大气污染物排污权初始分配研究
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摘要
伴随着现代经济的迅速发展,在环境问题越来越显著的今天,为平衡环境与经济发展之间的矛盾,环境保护与可持续经济发展更加受到人类的重视。建立一个完善的运转有效的排污权交易法律制度,不仅可以平衡上述矛盾,而且还能促进各个排污企业减少排污量,提高生产技术,实现低能耗,低污染,高效益。然而,要想完善排污权交易制度,目前还存在很多问题,其中最需首要解决的问题就是如何合理公平的分配排污权。
     本文是根据参阅许多文献的基础上,采用理论分析与研究的方法,动态规划建模的技术对大气排污权无偿分配以及大气排污权的定价进行研究。首先,需要对排污权,大气污染源,动态规划和经济定价的相关理论知识有充分的了解,才能根据动态规划建模的规则建立大气排污权初始分配模型,然后对大气排污权进行定价研究,界定两者之间的权重,得出大气污染物排污权初始分配总量模式,在构建模型之后,安排一个实例进行研究分析。
     本文的主要研究成果如下:
     (1)研究了我国大气污染物初始排污权免费分配模型。动态规划可以用来解决最优路径问题,资源分配问题,生产调度问题,库存问题,装载问题,排序问题,设备更新问题,生产过程最优控制问题等等。从最低治理费用以及分配的公平性的角度出发,建立动态规划模型,在这里还需要将多目标模型转换为单目标模型求解。
     (2)研究了我国大气污染物排污权初始分配总量模式。针对我国的经济和环境现状,结合国内外理论界研究成果,本文认为目前我国排污权初始分配模式比较适合免费分配与有偿分配相结合的模式。按照某区域内所有排污企业为此区域的社会福利所做的贡献,来确定排污权初始分配中免费分配所占的比重。
     大气污染物排污权初始分配在环境保护以及经济学中是一个新的待需解决的问题,研究也还处于初级阶段。本文虽然就某些问题进行了探讨,但是还是存在许多问题需要继续深入研究,如不同市场条件下初始排污权分配方式问题,本论文建立的总量模式在实践上有很大的困难,研究的系统科学性还不够等。
With the rapid development of modern economy, environmental issues are increasingly significant recently. In order to balance the contradiction between environment and economic development, human pay more attention to environmental protection and sustainable economic development. The establishment of a perfect and effective legal system of emissions trading can not only balance the contradiction, but also promote every emission corporations to reduce emissions and improve the production technology. It would enable emission corporations to achieve low power consumption, low pollution and high efficiency. However, there are many problems to improve the emission trading system. The core problem is how to scientific allocate the initial emission rights rationally.
     This thesis is based on read a lot of documents, researching on atmospheric emission rights free allocation and atmospheric emission rights pricing using theoretical analysis and research methods, dynamic programming modeling technology. First of all, it is necessary to understand the relevant theoretical knowledge such as emission rights, air pollution, dynamic programming and economic pricing. Establish a model of initial atmospheric emission rights allocation according to dynamic programming modeling rules. Secondly, by studying on air emission rights pricing, define the weight between free distribution and paid distribution and obtain the total model of air pollutants initial emission rights allocation. Finally, researching and analysis an example.
     The main results of this thesis are as follows:
     (1)Study on the model of air pollutants initial emission rights free allocation. Dynamic programming can be used to solve the optimal path problem, resource allocation, production scheduling problems, inventory problems, loading issues, scheduling problem, renewal of equipment problems, the production process optimal control problem and so on. This thesis put forward the mathematic model of dynamic programming under the conditions of minimum treatment expense and fairness of allocation. In this thesis, it is necessary to convert the multi-objective model for solving single-objective model.
     (2)Study on the total model of air pollutants initial emission rights allocation. In this thesis, the model of initial emission rights allocation in China recently is more suitable for free distribution combination with paid distribution under the conditions of economy and environmental status in China, combined with the theorists research results at home and abroad. In accordance with the contribution of the social welfare in a certain region, determine the proportion of free distribution in initial emission rights allocation.
     Air pollutants initial emission rights allocation in environmental protection and economics is a new pending issue needed to be solved. The study is still in its early stage. This thesis was discussed on some issues, but there are still many problems need to continue in-depth study such as initial emission rights allocation problems under the conditions of different market, there are great difficulties in practice, scientific research system is not enough and so on.
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