具有中断风险的竞争供应链均衡策略研究
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摘要
随着全球经济一体化进程的不断加快和市场竞争的日益激烈,企业面临的经营环境和需求情况变得更加复杂。为了最大限度地降低激烈竞争给自身物料供给以及产品需求带来的不确定性,并在激烈竞争的市场中获得竞争优势,企业已逐渐认识到“以往单打独斗式的竞争模式已不能满足激烈竞争的市场需求,只有站在供应链间竞争的角度来制定决策才能适应激烈变化的市场环境”。在这种竞争环境下企业仅仅关注自身供应链绩效的改善是远远不够的,不考虑竞争对手的行为而做出的决策往往会偏离系统最优策略,导致其在竞争中失利。因此,研究竞争供应链的均衡策略具有重要的理论和现实意义。
本文在对国内外供应链竞争、供应链契约以及供应链中断风险管理的相关理论及方法进行系统概括和分析的基础上,重点从供应链决策的角度对具有中断风险的竞争供应链均衡策略进行研究,将已有研究进一步扩展：在横向上从单链到双链,从无中断风险到有中断风险；在纵向上从市场层面决策到运作层面决策。获得了在不同中断环境下,基于不同博弈结构和不同渠道结构的均衡策略。
利用非线性规划和博弈理论,在对称信息的假设下,研究具有中断风险竞争供应链的均衡策略。一方面,针对供应商主导(SS)、零售商主导(RS)及供应商和零售商势力均等(VN)等不同博弈结构,分别建立了具有需求中断风险且链间进行Nash博弈的两竞争供应链的博弈均衡模型,给出了不同博弈结构下的均衡策略及其存在性条件,并与无需求中断风险下的均衡策略进行了比较,为供应链风险管理提供了理论指导；另一方面,针对两供应链均采用集权结构(II结构)、分权结构(DD结构)和采用集权结构与分权结构的混合结构(ID结构或DI结构),分别建立了具有供应中断风险且链间进行Stackelberg博弈的两竞争供应链的博弈均衡模型,给出了不同渠道结构下的均衡策略；进一步,利用比较理论对竞争供应链的占优策略进行分析,给出竞争供应链在两种不同中断风险下的占优策略。
利用非线性规划和博弈理论,在非对称信息的假设下,研究具有中断风险的竞争供应链的均衡策略,在两条具有中断风险的供应链均为分权式供应链、均为集权式供应链和分别为分权式与集权式供应链等四种情况下,分别建立了相应的EPEC、MPEC和Nash均衡模型,给出了不同渠道结构下的均衡策略。通过数值算例对不同渠道结构下的均衡结果进行比较分析,给出了相应中断风险下竞争供应链的占优渠道结构,并分析了中断风险对供应链占优渠道结构的影响。
利用契约理论,针对两供应链均采用批发价格契约(WW)、收益共享契约和分别采用批发价格契约与收益共享契约的混合契约(WR或RW)等不同的契约结构,分别建立了具有需求中断风险和竞争中断风险的供应链的博弈均衡模型,给出了不同契约结构下供应链的均衡策略。利用比较理论对不同契约结构下的均衡结果进行比较分析,给出了相应中断风险下竞争供应链的占优契约选择。
以国美和苏宁家电企业供应链为研究对象,运用实证分析方法分析了两家电行业供应链竞争现状,通过收集两供应链实际经营数据及对相关数据进行分析和处理,运用需求中断下竞争供应链的均衡策略结果,分别给出了在三种不同博弈结构和四种不同渠道结构下的均衡策略,为国美和苏宁两竞争供应链在面对需求中断风险时的最优决策提供了理论支持。
本文的研究结果丰富了供应链竞争及供应链中断风险决策理论,促进了供应链竞争决策在实际中的应用,为决策者进行实际决策提供了更充分的科学依据。
With the accelerating process of global economic integration and increasingly fierce market competition, the operating environment and demand situation faced by enterprises become more complicated. In order to reduce maximally uncertainty of own material supply and product demand caused by fierce competition, and to gain a advantage in the fierce market competition, enterprises have come to realize that go-it-alone competition mode in the past has been unable to meet fierce competition of the market demand, we can only develop decision-making from the perspective of competition between supply chain in order to adapt to the market environment with drastic changes. It is not enough for the enterprise to focus on supply chain performance of its own, because neglecting behavior of the rival, decision often deviates from optimal strategy, which can result in failure in competition. Therefore, it is of theoretical and practical significance to study equilibrium strategies for competitive supply chains.
In this thesis, based on the summarization and analysis of domestic and international theories and methods of competitive supply chains, supply chain contracts and supply chain disruption risk management, we focus on studying equilibrium strategies of competitive supply chains under disruption risk from operation angle and try to generalize the existing results of supply chain management from single supply chain to two supply chains and from none disruption risk to disruption in horizontal aspect, and from decisions of marketing level to decisions of operation level in vertical aspect. We obtain equilibrium strategies based on different game structures and different channel structures under different disruption environment.
