考虑排放许可与交易的排放依赖型生产运作优化
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摘要
工业化进程的推进伴随着有害排放物的大幅增加,所带来的环境灾害也明显增加。最典型的例子是,二氧化碳排放(简称“碳排放”)已被证实是近年来全球气温上升的主要祸首之一。为了减缓气候变暖以避免对人类造成灾难性的影响,气候安全已经成为一种公共利益,全球的政治实体应该重视气候变化问题,并拿出切实可行的对策来降低气候变化的风险,以保持人类社会发展的可持续性。经过世界各国的共同努力,一系列以碳排放问题为中心议题的国际性峰会陆续召开,并经过长期艰苦的谈判达成了一系列具有法律效力的公约。世界上第一个为全面控制二氧化碳等温室气体排放以应对气候变化的国际公约是1994年3月21日正式生效的《联合国气候变化框架公约(UNFCCC)》,这是国际社会在应对气候变化问题上进行国际合作的一个基本框架,规定了发达国家和发展中国家在温室气体减排上的义务以及履约程序。作为对UNFCCC的深化,2005年2月16日《京都议定书(Kyoto Protocol)》正式生效,这在温室气体减排上具有里程碑意义。它首次针对发达国家设定了国家层面的排放限额,并具有普遍的法律约束力；同时还规定了多种柔性的减排机制,其中最为引入瞩目的就是“国际排放交易(IET)”机制。此机制本质上赋予排放权以与能源、原材料、资金、劳动力等传统生产要素类似的资源商品地位,可通过特定的排放权交易市场自由交易。《京都议定书》设定了一种“限额与交易(Cap and Trade)"体系,即通过管制和市场的双重手段以达到有效减排的目的。2007年12月15日,联合国气候变化大会通过“巴厘路线图(Bali Roadmap)"决议,强调通过国际合作并坚持“共同但有区别的责任”原则寻求针对全球变暖的国际共同解决措施。直至2009年底,哥本哈根大会召开,近200个国家的高层官员商讨《京都议定书》一期承诺到期后的后续目标,但最终并未达成具有法律效力的协议。
虽然在这些气候大会上,各国出于自身利益的考虑在具体目标和执行方案上各执一词,但减排和排放限额与交易已成为各方共识和必然趋势。在公约设定的减排目标下,各国/地区最终必须将国家宏观层面的减排目标分解落实到微观企业的生产运作层面,针对有关排放依赖型企业制定相应的配额和交易政策。可预见的是,未来的排放限制将日趋严格,排放依赖型企业(如能源、化工、电力等)的各方面决策尤其是生产决策将受重大影响。另外,在排放限额与交易体系下,排放权成为有市场价值的资本,那些有能力实施减排项目的组织机构(如净化处理机构、绿色造林组织等)都将有条件成为排放权供应商。减排将成为这些组织机构自愿的行动,因为减排所带来的排放权能够给他们带来收益,故不必完全依赖于财政支持,从而为环保事业注入新活力。
本文旨在从微观运作层面探讨排放因素对生产及供应链效率的影响。文章以优化理论和博弈理论为基础,采用严谨的形式化方法,分别对排放依赖型生产和排放依赖型供应链的相关问题进行了深入探讨,并分别建立了数学模型,为排放依赖型的生产与供应链决策提供了切实可行的理论依据。
根据研究对象的不同,文章可被分为两大部分：
第一大部分是围绕着单个排放依赖型生产商的生产决策问题,主要章节是第2-4章。在这类问题中,本文考虑获取排放权的三种典型渠道：政府配额、市场交易和净化处理。政府配额是外生的,生产商出于己方成本效益的考虑,将会在市场交易和净化处理两种方式间权衡,并最终制定出利润最大化的产量决策。首先,文章探讨了确定性需求下的排放依赖型生产优化,分别研究了净化水平确定和净化水平可变两种情形；然后探讨了随机需求下的同类问题,分别研究了单次净化和允许多次净化的情形；
第二大部分是围绕着排放依赖型供应链而展开,主要章节是第5章。本文考虑了由排放权供应商和排放依赖型生产商所构成的简单两阶段供应链,并在报童背景下展开研究。深入分析供应链双方的博弈过程,并在此基础之上研究各方的最优决策以及给各方和供应链带来的最终利润水平。
在以上问题建模分析之后,各部分均提供了典型算例并加以灵敏度分析以探讨各种外部参数对最优决策和优化结果的影响,主要有：政府配额、市场需求波动性、排放权交易价格、净化处理成本等。通过对这些参数的灵敏度分析,本文得出了诸多颇有意义的管理启示。
本文的主要创新性工作如下：
(1)选题上的创新：本文旨在从微观运作角度研究排放因素对企业或供应链生产运作的影响,而过去排放权相关文献主要针对宏观层面。有学者证实目前国际主流学术期刊上尚无一篇运作层面的排放相关研究；
(2)研究思路的创新：本文综合考虑多种排放权获取渠道,研究排放依赖型生产商的权衡；另外,在排放依赖型供应链方面,本文重点强调排放权供应商作为供应链成员的角色,如何参与到与下游生产商竞争与合作的博弈中；
(3)研究结论的创新：本文以分析模型为基础,针对各种排放相关外部参数(如产品需求波动性、排放权价格波动性、政府限额等)加以深入分析,研究这些参数对各方优化决策及系统效率的影响,得到了诸多颇有价值的管理启示。尤其是通过对政府限额的研究,探讨了环境管理政策对企业及行业运作的影响,以期对政府根据环境目标制订合理有效的环境管理政策提供理论依据。
In company with the advance of industrial modernization, massive increase in harmful emissions leads to higher probability of natural disasters and human diseases. As a typical example, carbon (CO2) emission is proved to be the principal cause of global warming. To mitigate the global warming and prevent disasters happening, climate security has become the public welfare. So the global political entity should take note of the importance and urgency of emission reduction and propose some feasible measures to reduce the risk of climate change, in order to maintain the sustainability of human and social development. Through the joint efforts of the governments around the world, a series of worldwide summit with carbon emission as a central issue have been held. Countries in the world finally reached a series of legal covenant after long and arduous negotiations. