合约实施效率与中国地区产业比较优势研究
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摘要
论文主要从制度的重要维度——合约实施效率角度切入,讨论了中国地区产业比较优势和地区产业出口规模的微观决定机制,为解释中国经济转型中制度对地区产业比较优势的作用机制提供了理论与经验逻辑一致的研究方法和分析思路。在地区产业比较优势决定机制研究方面,讨论了合约实施效率对地区比较优势三种决定机制：专用性中间投资作用机制、债务融资作用机制、外资区位选择机制；在此基础上,讨论了地区合约实施和产权保护制度通过对地区企业生产效率的影响而对地区出口规模决定机制。
在地区产业比较优势第一种决定机制研究中,我们在垄断竞争背景下构建了一个专用性中间品合约不完全实施模型,模型研究表明,合约实施制度不完备会导致事前投资激励扭曲,进而对地区比较优势产生影响,合约实施效率高的地区在专用性中间品密集使用的产业具有比较优势。我们利用相关数据对这个命题进行了检验。另外我们还发现外资流入规模和企业的规模大小对地区对外贸易结构有显著影响。
在地区比较优势第二种决定机制研究中,我们垄断竞争背景下构建了一个债务融资合约实施模型,模型明确了合约实施效率通过“金融扩张效应”对比较优势产生影响的传导机制,合约实施效率的提高有助于债务融资中利率更低,融资规模更大,产品价格更低,导致合约实施效率高的地区将在资本弹性高的产业具有比较优势。相关的经验研究支持了上述地区比较优势的作用机制,从而较好地解释了中国经济转型过程中,地区合约实施、地区金融发展和地区比较优势形成三者的关系。
在地区比较优势第三种决定机制研究中,我们拓展了前面的合约不完全实施理论模型,考虑了合约实施效率对外资企业利润和区位选择对外资企业影响,以及最终对地区比较优势的影响,研究发现,那些属于专用性中间品使用密度较高产业的外商直接投资更倾向于流向合约实施效率高的地区,当合约实施效率较低地区的要素成本优势不够显著时,外资总是选择在合约实施效率高的地区,从而导致FDI产业地区分布结构性差异。这些结论在经验上得到了有力的支持。由于外资企业通常具有较高的出口倾向,这种FDI产业地区分布的结构性差异构成了地区比较优势重要来源。
在地区出口规模决定机制研究中,我们借助于新经济地理学的思想构建了一个两国三地区的开放垄断竞争模型,分析了合约实施效率和产权保护制度对地区出口差异产生影响的微观机制。地区合约实施效率和地区产权保护制度质量影响到地区出口企业生产效率,进而影响企业的出口竞争力,制度质量的地区差异成为地区出口规模差异的重要来源。相关面板数据经验研究表明：除了区位优势差异、外资分布差异和地区金融发展差异是地区贸易差异的重要来源外,合约实施效率和产权保护制度质量差异对地区出口规模差异产生了显著影响,而且影响力呈逐年上升趋势。在1998-2004年期间,相对于其他控制变量,制度对于劳动生产率和地区出口规模差异的解释力处于上升的态势。
论文的政策含义是十分清晰的,即对转型经济体而言,合约实施效率的提高具有显著的比较优势改善功能。首先是将有助于缓解专用性中间投入扭曲,从而改变FDI区位选择和地区对外贸易比较优势；其次是有助于地区金融扩张,使资本弹性较高行业获得动态比较优势；再次,合约实施效率改进不仅仅有利于吸引更多的外资,而且有助于外资结构的改善和技术溢出水平的提高,这个结论在很大程度上也适用于国内东西部之间的直接投资和相关的产业转移；最后,随着我国出口产品结构的提升,工业制成品占出口比重不断上升,出口产品对制度的依赖程度越来越强,地区出口差异对于制度差异越来越敏感,制度质量对于地区企业生产效率和出口竞争力的提高越来越重要。
We discuss the micro foundation of industrial comparative advantage and regional export scale in China from the contract enforcement aspect. On the study of what determines the regional industrial comparative advantage in China, we explore three mechanisms, the specialized intermediate investment mechanism, debt finance mechanism and FDI location choice mechanism. On the study of what determine the regional export difference, we explore how the contract enforcement and property right protection raise the enterprise heterogeneousness in different regions and how it determines the region's export.
On the study of the first mechanism on regional comparative advantage, we developed a simple incomplete enforced specialized intermediate contract model under monopoly competitive market at first. Theoretical analysis shows that ex post incomplete contract enforcement will distort the ex ante specific investment and product price. The more specialized intermediate input used in the production the more distortion happens. The region with higher contract enforcement efficiency will have comparative advantage on the industries intensively using the specialized intermediate inputs. This point is significantly supported by empirical study with Chinese regional and industrial data. This study gives some policy implications for Chinese judicial reform on efficiency improvement and the adjustment of regional industrial structure.
