管理者过度自信、投资—现金流敏感度与投资效率
|
摘要
近二十年来的国内外财务研究表明,企业投资支出与内部现金流存在显著相关关系。上市公司投资支出随现金流大幅波动,可能在现金流充裕或不足时分别伴随投资过度或不足,极大地损害股东和相关方利益。对此,主流研究在理性人假设基础上,分别提出了企业投资的“融资约束假说”和“自由现金流假说”,依此谋求治理方案。然而,大量心理学实验证实,管理者普遍存在过度自信的心理偏误。这种决策主体的非理性特征可能影响企业投资行为,并使得建立在主流理论基础上的治理机制失去效力。为此,本文尝试借鉴和发展新兴的行为金融研究成果,研究我国上市公司管理者过度自信心理对企业投资-现金流敏感度以及投资效率的影响,以期为非效率投资治理提供依据。
论文首先放松了相关行为金融研究的信息对称假设,通过构造投资决策模型,分别研究融资逆向选择条件下和管理者道德风险条件下过度自信对投资决策的影响。研究结果表明,对于上市公司这类“优质企业”而言:(1)管理者过度自信可能导致企业投资过度或不足;(2)管理者过度自信程度与企业投资-现金流敏感度正向关联;其他条件一定,企业融资约束程度越高,则投资-现金流敏感度越高;(3)在融资逆向选择和道德风险双重作用下,管理者过度自信与企业非效率投资几率的关系可能是非单调的;(4)过度自信管理者的道德风险与所受监督无关,与股权激励负相关;较高程度的自信水平有助于节约治理成本。
其次,论文针对我国上市公司管理者过度自信状况及其对投资-现金流敏感度、投资效率的影响展开实证研究:(1)基于企业景气调查和管理者持股变动的分析表明,绝大多数上市公司管理者表现出过度自信倾向;该自信程度与某些管理者个体特征和组织治理特征相关;(2)融资约束条件下管理者过度自信对投资-现金流敏感度影响的实证研究表明,1)由董事、高管组成的管理者群体自信程度对公司投资行为的影响较CEO个人或高管团队更为显著;2)管理者自信程度对投资-现金流敏感度具有显著正向影响;3)融资约束程度越高,过度自信管理者所在公司的投资-现金流敏感度越高。上述结论在控制信息不对称或委托代理问题后依然成立;(3)对上市公司管理者过度自信与投资效率(企业价值)关系的联立方程检验表明,1)管理者自信度与企业价值之间存在显著反馈关系;2)企业价值提高有助于增强管理者自信心;3)管理者自信对投资效率具有非单调作用——适度水平下管理者自信有助于提高企业价值,但超过一定限度后对其有不利影响。
本研究为上市公司非效率投资治理提供了新的政策意见和建议:(1)非效率投资治理不可忽视决策者非理性心理的影响;(2)减少管理者过度自信倾向、稳定现金流水平、增加信息披露、减少融资约束均有利于避免投资支出大起大落;(3)公司治理机制既要鼓励和选拔自信人才进入管理团队,也要注重及时干预和调整管理者自信心理,防止其演变为过度自信;(4)监督激励机制应根据管理者自信程度适当调整等等。
The overseas and domestic financial studies in the recent twenty years have both certified significant correlations between corporate investments and internal cash flows. When the capital expenditures of listed companies fluctuate greatly with different cash flow levels, it may be accompanied by over- or under-investment with surplus or inadequate cash flows, which harms the interests of shareholders and other related parties. Based on the rational person hypothesis, mainstream studies put forth investment theories such as the financial constraint hypothesis or the free cash flow hypothesis, and seek relevant governance measures. However, a great deal of psychological experiments has proved that overconfidence is prevelant among corporate managers. With this irrationality in decision-making, governance measures based on mainstream studies may fail to work. This paper tries to learn from and push forward the emerging behavioral financial research, and study managerial overconfidence of Chinese listed companies as well as its effect on investment-cash flow sensitivity and investment efficiency. The purpose is to provide clues for improving inefficient investment governance.
The paper first gives up the asymmetric information hypothesis of the related study. By means of an investment decision model, it theoretically investigates the effect of managerial overconfidence on investment decisions under the conditions of financing adverse-selection and managerial moral hazard respectively. The analysis shows that for "good companies" represented by listed companies: (1) managerial overconfidence may result in over- or under-investment; (2) it is positively related to the companies' investment-cash flow sensitivity; all else equal, the more severe the financial constraint, the higher the above sensitivity; (3) taking both financing adverse-selection and managerial moral hazard into account, managerial overconfidence may have a non-monotonic effect on inefficient investment probabilities; (4) the degree of moral hazard of overconfident managers is unrelated to supervision, but is negatively affected by ownership incentives; overconfidence at a high level helps save corporate governance costs.
The paper proceeds to empirically investigate how mangerial overconfidence affects investments and firm value of Chinese listed companies: (1) by measuring overconfidence based on Entrepreneur Confidence Index and management shareholding respectively, the paper shows that the majority of managers tend to be overconfident, and some of their personal characteristics and corporate governance features lead to difference in managerial confidence; (2) under the condition of financial constraint, 1) the overconfidence of management group composed of directors and executives has a more significant effect on corporate investments than that of CEOs or executives; 2) managerial overconfidence is significantly and positively related to corporate investment-cash flow sensitivity; 3).this effect is more evident when firms face serious financial constraint. The above findings hold even after controlling for asymmetric information problems or agency problem; (3) the effect of managerial overconfidence on investment efficiency (firm value) is explored by means of a simultaneous equation model, which shows that: 1) there is a significant interaction between managerial overconfidence and firm value via investment decisions; 2) firm value increase helps promote managerial confidence; 3) the effect of managerial confidence on firm value is non-monotonic, that is, the former up to a certain degree helps raise firm value (hence improve investment efficiency), but later on harms it.
The study provides new policy implications for inefficient investment governance of listed companies: (1) the governance should not ignore decision-makers' cognitive bias; (2) it is helpful to reduce managers' inclination for overconfidence, stabilize cash flows, increase information disclosure or reduce financial constraint in order to prevent fluctuations in investments; (3) corporate governance should encourage and promote confident talents into the management team as well as timely intervene and adjust their self-confidence, so as to prevent it from being transformed into overconfidence; (4) supervision and incentive measures should be properly adapted to managers' confidence levels, and so on.