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with entry into force on March 21,1994, which is the first international covenant on controlling emission of greenhouse gas such as Carbon dioxide and provides obligations and compliance procedures on greenhouse gas emission reduction for developed and developing countries, is a basic cooperation framework for international community to cope with the problem of global climate change. Kyoto Protocol, as the deepening of UNFCCC, came into effect from February 16,2005, becoming the milestone on greenhouse gas emission reduction. It firstly set emission limits at the national level for the developed countries, and has universal legally binding; and it also proposes a variety of flexible emission reduction mechanism, of which the most attention is the introduction of "international emissions trading" (IET) mechanism. This mechanism essentially takes emissions permits as resources commodity status similar to energy, raw materials, capital, labor and other traditional factors of production, which may be free traded through specific emissions trading market. Kyoto Protocol sets a "cap and trade" system, which achieves an effective emission reduction through both regulation and market. The United Nations Climate Change Conference adopted the "Bali Roadmap" resolution on December 15, 2007, and stressed to seek a common international solutions response to global warming through international cooperation adherence to the "common but differentiated responsibilities" principle. Until the end of 2009, in the Copenhagen General Assembly high-level officials from nearly 200 countries discussed of the Continuous Target after the expiration of a commitment about Kyoto Protocol, but ultimately did not reach an agreement with legal effect.
Although many countries don't come to agreement on specific objectives and implementation of programs in these climate conferences, emissions reduction and the emissions cap and trade has become the consensus of the parties and the inevitable trend. With emission reduction targets set in the Convention, countries and regions must ultimately devolve their national-level emissions reduction targets to the production operational level of individual industrial entities, and constitute emission trading policy and impose emission quotas to emission-dependent firms. It is foreseeable that emission will be restricted more and more strictly in the future, which will significantly impact production-related decision-makings for the emission-dependent firms (such as energy, chemicals, electric power). In addition, in the emissions cap-and-trade system, emission has become the capital of the market value. Those organization institutions which are capable of carrying out emission reduction projects (such as purifying processing organizations, forestation organizations, etc.) will be qualified to become emissions permits suppliers. As they earn profits by selling emissions permits and don't entirely depend on financial support, emissions reduction will be voluntary actions of these organizations, so as to inject new life into environmental protection.
