所有权、控制权和利益输送行为研究
摘要
在股权集中的情况下,上市公司本应由全体股东共同享有的控制权转移到控股股东手里。与控制权相伴的控制权私利诱使控股股东构造各种利益输送交易,转移上市公司利润和占用上市公司的资源,从而侵害了少数股东的利益。在金字塔控股结构下,最终控制人所有权和控制权的分离诱使了更为严重的利益输送行为。本文从最终控制人的所有权、控制权的角度研究中国自然人控制的上市公司的利益输送行为。
本文首先以LLSV等2002年提出的利益输送影响因素模型为基础,引入最终控制人的所有权、控制权和两权分离变量,从理论上论证了在法律因素既定的情况下,所有权、控制权和利益输送之间的相关关系,即所有权比例越低,控制权越高,两权分离程度越大,控制权私利价值越高,最终控制人进行利益输送的动机也越强烈。在理论分析的基础上,本文以2001-2003年沪深两市453家自然人控制公司为样本,以分组检验的方式考察了在法律环境不变的情况下,所有权比例、控制权取得方式、控制权比例、控制层级和两权分离系数等所有权、控制权变量,与利润转移、资源占用等利益输送变量之间的相关性。得出主要结论如下:
1.最终控制人持有的所有权比例、控制权取得方式、控制层级和与转移利润、担保和资金占用之间存在显著的相关关系。在所有权比例较低、借壳上市、控制层级较多、两权分离度较高的情况下,最终控制人利用非经常性损益交易转移利润、担保、非经营性占用上市公司资金等各类利益输送发生的可能性较高。
2.控制权比例的较高组别最终控制人采用资金占用的方式进行利益输送的可能性和资金占用水平都显著高于控制权比例较低组别。但是,控制权比例的高低与转移利润和担保之间呈相反关系,即控制权比例较低组别,转移利润和担保显著高于控制权比例高组别。
3.所有权比例、控制权取得方式、控制层级三个变量较好地解释了最终控制人对利润转移行为和共享收益行为的选择。即在所有权比例较低、借壳上市、控制层级较多的情况下,最终控制人更乐于以派发现金股利的方式与全体股东共享收益,在相反的情况下,最终控制人转移利润进行利益输送的行为更频繁。
本文主要学术贡献在于,不同于以往对直接股东持股比例和利益输送相关性的研究,本文从最终控制人所有权、控制权和两权分离这一能够更好解释控股股东行为的角度出发,研究最终控制人的利益输送行为特征,开拓了研究的视角。
Under concentrated-ownership structure, the common-shared control rights shift to controlling shareholders. The Private Benefit of Control (PBC) arising from control rights induces controlling shareholders to tunnel from listed companies, which is an expropriation of minority shareholders. The separation of control rights and ownership under pyramidal-controlled structure comes with a more intensive and frequent tunneling. The study analyzes tunneling from the aspect of ownership, control rights of the ultimate owners of entrepreneur-controlled companies.
The study firstly develops a theoretical model by combining ownership, control rights, separation of ownership and control rights into LLSV’s Model (2002) which focuses on analyzing the determinants of tunneling behaviors. Under the theoretical model, the study draws a primary conclusion that the lower the ownership of the ultimate owners, the higher control rights of the ultimate owners, the higher of the separation of ownership and control rights, the high the PBC is, and the ultimate owners have more incentives to tunnel.
Then, the study makes an empirical analysis on the relationship between tunneling and ownership, control rights and separation of ownership and control rights. The study selects 453 entrepreneur-controlled samples from China’s listed companies during 2001 to 2003. By using groups’comparison analysis, the study tests the correlation between ownership, control rights variables and tunneling variables. The major results are as follows:
1. A statistically significant correlation exists between ownership proportion, the method to acquiring control rights, numbers of pyramidal layers, and income transferred transactions, guarantees and net receivables from ultimate owners. The ultimate owners are likely to tunnel more by using non-operating income-related transactions, guarantees and non-operating credits under a lower ownership proportion or acquiring control rights from buy-out, or a complicated pyramidal structure.
2. The higher control proportion group is more likely to use credits to tunnel more compared with a lower control proportion group. On the contrary, the lower control group has a higher guarantees level.
3. The ownership proportion, the method of acquiring control and the number of pyramidal layers are more effective in explaining the ultimate owners’decision between transferring incomes and sharing incomes with all shareholders. Under a lower ownership proportion or acquiring control from buy-out or a more pyramidal layers circumstance, the ultimate owners are more likely to share cash dividend with all shareholders. Under the contrary circumstance, they make more income-transferring transactions to tunnel more.
