J..Estimating the Performance Effects of Business of Groups in Emerging Markets[J].Strategic Management Journal of Finance.2001,56(5):
33. La Porta R., et al. Corporate Ownership around the World [J].Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471—517.
34. Lamont O. Cash Flow and Investment:Evidence from Internal Capital Markets [J]. Journal of Finance.1997,52 (1):83-109.
35. Larry H. P. Lang and Rene M. Stulz. Tobin's q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance, Journal of Political Economy,1994,102(6):1248-1280
36. Leff, N.H.Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in the Developing Countries:the Economic Groups[J].Economic Development and Cultural Change.1978(26):661-675.
37. Lipton,Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, Business Lawyer,1992,48(1):59-77
38. Meyer, M., P.Milgrom and J.Roberts.Organizational prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes [J] Journal of Economies and Management Strategy.1992(1):9-35.
39. Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998(20):293-315.
40. Myers, S.C. and N.C. Majluf.Corporate Financingand Investment Decision when Firms Have Information that Investors Do not Have[J]. Journal of Financial Economics.1984(13):187-222.
41. Nikos Vafeas,Board Meeting Frequency and Firm Performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics.1999,53(1):113-142.
42. Peyer, U.C. and A. Shivdasani, Leverage and internal capital markets:Evidence from leveraged recapitalization [J].Journal of Financial Economics,2001,59 (2):477-515.
43. Peyer, U.C., Internal and External Capital Markets.Workoing Paper.University of North Carolina, INSEAD,2002.
44. Rajan, R., H.Sevraes and L.Zingales, The Cost of Diversity:The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment [J].Journal of Finance. 2000(55):35-80.
45. Rechner,P. and D.R. Dalton,CEO Duality and Organizational Performance:A Longitudinal Analysis[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1991(112):155-160.
46. Ross.The Determination of Financial Structure and the Incentive Signaling Approach[J], Journal of Economics.1986(8):23-40.
47. Rumelt, R.P., Diversification Strategy and Profitability[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1982,3(4):359-369
48. Scharsftein, D.S, The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets II:Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates, NBER Working Paper,1998.
49. Scharsftein, D.S. and J.C.Stein, The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment[J]. Journal of Finance.2000 (55):2537-2564.
50. Schoar, A.S. Effects of Corporate Diversification on Productivity [J] Journal of Finance.2002(57):2379-2403.
51. Shin and Park.Financing Constraints and Internal Capital Market:Evidence from Korean'chaebols'[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance.1999,5 (2): 169-191.
52. Shin, Hyun-Han. & Stulz, Rene, M. Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient? [J]. Quarterly journal of Economies.1998 (113):531-552.
53. Stein, J.C.,. Information Production and Capital Allocation:Decentralized vs. Hierarchical Firms[R], working Paper, Harvard.2002.
54. Stein, J.C., Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources [J]. Journal of Finance.1997(52):111-133.
55. Stulz R M.Managerial dicretion and optimal financing policies[J]. Journal of Financial Economies.1990(26):3-28.
56. Triantis.Organizations as Internal Capital Markets:The Boundaries of Corporations, Trusts and security intrests in Commercial and Charitable ventures[M].Harvard Law Review.2004.1102-1162.
57. Vihang R. Errunza and Lemma W. Senbet, The Effects of International Operations on the Market Value of the Firm:Theory and Evidence, The Journal of Finance, Vol.36, No.2,1981,401-417
58. Weston.C.R.A., Diffusion Index for Australian Business Cycles, Economic Record,1970,46:384-392
59. Williamson, Oliver E., Markets and Hierarchies:analysis and antitrust implications [M].New York, Collier Macmillan Publishers, Inc.,1975.
60. Williamson, Oliver E., Corporate Control and Business Behavior.New York, Free Press,1975.
61. Williamson, Oliver E..The Economies Institutions of Capitalism[M], New York, NY:The Free Press.1985
62. Wolfenzon, D., A Theory of Pyramidal Structures, Harvard University, mimeo, February,1999
63. Wulf, J., Influence and Inefficiency in the Internal Capital Market:Theory and Evidence, working Paper, University of Pennsylvania,1999.