论文首先放松了相关行为金融研究的信息对称假设,通过构造投资决策模型,分别研究融资逆向选择条件下和管理者道德风险条件下过度自信对投资决策的影响。研究结果表明,对于上市公司这类“优质企业”而言:(1)管理者过度自信可能导致企业投资过度或不足;(2)管理者过度自信程度与企业投资-现金流敏感度正向关联;其他条件一定,企业融资约束程度越高,则投资-现金流敏感度越高;(3)在融资逆向选择和道德风险双重作用下,管理者过度自信与企业非效率投资几率的关系可能是非单调的;(4)过度自信管理者的道德风险与所受监督无关,与股权激励负相关;较高程度的自信水平有助于节约治理成本。
其次,论文针对我国上市公司管理者过度自信状况及其对投资-现金流敏感度、投资效率的影响展开实证研究:(1)基于企业景气调查和管理者持股变动的分析表明,绝大多数上市公司管理者表现出过度自信倾向;该自信程度与某些管理者个体特征和组织治理特征相关;(2)融资约束条件下管理者过度自信对投资-现金流敏感度影响的实证研究表明,1)由董事、高管组成的管理者群体自信程度对公司投资行为的影响较CEO个人或高管团队更为显著;2)管理者自信程度对投资-现金流敏感度具有显著正向影响;3)融资约束程度越高,过度自信管理者所在公司的投资-现金流敏感度越高。上述结论在控制信息不对称或委托代理问题后依然成立;(3)对上市公司管理者过度自信与投资效率(企业价值)关系的联立方程检验表明,1)管理者自信度与企业价值之间存在显著反馈关系;2)企业价值提高有助于增强管理者自信心;3)管理者自信对投资效率具有非单调作用——适度水平下管理者自信有助于提高企业价值,但超过一定限度后对其有不利影响。
本研究为上市公司非效率投资治理提供了新的政策意见和建议:(1)非效率投资治理不可忽视决策者非理性心理的影响;(2)减少管理者过度自信倾向、稳定现金流水平、增加信息披露、减少融资约束均有利于避免投资支出大起大落;(3)公司治理机制既要鼓励和选拔自信人才进入管理团队,也要注重及时干预和调整管理者自信心理,防止其演变为过度自信;(4)监督激励机制应根据管理者自信程度适当调整等等。
The overseas and domestic financial studies in the recent twenty years have both certified significant correlations between corporate investments and internal cash flows. When the capital expenditures of listed companies fluctuate greatly with different cash flow levels, it may be accompanied by over- or under-investment with surplus or inadequate cash flows, which harms the interests of shareholders and other related parties. Based on the rational person hypothesis, mainstream studies put forth investment theories such as the financial constraint hypothesis or the free cash flow hypothesis, and seek relevant governance measures. However, a great deal of psychological experiments has proved that overconfidence is prevelant among corporate managers. With this irrationality in decision-making, governance measures based on mainstream studies may fail to work. This paper tries to learn from and push forward the emerging behavioral financial research, and study managerial overconfidence of Chinese listed companies as well as its effect on investment-cash flow sensitivity and investment efficiency. The purpose is to provide clues for improving inefficient investment governance.
The paper first gives up the asymmetric information hypothesis of the related study. By means of an investment decision model, it theoretically investigates the effect of managerial overconfidence on investment decisions under the conditions of financing adverse-selection and managerial moral hazard respectively. The analysis shows that for "good companies" represented by listed companies: (1) managerial overconfidence may result in over- or under-investment; (2) it is positively related to the companies' investment-cash flow sensitivity; all else equal, the more severe the financial constraint, the higher the above sensitivity; (3) taking both financing adverse-selection and managerial moral hazard into account, managerial overconfidence may have a non-monotonic effect on inefficient investment probabilities; (4) the degree of moral hazard of overconfident managers is unrelated to supervision, but is negatively affected by ownership incentives; overconfidence at a high level helps save corporate governance costs.
The paper proceeds to empirically investigate how mangerial overconfidence affects investments and firm value of Chinese listed companies: (1) by measuring overconfidence based on Entrepreneur Confidence Index and management shareholding respectively, the paper shows that the majority of managers tend to be overconfident, and some of their personal characteristics and corporate governance features lead to difference in managerial confidence; (2) under the condition of financial constraint, 1) the overconfidence of management group composed of directors and executives has a more significant effect on corporate investments than that of CEOs or executives; 2) managerial overconfidence is significantly and positively related to corporate investment-cash flow sensitivity; 3).this effect is more evident when firms face serious financial constraint. The above findings hold even after controlling for asymmetric information problems or agency problem; (3) the effect of managerial overconfidence on investment efficiency (firm value) is explored by means of a simultaneous equation model, which shows that: 1) there is a significant interaction between managerial overconfidence and firm value via investment decisions; 2) firm value increase helps promote managerial confidence; 3) the effect of managerial confidence on firm value is non-monotonic, that is, the former up to a certain degree helps raise firm value (hence improve investment efficiency), but later on harms it.
The study provides new policy implications for inefficient investment governance of listed companies: (1) the governance should not ignore decision-makers' cognitive bias; (2) it is helpful to reduce managers' inclination for overconfidence, stabilize cash flows, increase information disclosure or reduce financial constraint in order to prevent fluctuations in investments; (3) corporate governance should encourage and promote confident talents into the management team as well as timely intervene and adjust their self-confidence, so as to prevent it from being transformed into overconfidence; (4) supervision and incentive measures should be properly adapted to managers' confidence levels, and so on.
引文
[1]Albert,Kyle.Speculation duopoly with agreement to disagree:can overconfidence survive the market test.Journal of Finance,1997,52:2073-2090
[2]Alpert M.,and H.Raiffa.A Progress Report on the Training of Probability Assessors.in:D.Kahneman,P.Slovic and A.Tversky eds.Judgment Under Uncertainty:Heuristics and Biases.New York:Cambridge University Press,1982:295-305
[3]Baker,Malcolm,Joshua Coval,and Jeremy Stein.Corporate financing decisions when investors take the path of least resistance.Harvard University working paper.2004
[4]Baker,Malcolm,C.Fritz Foley,and Jeffrey Wurgler.The stock market and investment:Evidence from FDI flows.Harvard University working paper.2004
[5]Baker,Malcolm,Robin Greenwood,and Jeffrey Wurgler.The maturity of debt issues and predictable variation in bond returns.Journal of Financial Economics,2003,70:261-291.