By using Nonlinear programming and game theory, under the assumption of symmetry information, on the one hand, game equilibrium models are established for competitive supply chains with demand disruption risk under Nash game between supply chains when two supply chains adopt three different game structures, i.e. supplier-dominant (SS), retailer-dominant (RS) and equal power for supplier and retailer(VN). Equilibrium strategies and its existence conditions under different game structure are given. Equilibrium outcomes are compared with those of models without demand disruption risk to provide theoretical guidance for supply chain managers. On the other hand, related research are extended to models with supply disruption risk under Stackelberg game between supply chains, a corresponding game equilibrium model is established, and equilibrium strategies under different channels structure are further obtained. Further, by exploring dominant strategy of competitive supply chain, Nash equilibrium structures of competitive supply chains are provided under different disruption risks.
By applying Nonlinear programming and game theory, under the assumption of incomplete information, equilibrium strategies of competitive supply chains are studied under disruption risk. Corresponding EPEC, MPEC and Nash equilibrium models are constructed under four various supply chain structures including the structures of Decentralization-Decentralization (DD), Decentralization-Integration (DI), Integration-Decentralization (ID), and Integration-Integration (II). Equilibrium strategies under different channels structures are given by using optimization optimal theory. Further, Equilibrium outcomes are compared for four different supply chain structures by numerical examples, and dominant channel structures for competitive supply chain under different disruption risks and effect of disruption risk on dominant structure are provided.
By using contract theory, game equilibrium models are established for competitive supply chains under demand disruption risk and supply disruption risk when two supply chains adopt four different contract structures, namely, two supply chains all adapt wholesale-price contract (WW) or revenue-sharing contract (RR) or one adapts wholesale-price contract and the other adapts revenue-sharing contract (RW or WR). Equilibrium strategies under different contract structures are given by using optimization optimal theory. Equilibrium outcomes of four different contract structures are compared by numerical examples, and dominant contracts for competitive supply chains under different disruption risks are given.
By taking Gome and Suning household electrical appliances enterprise supply chains as a research object, supply chain competition for the appliance industry is analyzed using method of empirical analysis, data of actual operating are obtained, and the relevant competition data are analyzed and processed. Furthermore, we analyze equilibrium strategies under three various different game structures and four various different channel structures using equilibrium results of competitive supply chain under demand disruption, to provide theoretical support in the face of demand disruption for Gome and Suning supply chains.
The research results of paper not only enrich decision theory of supply chain competition and decision theory of supply chains with disruption risk, but also promote the application of the decision models of competitive supply chains, and provide more sufficient scientific evidence for decision makers of supply chain management.
本文在对国内外供应链竞争、供应链契约以及供应链中断风险管理的相关理论及方法进行系统概括和分析的基础上,重点从供应链决策的角度对具有中断风险的竞争供应链均衡策略进行研究,将已有研究进一步扩展：在横向上从单链到双链,从无中断风险到有中断风险；在纵向上从市场层面决策到运作层面决策。获得了在不同中断环境下,基于不同博弈结构和不同渠道结构的均衡策略。
利用非线性规划和博弈理论,在对称信息的假设下,研究具有中断风险竞争供应链的均衡策略。一方面,针对供应商主导(SS)、零售商主导(RS)及供应商和零售商势力均等(VN)等不同博弈结构,分别建立了具有需求中断风险且链间进行Nash博弈的两竞争供应链的博弈均衡模型,给出了不同博弈结构下的均衡策略及其存在性条件,并与无需求中断风险下的均衡策略进行了比较,为供应链风险管理提供了理论指导；另一方面,针对两供应链均采用集权结构(II结构)、分权结构(DD结构)和采用集权结构与分权结构的混合结构(ID结构或DI结构),分别建立了具有供应中断风险且链间进行Stackelberg博弈的两竞争供应链的博弈均衡模型,给出了不同渠道结构下的均衡策略；进一步,利用比较理论对竞争供应链的占优策略进行分析,给出竞争供应链在两种不同中断风险下的占优策略。
利用非线性规划和博弈理论,在非对称信息的假设下,研究具有中断风险的竞争供应链的均衡策略,在两条具有中断风险的供应链均为分权式供应链、均为集权式供应链和分别为分权式与集权式供应链等四种情况下,分别建立了相应的EPEC、MPEC和Nash均衡模型,给出了不同渠道结构下的均衡策略。通过数值算例对不同渠道结构下的均衡结果进行比较分析,给出了相应中断风险下竞争供应链的占优渠道结构,并分析了中断风险对供应链占优渠道结构的影响。
利用契约理论,针对两供应链均采用批发价格契约(WW)、收益共享契约和分别采用批发价格契约与收益共享契约的混合契约(WR或RW)等不同的契约结构,分别建立了具有需求中断风险和竞争中断风险的供应链的博弈均衡模型,给出了不同契约结构下供应链的均衡策略。利用比较理论对不同契约结构下的均衡结果进行比较分析,给出了相应中断风险下竞争供应链的占优契约选择。
以国美和苏宁家电企业供应链为研究对象,运用实证分析方法分析了两家电行业供应链竞争现状,通过收集两供应链实际经营数据及对相关数据进行分析和处理,运用需求中断下竞争供应链的均衡策略结果,分别给出了在三种不同博弈结构和四种不同渠道结构下的均衡策略,为国美和苏宁两竞争供应链在面对需求中断风险时的最优决策提供了理论支持。
本文的研究结果丰富了供应链竞争及供应链中断风险决策理论,促进了供应链竞争决策在实际中的应用,为决策者进行实际决策提供了更充分的科学依据。
