知识产权保护薄弱的国家如何发展高科技产业？
|
摘要
中国的知识产权保护状况不佳,这是众所周知的。根据香港政治经济风险顾问公司(Political & Economic Risk Consultancy)公布的亚洲国家和地区知识产权保护指数,中国在亚洲各国家和地区中排名倒数第二,仅好于印尼;根据世行公布的法律指数,该法律指数的成分之一就是知识产权保护状况,中国在195个国家中排名95位,低于世界平均水平。理论上讲,在知识产权保护如此薄弱的地区,企业的研发投资意愿应该不强。但令人颇感意外的是,中国却是个不折不扣的“研发大国”——根据世界经合组织报告,2006年中国企业的研发费用总额仅次于美国与日本位居世界第三,2002-2006年间中国企业研发费用增长率世界第一;根据联合国贸易发展大会2005年《世界投资报告》调查统计,中国超过所有国家和地区,成为世界上主要跨国公司进行研发投资的首选之地。在一个知识产权保护如此薄弱的国家里,如何实现高科技产业的迅猛发展,是否中国企业与众不同,他们不需要一个强有力的知识产权法律体系来保护其先进技术和创新产品?还是存在其他可以替代知识产权保护的机制可以支持中国企业的研发活动呢?这是本文要回答的两大问题。
为回答第一个问题,我们通过跨省比较分析来考察各省知识产权保护执法状况的不同是否影响各省高科技企业的融资,研发投资以及研发产出。研究发现:
(1)在知识产权保护执法力度较强的省份,高科技企业更可能获得各类外部融资:外部债务融资、非正式金融机构债务融资和外部股权融资,他们也更愿意将更大比例的资金投入到研发活动中,并开发出更多的专利技术和新产品。
(2)虽然我们上述结果表明知识产权执法力度与高科技企业的融资能力和研发能力之间存在正相关关系,但是否存在一个被我们所忽略的因素,不仅提高了知识产权保护水平,也提高了高科技企业发展水平,从而导致知识产权保护水平与高科技企业融资能力和研发能力之间的相关关系是“伪相关”呢?对于这一问题,如果我们发掘知识产权保护对高科技企业融资能力和研发能力的作用机制,那么显然二者的关系就是因果关系而非“伪相关”。作者设计实证检验并发现知识产权保护是通过以下三个作用机制对高科技企业的投融资行为产生影响的:第一,知识产权保护减少公司技术容易被竞争者仿制和盗取的“外部性问题”;第二,知识产权保护减少公司因担心研发项目信息被泄露而不愿向外部投资者披露信息,从而融资困难的“信息不对称问题”;第三,知识产权保护还可以减少中外合资企业的“代理问题”——中方股东很可能将外方股东所提供的先进技术挪为他用,致使后者不愿向合资企业转让技术。
上述研究结果对本文的第一个问题作出了回答:知识产权保护对国内高科技企业的投融资行为是起作用的。但是,即使中国的知识产权保护起作用,其总体水平仍然落后,外资高科技企业似乎不该将中国作为研发投资的首选之地。因为与国内企业不同,外资企业是可以选择到其他知识产权保护较强的国家进行研发投资的。因此作者推断:可能存在其他一些可以替代知识产权保护的机制可以起到吸引外资高科技企业到中国进行研发投资的作用。我们认为社会资本可能是一个非常重要的替代机制。社会资本在经济学领域的经典定义来自LLSV(1997):“一个社会中人们的合作倾向,也就是说,在社会资本比较高的社会里,人们倾向于通过合作来获得社会效率的最大化,而不是互相猜疑、互相算计导致‘囚徒困境式'无效率的结果。”Knack和Keefer(1997)则进一步强调社会资本包括社会互信、社会公德、和团队精神。基于世界观调查(World Values Survey)的数据,LLSV(1997)发现中国的社会资本和社会互信水平是非常高的,在全球40个主要发达国家和发展中国家中名列前茅。而Allen,Qian和Qian(2005)则进一步指出:与西方不同,中国较高的社会互信主要受到了千百年来中国社会的主流文化——儒家文化的熏陶,他们对中国企业主的进一步问卷调查结果还表明:100%的企业主认为如果企业破产了,那么经济上的任何损失都比不上信用和声誉的损失来得重要。可见,守信用在中国这种关系型社会中是非常被看重的。如果一个国家的社会资本很高,人民的诚信度和公德心很强,那么即使知识产权保护体系尚不完善,该国人民也较不可能去侵犯他人知识产权,所以社会资本可以作为吸引外资高科技企业的重要机制。为检验这一机制,我们考察了各省社会资本水平差异对外资高科技企业投资行为的影响。我们的主要研究结论是:
(1)在控制各省的经济发展水平,法律保护水平,政府廉洁程度,金融发展水平,同行业密集度,上、下游行业密集度,基础设施建设,薪酬水平,人力资源丰富程度,政策优惠哑变量之后,社会资本比较高的省份更容易吸引外资高科技企业的进驻。而且在社会资本较高的省份,外资高科技企业也更愿意与当地企业组成合资企业,并且研发投资意愿较强。
(2)在高社会资本的省份,外资高科技企业的研发强度逐年提高;相反地,在低社会资本的省份,外资高科技企业的研发强度却是逐年下降的。这一结果与我们的理论预测相一致,说明外资高科技企业对当地社会资本的逐步了解,逐步积累经验,并对当地人的诚信程度做出了逐步的反应。
这些结果回答了本文的第二个问题:在知识产权保护薄弱的国家里,社会资本可以起到了替代知识产权保护的作用。此外,为了更清楚地了解社会资本的作用机制,我们还考察了外商投资者来源国(地区)的社会资本和国家文化如何影响投资国(中国)社会资本的作用效果。我们得到如下研究结论:
(1)如果外资高科技企业是来自于社会资本水平较高的国家和地区,那么他们将更重视合作伙伴和员工的诚信程度,因此他们会选择到社会资本比较高的地区进行研发投资。
(2)如果外资高科技企业来自于中国文化背景差异很大的国家和地区,由于较大的文化差异使外商投资者对中国的投资环境非常陌生,因此为减少风险他们也将选择在具有较高社会资本的省份进行投资。
(3)来自风险回避程度较高的国家和地区的投资者,其投资决策也在更大程度上依赖于投资地区的社会资本水平的高低。
(4)对比其他国家的外商投资者,具有华人血缘关系的外商投资者的投资决策对投资地区的社会资本水平依赖程度较低,因为他们可以利用其他机制,例如基于关系与声誉的治理机制,来应对当地人的不诚信行为。
(5)历史上曾经交战的双方仍然很难忘记仇恨,历史上与中国交战越多的国家和地区的投资者更不可能与中国企业成立合资企业,也更不愿意在中国从事研发活动。鸦片战争以来这些国家与中国的交战次数每增加一次,两国投资者建立合资企业的概率就减少3.2%,来自这些国家的高科技企业在中国的研发强度减少0.6%。这些研究结果从多方面拓展了“文化与金融”这一新兴领域的研究。
全文共分为六章,各章的主要内容如下:
第一章导论。主要介绍论文的研究思路和分析框架。具体包括:研究背景、研究的问题、研究思路、研究内容以及研究的改进与创新等。
第二章文献回顾与理论分析。“知识产权保护与公司财务”,“社会资本与公司财务”都是交叉学科领域,目前该领域的文献不多,作者综合运用经济学、财务学、和社会学理论与方法,具体分析阐述知识产权保护及社会资本对高科技企业的融资、研发投资、研发产出、投资区域选择、股权结构选择等财务决策的作用机制。
第三章制度背景分析。首先介绍中国现行的主要知识产权法律法规,以及中国政府与有关国际组织签订的知识产权国际公约;然后我们讨论了中国各省知识产权执法状况的差异;最后我们分析了世界各国(地区)社会资本水平以及中国各省的社会资本水平的差异。
第四章研究知识产权保护对中国高科技企业外部融资、研发投资和研发产出的影响,并具体检验了知识产权保护对高科技企业投融资决策的三大作用机制。
第五章是研究社会资本对外资高科技企业投资区域选择、股权结构选择以及研发投资选择的影响,接着作者讨论了外资高科技企业来源国的社会资本和国家文化如何影响投资国社会资本的作用效果。
第六章是对论文研究成果的总结,包括研究结论与启示。
本研究的主要改进与创新体现在如下几个方面:
第一,在知识产权保护薄弱的国家里如何发展高科技产业?这是世界各国政府、企业和学术界普遍关注的问题。如果要研究这个问题,恐怕世界上没有一个国家的数据能比中国的数据有说服力,因为中国的知识产权保护之差,而高科技产业发展之快,无“国”能出其右。中国如何在不健全的知识产权保护体系下又快又好地发展高科技产业,这一问题为世人所困惑,也为世界所瞩目。本文利用了中国科技部提供的包括2001-2005年间中国所有高科技企业的数据库,对这一问题进行了系统地研究,在理论上和实证上首次分析了知识产权保护执法力度对高科技企业外部融资、研发投资、和研发产出的影响,并率先指出社会资本可以作为知识产权保护的替代机制,在外资高科技企业的投资区域选择、股权结构选择和研发投资选择等方面扮演着重要的作用。本文的研究结论不仅可为中国政府制定高科技产业未来数十年的发展规划和制度建设提供一个决策依据,而且也有助于其他国家了解和借鉴中国发展高科技产业的成功经验。
第二,本文是第一篇将知识产权保护执法力度引入公司财务研究领域的论文。前人的研究主要从跨国研究角度探讨世界各国知识产权保护的法律条文不同对各国经济增长(Gould和Gruben,1996)、技术变革(Moser,2005)、外商直接投资(Javorcik,2004;Du等,2008)的影响。这些研究并未涉及公司财务问题的研究,而且他们所采用的跨国研究方法无法考察知识产权保护执法水平的影响,因为各国知识产权保护的不同既有法律条文的不同,又有执法水平的不同,二者无法清楚区分。我们采用跨省研究而非跨国研究方法,因为同一国家的不同省份只有执法力度的差异,没有立法水平的差异,这使得我们可以集中考察知识产权保护执法力度对公司财务决策的影响。
第三,本文首次提出社会资本可以作为知识产权保护的替代机制,并率先应用“社会资本”的概念和原理来研究外资高科技企业的投资区域选择、股权结构选择和研发投资选择等问题。虽然目前已有不少研究考察了社会资本对经济增长(LLSV,1997;Knack和Keefer,1997),金融发展(Guiso,Sapienza和Zingales,2004a),股市参与(Guiso,Sapienza和Zingales,2008a),双边贸易和跨国投资(Guiso,Sapienza和Zingales,2008b)以及风险投资(Bottazzi,Da Rin和Hellmann,2008)的影响,但将社会资本引入股权结构选择,以及研发投资决策这些新的研究领域,本文尚属首次。
第四,本文率先构建了各种知识产权保护执法力度指数。前人研究主要是通过考察一个国家是否颁布一些旨在保护知识产权的法律法规,或者签订一些知识产权保护国际公约进行评分,来构建知识产权保护指数(Park和Ginarte,1997)。但是这类指数只是说明一个国家的知识产权法律体系完善与否,却不能用于衡量知识产权保护的执法力度。本文所构建的知识产权保护执法力度指数,希冀能为开展知识产权保护执法力度与经济金融领域的研究提供一个可资借鉴的分析工具和检验方法。
第五,本文具体解析了法律对企业融资的作用机制,从而在一定程度上拓展了“法与金融”领域的研究。自La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes,Shleifer和Vishny(以下简称LLSV)开创“法与金融”研究领域以来,尽管目前该领域的研究备受瞩目,但研究者始终没有能够清楚地说明宏观层面的法律保护究竟是通过什么经济学机制来影响微观层面的企业融资行为的。为解决这一问题,本文选择了一个“特殊”的法律——知识产权保护法,并选择了与该法律切身相关的行业——高科技行业,提出、检验、并证实了法律(知识产权保护法)是通过三大经济学机制影响企业(高科技公司)融资行为的:(1)减少外部性问题;(2)降低信息不对称程度;(3)减少代理成本。
第六,本文还对“文化与金融”这一新兴的研究领域做了一些有益的拓展。作者考察了外商投资者来源国的社会文化如何影响其在中国的投资行为。其中,社会文化包括:文化差异、血缘关系、风险回避程度、社会资本、战争史、语言、地理距离等诸多方面。迄今为止,“文化与金融”领域的研究还处于起步阶段,仅有零散的一些研究(见Guiso,Sapienza和Zingales(2006)的研究综述),因此对这个领域的任何拓展都有利于吸引越来越多的有兴趣者在前人的基础上做更深层次的探讨。
第七,本研究参加了学术领域的一场大辩论,也就是关于中国经济增长强劲而制度缺陷明显的悖论。Allen,Qian和Qian(2005)认为LLSV的法律与经济发展的理论很难解释中国为什么法律体系不完善,经济却取得迅猛的发展,所以他们认为法律似乎不是经济发展之必需,中国的经济增长是因为存在一些替代的治理机制如声誉机制和关系机制。Ayyagari,Demirgüc-Kunt和Maksimovic(2007)批评Allen,Qian和Qian(2005)夸大了声誉和关系机制在中国经济发展中的作用。而Fan,Morck,Xu和Yeung(2007)也批评说:中国经济增长却快于发达国家仅仅是因为中国人均GDP的起点比较低,所以增长空间大。本文一半支持也一半反对Allen,Qian和Qian(2005)的观点,我们的跨省研究表明法律在中国经济增长中是起作用的,因为加强知识产权执法力度是必需的,它可以起到促进高科技企业发展的作用,但法律的替代机制也是存在的——社会资本可以起到吸引外资高科技企业进驻投资的作用。这些结果意味着:一个国家、一个产业的发展并不是照搬一下西方的法律制度就一蹴而就的,重视和加强法律的执法力度很重要,而法律以外的因素比如加强“精神文明建设”,保护和传承五千年文明史留给我们的儒家诚信文化,夯实我们的社会资本基础,也同样至关重要。
China's intellectual property protection is considered very weak in comparison to other countries (Israel, 2006; Stratford, 2006; International Intellectual Property Association, 2007). The "Intellectual Property Rights Risk Index" reported by Hong Kong Political and Economic Risk Consultancy shows that China's intellectual property protection is weaker than most of Asian countries. The "Rule of Law Index" released by World Bank also suggests that China ranks 95th in 195 countries, and its score is lower than global average level. Theoretically, China is not an ideal location for R&D investment. However, we are surprised to find that the growth of China's R&D expenditure ranks first among 40 OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries and selected non-member economies from 2002 to 2006. And the amount of R&D expenditure of China ranks third in OECD countries, only lower than US and Japan. Additionly, in the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) survey to multinational companies, China is selected as the most attractive prospective R&D locations in the world. How could China develop its high tech industry in an environment generally perceived as poor protection of intellectual property (IP) rights? Is China somehow different and intellectual property protection does not matter there? Are there any other alternate mechanisms to support the R&D activities of Chinese high-tech firms? These are the questions I addresses in my thesis.