[6]Baker,M.,R.S.Ruback,J.Wugler.Behavioral Corporate Finance:A Survey.In:Espen Eckbo eds.Handbook of Corporate Finance:Empirical Corporate Finance.North-Holland:Elsevier,2004.1-62
[7]Baker,Malcolm,Jeremy Stein and Jeffrey Wurgler.When Does the Market Matter?Stock Prices and the Investment of Equity-Dependent Firms.Quarterly Journal of Economics,2003,118:969-1006
[8]Baker,Malcolm,and Jeffrey Wurgler.Market timing and capital structure.Journal of Finance,2002,57:1-32
[9]Baker,Malcolm,and Jeffrey Wurgler.A catering theory of dividends.Journal of Finance,2004a,59:271-288
[10]Baker,Malcolm and Jeffrey Wurgler.Appearing and disappearing dividends:The link to catering incentives.Journal of Financial Economics,forthcoming.2004b
[11]Barberis,Nicholas and Richard Thaler.A Survey of Behavioural Finance.Available at SSRN:http://ssm.com/abstract=327880,2003.
[12] Barber, Brad M. & Odean, T. Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2001,116(1):261-292
[13] Del Brio, Esther, Alberto De Miguel and Julio Pindado. Investment and firm value:an analysis using panel data. Applied Financial Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, 2003,13(12): 893-903
[14] Ben-David, Itzhak, Graham, John R. and Harvey, Campbell R. Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Policies. AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=890300. 2007.
[15] Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler. Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations. American Economic Review, 1989, (79):14-31
[16] Beyer, S. Gender differences in the accuracy of self-evaluations and performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1990,59: 960-70
[17] Bhandari, Gokul and Deaves, Richard. The Demographics of Overconfidence.Journal of Behavioral Finance, 2006,7(1): 5-11
[18] Blanchard, Olivier, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. What do firms do with cash windfalls? Journal of Financial Economics, 1994, 36: 337-360
[19] Brown, Jonathon D., and Kieth A. Dutton. The Thrill of Victory, the Complexity of Defeat: Self-Esteem and People's Emotional Reactions to Success and Failure.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1995,68 (4): 712-22
[20] Buehler, R., Griffin, D., and M. Ross. Exploring the Planning Fallacy: Why People Underestimate their Task Completion Times. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 1994, 67: 366-381
[21] Chen, Carl R., Weiyu Guo and Vivek Mande. Corporate Value, Managerial Stockholdings and Investments of Japanese Firms. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 2006,17:29-51
[22] Christensen-Szalanski , J.J. and Bushyhead, J.B. Physicians' use of probabilistic informational in a real clinical setting. Journal of Experimental Psychology:Human Perception and Performance, 1981,7:928-935
[23] Clark, J. Maurice. Business Acceleration and the Law of Demand: A Technical Factor in Economic Cycles.Journal of Political Economy,1917,25(1):217-235
[24]Cooper,Arnold C.,Carolyn Y.Woo,and William C.Dunkelberg.Entrepreneurs'Perceived Chances for Success.Journal of Business Venturing,1988,3:97-108
[25]Daniel,K.,D.Hirshleifer,and A.Subrahmanyam.A Theory of Overconfidence,Self-Attribution,and Security Market Under-and Over-reactions.Journal of Finance,1998,53:1839-1885
[26]Deaves,Richard,Lueders,Erik and Schroder,Michael.The Dynamics of Overconfidence:Evidence from Stock Market Forecasters.ZEW Discussion Paper No.05-83 Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=868970.2005
[27]De la Rosa,Leonidas Enrique.Overconfidence and Moral Hazard.Danish Center for Accounting and Finance(D-CAF) Working Paper No.24 Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=979901.2007
[28]Devenow,A.and Welch,I.Rational herding in financial economics.European Economic Review,1996,40:603-15
[29]Devereux,M.and F.Schiantarelli.Investment,Financial Factors,and Cash Flow:Evidence from U.K.Panel Data.In:Glenn Hubbard ed.Information,Capital Market and Investment.Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1990.213-246
[30]Donaldson G.Corporate debt capacity:a study of corporate debt policy and the determination of corporate debt capacity.Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration,1961.
[31]Fairchild,Richard J.The Effect of Managerial Overconfidence,Asymmetric Information,and Moral Hazard on Capital Structure Decisions.Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=711845.2006
[32]Fama,Eugene F.Market efficiency,long-term returns,and behavioral finance,Journal of Financial Economics,1998,49:283-306
[33]Fama,Eugene F.,and Kenneth R.French.Disappearing dividends:Changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics,2001,60:3-44
[34]Fazzari,M.,Hubbard,G.and Petersen,C.Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment.Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1988,19:141-195
[35]Fischhoff B.,Slovic,P.,and S.Lichtenstein.Knowing With Certainty:The Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence.Journal of Experimental Psychology:Human Perception and Performance,1977,3:552-564
[36]Goergen,M.and L.Renneboog.Investment Policy,Internal Financing and Ownership Concentration.Journal of Corporate Finance,2001,7(2):257-284
[37]Gervais,S.,and T.Odean.Learning to Be Overconfident.Review of Financial Studies,2001,14:1-27
[38]Gervais,Simon,Heaton,J.B.and Odean,Terrance.Overconfidence,Investment Policy,and Executive Stock Options.Rodney L.White Center for Financial Research Working Paper No.15-02.Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=361200 or DOI:10.2139/ssrn.361200.2003
[39]Glaser,Markus,Schers,Philipp and Weber,Martin.Managerial Optimism and Corporate Investment:Is the CEO Alone Responsible for the Relation.Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.corn/abstract=967649.2007
[40]Goel,Anand M.and Thakor,Anjan V.Rationality,Overconfidence and Leadership.Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=244999 or DOI:10.2139/ssrn.244999.2000
[41]Goel,Anand M.and Thakor,Anjan V.Overconfidence,CEO Selection,and Corporate Governance.AFA Chicago Meetings Paper Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=890274.2006
[42]Graham,John R.,and Campbell R.Harvey.The theory and practice of corporate finance:Evidence from the field,Journal of Financial Economics,2001,60:187-243
[43]Grossman,Stanford and Hart,Oliver.An Analysis of the Principal n Agent Problem.Econometrica,1983,51:7-45
[44]Hackbarth,Dirk.Managerial Traits and Capital Structure Decisions.EFA 2004Maastricht Meetings Paper Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.corn/abstract=362740 or DOI:10.2139/ssm.362740
[45]Hadlock,Port.CEO incentives,cash flow and investment.Financial Management,1998,23(3):125-141
[46]Harris,Milton and Raviv,Artur.The theory of capital structure.Journal of Finance,1991,56(1):297-355
[47]Hart,Oliver,and John Moore.Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm.Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(6):1119-1158
[48]Hart,O.and John Moore.Debt and Seniority:An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management.The American Economic Review,1995,85(3):567-585
[49]Heaton,James B.Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance.Financial Management,2002,31:33-46.
