企业影响力、会计稳健性与资源配置效率
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摘要
政府和企业是现代经济社会中最重要的两大主体,其相互关系不仅影响它们自身,而且影响到整个社会经济运行效率的高低。前期的研究中主要集中在政府对企业的影响和干预上,而很少研究二者之间互动和企业对政府影响的经济后果。但越来越多的转轨国家现实表明,企业对政府的影响不仅可能会影响资源配置效率的高低,而且会影响到转轨国家的改革步伐和方向,甚至会影响到最终转轨的成功与否。尽管会计稳健性是当前会计实证研究文献的热点,但直接为会计稳健性经济后果提供的经验证据仍然很少,在中国尤其如此。中国是一个新兴加转轨的国家;同时,又在会计制度改革过程中高度重视会计稳健性的应用。那么,在中国的制度背景下,企业对政府的影响力、会计稳健性对资源配置效率会产生怎样的影响呢?
     本文在对中国会计制度改革和行政权力体系深入分析的基础上,针对会计稳健性计量指标存在问题,利用中国上市公司的2004—2009年的数据采用相互校验的方式选择适应中国市场环境的会计稳健性计量指标;同时利用国际政治关系的相互依赖理论提出了一个基于终极产权人性质的粗糙企业影响力度量方法,从融资和投资两个视角利用2007—2009年上市公司数据对企业影响力、会计稳健性与资源配置之间的关系,以及市场化进程对其造成的影响进行了实证检验。研究结果发现:
     第一,会计稳健性在整体上有助于资源配置效率的提高。具体说来:(1)会计稳健性可以有效提高企业的融资效率,包括债务融资效率和权益融资效率;(2)会计稳健性一方面可以减少企业的过度投资非效率行为,另一方面会计稳健性会加剧投资不足的非效率投资行为。
     由于以下两个原因,我们认为会计稳健性在整体提高了资源的配置效率:(1)从全社会的角度来看,由于资本的短缺性,使得投资过度造成的社会损失更为严重,而投资不足造成的社会损失要低一些;(2)从决策信息的来源来看,资金供给方作为外部人员主要依靠公开财务报告信息来进行决策,而进行投资决策的经理人是企业的内部人员,具有更多的私有信息可供利用,从而可以最大限度地削弱会计稳健性可能加剧投资不足方面的不利后果。
     第二,企业影响力对资源配置产生双重影响。首先,企业利用其影响力直接借助于行政干预来影响企业的融资效率和投资效率;其次,企业影响力还会通过弱化稳健会计信息的市场化信息决策作用而扭曲社会资源的配置。
     第三,市场化改革通过强化市场配置资源的基础性地位,降低了政府对经济的干预,从而使得企业影响力对资源配置的扭曲性作用得以减少,同时也提高了稳健会计信息在社会资源配置的作用。
     第四,根据K&W(2009)提出的方法计算的公司年度会计稳健性计量指标在中国具有较大的适应性。
     在上述研究发现的基础上,本文提出了相关政策建议:深入研究会计稳健性的经济后果,在与国际会计接轨的同时,制定适合中国国情的会计准则和相关制度;转变政府职能,严格限定政府干预的范围及其方式,降低企业对政府的影响能力;加快政务公开,提高政府行为的透明度,发挥政府影响力的积极作用,降低企业影响力的消极作用。
The government and the firm are the two most important entities in the modern economic society. Their mutual relationship affects not only the government and the firms themselves, but also the social economic efficiency. Previous studies have primarily focused on the government's intervention and impact on firms. However, few studies have been carried out on the economic consequences from interaction of government and enterprises, and the influence on government by firms. More facts in transitional countries reveal that the firm's influence on the government will not only affect the efficiency of resource allocation, also affect the pace and direction of their reforms, even their success of transition. While much empirical research has been done on accounting conservatism, there are little direct empirical evidence of economic consequences for accounting conservatism, especially in China. China is an emerging and transitional country, in which more attentions are paid to the accounting conservatism in the reforming process of accounting system. So what is the relationship between the firms influence on government and the efficiency of resource allocation, and what is the relationship between accounting conservatism and the efficiency of resource allocation under the China's system?
     Based on the analysis of the system of the Chinese accounting reforming and administrative power, from the perspective of financing and investment, we tested the relationship between firms influence on government, accounting conservatism and resource allocation efficiency, and the effect by the marketalization with the data of Chinese listed companies in 2007-2009. In process of the research, we tested the reliability of the measure of accounting conservatism using 2004-2009 chinese listed companies data because there is not a common acceptted measure of comservatism, and refer to the theory of interdependence in international political relations subject to construct a measure of firms influence on the base of understanding of the chinese system. The results are as follows:
     1. Accounting conservatism overall helps to enhance the efficiency of resource allocation. Concretely speaking, on one hand, it can effectively improve the financing efficiency of firm, including debt financing efficiency and equity financing efficiency. On the other, it can reduce the inefficiency of overinvestment, and exacerbate the inefficiency of underinvestment.
     we think accounting conservatism helps to enhance the efficiency of resource allocation on the whole with the following reasons:(1) The loss of overinvestment is severer than the loss of underinvestment because of resource scarcity; (2) From the perspective of the source of decision information, the founds providers as the external related party depend mainly on the public financial accounting information to make decision; while the managers as internal personnel with more available private information can weaken the inefficiency of underinvestment greatly.