First, we examine whether intellectual property protection does not matter for Chinese high-tech firms. Based on following two findings, our answer to this question is intellectual property protection does matter.
1. We find that the enforcement of IP rights positively affects firms' ability to acquire new external debt (including formal and informal financing) and external equity. The firms in provinces with better enforcement of IP rights invest more funding in R&D, generate more patents, and produce more sales from new products.
2. As is known, financing of and investing in R&D is prone to risks of appropriation by competitors, information asymmetry, and agency problems. Our evidences show that the enforcement of IP rights affects financing of and investing in R&D by solving these three problems.
Second, although our evidences support that enforcement of IP rights matters even in China. It still difficult to explain why foreign investors regard China as the most attractive prospective R&D locations, since they could choose to locate in other countries which could provide better IP protection. Therefore, we conjecture that there exist alternative mechanisms to attract foreign investment in high tech industries. Our evidences show that social capital is the right mechanism. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define social capital as "a propensity of people in a society to cooperate to produce socially efficient outcomes and to avoid inefficient non-cooperative traps such as that in the prisoner's dilemma." Knack and Keefer (1997) also emphasize that trust, cooperative norms, and associations within groups all fall within the elastic definitions of social capital. These views of social capital share an important implication, namely, that high levels of social capital generate higher levels of trust toward others. LLSV (1997) find that China has one of the highest levels of social trust among a group of 40 developed and developing countries. Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) interpret high social trust in China as being influenced by Confucian beliefs, consistent with the idea that the social capital in China has a long history and is time persistent. When they asked the surveyed firms what type of losses concern them the most if the firm were to fail, every firm's founders/executives (100%) said "loss of reputation and trust among local friends and business partners" is a major concern, while only 60% of them said economic losses are of major concern. This suggests the importance of trustworthiness in Chinese business circle. We thus conjecture that high level of social capital enhances local people's trustworthiness, and thus reduces the risk that intellectual properties are misappropriated by local partners, employees and competitors. This leads us to hypothesize that social capital is one of the alternative mechanisms in attracting FDI in high tech firms. To test above hypotheses, we investigate the relationship between provincial-level social capital and the investment decisions of foreign high tech firms. Our empirical results show that:
1. The provinces in China characterized by high levels of social capital attract more foreign investment. We also find that the likelihood of foreign investors establishing joint ventures with local partners increases with the level of social capital prevailing in that area. Foreign high tech firms conduct more R&D investment and hire more R&D personnel in high-social-capital provinces.
2. Moreover, foreign-owned firms located in high-social-capital areas keep improving their intensity of R&D investments over time. By contrast, in low-social-capital areas, foreign high tech firms do not improve and actually diminish their R&D intensity over time. It suggests that foreign investors acquire knowledge of local social capital from learning from their own experience.
To understand the mechanisms through which social capital affect foreign high tech firm's investment in China, we also investigate how the social capital in the country of origin (the home country) of a foreign company affects its investment decisions in China, and we also examine the cultural difference between the home country and the host country bias the foreign company's weighing of the regional social capital difference in the host country. We find that:
1. The social capital in the country of origin (the home country) of a foreign company also affects its R&D investment decisions in China.
2. Cultural difference between the home country and the host country magnifies the foreign company's weighing of the regional social capital difference in the host country.
3. Foreign companies from higher uncertainty avoidance home country prefer to invest in regions with higher social capital in the host country.
4. Kinship decreases the need to deal with strangers, and thus reduces the reliance on the provincial social capital.
5. The history of wars discourages cooperation between foreign investors and local partners. Based on the reported coefficient, each additional war between the two countries decreases the possibility of establishing a joint venture with the local partners by 3.2%, and reduces their R&D intensity by 0.6%.
These findings contribute to the growing literature on cultural biases and economics outcome. This thesis consists of six chapters.
Chapter 1 raises the questions we address in this thesis. And we also introduce the research background, basic idea and main contributions.
Chapter 2 is literature review and theoretical analysis. Based on prior literatures, we analyze the impaction of IP rights enforcement and social capital on a series of investment decisions of domestic and foreign high tech firms.
Chapter 3 describes the institutional background. We introduce China's current main law, administrative regulations, and department rules regarding IP rights, as well as international conventions on IP rights China has acceded to. We also discuss the cross-province variation of IP rights enforcement, and the social capital across the provinces in China and arround the world.
Chapter 4 investigates the impaction of enforcement of IP rights on external financing, R&D input and output. We also examine the three mechanisms through which enforcement of IP rights affects financing of and investing in R&D.
Chapter 5 explores whether social capital matter in foreign companies' choice of location, ownership type, and investment in R&D. We also discuss how the social capital of their home country affects the foreign firms' investment choices in a host country. In addition, we examine whether country-level cultural differences bias the weights given to the host country's regional social capital in foreign direct investment decisions.
Chapter 6 concludes and gives policy suggestions.
My thesis addresses a topic of general interest and contributes to several streams of literature.