[50]Hilary,G.and Menzly,L.Does Past Success Lead Analysts to Become Overconfident? Management Science,2006,52(4):489-500
[51]Himmelberg,C.and Pertersen.R and D Investment and Internal Finance:A Panel Study of Small Firms in High-Tech Industries.Review of Economics and Statistics,1994,76:38-51
[52]Hirshleifer,David and Anjan V.Thakor.Managerial reputation,project choice and debt.Western Finance Association,Seattle,Washington,June 1989
[53]Holmstrom B.Moral Hazard and Observability.Bell Journal of Economics,1979,(1):74-91
[54]Hoshi,Takeo,Anil Kashyap,and David Scharfstein.Corporate Structure,Liquidity and Investment from Japanese Industrial Groups.Quarterly Journal of Economics,1991,106:33-60.
[55]Hubbard,R.Glenn.Capital-market imperfections and investment.Journal of Economic Literature,1998,36:193-225
[56]Jensen.M.C.Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow:Corporate Finance,and Takeover.American Economic Review,1986,(3):305-360
[57]Jenter,Dirk and MIT Sloan.Market timing and managerial portfolio decisions.Available at hppt://ise.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/～rschulz/QFS/filesQFS.2002
[58]Kaplan,Steven N.and Luigi Zingales.Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints? The Quarterly Journal of Economies,1997,112(1):169-215
[59]Kaplan,Steven N.,and Per Stromberg.Financial contracting theory meets the real world:an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts.Review of Economic Studies,2003,70:281-315
[60]Keiber K L.Managerial Com pensation Contracts and Overconf idence.Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=302416.2006
[61]Kruger,J.Lake Wobegon be gone! The below-average effect and the egocentric nature of comparative ability judgments.Journal of Pesonality and Social Psychology,1999,77(2):221-232
[62]Lamont,Owen.Cash Flow and Investment:Evidence from Internal Capital Markets.Journal of Finance,1997,52:83-109
[63]Landier,A.and Thesmar,D.Financial Contracting with Optimistic Entrepreneurs:Theory and Evidence.Available at SSRN:http://ssm.com/abstract=479581.2004
[64]Lang L,E.Ofek and RM Stulz.Leverage.Investment,and Firm Growth.Journal of Financial Economics,1996,40(1):3-30
[65]Lang L.H.P.,R.Litzenberger.Dividend Announcements:Cash Flow Signalling vs.Free Cash Flow Hypotheses.Journal of Financial Economics,1989,24:181-191
[66]Langer,E.J.The illusion of control.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1975,32:311-28.
[67]Leland,H.E.,and D.H.Pyle.Information Asymmetries,Financial Structure,and Financial Intermediation.Journal of Finance,1977,32:371-387
[68]Kidd,J.B.and J.R.Morgan.A Predictive Information System for Management.Operational Research Quarterly,1969,20:149-170
[69]Lamont,O.,Polk,C.Financial Constraints and Stock Returns.Review of Financial Studies,2001,14:529-554
[70]Landier,Augustin,and David Thesmar.Financial Contracting with Optimistic Entrepreneurs:Theory and Evidence.University of Chicago working paper.2004
[71]Lin Yueh-hsiang,Hu,Shing-yang and Chen,Ming-shen.Managerial Optimism and Corporate Investment:Some Empirical Evidence from Taiwan.Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,2005,13:523-546
[72]Lundeberg,M.A.,P.W.Fox and J.Punccohar.Highly confident but wrong:Gender differences and similarities in confidence judgments.Journal of Educational Psychology,1994,86:114-21
[73]Lundstrum.Corporate Investment Myopia:A Horserace of the Theories.Journal of Corporate Finance,2002(8):353-371
[74]Lyandres,Evgeny and Zhdanov,Alexei.Accelerated Investment in the Presence of Risky Debt.Simon School Working Paper No.FR 03-28 Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=446681 or DOI:10.2139/ssrn.446681.2003
[75]Malmendier,Ulrike,and Geoffrey Tate.CEO overconfidence and corporate investment.Journal of Finance,2005a,60(6):2661-2700
[76]Malmendier,Ulrike,and Geoffrey Tate.Does overconfidence affect corporate investment:CEO overconfidence measures revisited.Eruopean Financial Management,2005b,11:649-659
[77]Malmendier,U.and Tate,G.Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction.Stanford University working paper.2005c
[78]Merrow,Edward W.,Kenneth E.Phillips,and Christopher W.Myers.Understanding cost growth and performance shortfalls in pioneer process plants.Santa Monica,CA:Rand,1981.212-235
[79]Moore,D.A.and Kim,T.G.Myopic social prediction and the solo comparison effect.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,2003,85(6):1121-35
[80]Morek,R.,A.Shleifer and R.W.Vishny.Management Ownership and Market
[81]Valuation:An Empirical Analysis.Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20(1-2):293-315
[82]Moretto,Michele,Panteghini,Paolo M.and Scarpa,Carlo.Investment Size and Firm's Value under Profit Sharing Regulation.CESifo Working Paper Series No.1040;FEEM Working Paper No.80.2003.Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=456080
[83]Murphy K.J Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration:An Empirical Analysis.Journal of Accounting and Economics,1985,(1):11-42
[84]Myers,S.Determinants of corporate borrowing,Journal of Financial Economics,1977,5:147-175
[85]Myers,S.,Majluf,N.Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have.Journal of Financial Economics,1984,13:187-221
[86]Odean,Terrance.Volume,volatilitym,price and profit when all traders are above average. The Journal of Finance,1998,LIII(6):1887-1934
[87] Odean, Terrance. Do Investors Trade Too Much? American Economic Review,2002,89:1279-1298