On the study of the second mechanism on regional comparative advantage, we developed a debt contract enforcement model under monopoly competitive market structure at first. Then we discuss how the debt contract enforcement efficiency will affect regional comparative advantage. The debt contract model analysis shows how the contract enforcement efficiency will affect regional comparative advantage by "financial enlargement" and "producing scale enlargement" effects. More efficient higher contract enforcement will decrease the interest rate and it gives enterprise the incentive to enlarge the debt size and produce with larger scale. Finally, the final goods will be sold at a lower price and thus the comparative advantage gained. The relative empirical analysis with Chinese industrial data from regions supports this theoretical mechanism of the origin of regional comparative advantage. The regions with more efficient contract enforcement will have the comparative advantage in the industry with higher capital elasticity. It gives the policy connotations on regional contract enforcement efficiency and regional comparative advantage.
On the study of the third mechanism on regional comparative advantage, we developed the formal incompletely enforced contract model in chapter 3, discussed how the regional contract enforcement difference will affect foreign investor's profit and its location choice and finally affect the regional comparative advantage. The theoretical model shows that when the contract can not be fully enforced, those highly contract-intensive foreign investments will choose the regions with high contract enforcement efficiency. The empirical study with 19 manufacturing industrial and regional data supports this idea. By controlling the effect from regional agglomeration and human capital, it shows that the contract-intensive FDI industry is likely to locate in region with higher contract enforcement efficiency. Since the FDI has a high export preference, this regional FDI structure difference will be an important origin of regional comparative advantage.
On the study of regional export size, a monopoly competition model with two countries and three regions is developed following the New Economics of Geography framework in this paper. The micro-mechanism of Chinese regional unbalanced exports is studied, and the attribution of institution quality difference to this unbalance is emphasized. By taking advantage of Chinese regional export data during 1998 to 2004, we found that local legal institution quality and the property right protection institution play a significant role in the regional unequal export by controlling the regional difference of technological level, labor, geography, financial development and FDI. The reduction of regional institutional difference becomes more and more important for the alleviation of the unbalanced development of regional export and economy.
The policy connotation is clear that the improvement of contract enforcement is meaningful to change the region's comparative advantage. Firstly, it will relief the distortion in specialized intermediate input and it will change the FDI location choice and then the comparative advantage. Secondly, it will help enterprise to debt more, the industry with higher capital elasticity will have dynamic comparative advantage. Thirdly, it will not only enable regions to attract more FDI, but improve the FDI structure and it's technology diffusion probability. This conclusion also adapts to inter-regional investment. Finally, with the upgrading of export structure, the export becomes more and more sensitive to contract enforcement and property right. Improving the qualities of institutions will promote a harmonious development between regions.
在地区产业比较优势第一种决定机制研究中,我们在垄断竞争背景下构建了一个专用性中间品合约不完全实施模型,模型研究表明,合约实施制度不完备会导致事前投资激励扭曲,进而对地区比较优势产生影响,合约实施效率高的地区在专用性中间品密集使用的产业具有比较优势。我们利用相关数据对这个命题进行了检验。另外我们还发现外资流入规模和企业的规模大小对地区对外贸易结构有显著影响。
在地区比较优势第二种决定机制研究中,我们垄断竞争背景下构建了一个债务融资合约实施模型,模型明确了合约实施效率通过“金融扩张效应”对比较优势产生影响的传导机制,合约实施效率的提高有助于债务融资中利率更低,融资规模更大,产品价格更低,导致合约实施效率高的地区将在资本弹性高的产业具有比较优势。相关的经验研究支持了上述地区比较优势的作用机制,从而较好地解释了中国经济转型过程中,地区合约实施、地区金融发展和地区比较优势形成三者的关系。
在地区比较优势第三种决定机制研究中,我们拓展了前面的合约不完全实施理论模型,考虑了合约实施效率对外资企业利润和区位选择对外资企业影响,以及最终对地区比较优势的影响,研究发现,那些属于专用性中间品使用密度较高产业的外商直接投资更倾向于流向合约实施效率高的地区,当合约实施效率较低地区的要素成本优势不够显著时,外资总是选择在合约实施效率高的地区,从而导致FDI产业地区分布结构性差异。这些结论在经验上得到了有力的支持。由于外资企业通常具有较高的出口倾向,这种FDI产业地区分布的结构性差异构成了地区比较优势重要来源。
在地区出口规模决定机制研究中,我们借助于新经济地理学的思想构建了一个两国三地区的开放垄断竞争模型,分析了合约实施效率和产权保护制度对地区出口差异产生影响的微观机制。地区合约实施效率和地区产权保护制度质量影响到地区出口企业生产效率,进而影响企业的出口竞争力,制度质量的地区差异成为地区出口规模差异的重要来源。相关面板数据经验研究表明：除了区位优势差异、外资分布差异和地区金融发展差异是地区贸易差异的重要来源外,合约实施效率和产权保护制度质量差异对地区出口规模差异产生了显著影响,而且影响力呈逐年上升趋势。在1998-2004年期间,相对于其他控制变量,制度对于劳动生产率和地区出口规模差异的解释力处于上升的态势。
论文的政策含义是十分清晰的,即对转型经济体而言,合约实施效率的提高具有显著的比较优势改善功能。首先是将有助于缓解专用性中间投入扭曲,从而改变FDI区位选择和地区对外贸易比较优势；其次是有助于地区金融扩张,使资本弹性较高行业获得动态比较优势；再次,合约实施效率改进不仅仅有利于吸引更多的外资,而且有助于外资结构的改善和技术溢出水平的提高,这个结论在很大程度上也适用于国内东西部之间的直接投资和相关的产业转移；最后,随着我国出口产品结构的提升,工业制成品占出口比重不断上升,出口产品对制度的依赖程度越来越强,地区出口差异对于制度差异越来越敏感,制度质量对于地区企业生产效率和出口竞争力的提高越来越重要。