     2. Firms influence has dual influences on the allocation of resources. Firstly, Firms can use their influence directly by the administrative intervention to affect the firm financing efficiency and investment efficiency. Secondly, firms influence can affect the efficiency of resource allocation by weakening the role of conversatism information in the process of decision-making.
     3. Marketization reform can weaken the adverse effect on resource allocoation from the firms influence, because:(1) Marketization can reduce government intervention; and (2) Marketization can strengthen the role of accounting information in the process of decision-making.
     4. The firm-year measure of conservatism development by Knhy & Watts (2009) are more reliability as a measure of accounting conservatism in china in our study.
     Based on the above results of study, we recommend some constructive suggestion in this thesis:(1) study in depth on the economic consequences of accounting conservatism, and develop a set of accounting standards suitable for china in the process of accounting standard international harmonization; (2) change governmental functions, strictly limiting the scope of government intervention and its approach to reduce the impact of the government from enterprise; (3) Improving the transparency of government public affairs, improving the positive role of the firms influence and reducing the negative effects of the firms influence.
引文
1 在2005年7月27日和2005年7月20日的FASB和IASB的概念框架会议的分发材料中关于会计稳健性的问题是“会计稳健性的作用是什么?会计稳健性是否与中立性相矛盾?如果不矛盾,为什么?为什么需要保留会计稳健性?”
    2 对中国期刊网中的核心期刊进行搜索,然后逐-查看文献来进行统计;搜索时间截止2010年6月。
    1 当前谈论比较多的房地产商绑架政府、垄断企业集团阻碍改革的深化实际上都是企业影响政府决策的一些现实表现。
    1 转引自Ball, R., and L. Shivakumar, Earnings quality in UK private firms:conparative loss recognition timeliness[J], Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,39:83—128.P91
    2 引自FASB, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information. Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No.2,1980,Para 95
    1 Cheng、Collins和Huang(2006)的研究发现采用不同的企业固定增长率对权益资本成本的计算结果影响不大,蒋琰(2009a)以我国年均GDP增长率作为宏观经济增长率。
    1 全国人大代表、桂林电器科学研究所所长陈仲2010年两会期间,提交了《要求全国人大开展<反垄断法>的执法检查》的议案,在24小时内接到超过50个“关心”的电话,以及一次又一次的“被面谈”。虽然其中有表示支持的,但多数人的目的是希望他能撤回议案。转引自:http://www.smg.cn/Index News/newsDetail.aspx?newsID=118098&serialno=009&sid=2
    2 周黎安,转型中的地方政府,格致出版社、上海人民出版社,2008年11月第1版,p16
    3 转引引:樊勇明,西方国际政治经济学[M],上海人民出版社,2001年5月第1版
    1 张平治、杨景龙,中国人的毛病,中国社会出版社,1998年第1版,第88页。
    1 转引自,叶志锋,企业业绩操纵与银行债券保护研究,暨南大学博士论文,2009,第1页
    2 同上。
    1 田利辉(2005a)认为,部分民营企业通过与地方政府部门和国有银行分支机构的特殊关系,也有获得信贷优惠的可能性。但多是一种个案。同时,即使二者确实存在一定的关系,在一般情况下,国有企业获得政府干预下的行政优惠也要比民营企业更大。何贤杰、朱红军、陈信元(2008)分析了对国有企业和民营企业进行信贷行政干预的政治风险差异,而政治晋升是中国政府官员的最主要激励(周黎安,2004;田伟、田红云,2009;王贤彬、徐现祥,2009)。
    1 Pittman和Fortin (2004)采取的办法是删除了债务成本5%—95%以外的样本;蒋琰(2009a)采取的办法是所有小于5%分位数和大干95%分位数的变量,令其等于5%分位数和95%分位数
    1 剔除金融业之后,共有为21个行业,本来应该设置20个行业哑变量。但由于“制造业—木材、家俱”次类的观测值较少,在回归检验中合并在“制造业—其他”次类中一并进行,所以设置了19个行业哑变量。
    1 曾颖和陆正飞(2006)的样本期为2002—2003,总资产周转率的均值和中位数为0.6423和0.5064.
    1 1979—2003年间,国有市场总值年平均增长率为9.68%,要素投资对经济增长的贡献占60.2%,其中资本投资贡献45.5%,而投资效率提高对经济增长的贡献仅为37.2%。http://www.stats.gov.cn/(国家统计局网站):1996—2003年国民经济和社会发展统计公告。转引自王成秋:企业投资效率,经济科学出版社,2007年,p2
    1 潘敏和金岩(2003)、魏明海和柳建华(2007)都发现重复投资、过度扩展是国有企业的主要行为模式。而根据本文对企业影响力的定义,国有企业的实际上是影响力较高的企业。
    1 与第五章一样,将“制造业——木材、家俱”次类合并到“制造业——其他”之中进行回归检验。
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