The dissertation aims to explore the impact of emission factors to production and supply chain efficiency in the micro-operational level. Based on optimization theory and game theory, it adopts the precise formalization approach, and discusses in depth the issues related to emission-dependent production and supply chain. Mathematical models were established to provide theoretical support for the practice of emission-dependent production and supply chain decision-making.
According to the different research objects, the dissertation can be divided into two parts.
The first is production decision problems for single emission-dependent manufacturer, including Chapters 2 to 4. In such cases, the manufacturer can obtain emissions permits in three different ways, including emission quota allocated by the government, emissions permits purchased via emission trading, and emissions savings via purification. With government emission quota exogenous, manufacturer will make a trade-off between trading and purification and make the profit-maximizing production decision. First, we discuss optimal emission-dependent production decision under deterministic demand in two cases of fixed and variable purification level respectively; and then discuss the similar problem under stochastic demand in two cases of single-and multi-time purification respectively.
The second focuses on emission-dependent supply chain, which is discussed in Chapter 5. A simple two-stage supply chain including emissions permits supplier and emission-dependent firm is considered in the context of news-vendor. We analyses in-depth the game process between players (members of the supply chain), and discusses the optimal decision and the resulted profit of each member on this basis.
Following model analysis of the above problem, each section gives a typical numerical example and makes sensitivity analysis to show the impact of the various exogenous parameters to the optimal decision and optimization results, mainly including government emission quota, the fluctuation of market demand, emissions permits trading price, and purification costs. By the sensitivity analysis of these parameters, several significant managerial implications are concluded.
The main innovations of this dissertation lie in three aspects as follows:
(1) Innovation on the topics selected:
The dissertation focuses on the impact of emission factors to micro-manufacturing operations of firm and supply chain while the existing emission-related literatures aim mostly at the problem in the macro level. Some scholars have even confirmed that there are no emission-related operational researches published in the international mainstream academic journals by far.
(2) Innovation on the research thoughts:
The dissertation studies the trade-off for emissions-dependent manufacturer, considering a variety of sources of emission permits. Additionally, on the emission-dependent supply chain, emissions permits supplier, as a member of the supply chain, is particularly emphasized on its participation in the game of competition and cooperation with downstream emission-dependent firm.
(3) Innovation on research conclusions:
The dissertaion, based on analytical models, discusses various exogenous parameters related to emissions (such as the fluctuation of market demand, the fluctuation of the trading price of emissions permits, government emission quota, etc.) and the impact of these parameters to the optimal decision-making of the parties and to the system efficiency. Several valuable managerial implications are concluded. In particular, through the discussion on government emission quota, the influence of governmental environmental policies to the operations of enterprise and industry is disclosed, which provide a theoretical basis for the Government to adopt sound and effective environmental policies according to environmental objectives.