We discuss the micro foundation of industrial comparative advantage and regional export scale in China from the contract enforcement aspect. On the study of what determines the regional industrial comparative advantage in China, we explore three mechanisms, the specialized intermediate investment mechanism, debt finance mechanism and FDI location choice mechanism. On the study of what determine the regional export difference, we explore how the contract enforcement and property right protection raise the enterprise heterogeneousness in different regions and how it determines the region's export.
On the study of the first mechanism on regional comparative advantage, we developed a simple incomplete enforced specialized intermediate contract model under monopoly competitive market at first. Theoretical analysis shows that ex post incomplete contract enforcement will distort the ex ante specific investment and product price. The more specialized intermediate input used in the production the more distortion happens. The region with higher contract enforcement efficiency will have comparative advantage on the industries intensively using the specialized intermediate inputs. This point is significantly supported by empirical study with Chinese regional and industrial data. This study gives some policy implications for Chinese judicial reform on efficiency improvement and the adjustment of regional industrial structure.
On the study of the second mechanism on regional comparative advantage, we developed a debt contract enforcement model under monopoly competitive market structure at first. Then we discuss how the debt contract enforcement efficiency will affect regional comparative advantage. The debt contract model analysis shows how the contract enforcement efficiency will affect regional comparative advantage by "financial enlargement" and "producing scale enlargement" effects. More efficient higher contract enforcement will decrease the interest rate and it gives enterprise the incentive to enlarge the debt size and produce with larger scale. Finally, the final goods will be sold at a lower price and thus the comparative advantage gained. The relative empirical analysis with Chinese industrial data from regions supports this theoretical mechanism of the origin of regional comparative advantage. The regions with more efficient contract enforcement will have the comparative advantage in the industry with higher capital elasticity. It gives the policy connotations on regional contract enforcement efficiency and regional comparative advantage.
On the study of the third mechanism on regional comparative advantage, we developed the formal incompletely enforced contract model in chapter 3, discussed how the regional contract enforcement difference will affect foreign investor's profit and its location choice and finally affect the regional comparative advantage. The theoretical model shows that when the contract can not be fully enforced, those highly contract-intensive foreign investments will choose the regions with high contract enforcement efficiency. The empirical study with 19 manufacturing industrial and regional data supports this idea. By controlling the effect from regional agglomeration and human capital, it shows that the contract-intensive FDI industry is likely to locate in region with higher contract enforcement efficiency. Since the FDI has a high export preference, this regional FDI structure difference will be an important origin of regional comparative advantage.
On the study of regional export size, a monopoly competition model with two countries and three regions is developed following the New Economics of Geography framework in this paper. The micro-mechanism of Chinese regional unbalanced exports is studied, and the attribution of institution quality difference to this unbalance is emphasized. By taking advantage of Chinese regional export data during 1998 to 2004, we found that local legal institution quality and the property right protection institution play a significant role in the regional unequal export by controlling the regional difference of technological level, labor, geography, financial development and FDI. The reduction of regional institutional difference becomes more and more important for the alleviation of the unbalanced development of regional export and economy.
The policy connotation is clear that the improvement of contract enforcement is meaningful to change the region's comparative advantage. Firstly, it will relief the distortion in specialized intermediate input and it will change the FDI location choice and then the comparative advantage. Secondly, it will help enterprise to debt more, the industry with higher capital elasticity will have dynamic comparative advantage. Thirdly, it will not only enable regions to attract more FDI, but improve the FDI structure and it's technology diffusion probability. This conclusion also adapts to inter-regional investment. Finally, with the upgrading of export structure, the export becomes more and more sensitive to contract enforcement and property right. Improving the qualities of institutions will promote a harmonious development between regions.
引文
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