The expected contribution of this study is to explain the tunneling behaviors from ownership, control and separation of ownership and control aspects which are helpful in disclosing the fundamental incentive of tunneling.
本文首先以LLSV等2002年提出的利益输送影响因素模型为基础,引入最终控制人的所有权、控制权和两权分离变量,从理论上论证了在法律因素既定的情况下,所有权、控制权和利益输送之间的相关关系,即所有权比例越低,控制权越高,两权分离程度越大,控制权私利价值越高,最终控制人进行利益输送的动机也越强烈。在理论分析的基础上,本文以2001-2003年沪深两市453家自然人控制公司为样本,以分组检验的方式考察了在法律环境不变的情况下,所有权比例、控制权取得方式、控制权比例、控制层级和两权分离系数等所有权、控制权变量,与利润转移、资源占用等利益输送变量之间的相关性。得出主要结论如下:
1.最终控制人持有的所有权比例、控制权取得方式、控制层级和与转移利润、担保和资金占用之间存在显著的相关关系。在所有权比例较低、借壳上市、控制层级较多、两权分离度较高的情况下,最终控制人利用非经常性损益交易转移利润、担保、非经营性占用上市公司资金等各类利益输送发生的可能性较高。
2.控制权比例的较高组别最终控制人采用资金占用的方式进行利益输送的可能性和资金占用水平都显著高于控制权比例较低组别。但是,控制权比例的高低与转移利润和担保之间呈相反关系,即控制权比例较低组别,转移利润和担保显著高于控制权比例高组别。
3.所有权比例、控制权取得方式、控制层级三个变量较好地解释了最终控制人对利润转移行为和共享收益行为的选择。即在所有权比例较低、借壳上市、控制层级较多的情况下,最终控制人更乐于以派发现金股利的方式与全体股东共享收益,在相反的情况下,最终控制人转移利润进行利益输送的行为更频繁。
本文主要学术贡献在于,不同于以往对直接股东持股比例和利益输送相关性的研究,本文从最终控制人所有权、控制权和两权分离这一能够更好解释控股股东行为的角度出发,研究最终控制人的利益输送行为特征,开拓了研究的视角。
Under concentrated-ownership structure, the common-shared control rights shift to controlling shareholders. The Private Benefit of Control (PBC) arising from control rights induces controlling shareholders to tunnel from listed companies, which is an expropriation of minority shareholders. The separation of control rights and ownership under pyramidal-controlled structure comes with a more intensive and frequent tunneling. The study analyzes tunneling from the aspect of ownership, control rights of the ultimate owners of entrepreneur-controlled companies.
The study firstly develops a theoretical model by combining ownership, control rights, separation of ownership and control rights into LLSV’s Model (2002) which focuses on analyzing the determinants of tunneling behaviors. Under the theoretical model, the study draws a primary conclusion that the lower the ownership of the ultimate owners, the higher control rights of the ultimate owners, the higher of the separation of ownership and control rights, the high the PBC is, and the ultimate owners have more incentives to tunnel.
Then, the study makes an empirical analysis on the relationship between tunneling and ownership, control rights and separation of ownership and control rights. The study selects 453 entrepreneur-controlled samples from China’s listed companies during 2001 to 2003. By using groups’comparison analysis, the study tests the correlation between ownership, control rights variables and tunneling variables. The major results are as follows:
1. A statistically significant correlation exists between ownership proportion, the method to acquiring control rights, numbers of pyramidal layers, and income transferred transactions, guarantees and net receivables from ultimate owners. The ultimate owners are likely to tunnel more by using non-operating income-related transactions, guarantees and non-operating credits under a lower ownership proportion or acquiring control rights from buy-out, or a complicated pyramidal structure.
2. The higher control proportion group is more likely to use credits to tunnel more compared with a lower control proportion group. On the contrary, the lower control group has a higher guarantees level.
3. The ownership proportion, the method of acquiring control and the number of pyramidal layers are more effective in explaining the ultimate owners’decision between transferring incomes and sharing incomes with all shareholders. Under a lower ownership proportion or acquiring control from buy-out or a more pyramidal layers circumstance, the ultimate owners are more likely to share cash dividend with all shareholders. Under the contrary circumstance, they make more income-transferring transactions to tunnel more.