64. Wulf, J., Internal capital markets and Firm-level compensation incentives for division managers, Journal of Labore Economics,2002, Apr,20(2):219-262
65.陈志广,高级管理人员报酬的实证研究[J].经济研究,1997(9)：58-70..
66.樊纲、王小鲁和朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2009年报告[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2010.
67.冯丽霞.内部资本市场：组织载体、交易与租金[J].会计研究,2006(8)：37-43.
68.傅继波、杨朝军：多元化经营与公司价值研究[J].大连理工大学学报,2005(2)：36—40
69.高明华,马守莉：独立董事制度与公司绩效关系的实证分析——兼论中国独立董事有效行权的制度环境[J].南开经济研究,2002(2)：64-68.
70.谷祺、于东智,公司治理、董事会行为与经营绩效[J].财经问题研究,2002(2)：58-65.
71.郭旺.企业集团内部资本市场研究[D].长沙,中南大学,2004.
72.韩立岩、蔡红艳：我国资本配置效率及其与金融市场关系评价研究,[J]管理世界,2002(1)：65-70.
73.韩忠雪,朱荣林.多元化公司内部资本市场理论研究[J].外国经济与管理,2005(2)：38-43.
74.姜巍.上市公司系族集团内部资本市场——基于泰跃系的案例研究[D].北京,北京交通大学,2007.
75.李斌闰、丽荣、部亮亮：董事会特征与公司绩效研究——基于民营上市公司的经验分析[J].财贸经济,2005(12)：23-27.
76.李常青、赖建清,董事会特征影响公司绩效吗?[J].金融研究,2004(5)：64-77.
77.李增泉,激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计 研究,2000(1)：
78.刘斌、刘星、李世庆、何顺文,CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003(3)：35-39.
79.刘芍佳、孙霈、刘乃全：终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效[J].经济研究,2003(4)：51-62
80.刘玉敏：我国上市公司董事会效率与公司绩效的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2006(1)：84—90
81.卢峰,姚洋.金融压抑下的法治、金融发展和经济增长[J].中国社会科学,2004(1)：42-55.
82.卢建新.股权结构、公司治理与内部资本市场效率[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2009(4)：121-125.
83.卢建新.内部资本市场与外部资本市场——基于不完全信息的比较制度分析[J].首都经济贸易大学学报,2006(2)：81-84.
84.卢建新.资本配置、管理激励与内部资本市场效率[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2007(4)：92-98.
85.卢建新.内部资本市场配置效率,北京大学出版社,2008
86.陆军荣.国外关于企业内部资本市场研究观点综述[J].经济纵横,2005(4)：73-76.
87.陆军荣.企业内部资本市场：替代与治理[D].上海,复旦大学,2005.
88.潘文卿、张伟：中国资本配置效率与金融发展相关性研究[J].管理世界,2003(8)：16-23
89.蒲自立、刘芍佳,公司控制中的董事会领导结构和公司绩效[J].管理世界,2004(9)：117-130.
90.任建军.中国区域信贷配给现状及区域差异分析[J]金融论坛.2009(10)：12-19.
91.邵军,刘志远.业集团内部资本市场对其成员企业融资约束的影响——来自中国企业集团的经验证据[J].中国会计评论,2008(9)：275-286.
92.邵军,刘志远.“系族企业”内部资本市场有效率吗?——基于鸿仪系的案例研究[J].管理世界,2007(6)：114-121.
93.邵军,刘志远.“系族企业”内部资本市场有效率吗?基于中国“系族企业 的实证研究”[J].中国会计评论,2009(9)：271-282.
94.邵军,刘志远.企业集团内部资本市场最优规模设计[J].当代财经,2006(4)：32-36.
95.邵军.代理成本与内部资本市场效率[J].上海立信会计学院学报,2009(4)：16-20.
96.邵军.企业集团内部资本市场的功能与经济后果研究[M].上海,立信会计出版社,2007,42-53.
97.苏冬蔚.多元化经营与企业价值：我国上市公司多元化溢价的实证分析[J].经济学,2005(10)：136-158.
98.苏启林、朱文：上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究,2003(8)：36—45
99.孙永祥、章融：董事会规模、公司治理与绩效[J].企业经济,2000(6)：13-15.