1. How to develop high tech industry in a country with poor intellectual property protection? This is an issue of common concern among all countries. The sharp contrast between weak intellectual property protection and rapid growth of high tech industries make China a unique candidate for an investigation of this topic. In addition, a unique firm-level database compiled by the Ministry of Science and Technology of China (MOST) also facilitate our study. The importance of the topic to China is clear -China's emphasize to make substantial progress in scientific breakthrough needs to go hand in hand with adequate and efficient allocation of funds through both public and private sources. The results of our study could not only provide several policy implications to improve the way China could meet the technology challenge in the next few years, but also share with other countries China's successful experience.
2. My thesis contributes to the literature on law and finance. There are still some confusing questions in this research field. For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (1997) argue that countries with poorer investor protections have smaller and narrower capital market. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) show that in countries whose legal systems score high on an efficiency index, a greater proportion of firms use long-term external financing. However, these studies do not tell us what kinds of economic mechanisms through which law affect financial development and corporate finance. To address this problem, we choose a specific law - intellectual property legal protection, and a special industry - high-tech industry which is intimately bound up with this law. We examine and find that intellectual property legal protection affect firms' financing and investment by reduce the problem of positive externalities, asymmetric information and agency conflict.
3. We investigate the impact of local level enforcement of IP rights on the financing of and investing in R&D in China. Effective protection of intellectual property rights depends both on the existence of intellectual property protection laws and the enforcement of the laws. Although much has been written about the IP rules and laws (e.g., Gould and Gruben, 1996; Moser, 2005), there is little empirical evidence of the importance of enforcement. One reason is that studies of intellectual property protection are generally performed at country level. Country level analysis does not allow researchers to separate the confounding effects of the existence of the IP laws and the effectiveness of the enforcement. We deal with cross country variations in IP laws by focusing on a single country, China. We do not treat China as a single homogeneous entity. Rather we recognize that even though the applicable intellectual property laws and international treaties are the same within China, there exist significant differences in the local enforcement of the intellectual property protection (IPP) laws. Our approach of studying provincial variations is similar to that of Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) who study the difference in regional social capital in Italy, and Benfratello, Schiantarelli, and Sembenelli (2006) who investigate the effect of local banking development on firms' innovative activities in Italy. We analyze the impact of the local enforcement of IPP laws on financing of and investing in R&D by firms in various provinces throughout China. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to investigate the relationship between provincial-level enforcement of IP rights and firm-level financing of and investing in R&D.
4. In prior literatures, measures of IPP enforcement at country level are of two types: perception of IPP enforcement from a survey (see the studies cited in Lanjouw and Lerner, 1997), or existence of mechanism for enforcement. The latter is exemplified by the index constructed by Park and Ginarte (1997) where a country's enforcement score is the sum of the availability of (1) preliminary injunction, (2) contributory infringement pleadings, and (3) burden of proof reversals. My thesis adds to these studies by constructing several ways of measuring enforcement of intellectual property rights. These measures great facilitate the research on economic outcomes of IPP enforcement.
5. My thesis is related to the empirical literature on social capital and economic activities. Previous studies show that social capital has a positive effect on GDP growth (LLSV, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997, Temple and Johnson, 1998; Zak and Knack, 2001), financial development (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004a), stock market participation (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008c), bilateral trade and foreign direct investment (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008a), and venture capital investment (Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann, 2007). Our paper complements these studies by focusing on how social capital facilitates foreign direct investment in innovative activities, through which social capital could affect economic growth. Complementing the macro-based approach in prior literature, our micro-based approach provides details on the effect of social capital on foreign companies' investment decisions in choosing location, ownership structure, and magnitude of R&D investment.
6. My thesis also contributes to the growing literature on cultural biases and economics outcome (see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) for a recent survey). We show that the social capital in the home country and cultural backgrounds of foreign investors cause them to bias their weighing of local social capital in the host country.
7. My thesis adds to the ongoing debate about China's economic development and institutional defects. Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) propose that alternative governance mechanisms, such as those based on reputation and relationships, may support the rapid economic growth in China. Fan, Morck, Xu, and Yeung (2007) also try to explain why China attracts massive FDI despite global media spotlighting its institutional shortcomings. This paper adds to these studies by showing that social capital is one mechanism to support the high growth of the China economy; in particular, high social capital facilitates foreign investment in the innovative activities of high tech industry. Our results are in the same spirit as Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) on the roles of alternate governance mechanisms.
为回答第一个问题,我们通过跨省比较分析来考察各省知识产权保护执法状况的不同是否影响各省高科技企业的融资,研发投资以及研发产出。研究发现:
(1)在知识产权保护执法力度较强的省份,高科技企业更可能获得各类外部融资:外部债务融资、非正式金融机构债务融资和外部股权融资,他们也更愿意将更大比例的资金投入到研发活动中,并开发出更多的专利技术和新产品。
(2)虽然我们上述结果表明知识产权执法力度与高科技企业的融资能力和研发能力之间存在正相关关系,但是否存在一个被我们所忽略的因素,不仅提高了知识产权保护水平,也提高了高科技企业发展水平,从而导致知识产权保护水平与高科技企业融资能力和研发能力之间的相关关系是“伪相关”呢?对于这一问题,如果我们发掘知识产权保护对高科技企业融资能力和研发能力的作用机制,那么显然二者的关系就是因果关系而非“伪相关”。作者设计实证检验并发现知识产权保护是通过以下三个作用机制对高科技企业的投融资行为产生影响的:第一,知识产权保护减少公司技术容易被竞争者仿制和盗取的“外部性问题”;第二,知识产权保护减少公司因担心研发项目信息被泄露而不愿向外部投资者披露信息,从而融资困难的“信息不对称问题”;第三,知识产权保护还可以减少中外合资企业的“代理问题”——中方股东很可能将外方股东所提供的先进技术挪为他用,致使后者不愿向合资企业转让技术。
上述研究结果对本文的第一个问题作出了回答:知识产权保护对国内高科技企业的投融资行为是起作用的。但是,即使中国的知识产权保护起作用,其总体水平仍然落后,外资高科技企业似乎不该将中国作为研发投资的首选之地。因为与国内企业不同,外资企业是可以选择到其他知识产权保护较强的国家进行研发投资的。因此作者推断:可能存在其他一些可以替代知识产权保护的机制可以起到吸引外资高科技企业到中国进行研发投资的作用。我们认为社会资本可能是一个非常重要的替代机制。社会资本在经济学领域的经典定义来自LLSV(1997):“一个社会中人们的合作倾向,也就是说,在社会资本比较高的社会里,人们倾向于通过合作来获得社会效率的最大化,而不是互相猜疑、互相算计导致‘囚徒困境式'无效率的结果。”Knack和Keefer(1997)则进一步强调社会资本包括社会互信、社会公德、和团队精神。基于世界观调查(World Values Survey)的数据,LLSV(1997)发现中国的社会资本和社会互信水平是非常高的,在全球40个主要发达国家和发展中国家中名列前茅。而Allen,Qian和Qian(2005)则进一步指出:与西方不同,中国较高的社会互信主要受到了千百年来中国社会的主流文化——儒家文化的熏陶,他们对中国企业主的进一步问卷调查结果还表明:100%的企业主认为如果企业破产了,那么经济上的任何损失都比不上信用和声誉的损失来得重要。可见,守信用在中国这种关系型社会中是非常被看重的。如果一个国家的社会资本很高,人民的诚信度和公德心很强,那么即使知识产权保护体系尚不完善,该国人民也较不可能去侵犯他人知识产权,所以社会资本可以作为吸引外资高科技企业的重要机制。为检验这一机制,我们考察了各省社会资本水平差异对外资高科技企业投资行为的影响。我们的主要研究结论是:
(1)在控制各省的经济发展水平,法律保护水平,政府廉洁程度,金融发展水平,同行业密集度,上、下游行业密集度,基础设施建设,薪酬水平,人力资源丰富程度,政策优惠哑变量之后,社会资本比较高的省份更容易吸引外资高科技企业的进驻。而且在社会资本较高的省份,外资高科技企业也更愿意与当地企业组成合资企业,并且研发投资意愿较强。
(2)在高社会资本的省份,外资高科技企业的研发强度逐年提高;相反地,在低社会资本的省份,外资高科技企业的研发强度却是逐年下降的。这一结果与我们的理论预测相一致,说明外资高科技企业对当地社会资本的逐步了解,逐步积累经验,并对当地人的诚信程度做出了逐步的反应。
这些结果回答了本文的第二个问题:在知识产权保护薄弱的国家里,社会资本可以起到了替代知识产权保护的作用。此外,为了更清楚地了解社会资本的作用机制,我们还考察了外商投资者来源国(地区)的社会资本和国家文化如何影响投资国(中国)社会资本的作用效果。我们得到如下研究结论:
(1)如果外资高科技企业是来自于社会资本水平较高的国家和地区,那么他们将更重视合作伙伴和员工的诚信程度,因此他们会选择到社会资本比较高的地区进行研发投资。
(2)如果外资高科技企业来自于中国文化背景差异很大的国家和地区,由于较大的文化差异使外商投资者对中国的投资环境非常陌生,因此为减少风险他们也将选择在具有较高社会资本的省份进行投资。
(3)来自风险回避程度较高的国家和地区的投资者,其投资决策也在更大程度上依赖于投资地区的社会资本水平的高低。
(4)对比其他国家的外商投资者,具有华人血缘关系的外商投资者的投资决策对投资地区的社会资本水平依赖程度较低,因为他们可以利用其他机制,例如基于关系与声誉的治理机制,来应对当地人的不诚信行为。
(5)历史上曾经交战的双方仍然很难忘记仇恨,历史上与中国交战越多的国家和地区的投资者更不可能与中国企业成立合资企业,也更不愿意在中国从事研发活动。鸦片战争以来这些国家与中国的交战次数每增加一次,两国投资者建立合资企业的概率就减少3.2%,来自这些国家的高科技企业在中国的研发强度减少0.6%。这些研究结果从多方面拓展了“文化与金融”这一新兴领域的研究。
全文共分为六章,各章的主要内容如下:
第一章导论。主要介绍论文的研究思路和分析框架。具体包括:研究背景、研究的问题、研究思路、研究内容以及研究的改进与创新等。
第二章文献回顾与理论分析。“知识产权保护与公司财务”,“社会资本与公司财务”都是交叉学科领域,目前该领域的文献不多,作者综合运用经济学、财务学、和社会学理论与方法,具体分析阐述知识产权保护及社会资本对高科技企业的融资、研发投资、研发产出、投资区域选择、股权结构选择等财务决策的作用机制。
第三章制度背景分析。首先介绍中国现行的主要知识产权法律法规,以及中国政府与有关国际组织签订的知识产权国际公约;然后我们讨论了中国各省知识产权执法状况的差异;最后我们分析了世界各国(地区)社会资本水平以及中国各省的社会资本水平的差异。
第四章研究知识产权保护对中国高科技企业外部融资、研发投资和研发产出的影响,并具体检验了知识产权保护对高科技企业投融资决策的三大作用机制。
第五章是研究社会资本对外资高科技企业投资区域选择、股权结构选择以及研发投资选择的影响,接着作者讨论了外资高科技企业来源国的社会资本和国家文化如何影响投资国社会资本的作用效果。
第六章是对论文研究成果的总结,包括研究结论与启示。
本研究的主要改进与创新体现在如下几个方面:
第一,在知识产权保护薄弱的国家里如何发展高科技产业?这是世界各国政府、企业和学术界普遍关注的问题。如果要研究这个问题,恐怕世界上没有一个国家的数据能比中国的数据有说服力,因为中国的知识产权保护之差,而高科技产业发展之快,无“国”能出其右。中国如何在不健全的知识产权保护体系下又快又好地发展高科技产业,这一问题为世人所困惑,也为世界所瞩目。本文利用了中国科技部提供的包括2001-2005年间中国所有高科技企业的数据库,对这一问题进行了系统地研究,在理论上和实证上首次分析了知识产权保护执法力度对高科技企业外部融资、研发投资、和研发产出的影响,并率先指出社会资本可以作为知识产权保护的替代机制,在外资高科技企业的投资区域选择、股权结构选择和研发投资选择等方面扮演着重要的作用。本文的研究结论不仅可为中国政府制定高科技产业未来数十年的发展规划和制度建设提供一个决策依据,而且也有助于其他国家了解和借鉴中国发展高科技产业的成功经验。
第二,本文是第一篇将知识产权保护执法力度引入公司财务研究领域的论文。前人的研究主要从跨国研究角度探讨世界各国知识产权保护的法律条文不同对各国经济增长(Gould和Gruben,1996)、技术变革(Moser,2005)、外商直接投资(Javorcik,2004;Du等,2008)的影响。这些研究并未涉及公司财务问题的研究,而且他们所采用的跨国研究方法无法考察知识产权保护执法水平的影响,因为各国知识产权保护的不同既有法律条文的不同,又有执法水平的不同,二者无法清楚区分。我们采用跨省研究而非跨国研究方法,因为同一国家的不同省份只有执法力度的差异,没有立法水平的差异,这使得我们可以集中考察知识产权保护执法力度对公司财务决策的影响。
第三,本文首次提出社会资本可以作为知识产权保护的替代机制,并率先应用“社会资本”的概念和原理来研究外资高科技企业的投资区域选择、股权结构选择和研发投资选择等问题。虽然目前已有不少研究考察了社会资本对经济增长(LLSV,1997;Knack和Keefer,1997),金融发展(Guiso,Sapienza和Zingales,2004a),股市参与(Guiso,Sapienza和Zingales,2008a),双边贸易和跨国投资(Guiso,Sapienza和Zingales,2008b)以及风险投资(Bottazzi,Da Rin和Hellmann,2008)的影响,但将社会资本引入股权结构选择,以及研发投资决策这些新的研究领域,本文尚属首次。
第四,本文率先构建了各种知识产权保护执法力度指数。前人研究主要是通过考察一个国家是否颁布一些旨在保护知识产权的法律法规,或者签订一些知识产权保护国际公约进行评分,来构建知识产权保护指数(Park和Ginarte,1997)。但是这类指数只是说明一个国家的知识产权法律体系完善与否,却不能用于衡量知识产权保护的执法力度。本文所构建的知识产权保护执法力度指数,希冀能为开展知识产权保护执法力度与经济金融领域的研究提供一个可资借鉴的分析工具和检验方法。
第五,本文具体解析了法律对企业融资的作用机制,从而在一定程度上拓展了“法与金融”领域的研究。自La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes,Shleifer和Vishny(以下简称LLSV)开创“法与金融”研究领域以来,尽管目前该领域的研究备受瞩目,但研究者始终没有能够清楚地说明宏观层面的法律保护究竟是通过什么经济学机制来影响微观层面的企业融资行为的。为解决这一问题,本文选择了一个“特殊”的法律——知识产权保护法,并选择了与该法律切身相关的行业——高科技行业,提出、检验、并证实了法律(知识产权保护法)是通过三大经济学机制影响企业(高科技公司)融资行为的:(1)减少外部性问题;(2)降低信息不对称程度;(3)减少代理成本。
第六,本文还对“文化与金融”这一新兴的研究领域做了一些有益的拓展。作者考察了外商投资者来源国的社会文化如何影响其在中国的投资行为。其中,社会文化包括:文化差异、血缘关系、风险回避程度、社会资本、战争史、语言、地理距离等诸多方面。迄今为止,“文化与金融”领域的研究还处于起步阶段,仅有零散的一些研究(见Guiso,Sapienza和Zingales(2006)的研究综述),因此对这个领域的任何拓展都有利于吸引越来越多的有兴趣者在前人的基础上做更深层次的探讨。
第七,本研究参加了学术领域的一场大辩论,也就是关于中国经济增长强劲而制度缺陷明显的悖论。Allen,Qian和Qian(2005)认为LLSV的法律与经济发展的理论很难解释中国为什么法律体系不完善,经济却取得迅猛的发展,所以他们认为法律似乎不是经济发展之必需,中国的经济增长是因为存在一些替代的治理机制如声誉机制和关系机制。Ayyagari,Demirgüc-Kunt和Maksimovic(2007)批评Allen,Qian和Qian(2005)夸大了声誉和关系机制在中国经济发展中的作用。而Fan,Morck,Xu和Yeung(2007)也批评说:中国经济增长却快于发达国家仅仅是因为中国人均GDP的起点比较低,所以增长空间大。本文一半支持也一半反对Allen,Qian和Qian(2005)的观点,我们的跨省研究表明法律在中国经济增长中是起作用的,因为加强知识产权执法力度是必需的,它可以起到促进高科技企业发展的作用,但法律的替代机制也是存在的——社会资本可以起到吸引外资高科技企业进驻投资的作用。这些结果意味着:一个国家、一个产业的发展并不是照搬一下西方的法律制度就一蹴而就的,重视和加强法律的执法力度很重要,而法律以外的因素比如加强“精神文明建设”,保护和传承五千年文明史留给我们的儒家诚信文化,夯实我们的社会资本基础,也同样至关重要。
China's intellectual property protection is considered very weak in comparison to other countries (Israel, 2006; Stratford, 2006; International Intellectual Property Association, 2007). The "Intellectual Property Rights Risk Index" reported by Hong Kong Political and Economic Risk Consultancy shows that China's intellectual property protection is weaker than most of Asian countries. The "Rule of Law Index" released by World Bank also suggests that China ranks 95th in 195 countries, and its score is lower than global average level. Theoretically, China is not an ideal location for R&D investment. However, we are surprised to find that the growth of China's R&D expenditure ranks first among 40 OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries and selected non-member economies from 2002 to 2006. And the amount of R&D expenditure of China ranks third in OECD countries, only lower than US and Japan. Additionly, in the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) survey to multinational companies, China is selected as the most attractive prospective R&D locations in the world. How could China develop its high tech industry in an environment generally perceived as poor protection of intellectual property (IP) rights? Is China somehow different and intellectual property protection does not matter there? Are there any other alternate mechanisms to support the R&D activities of Chinese high-tech firms? These are the questions I addresses in my thesis.
First, we examine whether intellectual property protection does not matter for Chinese high-tech firms. Based on following two findings, our answer to this question is intellectual property protection does matter.
1. We find that the enforcement of IP rights positively affects firms' ability to acquire new external debt (including formal and informal financing) and external equity. The firms in provinces with better enforcement of IP rights invest more funding in R&D, generate more patents, and produce more sales from new products.
2. As is known, financing of and investing in R&D is prone to risks of appropriation by competitors, information asymmetry, and agency problems. Our evidences show that the enforcement of IP rights affects financing of and investing in R&D by solving these three problems.
Second, although our evidences support that enforcement of IP rights matters even in China. It still difficult to explain why foreign investors regard China as the most attractive prospective R&D locations, since they could choose to locate in other countries which could provide better IP protection. Therefore, we conjecture that there exist alternative mechanisms to attract foreign investment in high tech industries. Our evidences show that social capital is the right mechanism. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define social capital as "a propensity of people in a society to cooperate to produce socially efficient outcomes and to avoid inefficient non-cooperative traps such as that in the prisoner's dilemma." Knack and Keefer (1997) also emphasize that trust, cooperative norms, and associations within groups all fall within the elastic definitions of social capital. These views of social capital share an important implication, namely, that high levels of social capital generate higher levels of trust toward others. LLSV (1997) find that China has one of the highest levels of social trust among a group of 40 developed and developing countries. Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) interpret high social trust in China as being influenced by Confucian beliefs, consistent with the idea that the social capital in China has a long history and is time persistent. When they asked the surveyed firms what type of losses concern them the most if the firm were to fail, every firm's founders/executives (100%) said "loss of reputation and trust among local friends and business partners" is a major concern, while only 60% of them said economic losses are of major concern. This suggests the importance of trustworthiness in Chinese business circle. We thus conjecture that high level of social capital enhances local people's trustworthiness, and thus reduces the risk that intellectual properties are misappropriated by local partners, employees and competitors. This leads us to hypothesize that social capital is one of the alternative mechanisms in attracting FDI in high tech firms. To test above hypotheses, we investigate the relationship between provincial-level social capital and the investment decisions of foreign high tech firms. Our empirical results show that:
1. The provinces in China characterized by high levels of social capital attract more foreign investment. We also find that the likelihood of foreign investors establishing joint ventures with local partners increases with the level of social capital prevailing in that area. Foreign high tech firms conduct more R&D investment and hire more R&D personnel in high-social-capital provinces.
