论刑事诉讼公诉案件的诉讼结构
摘要
刑事公诉案件普通程序结构又称为刑事诉讼权力与权利结构,是指刑事诉讼中各权力与权利之间相互制衡与联系的架构。刑事诉讼中权力与权利的结构受人们法律观念、法律理念、法律思想的影响。最终,还是受到社会经济政治大环境的影响。反过来,一旦权力与权利结构形成又会影响人们的法律思维、法律行为。所以,权力与权利结构的选择与构建应当慎重。本文对我国现行刑事诉讼中存在的若干问题进行思考,认为在现代刑事诉讼的“三角结构”中,由于忽视了被害人的特殊作用,从而使得诉讼模式中各主体的法律关系难以有效协调,从程序上和结果上都无以对被害人的利益进行全面保护。出于对被害人利益的保护,我们必须对我国目前的“三角结构”和“线性结构”作一些修正,具体来讲就是在审判前的取保候审等羁押变更程序、检察院的决定起诉和不起诉程序、法院的定罪与量刑程序,以及审判后的刑罚执行变更程序中引入被害人的参与权。完善刑事诉讼中权力与权利结构,对于科学合理地配置当事人在诉讼中的具体权利义务,完善对抗制诉讼机制,开拓刑事诉讼法学的研究视野等都具有重要理论和实践意义。
The judicial structure in criminal cases is represented as restriction and connection between power and human rights. The structure is affected by people's legal conception and legal theories, and ultimately is affected by the circumstances of society, economy and politics. On the contrary, as long as the structure between power and rights is formed, it surely will influence people's legal conception and their behaviors. Therefore, the selection and the construction of the structure between power and rights should be very considered prudently. Via the analysis of some problems in our current criminal cases, this dissertation believes that the newly formed judicial structure can be displayed like this: judicial independence, confrontment between procurators and defendants, the essence of jurisdiction is the power of determination. Both the emphasis on equity between procurators and defendants and the acceptance of the balance between jurisdiction and parties' rights in proceedings will enable the triangle structure of criminal cases more apparent, in addition to the definite boundary between jurisdiction and human rights, which guarantees the independence of judges to supply an system pledge for the realization of justice in criminal cases. To improve the criminal judicial structure between power and rights is of great significance for distribution of parties' rights reasonably, for progress on the counter-party judicial system and for broader view in the investigation of criminal law.
Specifically, The whole dissertation consists of six parts, including the introduction and the conclusion.
In the introduction, the thesis, approach and framework are established. In the introduction, the thesis, approach and framework are established. First, I'll illustrate the embarrassing position of victim in our current procedural structure. Second, you'll understand the reason and measures of the problems that have been said. At last, I'll explain the protection of victim combined with the theory about the balance of interests.
In the second part, the author goes into particulars on the embarrassing situation of the victims in criminal judicial structure, who can not act like a party as a party in criminal cases. Their position are just between criminal suspects/defendants and witness, having more rights than witness, but less rights than suspects or defendants. This is displayed in two sides: one is the devoid of the victims' rights of action, which is reflected on the stages of accreditation, review and prosecution and trial. The reasons are as follows: firstly, the right of prosecution is held by people's procuratorate, who represent the interests of nation and society, which may differ from the interests of the victims; secondly, the history of socialism legal theories insists that individual interests should submit to social interests, however, law should not only pay attention to social interests or individual interests, but find the best coupling point between them; thirdly, procurators can not represent the interests of victims completely; fourthly, the position of people's procuratorate in the criminal law may carry weight. On the other side, the embarrassing situation of victims also behaves as the inequitable positions of the procurators and the defendants, which is induced by the lined structure between power and human rights in criminal cases. In addition, there are still some other reasons which count a lot, such as the restricts for the suspects and defendants getting help from lawyers, the absence of effective measures for enhancing the resistance ability of defendants.
The third part is used to demonstrate the reason for the problem argued in the second part. The embarrassing situation of the victim in criminal judicial structure of China is brought about by the present judicial structure of our country which is characterized by the "triangle structure" and the "linear structure". The advantages of "triangle structure" are as follows. First of all, it can help to separate the function of prosecution from that of decision, substitute public prosecution for private prosecution, and establish the principle of "no trial without complaint". Secondly, it can help the judges to use their judicial jurisdiction independently and ensure the independence of the judicial justice. Thirdly, it can help the defendant and his defender to take an active role in the procedure and protect the right of defense of the defendant. Finally, it can help to set the principle of public verdict and the doctrine of discetionale evaluation of evidence. However, such a structure neglects the special role of the victims, so it is not able to harmonize the relations between the objects of the procedure. As a result, it cannot protect the interests of the victim completely. Concretely, in the procedure of investigation and the procedure for commencement of action before the judicial justice, the victims are not able to participate in an effective way. In the stage of judicial justice, the victims are regarded as independent objects to some extent. However, in the execution procedure, the victims don't have any right of participation at all. What's more, the procuratorate and the prosecutors have a twofold role in that they not only have the right to prosecute, but also have the power to inspect as well.