The expected contribution of this study is to explain the tunneling behaviors from ownership, control and separation of ownership and control aspects which are helpful in disclosing the fundamental incentive of tunneling.
引文
① http://www.cnsmcc.com/modules.php?action=news&channelID=68&topicID=228&newsID=1563&keyword=
① 转引自冯根福. 双重委托代理理论:上市公司治理的另一种分析框架—兼论进一步完善中国上市公司治理的新思路[J]. 经济研究,2004(12):16-25
① 转引自 Olaf Ehrhardt and Eric Nowak, Private Benefit and Minority Shareholder Expropriation, Working Paper, Humboldt University and University of Southern Switzerland Lugarno, June 2003
① 这里的三个案例分别出自 Schmidt(1999)、Stanghellini(1995)和 Wymeersch(1993),转引自 Johnson et al.(2000)。
① OECD. Corporate Governance in Asia. 2001:7-10。本文转引自冯根福. 双重委托代理理论:上市公司治理的另一种分析框架—兼论进一步完善中国上市公司治理的新思路[J]. 经济研究,2004(12):16-25
① Facio, Mara and Lang, Larry H. P. Separation of Ownership from Control: An Analyst of Ultimate Ownership in Western Europe. Working Paper, Chinese University Of Hong Kong, 2000, 本文转引自赖建清(2005)。
① Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, L.Lang. The Expropriation of Minority Shareholders:Evidence from East Asia Corporation. Policy Research Paper, World Bank, Washington D.C.,1999(2088)
② 有兴趣的可以查阅 Bebchuk 等人的文献,即 Bebchuk et al. Stock Pyramids, Cross-ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights. Working Paper. Yale School of Management’s Economics Research Network, 1998
① 转引自李国富(2002)。
②赵昌文等. 中国上市公司控制权私有收益的度量与影响因素[J]. 中国工业经济,2004(6):100-105
①《 IMF 季刊》,2001(3),Volume 38, Number1, 本论文转引自李国富. 家族控制上市公司治理结构研究[D]. 厦门大学硕士论文,2002:21-22
① 转引自,Ming Jian and T.J. Wong, Earnings Management and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups, pp 23, SSRN, working paper, June, 2003
① http://yjbg.stock.cnfol.com/050729/139,1333,1366326,00.shtml
① 资料来源:http://info.news.hc360.com/html/001/002/009/018/53494.htm
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① 转引自冯根福. 双重委托代理理论:上市公司治理的另一种分析框架—兼论进一步完善中国上市公司治理的新思路[J]. 经济研究,2004(12):16-25
① 转引自 Olaf Ehrhardt and Eric Nowak, Private Benefit and Minority Shareholder Expropriation, Working Paper, Humboldt University and University of Southern Switzerland Lugarno, June 2003
① 这里的三个案例分别出自 Schmidt(1999)、Stanghellini(1995)和 Wymeersch(1993),转引自 Johnson et al.(2000)。
① OECD. Corporate Governance in Asia. 2001:7-10。本文转引自冯根福. 双重委托代理理论:上市公司治理的另一种分析框架—兼论进一步完善中国上市公司治理的新思路[J]. 经济研究,2004(12):16-25
① Facio, Mara and Lang, Larry H. P. Separation of Ownership from Control: An Analyst of Ultimate Ownership in Western Europe. Working Paper, Chinese University Of Hong Kong, 2000, 本文转引自赖建清(2005)。
① Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, L.Lang. The Expropriation of Minority Shareholders:Evidence from East Asia Corporation. Policy Research Paper, World Bank, Washington D.C.,1999(2088)
② 有兴趣的可以查阅 Bebchuk 等人的文献,即 Bebchuk et al. Stock Pyramids, Cross-ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights. Working Paper. Yale School of Management’s Economics Research Network, 1998
① 转引自李国富(2002)。
②赵昌文等. 中国上市公司控制权私有收益的度量与影响因素[J]. 中国工业经济,2004(6):100-105
①《 IMF 季刊》,2001(3),Volume 38, Number1, 本论文转引自李国富. 家族控制上市公司治理结构研究[D]. 厦门大学硕士论文,2002:21-22
① 转引自,Ming Jian and T.J. Wong, Earnings Management and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups, pp 23, SSRN, working paper, June, 2003
① http://yjbg.stock.cnfol.com/050729/139,1333,1366326,00.shtml
① 资料来源:http://info.news.hc360.com/html/001/002/009/018/53494.htm
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