100.孙源.我国企业集团内部资本市场运行机制研究[D].长沙,长沙理工大,2008.
101.孙铮、刘风委、李增泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构[J].经济研究,2005(5)：52-64.
102.万良勇,万良涛,饶静.我国企业集团内部资本市场的形成机制分析[J].金融与经济,2007(10)：41-42.
103.万良勇,魏明海.集团内部资本市场、银行债务与债权人保护——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南方经济,2009(1)：54-63.
104.万良勇,魏明海.我国企业集团内部资本市场的困境与功能实现问题——以三九集团和三九医药为例[J].当代财经,2006(2)：78-81.
105.万良勇.中国企业内部资本市场的功能、陷阱及其法律规制[J].经济与管理,2006(11)：5-9.
106.王峰娟、邹存良.多元化程度与内部资本市场效率——基于分部数据的多案例研究[J].管理世界,2009(4)：153-161.
107.王峰娟.内部资本市场效率研究——以H股为样本[M].北京,经济科学出版社,2009,84-89,127-140.
108.王华、黄之骏：经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值[J].管理世界, 2006(9)：101-116.
109.魏明海、陈建武,战略性激励及其约束机制的效应[J].管理学报,2004b(3)：273-276.
110.魏明海、卢锐,管理层风险报酬的有效性分析[J].当代财经,2005(2)：98-101.
111.魏明海、万良勇.我国企业内部资本市场的边界确定[J].中山大学学报.2006,1(46)：92-97.
112.吴淑琨、刘忠明、范建强：非执行董事与公司绩效的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2001(5)：69-76.
113.夏立军、方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值一来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(5)：40-52.
114.许奇挺.内部资本市场有效性研究[D].浙江,浙江大学,2005.
115.许艳芳、张伟华、文旷宇.系族企业内部资本市场功能异化及其经济后果——基于明天科技的案例研究[J].管理世界,2009(增刊)：103-109.
116.杨棉之.内部资本市场 公司绩效与控制权私有收益——以华通天香集团为例分析[J].会计研究,2006(12)：61-67.
117.杨棉之.多元化公司内部资本市场配置效率——国外相关研究述评与启示[J].会计研究,2007(11)：44-49.
118.杨兴君、宗长玉、江艺民：民营企业控制多家上市公司实证研究,上海交易所,2003.
119.叶勇、胡培、何伟：上市公司终极控制权、股权结构及公司绩效[J].管理科学,2005(4)：58-64.
120.于东智、池国华,董事会规模、稳定性与公司绩效[J].经济研究,1994(9)：70-79.
121.于东智.董事会规模、公司治理与绩效——对中国上市公司的经验分析[J].中国社会科学,2003(3)；29-41.
122.张华、张俊熹、宋敏：所有权和控制权分离对企业价值的影响——我国民营上市企业的实证研究[J].经济学(季刊),2004(10)
123.张俊瑞、赵进文、张建,高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003(9)：29-34.
124.张维迎,产权激励与公司治理,经济科学出版社,2005.
125.张维迎,企业的企业家——契约理论.上海人民出版社.1995.
126.赵红梅.我国内部资本市场边界确定及其影响因素分析[J].财会通讯,2009(2)：103-105.
127.甄红线、史永东：终极所有权结构研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据.[J]中国工业经济,2006(11)：108-118.
128.郑国坚、魏明海.我国上市公司IPO股权结构的形成：从我国控股股东的内部市场得到的证据[C].中国第四届实证会计国际研讨会论文集.2005.
129.周伟和谢诗蕾.中国上市公司持有高额现金的原因[J].世界经济,2007(3)：67-75.
130.周业安、韩梅.上市公司内部资本市场研究：以华联超市借壳上市为例分析[J]管理世界,2003(11)：118-125.
131.庄永磊.内部资本市场资金配置模型构建及分析[D].天津,天津财经大学,2009.
132.邹薇、钱雪松.融资成本、寻租行为和企业内部资本配置.[J]经济研究.2005(5)：64-74.