2. Moreover, foreign-owned firms located in high-social-capital areas keep improving their intensity of R&D investments over time. By contrast, in low-social-capital areas, foreign high tech firms do not improve and actually diminish their R&D intensity over time. It suggests that foreign investors acquire knowledge of local social capital from learning from their own experience.
To understand the mechanisms through which social capital affect foreign high tech firm's investment in China, we also investigate how the social capital in the country of origin (the home country) of a foreign company affects its investment decisions in China, and we also examine the cultural difference between the home country and the host country bias the foreign company's weighing of the regional social capital difference in the host country. We find that:
1. The social capital in the country of origin (the home country) of a foreign company also affects its R&D investment decisions in China.
2. Cultural difference between the home country and the host country magnifies the foreign company's weighing of the regional social capital difference in the host country.
3. Foreign companies from higher uncertainty avoidance home country prefer to invest in regions with higher social capital in the host country.
4. Kinship decreases the need to deal with strangers, and thus reduces the reliance on the provincial social capital.
5. The history of wars discourages cooperation between foreign investors and local partners. Based on the reported coefficient, each additional war between the two countries decreases the possibility of establishing a joint venture with the local partners by 3.2%, and reduces their R&D intensity by 0.6%.
These findings contribute to the growing literature on cultural biases and economics outcome. This thesis consists of six chapters.
Chapter 1 raises the questions we address in this thesis. And we also introduce the research background, basic idea and main contributions.
Chapter 2 is literature review and theoretical analysis. Based on prior literatures, we analyze the impaction of IP rights enforcement and social capital on a series of investment decisions of domestic and foreign high tech firms.
Chapter 3 describes the institutional background. We introduce China's current main law, administrative regulations, and department rules regarding IP rights, as well as international conventions on IP rights China has acceded to. We also discuss the cross-province variation of IP rights enforcement, and the social capital across the provinces in China and arround the world.
Chapter 4 investigates the impaction of enforcement of IP rights on external financing, R&D input and output. We also examine the three mechanisms through which enforcement of IP rights affects financing of and investing in R&D.
Chapter 5 explores whether social capital matter in foreign companies' choice of location, ownership type, and investment in R&D. We also discuss how the social capital of their home country affects the foreign firms' investment choices in a host country. In addition, we examine whether country-level cultural differences bias the weights given to the host country's regional social capital in foreign direct investment decisions.
Chapter 6 concludes and gives policy suggestions.
My thesis addresses a topic of general interest and contributes to several streams of literature.
1. How to develop high tech industry in a country with poor intellectual property protection? This is an issue of common concern among all countries. The sharp contrast between weak intellectual property protection and rapid growth of high tech industries make China a unique candidate for an investigation of this topic. In addition, a unique firm-level database compiled by the Ministry of Science and Technology of China (MOST) also facilitate our study. The importance of the topic to China is clear -China's emphasize to make substantial progress in scientific breakthrough needs to go hand in hand with adequate and efficient allocation of funds through both public and private sources. The results of our study could not only provide several policy implications to improve the way China could meet the technology challenge in the next few years, but also share with other countries China's successful experience.
2. My thesis contributes to the literature on law and finance. There are still some confusing questions in this research field. For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (1997) argue that countries with poorer investor protections have smaller and narrower capital market. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) show that in countries whose legal systems score high on an efficiency index, a greater proportion of firms use long-term external financing. However, these studies do not tell us what kinds of economic mechanisms through which law affect financial development and corporate finance. To address this problem, we choose a specific law - intellectual property legal protection, and a special industry - high-tech industry which is intimately bound up with this law. We examine and find that intellectual property legal protection affect firms' financing and investment by reduce the problem of positive externalities, asymmetric information and agency conflict.
3. We investigate the impact of local level enforcement of IP rights on the financing of and investing in R&D in China. Effective protection of intellectual property rights depends both on the existence of intellectual property protection laws and the enforcement of the laws. Although much has been written about the IP rules and laws (e.g., Gould and Gruben, 1996; Moser, 2005), there is little empirical evidence of the importance of enforcement. One reason is that studies of intellectual property protection are generally performed at country level. Country level analysis does not allow researchers to separate the confounding effects of the existence of the IP laws and the effectiveness of the enforcement. We deal with cross country variations in IP laws by focusing on a single country, China. We do not treat China as a single homogeneous entity. Rather we recognize that even though the applicable intellectual property laws and international treaties are the same within China, there exist significant differences in the local enforcement of the intellectual property protection (IPP) laws. Our approach of studying provincial variations is similar to that of Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) who study the difference in regional social capital in Italy, and Benfratello, Schiantarelli, and Sembenelli (2006) who investigate the effect of local banking development on firms' innovative activities in Italy. We analyze the impact of the local enforcement of IPP laws on financing of and investing in R&D by firms in various provinces throughout China. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to investigate the relationship between provincial-level enforcement of IP rights and firm-level financing of and investing in R&D.
4. In prior literatures, measures of IPP enforcement at country level are of two types: perception of IPP enforcement from a survey (see the studies cited in Lanjouw and Lerner, 1997), or existence of mechanism for enforcement. The latter is exemplified by the index constructed by Park and Ginarte (1997) where a country's enforcement score is the sum of the availability of (1) preliminary injunction, (2) contributory infringement pleadings, and (3) burden of proof reversals. My thesis adds to these studies by constructing several ways of measuring enforcement of intellectual property rights. These measures great facilitate the research on economic outcomes of IPP enforcement.
5. My thesis is related to the empirical literature on social capital and economic activities. Previous studies show that social capital has a positive effect on GDP growth (LLSV, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997, Temple and Johnson, 1998; Zak and Knack, 2001), financial development (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004a), stock market participation (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008c), bilateral trade and foreign direct investment (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008a), and venture capital investment (Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann, 2007). Our paper complements these studies by focusing on how social capital facilitates foreign direct investment in innovative activities, through which social capital could affect economic growth. Complementing the macro-based approach in prior literature, our micro-based approach provides details on the effect of social capital on foreign companies' investment decisions in choosing location, ownership structure, and magnitude of R&D investment.
6. My thesis also contributes to the growing literature on cultural biases and economics outcome (see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) for a recent survey). We show that the social capital in the home country and cultural backgrounds of foreign investors cause them to bias their weighing of local social capital in the host country.
7. My thesis adds to the ongoing debate about China's economic development and institutional defects. Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) propose that alternative governance mechanisms, such as those based on reputation and relationships, may support the rapid economic growth in China. Fan, Morck, Xu, and Yeung (2007) also try to explain why China attracts massive FDI despite global media spotlighting its institutional shortcomings. This paper adds to these studies by showing that social capital is one mechanism to support the high growth of the China economy; in particular, high social capital facilitates foreign investment in the innovative activities of high tech industry. Our results are in the same spirit as Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) on the roles of alternate governance mechanisms.
引文
[1]边燕杰、丘海雄,企业的社会资本及其功效[J],中国社会科学,2000(2):87-99。
[2]陈健,社会资本结构分析[J],经济研究,2008(3):104-111。
[3]陈雨露、马勇,社会信用文化、金融体系结构与金融业组织形式[J],经济研究,2008(3):29-38。
[4]成九雁、朱武祥,中国近代股市监管的兴起与演变:1873-1949年[J],经济研究,2006(12):114-123。
[5]蒋春燕、赵曙明,社会资本和公司企业家精神与绩效的关系[J],管理世界,2006(10):90-99。
[6]李常青、王毅辉、张风展,上市公司“管理层讨论与分析”披露质量影响因素研究[J],经济管理,2008(4):29-34。
[7]李涛,社会互动、信任与股市参与[J],经济研究,2006(1):34-45。
[8]李维安、吴德胜、徐皓,网上交易中的声誉机制--来自淘宝网的证据[J],南开管理评论,2007(5):36-46。
[9]刘峰、贺建刚、魏明海,控制权、业绩与利益输送--基于五粮液的案例研究[J],管理世界,2004(8):102-118。
[10]刘微芳、沈艺峰,黄娟娟,游家兴,嵌入性:氽业社会资本和企业融资结构--来自我国房地产业上市公司的经验证据[Z],工作论文,厦门大学财务研究与发展中心,2008。
[11]陆正飞、叶康涛,产权保护导向的会计研究:新近研究回顾[J],中国会计评论,2007(3):113-130。
[12]潘红波、夏新平、余明桂,政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J],经济研究,2008(4):41-52。
[13]屈文洲、许年行、关家雄、吴世农,市场化、政府干预与股票流动性溢价的分配[J],经济研究,2008(4):132-142。
[14]沈艺峰、肖珉、黄娟娟,中小投资者法律保护与公司权益资本成本[J],经济研究,2005(6):115-124.
[15]沈艺峰、许年行、杨熠,我国中小投资者法律保护历史实践的实证检验[J],经济研究,2004(9):90-100。
[16]石军伟、胡立君、付海艳,企业社会资本的功效结构:基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J],中国工业经济,2007(2):84-93。
[17]吴世农,高级管理统计方法[M],中国对外经济贸易出版社,1997。
[18]吴世农,现代财务理论与方法[M],中国经济出版社,1997。
[19]许年行、吴世农,我国中小投资者法律保护影响股权集中度吗?[M],经济学(季刊),2006(3):893-922。
[20]张俊生、曾亚敏,社会资本与区域金融发展[J],财经研究,2005(4):37-45。
[21]张维迎、柯荣住,信任及其解释:来自中国的跨省调查分析[J],经济研究,2002(10):90-100。
[22]周黎安、张维迎、顾全林、沈懿,信誉的价值:以网上拍卖交易为例[J],经济研究,2006(12):29-38。
[23]周小虎、陈传明,企业社会资本与持续竞争优势[J],中国工业经济,2004(5):90-96。
[1]Adler,P.,Kwon,S.,2009.Social capital:the good,the bad,and the ugly.Marshall Research Paper Series working paper.