虽然在这些气候大会上,各国出于自身利益的考虑在具体目标和执行方案上各执一词,但减排和排放限额与交易已成为各方共识和必然趋势。在公约设定的减排目标下,各国/地区最终必须将国家宏观层面的减排目标分解落实到微观企业的生产运作层面,针对有关排放依赖型企业制定相应的配额和交易政策。可预见的是,未来的排放限制将日趋严格,排放依赖型企业(如能源、化工、电力等)的各方面决策尤其是生产决策将受重大影响。另外,在排放限额与交易体系下,排放权成为有市场价值的资本,那些有能力实施减排项目的组织机构(如净化处理机构、绿色造林组织等)都将有条件成为排放权供应商。减排将成为这些组织机构自愿的行动,因为减排所带来的排放权能够给他们带来收益,故不必完全依赖于财政支持,从而为环保事业注入新活力。
本文旨在从微观运作层面探讨排放因素对生产及供应链效率的影响。文章以优化理论和博弈理论为基础,采用严谨的形式化方法,分别对排放依赖型生产和排放依赖型供应链的相关问题进行了深入探讨,并分别建立了数学模型,为排放依赖型的生产与供应链决策提供了切实可行的理论依据。
根据研究对象的不同,文章可被分为两大部分：
第一大部分是围绕着单个排放依赖型生产商的生产决策问题,主要章节是第2-4章。在这类问题中,本文考虑获取排放权的三种典型渠道：政府配额、市场交易和净化处理。政府配额是外生的,生产商出于己方成本效益的考虑,将会在市场交易和净化处理两种方式间权衡,并最终制定出利润最大化的产量决策。首先,文章探讨了确定性需求下的排放依赖型生产优化,分别研究了净化水平确定和净化水平可变两种情形；然后探讨了随机需求下的同类问题,分别研究了单次净化和允许多次净化的情形；
第二大部分是围绕着排放依赖型供应链而展开,主要章节是第5章。本文考虑了由排放权供应商和排放依赖型生产商所构成的简单两阶段供应链,并在报童背景下展开研究。深入分析供应链双方的博弈过程,并在此基础之上研究各方的最优决策以及给各方和供应链带来的最终利润水平。
在以上问题建模分析之后,各部分均提供了典型算例并加以灵敏度分析以探讨各种外部参数对最优决策和优化结果的影响,主要有：政府配额、市场需求波动性、排放权交易价格、净化处理成本等。通过对这些参数的灵敏度分析,本文得出了诸多颇有意义的管理启示。
本文的主要创新性工作如下：
(1)选题上的创新：本文旨在从微观运作角度研究排放因素对企业或供应链生产运作的影响,而过去排放权相关文献主要针对宏观层面。有学者证实目前国际主流学术期刊上尚无一篇运作层面的排放相关研究；
(2)研究思路的创新：本文综合考虑多种排放权获取渠道,研究排放依赖型生产商的权衡；另外,在排放依赖型供应链方面,本文重点强调排放权供应商作为供应链成员的角色,如何参与到与下游生产商竞争与合作的博弈中；
(3)研究结论的创新：本文以分析模型为基础,针对各种排放相关外部参数(如产品需求波动性、排放权价格波动性、政府限额等)加以深入分析,研究这些参数对各方优化决策及系统效率的影响,得到了诸多颇有价值的管理启示。尤其是通过对政府限额的研究,探讨了环境管理政策对企业及行业运作的影响,以期对政府根据环境目标制订合理有效的环境管理政策提供理论依据。
In company with the advance of industrial modernization, massive increase in harmful emissions leads to higher probability of natural disasters and human diseases. As a typical example, carbon (CO2) emission is proved to be the principal cause of global warming. To mitigate the global warming and prevent disasters happening, climate security has become the public welfare. So the global political entity should take note of the importance and urgency of emission reduction and propose some feasible measures to reduce the risk of climate change, in order to maintain the sustainability of human and social development. Through the joint efforts of the governments around the world, a series of worldwide summit with carbon emission as a central issue have been held. Countries in the world finally reached a series of legal covenant after long and arduous negotiations. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with entry into force on March 21,1994, which is the first international covenant on controlling emission of greenhouse gas such as Carbon dioxide and provides obligations and compliance procedures on greenhouse gas emission reduction for developed and developing countries, is a basic cooperation framework for international community to cope with the problem of global climate change. Kyoto Protocol, as the deepening of UNFCCC, came into effect from February 16,2005, becoming the milestone on greenhouse gas emission reduction. It firstly set emission limits at the national level for the developed countries, and has universal legally binding; and it also proposes a variety of flexible emission reduction mechanism, of which the most attention is the introduction of "international emissions trading" (IET) mechanism. This mechanism essentially takes emissions permits as resources commodity status similar to energy, raw materials, capital, labor and other traditional factors of production, which may be free traded through specific emissions trading market. Kyoto Protocol sets a "cap and trade" system, which achieves an effective emission reduction through both regulation and market. The United Nations Climate Change Conference adopted the "Bali Roadmap" resolution on December 15, 2007, and stressed to seek a common international solutions response to global warming through international cooperation adherence to the "common but differentiated responsibilities" principle. Until the end of 2009, in the Copenhagen General Assembly high-level officials from nearly 200 countries discussed of the Continuous Target after the expiration of a commitment about Kyoto Protocol, but ultimately did not reach an agreement with legal effect.