The forth part can be regarded as a countermeasure. First of all, the author analyzes the common way the other countries use to protect the right of the victims, which make sure the victims can take part in the procedure actively in some important stages of the procedure. And the stages are: the procedure of hearing for bail, the procedure of plea bargaining, the procedure of convict by the jury and sentence by the judge, and the procedure of commutation and parole in the execution. In these stages, the victim, the prosecutor, the defendant and the judge restrict each other and this help the victims to participate in the procedure in a great extent. Then the author demonstrates briefly what China has been doing to protect the rights of the victim: establishing the adversary procedure brought from the common law system and promoting the position of the victim to one part of the procedure. In a word, the victims are allowed to take part in the procedure of posting a bail and awaiting trial with stricted liberty of moving, the procedure of prosecution of the procuratorate, the procedure of judicial justice of the court and the procedure of execution to a great extent.
The fifth part is on the whole about the analysis on the balance of rights. There are three kinds of interests in modern criminal law system: interests of nation, interests of victims and interests of defendants. The author starts from the embodiment of the above interests in judicial process and judicial structure, and then illuminates that the three kinds of interests are destined to conflict because criminal cases are carried through by multi-parties. These conflicts are brought forward by the contradiction between judicial process and verdicts, the contradiction between nation power and human rights, the contradiction between the pursuit of truth and the fixed time and space in the judicial procedure, also the contradiction between justice and efficiency. At the same time, the author defines some important issues in estimation and selection of interests: firstly, estimation and selection of interests can only be put up in lawmaking, but not in judicial process; secondly, the selection of interests in specific criminal case is often displayed as sufficient protection of one kind of interests and complete abandon of another; thirdly, the estimation of interests in criminal cases can not be simply defined as traditional nation interests, collective interests and individual interests, which may educe an improper conclusion that individual interests submit to collective interests and collective interests submit to nation interests. Finally, on the basis of the theory of balance of interests, the author draws the conclusion that justice in proceeding can only been achieved by the rational balance of the interests of parties.
The last part emphasize on the importance of the protection of the victim's right of participation. As the present triangle structure neglects the special role of the victims, so it is not able to harmonize the relations between the objects of the procedure and protect the interests of the victim completely, it is necessary to modify the triangle structure and the linear structure. Concretely speaking, we have to ensure the right of participation of the victim in the procedure of posting a bail and awaiting trial with stricted liberty of moving, the procedure of prosecution of the procuratorate, the procedure of judicial justice of the court and the procedure of execution. So it is of great importance to point out the obstacles to achieve such a purpose. To begin with, the pre-judgement procedure is still an administrative procedure and the judicial review hasn't established yet. Secondly, the procedure of convict and sentence haven't been separated yet and the jury haven't play their due part. Thirdly, the power of the judges is too strong and their judgements tend to be administrative. To make things worth, the prosecutors have a twofold procedural function, which enhances the power of their own. On the other hand, the present procedural system hasn't done much to the protection of the rights of the defendant, so the protection of the rights of the victim tends to do harm to the rights of the defendant. Finally, the lack of the sense of personal rights also leads to the neglect of the rights of the victim. To sum up, only do we solve these problems, can we protect the right of victims as a matter of fact.
The judicial structure in criminal cases is represented as restriction and connection between power and human rights. The structure is affected by people's legal conception and legal theories, and ultimately is affected by the circumstances of society, economy and politics. On the contrary, as long as the structure between power and rights is formed, it surely will influence people's legal conception and their behaviors. Therefore, the selection and the construction of the structure between power and rights should be very considered prudently. Via the analysis of some problems in our current criminal cases, this dissertation believes that the newly formed judicial structure can be displayed like this: judicial independence, confrontment between procurators and defendants, the essence of jurisdiction is the power of determination. Both the emphasis on equity between procurators and defendants and the acceptance of the balance between jurisdiction and parties' rights in proceedings will enable the triangle structure of criminal cases more apparent, in addition to the definite boundary between jurisdiction and human rights, which guarantees the independence of judges to supply an system pledge for the realization of justice in criminal cases. To improve the criminal judicial structure between power and rights is of great significance for distribution of parties' rights reasonably, for progress on the counter-party judicial system and for broader view in the investigation of criminal law.
Specifically, The whole dissertation consists of six parts, including the introduction and the conclusion.
In the introduction, the thesis, approach and framework are established. In the introduction, the thesis, approach and framework are established. First, I'll illustrate the embarrassing position of victim in our current procedural structure. Second, you'll understand the reason and measures of the problems that have been said. At last, I'll explain the protection of victim combined with the theory about the balance of interests.