[2]Alien,F.,Qian,J.,Qian,M.,2005.Law,finance,and economic growth in China.Journal of Financial Economics 77,57-116.
[3]Amiti,M.,Javorcki,B.,2008.Trade costs and location of foreign firms in China.Journal of Development Economics 85,129-149.
[4]Anton,J.,Yao,D.,2002.The sale of ideas:strategic disclosure,property rights,and contracting.Review of Economic Studies 69,513-531.
[5]Arrow,K.,1962.Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention.In:Nelson,R.(Ed.),The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity,Princeton University Press,Princeton NJ.
[6]Asiedu,E.,Esfahani,H.,2001.Ownership structure in foreign direct investment projects.Review of Economics and Statistics 83,647-662.
[7] Ayyagari, M., Demirguc-Kunt, A., Maksimovic, V., 2008. Formal versus informal finance: evidence from China. Unpublished working paper, World Bank.
[8] Baker, M., Stein, J., Wurgler, J., 2003. When does the market matter? Stock prices and the investment of equity-dependent firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 969-1005.
[9] Beamish, P., Banks, J., 1987. Equity joint ventures and the theory of the multinational enterprise. Journal of International Business Studies 18, 1-16.
[10] Beck,T., Levine, R., Loayza, N., 2000. Finance and the sources of growth. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 261-300.
[11] Bekaert, G., Harvey, C., Lundblad, C., 2005. Does financial liberalization spur growth? Journal of Financial Economics 77, 3-55.
[12] Benfratello, L., Schiantarelli, F., Sembenelli, A., 2008. Banks and innovation: microeconometric evidence on Italian Firms. Journal of Financial Economics 90, 197-217.
[13] Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., Mullainathan, S., 2004. How much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 249-276.
[14] Bottazzi, L., Da Rin, M., Hellmann, T., 2007. The importance of trust for investment: evidence from venture capital. ECGI Working Paper.
[15] Boyd, R., Richerson, P., 1985. Culture and the evolutionary process. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
[16] Coleman, J., 1990. Foundations of social theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
[17] Contractor, F., 1990. Ownership patterns of U.S. joint ventures abroad and the liberalization of foreign government regulations in the 1980s: evidence from the benchmark surveys. Journal of International Business Studies 21, 55-73.
[18] Contractor, F., Lorange, P., 1988. Cooperative strategies in international business. Lexington Books, Lexington, MA.
[19] Cornell, B., Welch, I., 1996. Culture, information and screening discrimination. Journal of Political Economy 104, 542-572.
[20] Crepon, B., Duguet, E., 1997. Estimating the innovation function from patent numbers: GMM on count panel data. Journal of Applied Econometrics 12, 243-263.
[21] Cull, R., Xu, L., 2005. Institutions, ownership, and finance: the determinants of profit reinvestment among Chinese firms. Journal of Financial Economics 77,117-146.
[22] De Haan, L., Hinloopen, J., 2003. Preference hierarchies for internal finance, bank loans, bond, and share issues: evidence for Dutch firms. Journal of Empirical Finance 10, 661-681.
[23] Demirguc-Kunt, A., Maksimovic, V., 1998. Law, finance, and firm growth. Journal of Finance 53, 2107-2137.
[24] Desai, M., Foley, C., Hines J., 2004. The costs of shared ownership: evidence from international joint ventures. Journal of Financial Economics 73, 323-374.
[25] Du, J., Lu, Y., Tao, Z., 2008. Economic institutions and FDI location choice: evidence from US multinationals in China. Journal of Comparative Economics 36, 1-18.
[26] Dufwenberg, M., Gneezy, U., 2000. Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost wallet game. Games and Economic Behavior 30, 163-182.
[27] Fan, G., Wang, X., 2006. The report on the relative process of marketization of each region in China. The Economic Science Press, Beijing.
[28] Fan, J., Morck, R., Xu, L., Yeung, B., 2007. Institutions and foreign direct investment: China versus the rest of the world. World Development. Forthcoming.
[29] Fan, J., Rui, O., Zhao, M., 2008. Public governance and corporate finance: evidence from corruption cases. Journal of Comparative Economics 36,343-364.
[30] Fan, J., Titman, S., and Twite, G., 2006. An international comparison of capital structure and debt maturity choices. AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings.
[31] Farrell, D., Lund, S., Rosenfeld, J., Morin, F., Gupta, N., Greenberg, E., 2006. Putting China's capital to work: the value of financial system reform, McKinsey Global Institute Report.
[32] Franko, L., 1989. Use of minority and 50-50 joint ventures by United States multinationals during the 1970s: the interaction of host country policies and corporate strategies. Journal of International Business Studies 20, 19-40.
[33] Fukuyama, F., 1995. Trust. Free Press, New York.
[34] Fung, K., Iizaka, H., Siu, A., 2003. Japanese direct investment in China. China Economic Review 14, 304-315.
[35] Gambetta, D., 1988. Trust: Making and breaking cooperative relations. Blackwell, Cambridge.
[36] Gatignon, H., Anderson, E., 1988. The multinational corporation's degree of control over foreign subsidiaries: an empirical test of a transaction cost explanation. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 4, 305-336.
[37] Gomes-Casseres, B., 1990. Firm ownership preferences and host government restrictions: an integrated approach. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 21, 1-22.
[38] Gould, D., Gruben, W., 1996. The role of intellectual property rights in economic growth. Journal of Development Economics 48, 323-350.
[39] Griliches, Z., 1992. The search of corporate restructuring on industrial research and development. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 94, 29-47.
[40] Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2003. People's opium? Religion and economic attitudes. Journal of Monetary Economics 50, 225-282.
[41] Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2004a. The role of social capital in financial development. American Economic Review 94, 526-556.
[42] Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2004b. Does local financial development matter? Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 929-969.
[43] Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2006. Does cultural affect economic outcomes? Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, 23-48.
[44] Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2008a. Trusting the stock market. Journal of Finance 63, 2557-2600.
[45] Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2008b. Cultural biases in economic exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics. Forthcoming.
[46] Hall, B., 1996. The private and social returns to research and development. In: Smith, B., Barfield, C. (Ed.), Technology, R&D, and the Economy, Brooking Institution and the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, pp. 140-183.
[47] Hall, B., 2002. The financing of research and development. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 18, 35-51.
[48] Hall, B., Jaffe, A., Trajtenberg, M., 2005. Market value and patent citations. RAND Journal of Economics 36,16-38.
[49] Hausman, J., Hall, B., Griliches, Z., 1984. Econometric models for court data with an application to the patents-R&D relationship. Econometrica 52,909-938.
[50] Hausman, J., Hall, B., Griliches, Z., 1986. Patents and R&D: is there a lag? International Economic Review 27, 265-283.
[51] Head, K., Ries, J., Swenson, D., 1995. Agglomeration benefits and location choice: evidence from Japanese manufacturing investments in the United States. Journal of International Economics 38,223-247.
[52] Henisz, W., 2000. The institutional environment for multinational investment. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 16, 334-364.
[53] Hilary, G., Hui, K., 2008. Does religion matter in corporate decision making in America? Journal of Financial Economics. Forthcoming.
[54] Hofstede, G., 2001. Culture's Consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.
[55] Holmstrom, B., 1982. Moral hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13, 324 - 340.
[56] Hovakimian, A., Opler, T., Titman, S., 2001. The debt-equity choice. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 36, 1-24.
[57] International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2007. International intellectual property alliance 2002 special 301 report: People's Republic of China, IIPA Report.
[58] Israel, C., 2006. Piracy and counterfeiting in China. Testimony of US Coordinator for International Intellectual Property Enforcement before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
[59] Jackson, H., and Roe, M., 2008. Public and private enforcement of securities laws: resource-based evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.
[60] Javorcik, B., 2004. The composition of foreign direct investment and protection of intellectual property rights: evidence from transition economies. European Economic Review 48, 39-62.
[61] Kant, C., 1990. Multinational firms and government revenues. Journal of Public Economics 42, 135-147.
[62] Kashima, E., Kashima, Y., 1998. Culture and language: the case of cultural dimensions and personal pronoun use. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 29, 461-486.
[63] Khwaja, A., Main, A., 2005. Do lenders favor politically connected firms? Rent provision in an emerging financial market. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 1371-1411.
[64] King, R., Levine, R., 1993. Finance and growth: Schumpeter may be right. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 717-737.
[65] King-Metters, K., Metters, R., 2008, Misunderstanding the Chinese worker. Wall Street Journal, July7, R11.
[66] Kiyonari, T., Yamagishi, T., Cook, K., Cheshire, C., 2006. Does trust beget trustworthiness? Trust and trustworthiness in two games and two cultures: a research note. Social Psychology Quarterly 69, 270-283.
[67] Knack, S., Keefer, P., 1997. Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross social capital: its origins and applications in modern sociology. Annual Review of Sociology 24, 1-24.
[68] Kogut, B., Singh, H., 1988, The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode. Journal of International Business Studies 19, 411-432.
[69] Krugman, P., 1991. Increasing returns and economic geography. Journal of Political Economy 99, 483-499.
[70] Krugman, P., Venables, A., 1995. Globalization and the inequality of nations. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 857-880.
[71] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny R., 1997. Legal determinants of external finance. Journal of Finance 52, 1131-1150.
[72] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny R., 1997. Trust in large organization. American Economic Review 87, 333-338.
[73] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny R., 2006. What works in securities laws? Journal of Finance 61, 1-32.
[74] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1998. Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113-1155.
[75] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2002. Government ownership of banks. Journal of Finance 57, 265-301.
[76] Lanjouw, J., Lerner. J., 1997. The enforcement of intellectual property rights: A survey of the empirical literature. NBER Working paper W6296.
[77] Lerner, J., 1994. The importance of patent scope: an empirical analysis. RAND Journal of Economics 25, 319-333.
[78] Levine, R., Zervos, S., 1998. Stock market, banks, and economic growth. American Economic Review 88, 537-558.
[79] Li, K., Griffin, D., Yue, H., Zhao, L., 2008. Country of origin effects in capital structure decisions: evidence from foreign direct investment in China. Working paper.