2. Williamson, Oliver,1970, "Corporate Control and Business Behavior:An Inquiry into the Effects of Organization Form on Enterprise Behavior", New Jersey:Free Press
3. Akerlof,G., The Market for'Lemons':Quality Uncertainty and The Market Mechanism [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics.1970(84):488-500.
4. Alchian, Armen. Corporate Management and Property rights [J].Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities.1969 (60):787-794.
5. Berger, P. and E. Ofek, Diversification's Effect on firm value, Journal of Financial Economics,1995,37(1):39-65
6. Boys, B.K.,CEO Quality and Firm Performance:A Contingence Model [J].Strategic Management Journal,1995(16):301-312.
7. Chandler, A.D., Strategy and Structure:Chapters in the History of Industrial Enterprises, Cambridge Mass, MIT Press,1962
8. Claessens, S., S.Djankov, J.P.H.Fan and L.H.P.Lang, The Benefits and Costs of Internal Markets:Evidence From Asia Financial Crisis, working Paper, World Bank.1999.
9. Coase, R. The Natural of Firm[J]. Economica.1937(4):386-405.
10. Deloof M.Internal Capital Markets, Bank Borrowing, and Financing Constraints:Evidence from Belgian Firms[J]. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting.1998(25):945-968.
11. Donaldson, L.Davis J.,Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory:CEO Goverance and Shareholder Returns[J].The Academy of Management Review.1997,22(3):49-65.
12. Gertner, R.H, E.Powers and D.Scharsftein.Learning about Internal Capital Markets from Corporate Spin-offs [J].The Journal of Finance.2002(6)2479-2506.
13. Gertner, R.H.,D.Scharsftein and J.C.Stein. Internal Versus External Capital Markets [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economies,1994(109):1211-1230.
14. Granovetter, M.Busness Group,In N.Smelser and R.Swedberg.The Handbook of Economic Sociology [M].Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press, 1994:453-475.
15. Grant, R. M., A.P.Jammine and H. Thomas, Diversity, Diversification, and Profitability Among British Manufacturing Companies, Academy of Management of Journal,1988,31:771-801
16. Grossman, S.J. and O.D.Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration [J]. Journal of Political Economy. 1986 (94):691-719.
17. Harris, M., C.H.Kriebel and A.Raviv, Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation[J].Management Science.1982 (28):604-620.
18. Hart, O.and J.Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm [J].Journal of Political Economy.1990(98):1119-1158.
19. Hart, O.Corporate Goverance:Some Theory and Implications[J].The Economic Journal.1995(105):678-689.
20. Hermalin, B.,Weisbach, M, Boards of Directors as an Endogenous Determined Insititution:A Survey of the Economic Literature.Working Paper, University of California at Berkeley and University of Illinois.2000:154-162.
21. Hill, Charles, W.L. Internal Capital Market Controls and Financial Performance in Multidivisional Firms[J].The Journal of Industrial.1988(37):134-156.
22. Hubbard, R.G. and D.Palia, A Re-Examination of the Conglomerate Merger Wave in the 1960s:An Internal Capital Markets View [J].Journal of Finance.1999 (54):1131-1152
23. Islam, S. and A.Mozumdar., Financing Market Development and Importance of Internal Markets:Evidence from International Data.Working Paper.2002.
24. Jensen, M.C, The Model Industrial Revolution, Exit, Corporate Finance, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems [J] Journal of Finance.1993,46 (3): 831-880.
25. Jensen, M.C, W.H. Meckling. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers [J]. American Economies Review.1986 (76):323-329.
26. Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling. Theory of the firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and ownership Structure [J] Journal of Finance, 1976(3)308-342.
27. Khanna,.T, Palepu, K., Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets?An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Group, Journal of Finance,2000b,55(12):867-899
28. Khanna,.T, Palepu, K., The future of business groups in emerging markets Long-run evidence from Chile, Academy of Mamagement Journal,2000a, 1143(13):268-285
29. Khanna,.T, Palepu, K.,.Why focused strategies may be wrong of remerging markets:Long run evidence from Chile[J].Academy of Management Journal.1997,43(3):268-285.
30. Khanna, T. and S.Tice, The Bright Side of Internal Capital Markets [J].Journal of Finance.2001,56(5):1489-1527.
31. Khanna, T., and Rivkin, J.. Ties That Bind Business Groups:Evidence from an Emerging Economy. Harvard Business School Working Paper Series.2000(8):1-68.