Although many countries don't come to agreement on specific objectives and implementation of programs in these climate conferences, emissions reduction and the emissions cap and trade has become the consensus of the parties and the inevitable trend. With emission reduction targets set in the Convention, countries and regions must ultimately devolve their national-level emissions reduction targets to the production operational level of individual industrial entities, and constitute emission trading policy and impose emission quotas to emission-dependent firms. It is foreseeable that emission will be restricted more and more strictly in the future, which will significantly impact production-related decision-makings for the emission-dependent firms (such as energy, chemicals, electric power). In addition, in the emissions cap-and-trade system, emission has become the capital of the market value. Those organization institutions which are capable of carrying out emission reduction projects (such as purifying processing organizations, forestation organizations, etc.) will be qualified to become emissions permits suppliers. As they earn profits by selling emissions permits and don't entirely depend on financial support, emissions reduction will be voluntary actions of these organizations, so as to inject new life into environmental protection.
The dissertation aims to explore the impact of emission factors to production and supply chain efficiency in the micro-operational level. Based on optimization theory and game theory, it adopts the precise formalization approach, and discusses in depth the issues related to emission-dependent production and supply chain. Mathematical models were established to provide theoretical support for the practice of emission-dependent production and supply chain decision-making.
According to the different research objects, the dissertation can be divided into two parts.
The first is production decision problems for single emission-dependent manufacturer, including Chapters 2 to 4. In such cases, the manufacturer can obtain emissions permits in three different ways, including emission quota allocated by the government, emissions permits purchased via emission trading, and emissions savings via purification. With government emission quota exogenous, manufacturer will make a trade-off between trading and purification and make the profit-maximizing production decision. First, we discuss optimal emission-dependent production decision under deterministic demand in two cases of fixed and variable purification level respectively; and then discuss the similar problem under stochastic demand in two cases of single-and multi-time purification respectively.
The second focuses on emission-dependent supply chain, which is discussed in Chapter 5. A simple two-stage supply chain including emissions permits supplier and emission-dependent firm is considered in the context of news-vendor. We analyses in-depth the game process between players (members of the supply chain), and discusses the optimal decision and the resulted profit of each member on this basis.
Following model analysis of the above problem, each section gives a typical numerical example and makes sensitivity analysis to show the impact of the various exogenous parameters to the optimal decision and optimization results, mainly including government emission quota, the fluctuation of market demand, emissions permits trading price, and purification costs. By the sensitivity analysis of these parameters, several significant managerial implications are concluded.
The main innovations of this dissertation lie in three aspects as follows:
(1) Innovation on the topics selected:
The dissertation focuses on the impact of emission factors to micro-manufacturing operations of firm and supply chain while the existing emission-related literatures aim mostly at the problem in the macro level. Some scholars have even confirmed that there are no emission-related operational researches published in the international mainstream academic journals by far.
(2) Innovation on the research thoughts:
The dissertation studies the trade-off for emissions-dependent manufacturer, considering a variety of sources of emission permits. Additionally, on the emission-dependent supply chain, emissions permits supplier, as a member of the supply chain, is particularly emphasized on its participation in the game of competition and cooperation with downstream emission-dependent firm.
(3) Innovation on research conclusions:
The dissertaion, based on analytical models, discusses various exogenous parameters related to emissions (such as the fluctuation of market demand, the fluctuation of the trading price of emissions permits, government emission quota, etc.) and the impact of these parameters to the optimal decision-making of the parties and to the system efficiency. Several valuable managerial implications are concluded. In particular, through the discussion on government emission quota, the influence of governmental environmental policies to the operations of enterprise and industry is disclosed, which provide a theoretical basis for the Government to adopt sound and effective environmental policies according to environmental objectives.
引文
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Galiana, F.D., Khatib, S.E.2010. Emission allowances auction for an oligopolistic electricity market operating under cap-and-trade. IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution,4(2):191-200.