[88] Pindado, J. and C. de la Torre. The Effect of Ownership Structure on Underinvestment and Overinvestment Processes. Paper No. 1401692 for 2002 FMA Annual Metting,New Orleans. 2002
[89] Richardson, Scott Anthony. Corporate governance and the over-investment of surplus cash. Dissertation of Michigan University, 2003
[90] Robbins, E. and J. Schatzberg. Callable Bonds: A Risk-Reducing Signalling Mechanism. Journal of Finance, 1986,(3): 935-949
[91] Roll, Richard. The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers. Journal of Business,1986,(59):197-216
[92] Ross , N. Shepand. L. A. Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation . Rand Journal of Economics ,1997, (28) :489 - 51
[93] Ross, Stephen A. The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach. Bell Journal of Economics, 1977, 8(1):23-40
[94] Schaller, H. Asymmetric Information, Liquidity Constraints and Canadian Investment. The Canadian Journal of Economics, 1993,26(3):552- 574
[95] Shefrin, Hersh. Beyond Greed and Fear : Understanding Behavioral Finance and the Psychology of Investing. Boston , MA:Harvard Business School Press,1999.360-371
[96] Shefrin, Hersh and Meir Statman. Explaining investor preference for cash dividends,Journal of Financial Economics, 1984,13:253-282
[97] Shleifer, A. R. Vishny. Managerial Entrenchment: The Case of Manager Specific Investment. Journal of Financial Economics. 1988, (1):123 -140
[98] Statman, Meir, and Tyzoon T. Tyebjee. Optimistic Capital Budgeting Forecasts: An Experiment. Financial Management ,1985,14: 27-33
[99] Stein, Jeremy C. Agency, Information and Corporate Investment. In:Constantinides, G M., Harris, M. and Stulz R. M. Eds. Handbook of the Economics of Finance. North-Holland: Elsevier, 2003.111-165
[100] Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Andrew Weiss. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.American Economic Review,1981,71:393-410
[101]Stulz R.Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies.Journal of Financial Economics,1990,26:3-27
[102]Taylor,S.E.and J.D.Brown.Illusion and well-being:A social psychological perspective on mental health.Psychological Bulletin,1988,103:193-210
[103]Thaler and Johnson.Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Breakeven:the Effect of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice.Management Science,1990,36:643-660
[104]Vogit S.C.The cash flow,investment relationship:evidence from U.S.manufacturing firms.FinancialManagement,1994,(23):3-20
[105]Weinberg,B.A.A Model of Overconfidence.Working paper,Ohio State University.available at http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/weinberg/conf.pdf.2006
[106]Weinstein,N.D.Unrealistic optimism about future life events.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1980,39:806-20
[107]Weinstein,N.D.and Klein,W.M.Resistance of personal risk pereeptions to debiasing interventions.In:T.Gilovich,D.Griffin and D.Kahneman(eds).Heuristics and Biases:the Psychology of Intuitive Judgment.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2002.313-23
[108]Wong,Sonja Opper.Shareholding structure,depoliticization and firm performance:Lessons from China's listed firms.Economics of Transition,2004,12:29-66
[109]Zwiebel,Jeff.Dynamic Capital Structure Under Managerial Entrenchment.American Economic Review,1996,86:1197-1215
[110]不列颠百科全书(第八卷).北京:中国大百科全书出版社,2001.413
[111]陈其安,杨秀苔.基于代理人过度自信的委托-代理关系模型研究.管理工程学报,2007,1:110-116
[112]陈其安.基于过度自信和外部监督的团队合作均衡研究.管理科学学报,2005,6:60-68
[113]辞海.上海:上海辞书出版社,1999.815
[114]郝颖,刘星,林朝南.我国上市公司高管人员过度自信与投资决策的实证研究.中国管理科学,2005,5:142-148
[115]黄健柏,杨涛,朱学红.基于过度自信的相关研究及应用综述.预测,2007,26(3):1-7
[116]江伟,沈艺峰.负债的两面性与企业价值.中国第3届实证会计国际研讨会论文集,2004.782-792
[117]江伟,沈艺峰.大股东控制、资产替代与债权人保护.财经研究,2005,(12):95-106
[118]林有志,张雅芬.信息透明度与企业经营绩效的关系.会计研究,2007,9:26-35
[119]刘昌国.公司治理机制、自由现金流量与上市公司过度投资行为研究.经济科学,2006,4:50-58
[120]刘凤良,刘明兴.现代西方厂商投资理论及其在中国的应用前景.教学与研究,2000,2:64-69
[121]刘星,杨亦民.融资结构对企业投资行为的影响——来自沪深股市的经验证据.预测,2006,3:33-37
[122]陆正飞,高强.中国上市公司融资行为研究——基于问卷调查的分析.会计研究,2003,10:16-24
[123]梅丹.我国上市公司固定资产投资规模财务影响因素研究.管理科学,2005,10:80-86
[124]欧阳凌,欧阳令南,周红霞.股权制度安排、信息不对称与企业非效率投资行为.当代经济科学,2005,6:72-79
[125]施东晖.现代金融学前沿.上海:上海交通大学出版社,2006,1:159-189
[126]孙覃钥.从我国投资效率低下分析储蓄转化为投资的障碍.科技情报开发与经济,2004,10:10
[127]童盼,陆正飞.负债融资对企业投资行为影响研究:述评与展望.会计研究,2005a,12:71-77
[128]童盼,陆正飞.负债融资、负债来源与企业投资行为——来自中国上市公司的经验证据.经济研究,2005b,5:75-84
[129]王化成.高级财务学.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2006.2-16
[130]谢海东.基于过度自信理论的公司购并行为分析.现代财经,2006,10:37-40
[131]严志辉,钟美瑞,黄健柏.基于过度自信的多任务委托——代理模型扩展研究.系统工程,2006,2:19-22
[132]余明桂,夏新平,邹振松.管理者过度自信与企业激进负债行为.管理世界,2006,8:104-113
[133]袁春生,杨淑娥.经理管理防御与企业非效率投资.经济问题,2006,6:40-42
[134]赵新顺.金融经济学的研究范式及其演进.河南大学学报(社会科学版),2006,6:50-54
[135]郑玲,李颖.投资者非理性行为对公司资本配置的影响.商业会计,2006,8:11-12
[136]郑直.过度自信交易成本和投资.金融经济,2006,6:92-94
[137]支晓强,童盼.管理层业绩报酬敏感度、内部现金流与企业投资行为——对自由现金流和信息不对称理论的一个检验.会计研究,2007,10:73-82
[138]周红霞,欧阳凌.企业非效率投资行为研究综述.管理科学,2004(12):24-29
[139]周业安,陈彦斌.公司金融理论的新进展.经济理论与经济管理,2004,8:65-70
[2]Alpert M.,and H.Raiffa.A Progress Report on the Training of Probability Assessors.in:D.Kahneman,P.Slovic and A.Tversky eds.Judgment Under Uncertainty:Heuristics and Biases.New York:Cambridge University Press,1982:295-305
[3]Baker,Malcolm,Joshua Coval,and Jeremy Stein.Corporate financing decisions when investors take the path of least resistance.Harvard University working paper.2004
[4]Baker,Malcolm,C.Fritz Foley,and Jeffrey Wurgler.The stock market and investment:Evidence from FDI flows.Harvard University working paper.2004
[5]Baker,Malcolm,Robin Greenwood,and Jeffrey Wurgler.The maturity of debt issues and predictable variation in bond returns.Journal of Financial Economics,2003,70:261-291.