In the second part, the author goes into particulars on the embarrassing situation of the victims in criminal judicial structure, who can not act like a party as a party in criminal cases. Their position are just between criminal suspects/defendants and witness, having more rights than witness, but less rights than suspects or defendants. This is displayed in two sides: one is the devoid of the victims' rights of action, which is reflected on the stages of accreditation, review and prosecution and trial. The reasons are as follows: firstly, the right of prosecution is held by people's procuratorate, who represent the interests of nation and society, which may differ from the interests of the victims; secondly, the history of socialism legal theories insists that individual interests should submit to social interests, however, law should not only pay attention to social interests or individual interests, but find the best coupling point between them; thirdly, procurators can not represent the interests of victims completely; fourthly, the position of people's procuratorate in the criminal law may carry weight. On the other side, the embarrassing situation of victims also behaves as the inequitable positions of the procurators and the defendants, which is induced by the lined structure between power and human rights in criminal cases. In addition, there are still some other reasons which count a lot, such as the restricts for the suspects and defendants getting help from lawyers, the absence of effective measures for enhancing the resistance ability of defendants.
The third part is used to demonstrate the reason for the problem argued in the second part. The embarrassing situation of the victim in criminal judicial structure of China is brought about by the present judicial structure of our country which is characterized by the "triangle structure" and the "linear structure". The advantages of "triangle structure" are as follows. First of all, it can help to separate the function of prosecution from that of decision, substitute public prosecution for private prosecution, and establish the principle of "no trial without complaint". Secondly, it can help the judges to use their judicial jurisdiction independently and ensure the independence of the judicial justice. Thirdly, it can help the defendant and his defender to take an active role in the procedure and protect the right of defense of the defendant. Finally, it can help to set the principle of public verdict and the doctrine of discetionale evaluation of evidence. However, such a structure neglects the special role of the victims, so it is not able to harmonize the relations between the objects of the procedure. As a result, it cannot protect the interests of the victim completely. Concretely, in the procedure of investigation and the procedure for commencement of action before the judicial justice, the victims are not able to participate in an effective way. In the stage of judicial justice, the victims are regarded as independent objects to some extent. However, in the execution procedure, the victims don't have any right of participation at all. What's more, the procuratorate and the prosecutors have a twofold role in that they not only have the right to prosecute, but also have the power to inspect as well.
The forth part can be regarded as a countermeasure. First of all, the author analyzes the common way the other countries use to protect the right of the victims, which make sure the victims can take part in the procedure actively in some important stages of the procedure. And the stages are: the procedure of hearing for bail, the procedure of plea bargaining, the procedure of convict by the jury and sentence by the judge, and the procedure of commutation and parole in the execution. In these stages, the victim, the prosecutor, the defendant and the judge restrict each other and this help the victims to participate in the procedure in a great extent. Then the author demonstrates briefly what China has been doing to protect the rights of the victim: establishing the adversary procedure brought from the common law system and promoting the position of the victim to one part of the procedure. In a word, the victims are allowed to take part in the procedure of posting a bail and awaiting trial with stricted liberty of moving, the procedure of prosecution of the procuratorate, the procedure of judicial justice of the court and the procedure of execution to a great extent.
The fifth part is on the whole about the analysis on the balance of rights. There are three kinds of interests in modern criminal law system: interests of nation, interests of victims and interests of defendants. The author starts from the embodiment of the above interests in judicial process and judicial structure, and then illuminates that the three kinds of interests are destined to conflict because criminal cases are carried through by multi-parties. These conflicts are brought forward by the contradiction between judicial process and verdicts, the contradiction between nation power and human rights, the contradiction between the pursuit of truth and the fixed time and space in the judicial procedure, also the contradiction between justice and efficiency. At the same time, the author defines some important issues in estimation and selection of interests: firstly, estimation and selection of interests can only be put up in lawmaking, but not in judicial process; secondly, the selection of interests in specific criminal case is often displayed as sufficient protection of one kind of interests and complete abandon of another; thirdly, the estimation of interests in criminal cases can not be simply defined as traditional nation interests, collective interests and individual interests, which may educe an improper conclusion that individual interests submit to collective interests and collective interests submit to nation interests. Finally, on the basis of the theory of balance of interests, the author draws the conclusion that justice in proceeding can only been achieved by the rational balance of the interests of parties.
The last part emphasize on the importance of the protection of the victim's right of participation. As the present triangle structure neglects the special role of the victims, so it is not able to harmonize the relations between the objects of the procedure and protect the interests of the victim completely, it is necessary to modify the triangle structure and the linear structure. Concretely speaking, we have to ensure the right of participation of the victim in the procedure of posting a bail and awaiting trial with stricted liberty of moving, the procedure of prosecution of the procuratorate, the procedure of judicial justice of the court and the procedure of execution. So it is of great importance to point out the obstacles to achieve such a purpose. To begin with, the pre-judgement procedure is still an administrative procedure and the judicial review hasn't established yet. Secondly, the procedure of convict and sentence haven't been separated yet and the jury haven't play their due part. Thirdly, the power of the judges is too strong and their judgements tend to be administrative. To make things worth, the prosecutors have a twofold procedural function, which enhances the power of their own. On the other hand, the present procedural system hasn't done much to the protection of the rights of the defendant, so the protection of the rights of the victim tends to do harm to the rights of the defendant. Finally, the lack of the sense of personal rights also leads to the neglect of the rights of the victim. To sum up, only do we solve these problems, can we protect the right of victims as a matter of fact.