[80] Maskus, K., Dougherty, S., Mertha, A., 2005. Intellectual property rights and economic development in China, in Fink, C. and Maskus, K. (Ed.), Intellectual property and development: lessons from recent economic research. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 295-331.
[81] Mayer, C., 2008. Trust in financial markets. European Financial Management 14, 617-632.
[82] McFadden, D., 1974. Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In: Zarembka, P. (Ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics. Academic Press, New York.
[83] Moser, P., 2005. How do patent laws influence innovation? Evidence from nineteenth-century world's fairs. American Economic Review 95, 1214-1236.
[84] Nelson, R., 1959. The simple economics of basic scientific research. Journal of Political Economy 49, 297-306.
[85] Nordhaus, W., 1969. An economic theory of technological change. American Economic Review 59, 18-28.
[86] North, D., 1990. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[87] Park, W., Ginarte, J., 1997. Intellectual property rights and economic growth. Contemporary Economic Policy 15, 51-61.
[88] Portes, A., 1998. Social capital: Its origins and applications in modern sociology. Annual Review of Sociology 24, 1-24.
[89] Putnam, R., 1993. Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton Unversity Press, Princeton, NJ.
[90] Rajan, R., Zingales, L., 1998. Financial dependence and growth. American Economic Review 88, 559-586.
[91] Ramachandran, V., 1993. Technology transfer, firm ownership, and investment in human capital. Review of Economics and Statistics 75, 664-670.
[92] Sakakibara, M., Branstetter, L., 2001. Do stronger patents induce more innovation? Evidence from the 1988 Japanese patent law reforms. RAND Journal of Economics 32, 77-100.
[93] Sapienza, P., 2004. The effect of government ownership on bank lending. Journal of Financial Economics 72, 357-384.
[94] Schankerman, M., 1998. How valuable is patent protection? Estimates by technology field. RAND Journal of Economics 29, 77-107.
[95] Schwartz, S., 1994, Beyond individualism/collectivism: new cultural dimensions of values. In Kim, U., Triandis, H., Kagitcibasi, C, Choi, S., and Yoon, G. (Ed.), Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method, and Applications, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
[96] Stratford, T., 2006. China's enforcement of intellectual property rights and the dangers of the movement of counterfeit and pirated goods into the United States. Prepared statement of Assistant US Trade Representative before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 7.
[97] Sun, Q., Tong, W., Wu, Y., 2006. Bonding premium as a general phenomenon. SSRN working paper.
[98] Temple, J., Johnson, P., 1998. Social capability and economic growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 965-990.
[99] Tullberg, J., 2008. Trust-The importance of trustfulness versus trustworthiness. Journal of the Socio-Economics 37, 2059-2071.
[100] Ueda, M., 2004. Banks versus venture capital: project evaluation, screening, and expropriation. Journal of Finance 59, 601-621.
[101] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2005. World investment report: transnational corporations and the internationalization of R&D. July, New York.
[102] Wang, L., 2004. Intellectual property protection in China. International Information & Library Review 36,253-261.
[103] Wang, Q., Wong, T. J., Xia, L. 2008. State ownership, the institutional environment, and auditor choice: evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Economics 46, 112-134.
[104] Wu, S., Xu, N., Yuan, Q., 2009. State control, legal investor protection, and ownership concertration: evidence from China. Corporate Governance: An International Review 17, 176-192.
[105] Yu, P. K., 2007. Intellectual property, economic development, and the China puzzle, in Daniel J. Gervais (Ed.), Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a TRIPS Plus Era. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 173-220.
[106] Zak, P., Knack, S., 2001. Trust and growth. Economic Journal 111, 295-321.
[2]陈健,社会资本结构分析[J],经济研究,2008(3):104-111。
[3]陈雨露、马勇,社会信用文化、金融体系结构与金融业组织形式[J],经济研究,2008(3):29-38。
[4]成九雁、朱武祥,中国近代股市监管的兴起与演变:1873-1949年[J],经济研究,2006(12):114-123。
[5]蒋春燕、赵曙明,社会资本和公司企业家精神与绩效的关系[J],管理世界,2006(10):90-99。
[6]李常青、王毅辉、张风展,上市公司“管理层讨论与分析”披露质量影响因素研究[J],经济管理,2008(4):29-34。
[7]李涛,社会互动、信任与股市参与[J],经济研究,2006(1):34-45。
[8]李维安、吴德胜、徐皓,网上交易中的声誉机制--来自淘宝网的证据[J],南开管理评论,2007(5):36-46。
[9]刘峰、贺建刚、魏明海,控制权、业绩与利益输送--基于五粮液的案例研究[J],管理世界,2004(8):102-118。
[10]刘微芳、沈艺峰,黄娟娟,游家兴,嵌入性:氽业社会资本和企业融资结构--来自我国房地产业上市公司的经验证据[Z],工作论文,厦门大学财务研究与发展中心,2008。
[11]陆正飞、叶康涛,产权保护导向的会计研究:新近研究回顾[J],中国会计评论,2007(3):113-130。
[12]潘红波、夏新平、余明桂,政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J],经济研究,2008(4):41-52。
[13]屈文洲、许年行、关家雄、吴世农,市场化、政府干预与股票流动性溢价的分配[J],经济研究,2008(4):132-142。
[14]沈艺峰、肖珉、黄娟娟,中小投资者法律保护与公司权益资本成本[J],经济研究,2005(6):115-124.
[15]沈艺峰、许年行、杨熠,我国中小投资者法律保护历史实践的实证检验[J],经济研究,2004(9):90-100。
[16]石军伟、胡立君、付海艳,企业社会资本的功效结构:基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J],中国工业经济,2007(2):84-93。
[17]吴世农,高级管理统计方法[M],中国对外经济贸易出版社,1997。
[18]吴世农,现代财务理论与方法[M],中国经济出版社,1997。
[19]许年行、吴世农,我国中小投资者法律保护影响股权集中度吗?[M],经济学(季刊),2006(3):893-922。
[20]张俊生、曾亚敏,社会资本与区域金融发展[J],财经研究,2005(4):37-45。
[21]张维迎、柯荣住,信任及其解释:来自中国的跨省调查分析[J],经济研究,2002(10):90-100。
[22]周黎安、张维迎、顾全林、沈懿,信誉的价值:以网上拍卖交易为例[J],经济研究,2006(12):29-38。
[23]周小虎、陈传明,企业社会资本与持续竞争优势[J],中国工业经济,2004(5):90-96。
[1]Adler,P.,Kwon,S.,2009.Social capital:the good,the bad,and the ugly.Marshall Research Paper Series working paper.
[2]Alien,F.,Qian,J.,Qian,M.,2005.Law,finance,and economic growth in China.Journal of Financial Economics 77,57-116.
[3]Amiti,M.,Javorcki,B.,2008.Trade costs and location of foreign firms in China.Journal of Development Economics 85,129-149.
[4]Anton,J.,Yao,D.,2002.The sale of ideas:strategic disclosure,property rights,and contracting.Review of Economic Studies 69,513-531.
[5]Arrow,K.,1962.Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention.In:Nelson,R.(Ed.),The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity,Princeton University Press,Princeton NJ.
[6]Asiedu,E.,Esfahani,H.,2001.Ownership structure in foreign direct investment projects.Review of Economics and Statistics 83,647-662.
[7] Ayyagari, M., Demirguc-Kunt, A., Maksimovic, V., 2008. Formal versus informal finance: evidence from China. Unpublished working paper, World Bank.
[8] Baker, M., Stein, J., Wurgler, J., 2003. When does the market matter? Stock prices and the investment of equity-dependent firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 969-1005.
[9] Beamish, P., Banks, J., 1987. Equity joint ventures and the theory of the multinational enterprise. Journal of International Business Studies 18, 1-16.
[10] Beck,T., Levine, R., Loayza, N., 2000. Finance and the sources of growth. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 261-300.
[11] Bekaert, G., Harvey, C., Lundblad, C., 2005. Does financial liberalization spur growth? Journal of Financial Economics 77, 3-55.
[12] Benfratello, L., Schiantarelli, F., Sembenelli, A., 2008. Banks and innovation: microeconometric evidence on Italian Firms. Journal of Financial Economics 90, 197-217.
[13] Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., Mullainathan, S., 2004. How much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 249-276.
[14] Bottazzi, L., Da Rin, M., Hellmann, T., 2007. The importance of trust for investment: evidence from venture capital. ECGI Working Paper.
[15] Boyd, R., Richerson, P., 1985. Culture and the evolutionary process. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
[16] Coleman, J., 1990. Foundations of social theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
[17] Contractor, F., 1990. Ownership patterns of U.S. joint ventures abroad and the liberalization of foreign government regulations in the 1980s: evidence from the benchmark surveys. Journal of International Business Studies 21, 55-73.
[18] Contractor, F., Lorange, P., 1988. Cooperative strategies in international business. Lexington Books, Lexington, MA.
[19] Cornell, B., Welch, I., 1996. Culture, information and screening discrimination. Journal of Political Economy 104, 542-572.
[20] Crepon, B., Duguet, E., 1997. Estimating the innovation function from patent numbers: GMM on count panel data. Journal of Applied Econometrics 12, 243-263.
[21] Cull, R., Xu, L., 2005. Institutions, ownership, and finance: the determinants of profit reinvestment among Chinese firms. Journal of Financial Economics 77,117-146.
[22] De Haan, L., Hinloopen, J., 2003. Preference hierarchies for internal finance, bank loans, bond, and share issues: evidence for Dutch firms. Journal of Empirical Finance 10, 661-681.
[23] Demirguc-Kunt, A., Maksimovic, V., 1998. Law, finance, and firm growth. Journal of Finance 53, 2107-2137.
[24] Desai, M., Foley, C., Hines J., 2004. The costs of shared ownership: evidence from international joint ventures. Journal of Financial Economics 73, 323-374.
[25] Du, J., Lu, Y., Tao, Z., 2008. Economic institutions and FDI location choice: evidence from US multinationals in China. Journal of Comparative Economics 36, 1-18.
[26] Dufwenberg, M., Gneezy, U., 2000. Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost wallet game. Games and Economic Behavior 30, 163-182.