32. Khanna, T., and Rivkin, J..Estimating the Performance Effects of Business of Groups in Emerging Markets[J].Strategic Management Journal of Finance.2001,56(5):
33. La Porta R., et al. Corporate Ownership around the World [J].Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471—517.
34. Lamont O. Cash Flow and Investment:Evidence from Internal Capital Markets [J]. Journal of Finance.1997,52 (1):83-109.
35. Larry H. P. Lang and Rene M. Stulz. Tobin's q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance, Journal of Political Economy,1994,102(6):1248-1280
36. Leff, N.H.Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in the Developing Countries:the Economic Groups[J].Economic Development and Cultural Change.1978(26):661-675.
37. Lipton,Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, Business Lawyer,1992,48(1):59-77
38. Meyer, M., P.Milgrom and J.Roberts.Organizational prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes [J] Journal of Economies and Management Strategy.1992(1):9-35.
39. Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998(20):293-315.
40. Myers, S.C. and N.C. Majluf.Corporate Financingand Investment Decision when Firms Have Information that Investors Do not Have[J]. Journal of Financial Economics.1984(13):187-222.
41. Nikos Vafeas,Board Meeting Frequency and Firm Performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics.1999,53(1):113-142.
42. Peyer, U.C. and A. Shivdasani, Leverage and internal capital markets:Evidence from leveraged recapitalization [J].Journal of Financial Economics,2001,59 (2):477-515.
43. Peyer, U.C., Internal and External Capital Markets.Workoing Paper.University of North Carolina, INSEAD,2002.
44. Rajan, R., H.Sevraes and L.Zingales, The Cost of Diversity:The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment [J].Journal of Finance. 2000(55):35-80.
45. Rechner,P. and D.R. Dalton,CEO Duality and Organizational Performance:A Longitudinal Analysis[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1991(112):155-160.
46. Ross.The Determination of Financial Structure and the Incentive Signaling Approach[J], Journal of Economics.1986(8):23-40.
47. Rumelt, R.P., Diversification Strategy and Profitability[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1982,3(4):359-369
48. Scharsftein, D.S, The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets II:Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates, NBER Working Paper,1998.
49. Scharsftein, D.S. and J.C.Stein, The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment[J]. Journal of Finance.2000 (55):2537-2564.
50. Schoar, A.S. Effects of Corporate Diversification on Productivity [J] Journal of Finance.2002(57):2379-2403.
51. Shin and Park.Financing Constraints and Internal Capital Market:Evidence from Korean'chaebols'[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance.1999,5 (2): 169-191.
52. Shin, Hyun-Han. & Stulz, Rene, M. Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient? [J]. Quarterly journal of Economies.1998 (113):531-552.
53. Stein, J.C.,. Information Production and Capital Allocation:Decentralized vs. Hierarchical Firms[R], working Paper, Harvard.2002.
54. Stein, J.C., Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources [J]. Journal of Finance.1997(52):111-133.
55. Stulz R M.Managerial dicretion and optimal financing policies[J]. Journal of Financial Economies.1990(26):3-28.
56. Triantis.Organizations as Internal Capital Markets:The Boundaries of Corporations, Trusts and security intrests in Commercial and Charitable ventures[M].Harvard Law Review.2004.1102-1162.
57. Vihang R. Errunza and Lemma W. Senbet, The Effects of International Operations on the Market Value of the Firm:Theory and Evidence, The Journal of Finance, Vol.36, No.2,1981,401-417
58. Weston.C.R.A., Diffusion Index for Australian Business Cycles, Economic Record,1970,46:384-392
59. Williamson, Oliver E., Markets and Hierarchies:analysis and antitrust implications [M].New York, Collier Macmillan Publishers, Inc.,1975.
60. Williamson, Oliver E., Corporate Control and Business Behavior.New York, Free Press,1975.
61. Williamson, Oliver E..The Economies Institutions of Capitalism[M], New York, NY:The Free Press.1985
62. Wolfenzon, D., A Theory of Pyramidal Structures, Harvard University, mimeo, February,1999
63. Wulf, J., Influence and Inefficiency in the Internal Capital Market:Theory and Evidence, working Paper, University of Pennsylvania,1999.
