我国政府主导型风险投资治理机制设计
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摘要
风险投资依托于高科技,指将资本投资于创业企业或创新项目,在高风险的运作下,在合理治理机制的规范下最终获得丰厚报酬的投资方式。国外的风险投资已经有了一套成熟的运作机制,首先在于他们的出资人是市场性的,竞争性的;而我国的风险投资却是以政府出资为主导,存在着尤其严重的信息不对称和双重道德风险,政府非有效干预多,治理机制设计不完善。因此,本文目标在于设计符合我国政府主导的风险投资治理机制,并通过对比论述、模型推算及案例分析的方法证明其有效性。
本文主要内容共分三部分:第一,对风险投资的基本概念、涉及的两级契约和治理机制设计的必要性进行阐述,并对本文将运用的理论基础做出文献综述。然后,介绍国外风险投资领域涉及到的成熟的组织模式、治理机制、融资契约等。主要有有限合伙制、可转换证券以及控制权的分配和转移。第二,这是本文的核心部分,研究了适合我国政府主导型风险投资的治理机制,并进行改进,包括两块内容。首先分析我国风险投资领域的宏观制度环境,然后针对制度背景提出建议;其次在微观治理上,从风险投资家向政府寻租和风险投资家与创业企业家间的控制权分配和转移上进行了治理机制的设计。最后,采用案例分析的方法,比较了我国政府主导的风险投资公司与国外风险投资基金在治理机制上的差别,并以前述理论为基础对每种契约条款进行评析。
本文最重要的结论主要有三个:一、防范政府主导型风险投资中风险投资家寻租行为;二、利用风险投资家与创业企业家间控制权的相机转移达到对双方的激励约束;三、风险投资应选择风险企业价值最大化为退出的最佳时机;并且政府应该完善产权交易市场和资本市场,以实现企业的IPO及股权转让。
Backing on the high technology, venture investment is a kind of method which invests funds on the risk entrepreneurs or projects to achieve large returns, under the high-risks operating and the rules of reasonable governing mechanism. The venture capital abroad has already form a developed governing mechanism whose suppliers are of markets and competence; otherwise, Chinese are based on the government which exist especially serious information asymmetry, double moral hazard, more interference of government and imperfect governing mechanism. As a result, this essay aims at designing a correspondent mechanism of venture investment, and through comparing, models and examples to prove its effectiveness.
The main content of this test is roughly divided into three parts. This thesis begins with discussing the basic concepts about venture investment, two kinds of typical principal-agent relationships, the necessities of mechanism planning, and the relevant theories. Besides, the developed organizational models and governing mechanisms and financial contracts will be introduced in the third charter, including limited partnership, Convertible security, and the allocation & contingent transferring of control rights. Second, this part with two sections is the core of the text which analyzes the suitable mechanism of venture capital invested by our government and also gives an improvement. First is to conclude the problems found in the macro institute environments and give some advices on the institute backgrounds. Then in the micro level, the most important is to reveal the rent-seeking activity of venture capitalists and demonstrate the contingent transferring of control rights between venture capitalist and entrepreneur. The thesis ends by analyzing with two examples to compare these two kinds of different arrangements and evaluating every contract based on the above theories.
The main conclusions of research of this text includes:1、try to forbid the rent-seeking activity of venture capitalists; 2、to get the target of encouraging and restraining the ventures and entrepreneurs by the use of contingent transferring of control rights;3、venture investment must choose the best time to exit smoothly under the standard of maximizing the corporation’s market value. From the role of the government, the market for property ownership transactions and capital flowing must be founded to support the smooth exit of venture capital.