[6]Baker,M.,R.S.Ruback,J.Wugler.Behavioral Corporate Finance:A Survey.In:Espen Eckbo eds.Handbook of Corporate Finance:Empirical Corporate Finance.North-Holland:Elsevier,2004.1-62
[7]Baker,Malcolm,Jeremy Stein and Jeffrey Wurgler.When Does the Market Matter?Stock Prices and the Investment of Equity-Dependent Firms.Quarterly Journal of Economics,2003,118:969-1006
[8]Baker,Malcolm,and Jeffrey Wurgler.Market timing and capital structure.Journal of Finance,2002,57:1-32
[9]Baker,Malcolm,and Jeffrey Wurgler.A catering theory of dividends.Journal of Finance,2004a,59:271-288
[10]Baker,Malcolm and Jeffrey Wurgler.Appearing and disappearing dividends:The link to catering incentives.Journal of Financial Economics,forthcoming.2004b
[11]Barberis,Nicholas and Richard Thaler.A Survey of Behavioural Finance.Available at SSRN:http://ssm.com/abstract=327880,2003.
[12] Barber, Brad M. & Odean, T. Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2001,116(1):261-292
[13] Del Brio, Esther, Alberto De Miguel and Julio Pindado. Investment and firm value:an analysis using panel data. Applied Financial Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, 2003,13(12): 893-903
[14] Ben-David, Itzhak, Graham, John R. and Harvey, Campbell R. Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Policies. AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=890300. 2007.
[15] Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler. Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations. American Economic Review, 1989, (79):14-31
[16] Beyer, S. Gender differences in the accuracy of self-evaluations and performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1990,59: 960-70
[17] Bhandari, Gokul and Deaves, Richard. The Demographics of Overconfidence.Journal of Behavioral Finance, 2006,7(1): 5-11
[18] Blanchard, Olivier, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. What do firms do with cash windfalls? Journal of Financial Economics, 1994, 36: 337-360
[19] Brown, Jonathon D., and Kieth A. Dutton. The Thrill of Victory, the Complexity of Defeat: Self-Esteem and People's Emotional Reactions to Success and Failure.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1995,68 (4): 712-22
[20] Buehler, R., Griffin, D., and M. Ross. Exploring the Planning Fallacy: Why People Underestimate their Task Completion Times. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 1994, 67: 366-381
[21] Chen, Carl R., Weiyu Guo and Vivek Mande. Corporate Value, Managerial Stockholdings and Investments of Japanese Firms. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 2006,17:29-51
[22] Christensen-Szalanski , J.J. and Bushyhead, J.B. Physicians' use of probabilistic informational in a real clinical setting. Journal of Experimental Psychology:Human Perception and Performance, 1981,7:928-935
[23] Clark, J. Maurice. Business Acceleration and the Law of Demand: A Technical Factor in Economic Cycles.Journal of Political Economy,1917,25(1):217-235
[24]Cooper,Arnold C.,Carolyn Y.Woo,and William C.Dunkelberg.Entrepreneurs'Perceived Chances for Success.Journal of Business Venturing,1988,3:97-108
[25]Daniel,K.,D.Hirshleifer,and A.Subrahmanyam.A Theory of Overconfidence,Self-Attribution,and Security Market Under-and Over-reactions.Journal of Finance,1998,53:1839-1885
[26]Deaves,Richard,Lueders,Erik and Schroder,Michael.The Dynamics of Overconfidence:Evidence from Stock Market Forecasters.ZEW Discussion Paper No.05-83 Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=868970.2005
[27]De la Rosa,Leonidas Enrique.Overconfidence and Moral Hazard.Danish Center for Accounting and Finance(D-CAF) Working Paper No.24 Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=979901.2007
[28]Devenow,A.and Welch,I.Rational herding in financial economics.European Economic Review,1996,40:603-15
[29]Devereux,M.and F.Schiantarelli.Investment,Financial Factors,and Cash Flow:Evidence from U.K.Panel Data.In:Glenn Hubbard ed.Information,Capital Market and Investment.Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1990.213-246
[30]Donaldson G.Corporate debt capacity:a study of corporate debt policy and the determination of corporate debt capacity.Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration,1961.
[31]Fairchild,Richard J.The Effect of Managerial Overconfidence,Asymmetric Information,and Moral Hazard on Capital Structure Decisions.Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=711845.2006
[32]Fama,Eugene F.Market efficiency,long-term returns,and behavioral finance,Journal of Financial Economics,1998,49:283-306
[33]Fama,Eugene F.,and Kenneth R.French.Disappearing dividends:Changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics,2001,60:3-44
[34]Fazzari,M.,Hubbard,G.and Petersen,C.Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment.Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1988,19:141-195
[35]Fischhoff B.,Slovic,P.,and S.Lichtenstein.Knowing With Certainty:The Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence.Journal of Experimental Psychology:Human Perception and Performance,1977,3:552-564
[36]Goergen,M.and L.Renneboog.Investment Policy,Internal Financing and Ownership Concentration.Journal of Corporate Finance,2001,7(2):257-284
[37]Gervais,S.,and T.Odean.Learning to Be Overconfident.Review of Financial Studies,2001,14:1-27
[38]Gervais,Simon,Heaton,J.B.and Odean,Terrance.Overconfidence,Investment Policy,and Executive Stock Options.Rodney L.White Center for Financial Research Working Paper No.15-02.Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=361200 or DOI:10.2139/ssrn.361200.2003
[39]Glaser,Markus,Schers,Philipp and Weber,Martin.Managerial Optimism and Corporate Investment:Is the CEO Alone Responsible for the Relation.Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.corn/abstract=967649.2007
[40]Goel,Anand M.and Thakor,Anjan V.Rationality,Overconfidence and Leadership.Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=244999 or DOI:10.2139/ssrn.244999.2000
[41]Goel,Anand M.and Thakor,Anjan V.Overconfidence,CEO Selection,and Corporate Governance.AFA Chicago Meetings Paper Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=890274.2006
[42]Graham,John R.,and Campbell R.Harvey.The theory and practice of corporate finance:Evidence from the field,Journal of Financial Economics,2001,60:187-243
[43]Grossman,Stanford and Hart,Oliver.An Analysis of the Principal n Agent Problem.Econometrica,1983,51:7-45
[44]Hackbarth,Dirk.Managerial Traits and Capital Structure Decisions.EFA 2004Maastricht Meetings Paper Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.corn/abstract=362740 or DOI:10.2139/ssm.362740
[45]Hadlock,Port.CEO incentives,cash flow and investment.Financial Management,1998,23(3):125-141
[46]Harris,Milton and Raviv,Artur.The theory of capital structure.Journal of Finance,1991,56(1):297-355
[47]Hart,Oliver,and John Moore.Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm.Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(6):1119-1158
[48]Hart,O.and John Moore.Debt and Seniority:An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management.The American Economic Review,1995,85(3):567-585
[49]Heaton,James B.Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance.Financial Management,2002,31:33-46.