引文
[1]汪建成:《论刑事诉讼中的利益观》,《中国法学》2000年第2期,第148页。
[2]马贵翔:《刑事司法程序正义论》,中国检察出版社2002年第1版,第54-56页。
[3]所谓“刑事诉讼权力与权利结构”是指刑事诉讼中各权力与权利之间相互制衡与联系的架构。它的形成受到人们法律观念、法律理念、法律思想的影响,最终,还是受到社会经济政治大环境的影响。反过来,一旦权力与权利结构形成,又会影响人们的法律思维和法律行为。不同的权利与权力结构会产生完全不同的法律效果,所以对权力与权利结构的选择与构建应当慎重。参见李荐:《引入诉权理念完善刑事诉讼权力与权利结构》,《法制与社会》2006年第10期,第9页。
[4]所谓“起诉状一本主义”是指检察官在起诉时只将具有法定事项和格式的起诉书提交有管辖权的法院的诉讼原则。开庭前,检查官仅将起诉书交于法官,不交付其余的证据,资料只有一本起诉书,避免法官在开庭前形成主观臆断,偏向于控方,使被告陷于不利的状态。实行“起诉状一本主义”,一切与案件有关的事实、证据,只有在开庭时才呈现在法官面前,可以使法官保持一种“空明”的心境,以保证在公开、辩论式的程序中获得独立的审理,防止法官先入为主,增强了控辩双方的对抗性。法庭在经过控辩双方举证、质证和辩论后才能定案,真正做到“有证举在法庭,有理讲在法庭”,充分调动控辩双方举证、质证和辩论的积极性和主动性,以保证审判的客观和公正。此外,该方式不增加诉讼环节,不浪费人力,也不移送复印材料,还节省了诉讼成本。起诉书一本主义是英、美、日等国所采用的公诉模式, 当今日本是实行起诉书一本主义的典型国家。它有助于排除法官的庭前预断,实现控辩平衡,并有助于贯彻直接言词原则。参见《扬州邗江区检察院试行开庭前证据材料不移送法院起诉书一本主义防止法官先入为主》,“搜狐新闻网”,http://news.sohu.com/20070810/n251515449.shtml,2007年12月13日。
[5]转引自马贵翔:《刑事司法程序正义论》,中国检察出版社2002年第1版,第99页。
[6]崔敏:《中国刑事诉讼的新发展》,中国人民公安大学出版社1996年第1版,第233页。
[7]秦绪才:《我国刑事诉讼结构的类型属性和运作中存在的问题及其完善》,《河北法学》2000年第3期,第53页。
[8]李心鉴:《刑事诉讼结构论》,中国政法大学出版社1992年第1版,第7页。
[9]陈瑞华:《刑事诉讼的前沿问题》,中国人民大学出版社2000年第1版,第222页。
[10]参见胡锡庆主编:《刑事审判方式改革研究》,中国法制出版社2001年第1版,第19-27页。
[11]马贵翔:《刑事司法程序正义论》,中国检察出版社2002年第1版,第69页。
[12]马贵翔:《刑事司法程序正义论》,中国检察出版社2002年第1版,第72-77页。
[13]马贵翔:《刑事司法程序正义论》,中国检察出版社2002年第1版,第23-24页。
[14]左卫民:《价值与结构——刑事程序的双重分析》,法律出版社2003年第1版,第139页。
[15]参见侯智武:《对辩护交易制度的理性思考》,《理论导刊》2006年4期,第69页。
[16]参见甄贞、王丽:《美国大陪审团与人民监督员制度比较》,《人民检察》2007年第5期,第60页。
[17]王国锋:《保释制度的理论基础及价值蕴涵——兼谈我国取保候审制度与其之不同及借鉴》,《河南大学学报》(社会科学版)2006年第4期,第61页。
[18]汪建成:《论刑事诉讼中的利益观》,《中国法学》2000年第2期,第141页。
[19][德]康德:《法的形而上学原理——权利的科学》,沈叔平译,商务印书馆1991年第1版,第164页。
[20]龙宗智:《刑事诉讼价值模式论析》,《现代法学》1993年第2期,第20页。
[21]黄东熊:《刑事诉讼法论》,台湾三民书局1987年第版,第4页
[22]《马克思恩格斯全集》(第一卷),人民出版社1956年第1版,第169页。
[23]《马克思恩格斯全集》(第一卷),人民出版社1956年第1版,第154页。
[24]付子堂:《对利益问题的法律解释》,《法学家》2001年第2期,第148页。
[25]郑丁足、陈双喜:《公诉制度的利益衡平论》,《湘潭大学社会科学学报》2003年第2期,第66页。
1.《马克思恩格斯全集》(第一卷),人民出版社1956年第1版。
2.[美]阿瑟·奥肯:《平等与效率》,王奔洲译,华夏出版社1999年第1版。
3.[德]康德:《法的形而上学原理——权利的科学》,沈叔平译,商务印书馆1991年第1版。