本文主要内容共分三部分:第一,对风险投资的基本概念、涉及的两级契约和治理机制设计的必要性进行阐述,并对本文将运用的理论基础做出文献综述。然后,介绍国外风险投资领域涉及到的成熟的组织模式、治理机制、融资契约等。主要有有限合伙制、可转换证券以及控制权的分配和转移。第二,这是本文的核心部分,研究了适合我国政府主导型风险投资的治理机制,并进行改进,包括两块内容。首先分析我国风险投资领域的宏观制度环境,然后针对制度背景提出建议;其次在微观治理上,从风险投资家向政府寻租和风险投资家与创业企业家间的控制权分配和转移上进行了治理机制的设计。最后,采用案例分析的方法,比较了我国政府主导的风险投资公司与国外风险投资基金在治理机制上的差别,并以前述理论为基础对每种契约条款进行评析。
本文最重要的结论主要有三个:一、防范政府主导型风险投资中风险投资家寻租行为;二、利用风险投资家与创业企业家间控制权的相机转移达到对双方的激励约束;三、风险投资应选择风险企业价值最大化为退出的最佳时机;并且政府应该完善产权交易市场和资本市场,以实现企业的IPO及股权转让。
Backing on the high technology, venture investment is a kind of method which invests funds on the risk entrepreneurs or projects to achieve large returns, under the high-risks operating and the rules of reasonable governing mechanism. The venture capital abroad has already form a developed governing mechanism whose suppliers are of markets and competence; otherwise, Chinese are based on the government which exist especially serious information asymmetry, double moral hazard, more interference of government and imperfect governing mechanism. As a result, this essay aims at designing a correspondent mechanism of venture investment, and through comparing, models and examples to prove its effectiveness.
The main content of this test is roughly divided into three parts. This thesis begins with discussing the basic concepts about venture investment, two kinds of typical principal-agent relationships, the necessities of mechanism planning, and the relevant theories. Besides, the developed organizational models and governing mechanisms and financial contracts will be introduced in the third charter, including limited partnership, Convertible security, and the allocation & contingent transferring of control rights. Second, this part with two sections is the core of the text which analyzes the suitable mechanism of venture capital invested by our government and also gives an improvement. First is to conclude the problems found in the macro institute environments and give some advices on the institute backgrounds. Then in the micro level, the most important is to reveal the rent-seeking activity of venture capitalists and demonstrate the contingent transferring of control rights between venture capitalist and entrepreneur. The thesis ends by analyzing with two examples to compare these two kinds of different arrangements and evaluating every contract based on the above theories.
The main conclusions of research of this text includes:1、try to forbid the rent-seeking activity of venture capitalists; 2、to get the target of encouraging and restraining the ventures and entrepreneurs by the use of contingent transferring of control rights;3、venture investment must choose the best time to exit smoothly under the standard of maximizing the corporation’s market value. From the role of the government, the market for property ownership transactions and capital flowing must be founded to support the smooth exit of venture capital.
引文
[1]安实,王健,何琳.风险企业控制权分配的博弈过程分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2002,12:81-87.
[2]安实,王健,何琳.风险企业控制权分配模型研究[J].系统工程学报,2004,2:38-44.
[3]陈工孟.2006年中国风险投资业调研报告[R].中国风险投资研究院,2006
[4]顾磊.风险投资的制度经济性本质及其对中国政府的启示[J].42-45
[5]郝宇,韩文秀.风险企业控制权配置研究[J].天津大学学报,2005,2:102-105.
[6]胡海峰.创业资本投资过程中的契约安排:理论回顾与展望[J].南开经济研究,2002,3:64-66.
[7]李金龙,费方域,谈毅.不完全合同、退出的激励平衡和控制权转移[J].财经研究2006,7:134-143.
[8]李金龙,费方域,谈毅.风险投资中控制权、私人利益、声誉以及现金流权利的研究[J].系统工程,2006,1:87-90.
[9]李湛.风险资本契约理论和实证研究的最新进展[J].当代财经,2007,2:123-129.张静,吴菡,何国杰.政府设立创业风险投资引导基金的模式探讨[J].科技管理研究,2007,2:4-6.
[10]李成,黄顺绪,毛娜.我国政府主导型风险投资制度供给与环境约束[J].河南金融管理干部学院学报,2007,1:120-123.
[11]刘志阳,施祖留.我国政府主导型风险投资机理分析[J].经济体制改革,2006,6:103-106.
[12]买忆媛,李云鹤.创业企业的控制权与企业家才能匹配关系研究[J].科技管理研究,2007,1:127-130.