[50]Hilary,G.and Menzly,L.Does Past Success Lead Analysts to Become Overconfident? Management Science,2006,52(4):489-500
[51]Himmelberg,C.and Pertersen.R and D Investment and Internal Finance:A Panel Study of Small Firms in High-Tech Industries.Review of Economics and Statistics,1994,76:38-51
[52]Hirshleifer,David and Anjan V.Thakor.Managerial reputation,project choice and debt.Western Finance Association,Seattle,Washington,June 1989
[53]Holmstrom B.Moral Hazard and Observability.Bell Journal of Economics,1979,(1):74-91
[54]Hoshi,Takeo,Anil Kashyap,and David Scharfstein.Corporate Structure,Liquidity and Investment from Japanese Industrial Groups.Quarterly Journal of Economics,1991,106:33-60.
[55]Hubbard,R.Glenn.Capital-market imperfections and investment.Journal of Economic Literature,1998,36:193-225
[56]Jensen.M.C.Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow:Corporate Finance,and Takeover.American Economic Review,1986,(3):305-360
[57]Jenter,Dirk and MIT Sloan.Market timing and managerial portfolio decisions.Available at hppt://ise.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/～rschulz/QFS/filesQFS.2002
[58]Kaplan,Steven N.and Luigi Zingales.Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints? The Quarterly Journal of Economies,1997,112(1):169-215
[59]Kaplan,Steven N.,and Per Stromberg.Financial contracting theory meets the real world:an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts.Review of Economic Studies,2003,70:281-315
[60]Keiber K L.Managerial Com pensation Contracts and Overconf idence.Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=302416.2006
[61]Kruger,J.Lake Wobegon be gone! The below-average effect and the egocentric nature of comparative ability judgments.Journal of Pesonality and Social Psychology,1999,77(2):221-232
[62]Lamont,Owen.Cash Flow and Investment:Evidence from Internal Capital Markets.Journal of Finance,1997,52:83-109
[63]Landier,A.and Thesmar,D.Financial Contracting with Optimistic Entrepreneurs:Theory and Evidence.Available at SSRN:http://ssm.com/abstract=479581.2004
[64]Lang L,E.Ofek and RM Stulz.Leverage.Investment,and Firm Growth.Journal of Financial Economics,1996,40(1):3-30
[65]Lang L.H.P.,R.Litzenberger.Dividend Announcements:Cash Flow Signalling vs.Free Cash Flow Hypotheses.Journal of Financial Economics,1989,24:181-191
[66]Langer,E.J.The illusion of control.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1975,32:311-28.
[67]Leland,H.E.,and D.H.Pyle.Information Asymmetries,Financial Structure,and Financial Intermediation.Journal of Finance,1977,32:371-387
[68]Kidd,J.B.and J.R.Morgan.A Predictive Information System for Management.Operational Research Quarterly,1969,20:149-170
[69]Lamont,O.,Polk,C.Financial Constraints and Stock Returns.Review of Financial Studies,2001,14:529-554
[70]Landier,Augustin,and David Thesmar.Financial Contracting with Optimistic Entrepreneurs:Theory and Evidence.University of Chicago working paper.2004
[71]Lin Yueh-hsiang,Hu,Shing-yang and Chen,Ming-shen.Managerial Optimism and Corporate Investment:Some Empirical Evidence from Taiwan.Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,2005,13:523-546
[72]Lundeberg,M.A.,P.W.Fox and J.Punccohar.Highly confident but wrong:Gender differences and similarities in confidence judgments.Journal of Educational Psychology,1994,86:114-21
[73]Lundstrum.Corporate Investment Myopia:A Horserace of the Theories.Journal of Corporate Finance,2002(8):353-371
[74]Lyandres,Evgeny and Zhdanov,Alexei.Accelerated Investment in the Presence of Risky Debt.Simon School Working Paper No.FR 03-28 Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=446681 or DOI:10.2139/ssrn.446681.2003
[75]Malmendier,Ulrike,and Geoffrey Tate.CEO overconfidence and corporate investment.Journal of Finance,2005a,60(6):2661-2700
[76]Malmendier,Ulrike,and Geoffrey Tate.Does overconfidence affect corporate investment:CEO overconfidence measures revisited.Eruopean Financial Management,2005b,11:649-659
[77]Malmendier,U.and Tate,G.Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction.Stanford University working paper.2005c
[78]Merrow,Edward W.,Kenneth E.Phillips,and Christopher W.Myers.Understanding cost growth and performance shortfalls in pioneer process plants.Santa Monica,CA:Rand,1981.212-235
[79]Moore,D.A.and Kim,T.G.Myopic social prediction and the solo comparison effect.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,2003,85(6):1121-35
[80]Morek,R.,A.Shleifer and R.W.Vishny.Management Ownership and Market
[81]Valuation:An Empirical Analysis.Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20(1-2):293-315
[82]Moretto,Michele,Panteghini,Paolo M.and Scarpa,Carlo.Investment Size and Firm's Value under Profit Sharing Regulation.CESifo Working Paper Series No.1040;FEEM Working Paper No.80.2003.Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=456080
[83]Murphy K.J Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration:An Empirical Analysis.Journal of Accounting and Economics,1985,(1):11-42
[84]Myers,S.Determinants of corporate borrowing,Journal of Financial Economics,1977,5:147-175
[85]Myers,S.,Majluf,N.Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have.Journal of Financial Economics,1984,13:187-221