4.[意]戴维·奈尔肯编:《比较刑事司法论》,张明楷等译,清华大学出版社2004年第1版。
5.[日]棚濑孝雄:《纠纷的解决与审判制度》,王亚新译,中国政法大学2004年第1版。
6.[美]约翰·V·奥尔特:《正当程序简史》,杨明成、陈霜玲译,商务印书馆2006年第1版。
7.[意]莫诺·卡佩莱蒂:《比较法视野中的司法程序》,徐昕、王奕译,清华大学出版社2005年第1版。
8.[美]E·博登海默:《法理学——法哲学及其方法》,邓正来译,中国政法大学出版社2004年第1版。
9.张文显主编:《马克思主义法理学》,高等教育出版社2003年第1版。
10.刘建国主编:《刑事公诉的实践探索与制度构建》,中国检察出版社2003年第1版。
11.张军、郝银钟:《刑事诉讼庭审程序专题研究》,中国人民大学出版社2005年第1版。
12.徐静村主编:《21世纪中国刑事程序改革研究——<中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法第二修正案(学者建议稿)>》,法律出版社2003年第1版。
13.左卫民:《价值与结构——刑事程序的双重分析》,法律出版社2003年第1版。
14.刘计划:《中国控辩式庭审方式研究》,中国方正出版社2005年第1版。
15.国家森主编:《中国控辩协商制度研究》,中国检察出版社2005年第1版。
16.高维俭:《刑事三元结构论——刑事哲学方法初探》,北京大学出版社2006年第1版。
17.樊崇义等:《正当法律程序研究——以刑事诉讼程序为视角》,中国人民公安大学出版社2005年第1版。
18.陈瑞华:《程序性制裁理论》,中国法制出版社2005年第1版。
19.龙宗智:《理论反对实践》,法律出版社2003年第1版。
20.万毅:《变革社会的程序正义——法境中的中国刑事司法改革》,中国方正出版社2004年第1版。
21.谭世贵主编:《刑事诉讼原理与改革》,法律出版社2002年第1版。
22.张健伟:《司法竞技主义——英美诉讼传统与中国庭审方式》,北京大学出版社2005年第1版。
23.范明志:《司法公正与诉讼程序》,人民法院出版社2005年第1版。
24.徐友军:《比较刑事程序结构》,现代出版社1992年第1版。
25.谢佑平:《刑事司法程序的一般理论》,复旦大学出版社2003年第1版。
26.孙长平:《探索正当程序——比较刑事诉讼法专论》,中国法制出版社2005年第1版。
27.赫银钟:《刑事公诉权原理》,人民法院出版社2004年第1版。
28.锁正杰:《刑事程序的法哲学原理》,中国人民公安大学出版社2002年第1版。
29.宋冰主编:《程序、正义与现代化——外国法学家在华演讲录》,中国 政法大学出版社1998年第1版。
30.左卫民主编:《刑事程序问题研究》,中国政法大学出版社1999年第1版。
31.崔敏:《中国刑事诉讼的新发展》,中国人民公安大学出版社1996年第1版。
32.黄东熊:《刑事诉讼法论》,台湾三民书局1987年第1版。
33.马贵翔:《刑事司法程序正义论》,中国检察出版社2002年第1版。
34.王顺义:《辩诉对抗论》,中国检察出版社2003年第1版。
1.龙宗智:《论刑罚司法中个人权利与国家权力的冲突与协调》,《中国律师》1998年第5期。
2.季卫东:《法律程序的意义》,《中国社会科学》1993年第1期。
3.龙宗智:《刑事诉讼价值模式论析》,《现代法学》1993年第2期。
4.汪建成:《论刑事诉讼中的利益观》,《中国法学》2000年第2期。
5.付子堂:《对利益问题的法律解释》,《法学家》2001年第2期。
6.许尚金:《检察权定位问题研究》,浙江大学2002年硕士学位论文。
7 郑丁足、陈双喜:《公诉制度的利益衡平论》,《湘潭大学社会科学学报》2003年第2期。
8.李荐:《引入诉权理念完善刑事诉讼权力与权利结构》,《法制与社会》2006年10月。
9.陈翠玉:《走向权力与权利的和谐——解读和谐社会的一个视角》,《中共四川省委党校学报》2005年第2期。
10.江显和、孙静:《重塑我国被害人对公认权的制约机制》,《法律适用》(月刊)2002年第9期。
11.喻中:《在法律授予权力与法律授予权利之间——法学中的拉弗曲线》,《中共四川省委党校学报》2005年第4期。
12.秦绪才:《我国刑事诉讼结构的类型属性和运作中存在的问题及其完善》,《河北法学》2000年第3期。
13.刘汉贵:《刑事诉讼中权力与权利的冲突与平衡》,《山西高等学校社会科学学报》2006年第2期。