64. Wulf, J., Internal capital markets and Firm-level compensation incentives for division managers, Journal of Labore Economics,2002, Apr,20(2):219-262
65.陈志广,高级管理人员报酬的实证研究[J].经济研究,1997(9)：58-70..
66.樊纲、王小鲁和朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2009年报告[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2010.
67.冯丽霞.内部资本市场：组织载体、交易与租金[J].会计研究,2006(8)：37-43.
68.傅继波、杨朝军：多元化经营与公司价值研究[J].大连理工大学学报,2005(2)：36—40
69.高明华,马守莉：独立董事制度与公司绩效关系的实证分析——兼论中国独立董事有效行权的制度环境[J].南开经济研究,2002(2)：64-68.
70.谷祺、于东智,公司治理、董事会行为与经营绩效[J].财经问题研究,2002(2)：58-65.
71.郭旺.企业集团内部资本市场研究[D].长沙,中南大学,2004.
72.韩立岩、蔡红艳：我国资本配置效率及其与金融市场关系评价研究,[J]管理世界,2002(1)：65-70.
73.韩忠雪,朱荣林.多元化公司内部资本市场理论研究[J].外国经济与管理,2005(2)：38-43.
74.姜巍.上市公司系族集团内部资本市场——基于泰跃系的案例研究[D].北京,北京交通大学,2007.
75.李斌闰、丽荣、部亮亮：董事会特征与公司绩效研究——基于民营上市公司的经验分析[J].财贸经济,2005(12)：23-27.
76.李常青、赖建清,董事会特征影响公司绩效吗?[J].金融研究,2004(5)：64-77.
77.李增泉,激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计 研究,2000(1)：
78.刘斌、刘星、李世庆、何顺文,CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003(3)：35-39.
79.刘芍佳、孙霈、刘乃全：终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效[J].经济研究,2003(4)：51-62
80.刘玉敏：我国上市公司董事会效率与公司绩效的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2006(1)：84—90
81.卢峰,姚洋.金融压抑下的法治、金融发展和经济增长[J].中国社会科学,2004(1)：42-55.
82.卢建新.股权结构、公司治理与内部资本市场效率[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2009(4)：121-125.
83.卢建新.内部资本市场与外部资本市场——基于不完全信息的比较制度分析[J].首都经济贸易大学学报,2006(2)：81-84.
84.卢建新.资本配置、管理激励与内部资本市场效率[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2007(4)：92-98.
85.卢建新.内部资本市场配置效率,北京大学出版社,2008
86.陆军荣.国外关于企业内部资本市场研究观点综述[J].经济纵横,2005(4)：73-76.
87.陆军荣.企业内部资本市场：替代与治理[D].上海,复旦大学,2005.
88.潘文卿、张伟：中国资本配置效率与金融发展相关性研究[J].管理世界,2003(8)：16-23
89.蒲自立、刘芍佳,公司控制中的董事会领导结构和公司绩效[J].管理世界,2004(9)：117-130.
90.任建军.中国区域信贷配给现状及区域差异分析[J]金融论坛.2009(10)：12-19.
91.邵军,刘志远.业集团内部资本市场对其成员企业融资约束的影响——来自中国企业集团的经验证据[J].中国会计评论,2008(9)：275-286.
92.邵军,刘志远.“系族企业”内部资本市场有效率吗?——基于鸿仪系的案例研究[J].管理世界,2007(6)：114-121.
93.邵军,刘志远.“系族企业”内部资本市场有效率吗?基于中国“系族企业 的实证研究”[J].中国会计评论,2009(9)：271-282.
94.邵军,刘志远.企业集团内部资本市场最优规模设计[J].当代财经,2006(4)：32-36.
95.邵军.代理成本与内部资本市场效率[J].上海立信会计学院学报,2009(4)：16-20.
96.邵军.企业集团内部资本市场的功能与经济后果研究[M].上海,立信会计出版社,2007,42-53.
97.苏冬蔚.多元化经营与企业价值：我国上市公司多元化溢价的实证分析[J].经济学,2005(10)：136-158.