[86]Odean,Terrance.Volume,volatilitym,price and profit when all traders are above average. The Journal of Finance,1998,LIII(6):1887-1934
[87] Odean, Terrance. Do Investors Trade Too Much? American Economic Review,2002,89:1279-1298
[88] Pindado, J. and C. de la Torre. The Effect of Ownership Structure on Underinvestment and Overinvestment Processes. Paper No. 1401692 for 2002 FMA Annual Metting,New Orleans. 2002
[89] Richardson, Scott Anthony. Corporate governance and the over-investment of surplus cash. Dissertation of Michigan University, 2003
[90] Robbins, E. and J. Schatzberg. Callable Bonds: A Risk-Reducing Signalling Mechanism. Journal of Finance, 1986,(3): 935-949
[91] Roll, Richard. The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers. Journal of Business,1986,(59):197-216
[92] Ross , N. Shepand. L. A. Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation . Rand Journal of Economics ,1997, (28) :489 - 51
[93] Ross, Stephen A. The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach. Bell Journal of Economics, 1977, 8(1):23-40
[94] Schaller, H. Asymmetric Information, Liquidity Constraints and Canadian Investment. The Canadian Journal of Economics, 1993,26(3):552- 574
[95] Shefrin, Hersh. Beyond Greed and Fear : Understanding Behavioral Finance and the Psychology of Investing. Boston , MA:Harvard Business School Press,1999.360-371
[96] Shefrin, Hersh and Meir Statman. Explaining investor preference for cash dividends,Journal of Financial Economics, 1984,13:253-282
[97] Shleifer, A. R. Vishny. Managerial Entrenchment: The Case of Manager Specific Investment. Journal of Financial Economics. 1988, (1):123 -140
[98] Statman, Meir, and Tyzoon T. Tyebjee. Optimistic Capital Budgeting Forecasts: An Experiment. Financial Management ,1985,14: 27-33
[99] Stein, Jeremy C. Agency, Information and Corporate Investment. In:Constantinides, G M., Harris, M. and Stulz R. M. Eds. Handbook of the Economics of Finance. North-Holland: Elsevier, 2003.111-165
[100] Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Andrew Weiss. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.American Economic Review,1981,71:393-410
[101]Stulz R.Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies.Journal of Financial Economics,1990,26:3-27
[102]Taylor,S.E.and J.D.Brown.Illusion and well-being:A social psychological perspective on mental health.Psychological Bulletin,1988,103:193-210
[103]Thaler and Johnson.Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Breakeven:the Effect of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice.Management Science,1990,36:643-660
[104]Vogit S.C.The cash flow,investment relationship:evidence from U.S.manufacturing firms.FinancialManagement,1994,(23):3-20
[105]Weinberg,B.A.A Model of Overconfidence.Working paper,Ohio State University.available at http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/weinberg/conf.pdf.2006
[106]Weinstein,N.D.Unrealistic optimism about future life events.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1980,39:806-20
[107]Weinstein,N.D.and Klein,W.M.Resistance of personal risk pereeptions to debiasing interventions.In:T.Gilovich,D.Griffin and D.Kahneman(eds).Heuristics and Biases:the Psychology of Intuitive Judgment.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2002.313-23
[108]Wong,Sonja Opper.Shareholding structure,depoliticization and firm performance:Lessons from China's listed firms.Economics of Transition,2004,12:29-66
[109]Zwiebel,Jeff.Dynamic Capital Structure Under Managerial Entrenchment.American Economic Review,1996,86:1197-1215
[110]不列颠百科全书(第八卷).北京:中国大百科全书出版社,2001.413
[111]陈其安,杨秀苔.基于代理人过度自信的委托-代理关系模型研究.管理工程学报,2007,1:110-116
[112]陈其安.基于过度自信和外部监督的团队合作均衡研究.管理科学学报,2005,6:60-68
[113]辞海.上海:上海辞书出版社,1999.815
[114]郝颖,刘星,林朝南.我国上市公司高管人员过度自信与投资决策的实证研究.中国管理科学,2005,5:142-148
[115]黄健柏,杨涛,朱学红.基于过度自信的相关研究及应用综述.预测,2007,26(3):1-7
[116]江伟,沈艺峰.负债的两面性与企业价值.中国第3届实证会计国际研讨会论文集,2004.782-792
[117]江伟,沈艺峰.大股东控制、资产替代与债权人保护.财经研究,2005,(12):95-106
[118]林有志,张雅芬.信息透明度与企业经营绩效的关系.会计研究,2007,9:26-35
[119]刘昌国.公司治理机制、自由现金流量与上市公司过度投资行为研究.经济科学,2006,4:50-58
[120]刘凤良,刘明兴.现代西方厂商投资理论及其在中国的应用前景.教学与研究,2000,2:64-69
[121]刘星,杨亦民.融资结构对企业投资行为的影响——来自沪深股市的经验证据.预测,2006,3:33-37
[122]陆正飞,高强.中国上市公司融资行为研究——基于问卷调查的分析.会计研究,2003,10:16-24
[123]梅丹.我国上市公司固定资产投资规模财务影响因素研究.管理科学,2005,10:80-86
[124]欧阳凌,欧阳令南,周红霞.股权制度安排、信息不对称与企业非效率投资行为.当代经济科学,2005,6:72-79
[125]施东晖.现代金融学前沿.上海:上海交通大学出版社,2006,1:159-189
[126]孙覃钥.从我国投资效率低下分析储蓄转化为投资的障碍.科技情报开发与经济,2004,10:10
[127]童盼,陆正飞.负债融资对企业投资行为影响研究:述评与展望.会计研究,2005a,12:71-77
[128]童盼,陆正飞.负债融资、负债来源与企业投资行为——来自中国上市公司的经验证据.经济研究,2005b,5:75-84
[129]王化成.高级财务学.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2006.2-16
[130]谢海东.基于过度自信理论的公司购并行为分析.现代财经,2006,10:37-40
[131]严志辉,钟美瑞,黄健柏.基于过度自信的多任务委托——代理模型扩展研究.系统工程,2006,2:19-22
[132]余明桂,夏新平,邹振松.管理者过度自信与企业激进负债行为.管理世界,2006,8:104-113
[133]袁春生,杨淑娥.经理管理防御与企业非效率投资.经济问题,2006,6:40-42
[134]赵新顺.金融经济学的研究范式及其演进.河南大学学报(社会科学版),2006,6:50-54
[135]郑玲,李颖.投资者非理性行为对公司资本配置的影响.商业会计,2006,8:11-12
[136]郑直.过度自信交易成本和投资.金融经济,2006,6:92-94
[137]支晓强,童盼.管理层业绩报酬敏感度、内部现金流与企业投资行为——对自由现金流和信息不对称理论的一个检验.会计研究,2007,10:73-82
[138]周红霞,欧阳凌.企业非效率投资行为研究综述.管理科学,2004(12):24-29
[139]周业安,陈彦斌.公司金融理论的新进展.经济理论与经济管理,2004,8:65-70