14.白冬:《刑事诉讼人权保障思想发展述论》,《南都学坛》(社会科学版)2005年第4期。
15.李蓉:《刑事诉讼权力(利)配置的原则》,《求索》2006年第5期。
16.苏惠渔、孙万怀:《刑事法治和谐精神的缘起》,《人民检察》2006年第12期。
17.胡启蓉、甘华银:《刑事被害人权利的结构分析》,《天津成人高等学校联合学报》2005年第6期。
18.黄柳:《我国公诉权制约机制现存问题及对策》,《湖南省社会主义学院学报》2005年第2期。
19 刘作凌、刘学敏:《试论对公诉权的监督与制衡》,《湘潭师范学院学报》(社会科学版)2002年第6期。
20.王云婵:《诉权——现代法治社会第一制度性权利》,《山东行政学院山东省经济管理干部学院学报》2005年第4期。
21.李蓉:《论刑事诉讼权力配置的均衡》,《中国人民大学学报》2006年第4期。
22.赵萍、傅勇平:《论刑事诉讼监督与制约》,《天中学刊》2003年第12期。
23.邓名奋:《论权力制约的基本途径及方式》,《福建行政学院福建经济管理干部学院学报》,2006年第6期。
24.于昆:《论公民权利与国家权力的理性平衡》,《甘肃社会科学》2006 年第6期。
25.刘学敏、屈波:《公诉制度渊源探析》,《佳木斯大学社会科学学报》2004年第4期。
26.郑丁足、陈双喜:《公诉制度的利益衡平论》,《湘潭大学社会科学学报》2003年第2期。
27.赵永红:《公诉权制约研究》,《中央政法管理干部学院学报》1999年第4期。
28.胡子君等:《公诉权概念分析》,《法制与社会》2006年第8期。
29.唐丽英:《公诉权的法理分析》,《甘肃政法成人教育学院学报》2003年第2期。
30.张少林:《构建双向三角诉讼结构——坚持公诉权和审判监督权统一行使新论》,《河南省政法管理干部学院学报》2001年第2期。
31.胡玉鸿:《关于“利益衡量”的几个法理问题》,《现代法学》2001年第4期。
32.汪家宝:《论公诉权谦抑之方法》,《周口师范学院学报》2006年第6期。
33.郝银钟、付良英:《论公诉权的制度诱因与价值基础》,《中国人民大学学报》2001年第1期。
1.宋显忠:《宪政与程序保障》,“吉林大学理论法学研究中心网”http://www.legaltheory.com.cn/info.asp?id=10891,2007年9月21日。
[2]马贵翔:《刑事司法程序正义论》,中国检察出版社2002年第1版,第54-56页。
[3]所谓“刑事诉讼权力与权利结构”是指刑事诉讼中各权力与权利之间相互制衡与联系的架构。它的形成受到人们法律观念、法律理念、法律思想的影响,最终,还是受到社会经济政治大环境的影响。反过来,一旦权力与权利结构形成,又会影响人们的法律思维和法律行为。不同的权利与权力结构会产生完全不同的法律效果,所以对权力与权利结构的选择与构建应当慎重。参见李荐:《引入诉权理念完善刑事诉讼权力与权利结构》,《法制与社会》2006年第10期,第9页。
[4]所谓“起诉状一本主义”是指检察官在起诉时只将具有法定事项和格式的起诉书提交有管辖权的法院的诉讼原则。开庭前,检查官仅将起诉书交于法官,不交付其余的证据,资料只有一本起诉书,避免法官在开庭前形成主观臆断,偏向于控方,使被告陷于不利的状态。实行“起诉状一本主义”,一切与案件有关的事实、证据,只有在开庭时才呈现在法官面前,可以使法官保持一种“空明”的心境,以保证在公开、辩论式的程序中获得独立的审理,防止法官先入为主,增强了控辩双方的对抗性。法庭在经过控辩双方举证、质证和辩论后才能定案,真正做到“有证举在法庭,有理讲在法庭”,充分调动控辩双方举证、质证和辩论的积极性和主动性,以保证审判的客观和公正。此外,该方式不增加诉讼环节,不浪费人力,也不移送复印材料,还节省了诉讼成本。起诉书一本主义是英、美、日等国所采用的公诉模式, 当今日本是实行起诉书一本主义的典型国家。它有助于排除法官的庭前预断,实现控辩平衡,并有助于贯彻直接言词原则。参见《扬州邗江区检察院试行开庭前证据材料不移送法院起诉书一本主义防止法官先入为主》,“搜狐新闻网”,http://news.sohu.com/20070810/n251515449.shtml,2007年12月13日。
[5]转引自马贵翔:《刑事司法程序正义论》,中国检察出版社2002年第1版,第99页。
[6]崔敏:《中国刑事诉讼的新发展》,中国人民公安大学出版社1996年第1版,第233页。
[7]秦绪才:《我国刑事诉讼结构的类型属性和运作中存在的问题及其完善》,《河北法学》2000年第3期,第53页。