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Jaffe, J., Ranson, M., Stavins, R.N.2009. Linking Tradable Permit Systems:A Key Element of Emerging International Climate Policy Architecture. Ecology Law Quarterly,36:789-808.
Johansson, B.2006. Climate policy instruments and industry-effects and potential responses in the Swedish context. Energy Policy,34(15):2344-2360.
Kara, M., Syri, S., Lehtila, A., Helynen, S., Kekkonen, V., Ruska, M., Forsstrom, J. 2008. The impacts of EU CO2 emissions trading on electricity markets and electricity consumers in Finland. Energy Economics,30(2):193-211.
Khouja, M., Mehrez, A.1994. Economic production lot size model with variable production rate and imperfect quality. Journal of the Operational Research Society,45:1405-1417.
Klevas, V., Streimikiene, D., Grikstaite, R.2007. Sustainable Energy in Baltic States. Energy Policy,35(1):76-90.
Kleindorfer, P.R., Singhal, K., van Wassenhove, L.N.2005. Sustainable Operations Management. Production and Operations Management,14(4):482-492.
Knut, E.R.2008. Incentives and prices in an emissions trading scheme with updating. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,56(1):69-82.
Kockar, I., Conejo, A.J., McDonald, J.R.2009. Influence of the Emissions Trading Scheme on generation scheduling. International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems,31(9):465-473.
Kohl, A.L., Nielsen, R.1997. Gas purification,5th ed. Houston, Texas:Gulf Publishing Company.
Kuik,0., Mulder, M.2004. Emission trading and competitiveness:pros and cons of relative and absolute schemes. Energy Policy,32(6):737-745.
Laffont, J., Tirole, J.1996a. Pollution Permits and Compliance Strategies. Journal of Public Economics,62(1-2):85-125.
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Lariviere, M.A.2006. A Note on Probability Distributions with Increasing Generalized Failure Rates. Operations Research,54(3):602-604.
Lariviere, M.A., Porteus, E.L.,2001. Selling to the Newsvendor:an Analysis of Price-Only Contracts. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management,3(4): 293-305.
Linton, J.D., Klassen, R., Jayaraman, J.2007. Sustainable Supply Chains:An Introduction. Journal of Operations Management,25(6):1075-1082.
Lombardi, L.2003. Life Cycle Assessment Comparison of Technical Solutions for CO2 Emissions Reduction in Power Generation. Energy Conversion and Management,44(1):93-108.
Mankiw, N.G.1985. Small Menu Costs and Large Business Cycles:A Macroeconomic Model of Monopoly. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100(2):529-537.
Meier, M. A.1997. Eco-efficiency evaluation of waste gas purification systems in the chemical industry. In:LCA documents,2, Klopffer, W., Hutzinger, O. eds. Bayreuth, Germany:Eco-Informa Press.
Michael, A.S.1975. Monopoly, quality, and regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics,6(2):417-429.
Monica, B., Frabcesco, G.2007. Electricity pricing under "carbon emissions trading": A dominant firm with competitive fringe model. Energy Policy,35(8): 4200-4220.
Montgomery, W.D.1972. Markets in licences and efficient pollution control programs. Journal of Economic Theory,5(3):395-418.
Nakata, T., Lamont, A.2001. Analysis of the impacts of carbon taxes on energy systems in Japan. Energy Policy,29(2):159-166.
Oberthur, S., Ott, H.E.1999. The Kyoto protocol:international climate policy for the 21st century. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York:Springer.
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Sartzetakis, E.S.1997. Raising rivals'costs strategies via Eemission permits markets. Review of Industrial Organization,12(5-6):751-765.
Scrimgeour, F., Oxley, L., Fatai, K.2005. Reducing carbon emissions? The relative effectiveness of different types of environmental tax:the case of New Zealand. Environmental Modelling & Software,20(11):1439-1448.
Sheshinski, E.1976. Price, Quality and Quantity Regulation in Monopoly Situations. Economica, New Series,43(170):127-137.
Stavins, R.N.1995. Transaction costs and tradeable permits. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,29(2):133-148.
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Streimikiene, D., Roos, I.2009. GHG emission trading implications on energy sector in Baltic States. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews,13(4):854-862.
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