[27] Fan, G., Wang, X., 2006. The report on the relative process of marketization of each region in China. The Economic Science Press, Beijing.
[28] Fan, J., Morck, R., Xu, L., Yeung, B., 2007. Institutions and foreign direct investment: China versus the rest of the world. World Development. Forthcoming.
[29] Fan, J., Rui, O., Zhao, M., 2008. Public governance and corporate finance: evidence from corruption cases. Journal of Comparative Economics 36,343-364.
[30] Fan, J., Titman, S., and Twite, G., 2006. An international comparison of capital structure and debt maturity choices. AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings.
[31] Farrell, D., Lund, S., Rosenfeld, J., Morin, F., Gupta, N., Greenberg, E., 2006. Putting China's capital to work: the value of financial system reform, McKinsey Global Institute Report.
[32] Franko, L., 1989. Use of minority and 50-50 joint ventures by United States multinationals during the 1970s: the interaction of host country policies and corporate strategies. Journal of International Business Studies 20, 19-40.
[33] Fukuyama, F., 1995. Trust. Free Press, New York.
[34] Fung, K., Iizaka, H., Siu, A., 2003. Japanese direct investment in China. China Economic Review 14, 304-315.
[35] Gambetta, D., 1988. Trust: Making and breaking cooperative relations. Blackwell, Cambridge.
[36] Gatignon, H., Anderson, E., 1988. The multinational corporation's degree of control over foreign subsidiaries: an empirical test of a transaction cost explanation. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 4, 305-336.
[37] Gomes-Casseres, B., 1990. Firm ownership preferences and host government restrictions: an integrated approach. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 21, 1-22.
[38] Gould, D., Gruben, W., 1996. The role of intellectual property rights in economic growth. Journal of Development Economics 48, 323-350.
[39] Griliches, Z., 1992. The search of corporate restructuring on industrial research and development. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 94, 29-47.
[40] Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2003. People's opium? Religion and economic attitudes. Journal of Monetary Economics 50, 225-282.
[41] Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2004a. The role of social capital in financial development. American Economic Review 94, 526-556.
[42] Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2004b. Does local financial development matter? Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 929-969.
[43] Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2006. Does cultural affect economic outcomes? Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, 23-48.
[44] Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2008a. Trusting the stock market. Journal of Finance 63, 2557-2600.
[45] Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2008b. Cultural biases in economic exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics. Forthcoming.
[46] Hall, B., 1996. The private and social returns to research and development. In: Smith, B., Barfield, C. (Ed.), Technology, R&D, and the Economy, Brooking Institution and the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, pp. 140-183.
[47] Hall, B., 2002. The financing of research and development. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 18, 35-51.
[48] Hall, B., Jaffe, A., Trajtenberg, M., 2005. Market value and patent citations. RAND Journal of Economics 36,16-38.
[49] Hausman, J., Hall, B., Griliches, Z., 1984. Econometric models for court data with an application to the patents-R&D relationship. Econometrica 52,909-938.
[50] Hausman, J., Hall, B., Griliches, Z., 1986. Patents and R&D: is there a lag? International Economic Review 27, 265-283.
[51] Head, K., Ries, J., Swenson, D., 1995. Agglomeration benefits and location choice: evidence from Japanese manufacturing investments in the United States. Journal of International Economics 38,223-247.
[52] Henisz, W., 2000. The institutional environment for multinational investment. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 16, 334-364.
[53] Hilary, G., Hui, K., 2008. Does religion matter in corporate decision making in America? Journal of Financial Economics. Forthcoming.
[54] Hofstede, G., 2001. Culture's Consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.
[55] Holmstrom, B., 1982. Moral hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13, 324 - 340.
[56] Hovakimian, A., Opler, T., Titman, S., 2001. The debt-equity choice. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 36, 1-24.
[57] International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2007. International intellectual property alliance 2002 special 301 report: People's Republic of China, IIPA Report.
[58] Israel, C., 2006. Piracy and counterfeiting in China. Testimony of US Coordinator for International Intellectual Property Enforcement before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
[59] Jackson, H., and Roe, M., 2008. Public and private enforcement of securities laws: resource-based evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.
[60] Javorcik, B., 2004. The composition of foreign direct investment and protection of intellectual property rights: evidence from transition economies. European Economic Review 48, 39-62.
[61] Kant, C., 1990. Multinational firms and government revenues. Journal of Public Economics 42, 135-147.
[62] Kashima, E., Kashima, Y., 1998. Culture and language: the case of cultural dimensions and personal pronoun use. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 29, 461-486.
[63] Khwaja, A., Main, A., 2005. Do lenders favor politically connected firms? Rent provision in an emerging financial market. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 1371-1411.
[64] King, R., Levine, R., 1993. Finance and growth: Schumpeter may be right. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 717-737.
[65] King-Metters, K., Metters, R., 2008, Misunderstanding the Chinese worker. Wall Street Journal, July7, R11.
[66] Kiyonari, T., Yamagishi, T., Cook, K., Cheshire, C., 2006. Does trust beget trustworthiness? Trust and trustworthiness in two games and two cultures: a research note. Social Psychology Quarterly 69, 270-283.
[67] Knack, S., Keefer, P., 1997. Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross social capital: its origins and applications in modern sociology. Annual Review of Sociology 24, 1-24.
[68] Kogut, B., Singh, H., 1988, The effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode. Journal of International Business Studies 19, 411-432.
[69] Krugman, P., 1991. Increasing returns and economic geography. Journal of Political Economy 99, 483-499.
[70] Krugman, P., Venables, A., 1995. Globalization and the inequality of nations. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 857-880.
[71] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny R., 1997. Legal determinants of external finance. Journal of Finance 52, 1131-1150.
[72] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny R., 1997. Trust in large organization. American Economic Review 87, 333-338.
[73] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny R., 2006. What works in securities laws? Journal of Finance 61, 1-32.
[74] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1998. Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113-1155.
[75] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2002. Government ownership of banks. Journal of Finance 57, 265-301.
[76] Lanjouw, J., Lerner. J., 1997. The enforcement of intellectual property rights: A survey of the empirical literature. NBER Working paper W6296.
[77] Lerner, J., 1994. The importance of patent scope: an empirical analysis. RAND Journal of Economics 25, 319-333.
[78] Levine, R., Zervos, S., 1998. Stock market, banks, and economic growth. American Economic Review 88, 537-558.
[79] Li, K., Griffin, D., Yue, H., Zhao, L., 2008. Country of origin effects in capital structure decisions: evidence from foreign direct investment in China. Working paper.
[80] Maskus, K., Dougherty, S., Mertha, A., 2005. Intellectual property rights and economic development in China, in Fink, C. and Maskus, K. (Ed.), Intellectual property and development: lessons from recent economic research. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 295-331.
[81] Mayer, C., 2008. Trust in financial markets. European Financial Management 14, 617-632.
[82] McFadden, D., 1974. Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In: Zarembka, P. (Ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics. Academic Press, New York.
[83] Moser, P., 2005. How do patent laws influence innovation? Evidence from nineteenth-century world's fairs. American Economic Review 95, 1214-1236.
[84] Nelson, R., 1959. The simple economics of basic scientific research. Journal of Political Economy 49, 297-306.
[85] Nordhaus, W., 1969. An economic theory of technological change. American Economic Review 59, 18-28.
[86] North, D., 1990. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[87] Park, W., Ginarte, J., 1997. Intellectual property rights and economic growth. Contemporary Economic Policy 15, 51-61.
[88] Portes, A., 1998. Social capital: Its origins and applications in modern sociology. Annual Review of Sociology 24, 1-24.
[89] Putnam, R., 1993. Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton Unversity Press, Princeton, NJ.
[90] Rajan, R., Zingales, L., 1998. Financial dependence and growth. American Economic Review 88, 559-586.
[91] Ramachandran, V., 1993. Technology transfer, firm ownership, and investment in human capital. Review of Economics and Statistics 75, 664-670.
[92] Sakakibara, M., Branstetter, L., 2001. Do stronger patents induce more innovation? Evidence from the 1988 Japanese patent law reforms. RAND Journal of Economics 32, 77-100.
[93] Sapienza, P., 2004. The effect of government ownership on bank lending. Journal of Financial Economics 72, 357-384.
[94] Schankerman, M., 1998. How valuable is patent protection? Estimates by technology field. RAND Journal of Economics 29, 77-107.
[95] Schwartz, S., 1994, Beyond individualism/collectivism: new cultural dimensions of values. In Kim, U., Triandis, H., Kagitcibasi, C, Choi, S., and Yoon, G. (Ed.), Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method, and Applications, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
[96] Stratford, T., 2006. China's enforcement of intellectual property rights and the dangers of the movement of counterfeit and pirated goods into the United States. Prepared statement of Assistant US Trade Representative before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 7.
[97] Sun, Q., Tong, W., Wu, Y., 2006. Bonding premium as a general phenomenon. SSRN working paper.
[98] Temple, J., Johnson, P., 1998. Social capability and economic growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 965-990.
[99] Tullberg, J., 2008. Trust-The importance of trustfulness versus trustworthiness. Journal of the Socio-Economics 37, 2059-2071.
[100] Ueda, M., 2004. Banks versus venture capital: project evaluation, screening, and expropriation. Journal of Finance 59, 601-621.
[101] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2005. World investment report: transnational corporations and the internationalization of R&D. July, New York.
[102] Wang, L., 2004. Intellectual property protection in China. International Information & Library Review 36,253-261.
[103] Wang, Q., Wong, T. J., Xia, L. 2008. State ownership, the institutional environment, and auditor choice: evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Economics 46, 112-134.
[104] Wu, S., Xu, N., Yuan, Q., 2009. State control, legal investor protection, and ownership concertration: evidence from China. Corporate Governance: An International Review 17, 176-192.
[105] Yu, P. K., 2007. Intellectual property, economic development, and the China puzzle, in Daniel J. Gervais (Ed.), Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a TRIPS Plus Era. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 173-220.
[106] Zak, P., Knack, S., 2001. Trust and growth. Economic Journal 111, 295-321.