[13]欧阳凌,欧阳令南,周红霞.创业投资企业的控制权配置与非效率投资行为[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2005,2:104-107.
[14]唐伟.创业企业中的双边道德风险与最优融资合约[J].中央财经大学学报,2005,4:39-43.
[15]谈毅.我国风险投资制度安排的演进与创新[J].研究与发展管理,2004,3:1-8.
[16]王国钟.风险企业家的激励机制研究[D].武汉,武汉大学,2005.
[17]徐爱东.关于我国风险投资契约安排的研究[J].重庆工商大学学报,2005,6:62-65.
[18]姚佐文.风险资本家与企业家之间的控制权分配和转移[J].安徽农业大学学报,2004,3:26-29.
[19]尹久,刘曼红,郭风华.风险投资软环境中的风险投资家[J].商业研究,2006,19:148-150.
[20]易敏.风险投资契约机制研究[D].武汉,武汉大学,2004.
[21]赵振武,唐万生.风险资本家与企业家间双重道德风险的研究[J].哈尔滨工业大学学报,2005,5:49-53.
[22]朱心来.风险投资中道德风险与可转换证券关系的分析[J].经济经纬,2006,2:150-153.
[23]郑君君,刘桓.基于委托-代理关系的风险投资者对风险投资家激励模型的研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2005,5:151-156.
[24]周明.政府背景风险投资治理机制研究[D].大连,东北财经大学,2005.
[25]赵西亮.风险投资中的契约关系研究[D] .北京,清华大学,2005.
[30]Allen&Gale 2000.Comparing Financial Systems[M].The MIT Press,239-256
[31]Aghion, P. and P. Bolton.An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting.Review of Economic Studies, 1992,(59):473~494.
[32]Andrea Schertler . Venture Capital Contracts: Survey of the Recent Literature.Kiel Working Paper No. 1017,2000,12.
[33]Andrea Schertler . Venture Capital Contracts:A Survey of the Recent Literature.Kiel Working Paper No. 1017, 12. 2000
[34]Berkovitch & Kim, Financial Contracting and Leverage Induced over-and-under-investment incentives, Journal of Finande, 1990
[35]Chan Y, Siegel D, Thakor, A Learning corporate control and performance requirements in venture capital contracts, International Economic Review, 1990,31(2):7～9
[36] Derk Bergemann & Ulrich Hege, Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard, and Learning. Journal of Banking & Finance, 1998, 2
[37] Diamond, D. W., 1984,”Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring”, Review of Economic Studies, 51, 393, 414
[38]Douglas J. Cumming Agency costs, institutions, learning, and taxation in venture capital contracting Journal of Business Venturing, 2005, 20(5): 573～622
[39] Jeffrey J. Trester, Venture capital contracting under asymmetric information, Journal of Banking & Finance, 1998, 22(6-8): 675～699
[40] Leland, H & Pyle, D. 1977,”Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure andFinancial Intermediation”, Journal of Finance,32,2
[41] Mish kin, F. A.,1993,1995,2001,The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets, Harper Collins College Publishers
[42] Neher. Why do venture capital firms exist? theory and Canadian evidence, Journal of Business Venturing, 1998,13(6):441～466
[43]Trester Jeffery, Venture Capital Contracting under Asymmetric Information, Journal of Banking & Finance, 1998, 22
[44]William A. Sahlman, The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations, Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 27(2): 473～521
[2]安实,王健,何琳.风险企业控制权分配模型研究[J].系统工程学报,2004,2:38-44.
[3]陈工孟.2006年中国风险投资业调研报告[R].中国风险投资研究院,2006
[4]顾磊.风险投资的制度经济性本质及其对中国政府的启示[J].42-45
[5]郝宇,韩文秀.风险企业控制权配置研究[J].天津大学学报,2005,2:102-105.
[6]胡海峰.创业资本投资过程中的契约安排:理论回顾与展望[J].南开经济研究,2002,3:64-66.
[7]李金龙,费方域,谈毅.不完全合同、退出的激励平衡和控制权转移[J].财经研究2006,7:134-143.
[8]李金龙,费方域,谈毅.风险投资中控制权、私人利益、声誉以及现金流权利的研究[J].系统工程,2006,1:87-90.