[8]李心鉴:《刑事诉讼结构论》,中国政法大学出版社1992年第1版,第7页。
[9]陈瑞华:《刑事诉讼的前沿问题》,中国人民大学出版社2000年第1版,第222页。
[10]参见胡锡庆主编:《刑事审判方式改革研究》,中国法制出版社2001年第1版,第19-27页。
[11]马贵翔:《刑事司法程序正义论》,中国检察出版社2002年第1版,第69页。
[12]马贵翔:《刑事司法程序正义论》,中国检察出版社2002年第1版,第72-77页。
[13]马贵翔:《刑事司法程序正义论》,中国检察出版社2002年第1版,第23-24页。
[14]左卫民:《价值与结构——刑事程序的双重分析》,法律出版社2003年第1版,第139页。
[15]参见侯智武:《对辩护交易制度的理性思考》,《理论导刊》2006年4期,第69页。
[16]参见甄贞、王丽:《美国大陪审团与人民监督员制度比较》,《人民检察》2007年第5期,第60页。
[17]王国锋:《保释制度的理论基础及价值蕴涵——兼谈我国取保候审制度与其之不同及借鉴》,《河南大学学报》(社会科学版)2006年第4期,第61页。
[18]汪建成:《论刑事诉讼中的利益观》,《中国法学》2000年第2期,第141页。
[19][德]康德:《法的形而上学原理——权利的科学》,沈叔平译,商务印书馆1991年第1版,第164页。
[20]龙宗智:《刑事诉讼价值模式论析》,《现代法学》1993年第2期,第20页。
[21]黄东熊:《刑事诉讼法论》,台湾三民书局1987年第版,第4页
[22]《马克思恩格斯全集》(第一卷),人民出版社1956年第1版,第169页。
[23]《马克思恩格斯全集》(第一卷),人民出版社1956年第1版,第154页。
[24]付子堂:《对利益问题的法律解释》,《法学家》2001年第2期,第148页。
[25]郑丁足、陈双喜:《公诉制度的利益衡平论》,《湘潭大学社会科学学报》2003年第2期,第66页。
1.《马克思恩格斯全集》(第一卷),人民出版社1956年第1版。
2.[美]阿瑟·奥肯:《平等与效率》,王奔洲译,华夏出版社1999年第1版。
3.[德]康德:《法的形而上学原理——权利的科学》,沈叔平译,商务印书馆1991年第1版。
4.[意]戴维·奈尔肯编:《比较刑事司法论》,张明楷等译,清华大学出版社2004年第1版。
5.[日]棚濑孝雄:《纠纷的解决与审判制度》,王亚新译,中国政法大学2004年第1版。
6.[美]约翰·V·奥尔特:《正当程序简史》,杨明成、陈霜玲译,商务印书馆2006年第1版。
7.[意]莫诺·卡佩莱蒂:《比较法视野中的司法程序》,徐昕、王奕译,清华大学出版社2005年第1版。
8.[美]E·博登海默:《法理学——法哲学及其方法》,邓正来译,中国政法大学出版社2004年第1版。
9.张文显主编:《马克思主义法理学》,高等教育出版社2003年第1版。
10.刘建国主编:《刑事公诉的实践探索与制度构建》,中国检察出版社2003年第1版。
11.张军、郝银钟:《刑事诉讼庭审程序专题研究》,中国人民大学出版社2005年第1版。
12.徐静村主编:《21世纪中国刑事程序改革研究——<中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法第二修正案(学者建议稿)>》,法律出版社2003年第1版。
13.左卫民:《价值与结构——刑事程序的双重分析》,法律出版社2003年第1版。
14.刘计划:《中国控辩式庭审方式研究》,中国方正出版社2005年第1版。
15.国家森主编:《中国控辩协商制度研究》,中国检察出版社2005年第1版。
16.高维俭:《刑事三元结构论——刑事哲学方法初探》,北京大学出版社2006年第1版。
17.樊崇义等:《正当法律程序研究——以刑事诉讼程序为视角》,中国人民公安大学出版社2005年第1版。
18.陈瑞华:《程序性制裁理论》,中国法制出版社2005年第1版。
19.龙宗智:《理论反对实践》,法律出版社2003年第1版。
20.万毅:《变革社会的程序正义——法境中的中国刑事司法改革》,中国方正出版社2004年第1版。
21.谭世贵主编:《刑事诉讼原理与改革》,法律出版社2002年第1版。
22.张健伟:《司法竞技主义——英美诉讼传统与中国庭审方式》,北京大学出版社2005年第1版。
23.范明志:《司法公正与诉讼程序》,人民法院出版社2005年第1版。
24.徐友军:《比较刑事程序结构》,现代出版社1992年第1版。
25.谢佑平:《刑事司法程序的一般理论》,复旦大学出版社2003年第1版。