98.苏启林、朱文：上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究,2003(8)：36—45
99.孙永祥、章融：董事会规模、公司治理与绩效[J].企业经济,2000(6)：13-15.
100.孙源.我国企业集团内部资本市场运行机制研究[D].长沙,长沙理工大,2008.
101.孙铮、刘风委、李增泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构[J].经济研究,2005(5)：52-64.
102.万良勇,万良涛,饶静.我国企业集团内部资本市场的形成机制分析[J].金融与经济,2007(10)：41-42.
103.万良勇,魏明海.集团内部资本市场、银行债务与债权人保护——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南方经济,2009(1)：54-63.
104.万良勇,魏明海.我国企业集团内部资本市场的困境与功能实现问题——以三九集团和三九医药为例[J].当代财经,2006(2)：78-81.
105.万良勇.中国企业内部资本市场的功能、陷阱及其法律规制[J].经济与管理,2006(11)：5-9.
106.王峰娟、邹存良.多元化程度与内部资本市场效率——基于分部数据的多案例研究[J].管理世界,2009(4)：153-161.
107.王峰娟.内部资本市场效率研究——以H股为样本[M].北京,经济科学出版社,2009,84-89,127-140.
108.王华、黄之骏：经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值[J].管理世界, 2006(9)：101-116.
109.魏明海、陈建武,战略性激励及其约束机制的效应[J].管理学报,2004b(3)：273-276.
110.魏明海、卢锐,管理层风险报酬的有效性分析[J].当代财经,2005(2)：98-101.
111.魏明海、万良勇.我国企业内部资本市场的边界确定[J].中山大学学报.2006,1(46)：92-97.
112.吴淑琨、刘忠明、范建强：非执行董事与公司绩效的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2001(5)：69-76.
113.夏立军、方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值一来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(5)：40-52.
114.许奇挺.内部资本市场有效性研究[D].浙江,浙江大学,2005.
115.许艳芳、张伟华、文旷宇.系族企业内部资本市场功能异化及其经济后果——基于明天科技的案例研究[J].管理世界,2009(增刊)：103-109.
116.杨棉之.内部资本市场 公司绩效与控制权私有收益——以华通天香集团为例分析[J].会计研究,2006(12)：61-67.
117.杨棉之.多元化公司内部资本市场配置效率——国外相关研究述评与启示[J].会计研究,2007(11)：44-49.
118.杨兴君、宗长玉、江艺民：民营企业控制多家上市公司实证研究,上海交易所,2003.
119.叶勇、胡培、何伟：上市公司终极控制权、股权结构及公司绩效[J].管理科学,2005(4)：58-64.
120.于东智、池国华,董事会规模、稳定性与公司绩效[J].经济研究,1994(9)：70-79.
121.于东智.董事会规模、公司治理与绩效——对中国上市公司的经验分析[J].中国社会科学,2003(3)；29-41.
122.张华、张俊熹、宋敏：所有权和控制权分离对企业价值的影响——我国民营上市企业的实证研究[J].经济学(季刊),2004(10)
123.张俊瑞、赵进文、张建,高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003(9)：29-34.
124.张维迎,产权激励与公司治理,经济科学出版社,2005.
125.张维迎,企业的企业家——契约理论.上海人民出版社.1995.
126.赵红梅.我国内部资本市场边界确定及其影响因素分析[J].财会通讯,2009(2)：103-105.
127.甄红线、史永东：终极所有权结构研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据.[J]中国工业经济,2006(11)：108-118.
128.郑国坚、魏明海.我国上市公司IPO股权结构的形成：从我国控股股东的内部市场得到的证据[C].中国第四届实证会计国际研讨会论文集.2005.
129.周伟和谢诗蕾.中国上市公司持有高额现金的原因[J].世界经济,2007(3)：67-75.
130.周业安、韩梅.上市公司内部资本市场研究：以华联超市借壳上市为例分析[J]管理世界,2003(11)：118-125.
131.庄永磊.内部资本市场资金配置模型构建及分析[D].天津,天津财经大学,2009.
132.邹薇、钱雪松.融资成本、寻租行为和企业内部资本配置.[J]经济研究.2005(5)：64-74.