[9]李湛.风险资本契约理论和实证研究的最新进展[J].当代财经,2007,2:123-129.张静,吴菡,何国杰.政府设立创业风险投资引导基金的模式探讨[J].科技管理研究,2007,2:4-6.
[10]李成,黄顺绪,毛娜.我国政府主导型风险投资制度供给与环境约束[J].河南金融管理干部学院学报,2007,1:120-123.
[11]刘志阳,施祖留.我国政府主导型风险投资机理分析[J].经济体制改革,2006,6:103-106.
[12]买忆媛,李云鹤.创业企业的控制权与企业家才能匹配关系研究[J].科技管理研究,2007,1:127-130.
[13]欧阳凌,欧阳令南,周红霞.创业投资企业的控制权配置与非效率投资行为[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2005,2:104-107.
[14]唐伟.创业企业中的双边道德风险与最优融资合约[J].中央财经大学学报,2005,4:39-43.
[15]谈毅.我国风险投资制度安排的演进与创新[J].研究与发展管理,2004,3:1-8.
[16]王国钟.风险企业家的激励机制研究[D].武汉,武汉大学,2005.
[17]徐爱东.关于我国风险投资契约安排的研究[J].重庆工商大学学报,2005,6:62-65.
[18]姚佐文.风险资本家与企业家之间的控制权分配和转移[J].安徽农业大学学报,2004,3:26-29.
[19]尹久,刘曼红,郭风华.风险投资软环境中的风险投资家[J].商业研究,2006,19:148-150.
[20]易敏.风险投资契约机制研究[D].武汉,武汉大学,2004.
[21]赵振武,唐万生.风险资本家与企业家间双重道德风险的研究[J].哈尔滨工业大学学报,2005,5:49-53.
[22]朱心来.风险投资中道德风险与可转换证券关系的分析[J].经济经纬,2006,2:150-153.
[23]郑君君,刘桓.基于委托-代理关系的风险投资者对风险投资家激励模型的研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2005,5:151-156.
[24]周明.政府背景风险投资治理机制研究[D].大连,东北财经大学,2005.
[25]赵西亮.风险投资中的契约关系研究[D] .北京,清华大学,2005.
[30]Allen&Gale 2000.Comparing Financial Systems[M].The MIT Press,239-256
[31]Aghion, P. and P. Bolton.An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting.Review of Economic Studies, 1992,(59):473~494.
[32]Andrea Schertler . Venture Capital Contracts: Survey of the Recent Literature.Kiel Working Paper No. 1017,2000,12.
[33]Andrea Schertler . Venture Capital Contracts:A Survey of the Recent Literature.Kiel Working Paper No. 1017, 12. 2000
[34]Berkovitch & Kim, Financial Contracting and Leverage Induced over-and-under-investment incentives, Journal of Finande, 1990
[35]Chan Y, Siegel D, Thakor, A Learning corporate control and performance requirements in venture capital contracts, International Economic Review, 1990,31(2):7～9
[36] Derk Bergemann & Ulrich Hege, Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard, and Learning. Journal of Banking & Finance, 1998, 2
[37] Diamond, D. W., 1984,”Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring”, Review of Economic Studies, 51, 393, 414
[38]Douglas J. Cumming Agency costs, institutions, learning, and taxation in venture capital contracting Journal of Business Venturing, 2005, 20(5): 573～622
[39] Jeffrey J. Trester, Venture capital contracting under asymmetric information, Journal of Banking & Finance, 1998, 22(6-8): 675～699
[40] Leland, H & Pyle, D. 1977,”Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure andFinancial Intermediation”, Journal of Finance,32,2
[41] Mish kin, F. A.,1993,1995,2001,The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets, Harper Collins College Publishers
[42] Neher. Why do venture capital firms exist? theory and Canadian evidence, Journal of Business Venturing, 1998,13(6):441～466
[43]Trester Jeffery, Venture Capital Contracting under Asymmetric Information, Journal of Banking & Finance, 1998, 22
[44]William A. Sahlman, The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations, Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 27(2): 473～521