26.孙长平:《探索正当程序——比较刑事诉讼法专论》,中国法制出版社2005年第1版。
27.赫银钟:《刑事公诉权原理》,人民法院出版社2004年第1版。
28.锁正杰:《刑事程序的法哲学原理》,中国人民公安大学出版社2002年第1版。
29.宋冰主编:《程序、正义与现代化——外国法学家在华演讲录》,中国 政法大学出版社1998年第1版。
30.左卫民主编:《刑事程序问题研究》,中国政法大学出版社1999年第1版。
31.崔敏:《中国刑事诉讼的新发展》,中国人民公安大学出版社1996年第1版。
32.黄东熊:《刑事诉讼法论》,台湾三民书局1987年第1版。
33.马贵翔:《刑事司法程序正义论》,中国检察出版社2002年第1版。
34.王顺义:《辩诉对抗论》,中国检察出版社2003年第1版。
1.龙宗智:《论刑罚司法中个人权利与国家权力的冲突与协调》,《中国律师》1998年第5期。
2.季卫东:《法律程序的意义》,《中国社会科学》1993年第1期。
3.龙宗智:《刑事诉讼价值模式论析》,《现代法学》1993年第2期。
4.汪建成:《论刑事诉讼中的利益观》,《中国法学》2000年第2期。
5.付子堂:《对利益问题的法律解释》,《法学家》2001年第2期。
6.许尚金:《检察权定位问题研究》,浙江大学2002年硕士学位论文。
7 郑丁足、陈双喜:《公诉制度的利益衡平论》,《湘潭大学社会科学学报》2003年第2期。
8.李荐:《引入诉权理念完善刑事诉讼权力与权利结构》,《法制与社会》2006年10月。
9.陈翠玉:《走向权力与权利的和谐——解读和谐社会的一个视角》,《中共四川省委党校学报》2005年第2期。
10.江显和、孙静:《重塑我国被害人对公认权的制约机制》,《法律适用》(月刊)2002年第9期。
11.喻中:《在法律授予权力与法律授予权利之间——法学中的拉弗曲线》,《中共四川省委党校学报》2005年第4期。
12.秦绪才:《我国刑事诉讼结构的类型属性和运作中存在的问题及其完善》,《河北法学》2000年第3期。
13.刘汉贵:《刑事诉讼中权力与权利的冲突与平衡》,《山西高等学校社会科学学报》2006年第2期。
14.白冬:《刑事诉讼人权保障思想发展述论》,《南都学坛》(社会科学版)2005年第4期。
15.李蓉:《刑事诉讼权力(利)配置的原则》,《求索》2006年第5期。
16.苏惠渔、孙万怀:《刑事法治和谐精神的缘起》,《人民检察》2006年第12期。
17.胡启蓉、甘华银:《刑事被害人权利的结构分析》,《天津成人高等学校联合学报》2005年第6期。
18.黄柳:《我国公诉权制约机制现存问题及对策》,《湖南省社会主义学院学报》2005年第2期。
19 刘作凌、刘学敏:《试论对公诉权的监督与制衡》,《湘潭师范学院学报》(社会科学版)2002年第6期。
20.王云婵:《诉权——现代法治社会第一制度性权利》,《山东行政学院山东省经济管理干部学院学报》2005年第4期。
21.李蓉:《论刑事诉讼权力配置的均衡》,《中国人民大学学报》2006年第4期。
22.赵萍、傅勇平:《论刑事诉讼监督与制约》,《天中学刊》2003年第12期。
23.邓名奋:《论权力制约的基本途径及方式》,《福建行政学院福建经济管理干部学院学报》,2006年第6期。
24.于昆:《论公民权利与国家权力的理性平衡》,《甘肃社会科学》2006 年第6期。
25.刘学敏、屈波:《公诉制度渊源探析》,《佳木斯大学社会科学学报》2004年第4期。
26.郑丁足、陈双喜:《公诉制度的利益衡平论》,《湘潭大学社会科学学报》2003年第2期。
27.赵永红:《公诉权制约研究》,《中央政法管理干部学院学报》1999年第4期。
28.胡子君等:《公诉权概念分析》,《法制与社会》2006年第8期。
29.唐丽英:《公诉权的法理分析》,《甘肃政法成人教育学院学报》2003年第2期。
30.张少林:《构建双向三角诉讼结构——坚持公诉权和审判监督权统一行使新论》,《河南省政法管理干部学院学报》2001年第2期。
31.胡玉鸿:《关于“利益衡量”的几个法理问题》,《现代法学》2001年第4期。
32.汪家宝:《论公诉权谦抑之方法》,《周口师范学院学报》2006年第6期。
33.郝银钟、付良英:《论公诉权的制度诱因与价值基础》,《中国人民大学学报》2001年第1期。
1.宋显忠:《宪政与程序保障》,“吉林大学理论法学研究中心网”http://www.legaltheory.com.cn/info.asp?id=10891,2007年9月21日。