With the accelerating process of global economic integration and increasingly fierce market competition, the operating environment and demand situation faced by enterprises become more complicated. In order to reduce maximally uncertainty of own material supply and product demand caused by fierce competition, and to gain a advantage in the fierce market competition, enterprises have come to realize that go-it-alone competition mode in the past has been unable to meet fierce competition of the market demand, we can only develop decision-making from the perspective of competition between supply chain in order to adapt to the market environment with drastic changes. It is not enough for the enterprise to focus on supply chain performance of its own, because neglecting behavior of the rival, decision often deviates from optimal strategy, which can result in failure in competition. Therefore, it is of theoretical and practical significance to study equilibrium strategies for competitive supply chains.
In this thesis, based on the summarization and analysis of domestic and international theories and methods of competitive supply chains, supply chain contracts and supply chain disruption risk management, we focus on studying equilibrium strategies of competitive supply chains under disruption risk from operation angle and try to generalize the existing results of supply chain management from single supply chain to two supply chains and from none disruption risk to disruption in horizontal aspect, and from decisions of marketing level to decisions of operation level in vertical aspect. We obtain equilibrium strategies based on different game structures and different channel structures under different disruption environment.
By using Nonlinear programming and game theory, under the assumption of symmetry information, on the one hand, game equilibrium models are established for competitive supply chains with demand disruption risk under Nash game between supply chains when two supply chains adopt three different game structures, i.e. supplier-dominant (SS), retailer-dominant (RS) and equal power for supplier and retailer(VN). Equilibrium strategies and its existence conditions under different game structure are given. Equilibrium outcomes are compared with those of models without demand disruption risk to provide theoretical guidance for supply chain managers. On the other hand, related research are extended to models with supply disruption risk under Stackelberg game between supply chains, a corresponding game equilibrium model is established, and equilibrium strategies under different channels structure are further obtained. Further, by exploring dominant strategy of competitive supply chain, Nash equilibrium structures of competitive supply chains are provided under different disruption risks.
By applying Nonlinear programming and game theory, under the assumption of incomplete information, equilibrium strategies of competitive supply chains are studied under disruption risk. Corresponding EPEC, MPEC and Nash equilibrium models are constructed under four various supply chain structures including the structures of Decentralization-Decentralization (DD), Decentralization-Integration (DI), Integration-Decentralization (ID), and Integration-Integration (II). Equilibrium strategies under different channels structures are given by using optimization optimal theory. Further, Equilibrium outcomes are compared for four different supply chain structures by numerical examples, and dominant channel structures for competitive supply chain under different disruption risks and effect of disruption risk on dominant structure are provided.
By using contract theory, game equilibrium models are established for competitive supply chains under demand disruption risk and supply disruption risk when two supply chains adopt four different contract structures, namely, two supply chains all adapt wholesale-price contract (WW) or revenue-sharing contract (RR) or one adapts wholesale-price contract and the other adapts revenue-sharing contract (RW or WR). Equilibrium strategies under different contract structures are given by using optimization optimal theory. Equilibrium outcomes of four different contract structures are compared by numerical examples, and dominant contracts for competitive supply chains under different disruption risks are given.
By taking Gome and Suning household electrical appliances enterprise supply chains as a research object, supply chain competition for the appliance industry is analyzed using method of empirical analysis, data of actual operating are obtained, and the relevant competition data are analyzed and processed. Furthermore, we analyze equilibrium strategies under three various different game structures and four various different channel structures using equilibrium results of competitive supply chain under demand disruption, to provide theoretical support in the face of demand disruption for Gome and Suning supply chains.
The research results of paper not only enrich decision theory of supply chain competition and decision theory of supply chains with disruption risk, but also promote the application of the decision models of competitive supply chains, and provide more sufficient scientific evidence for decision makers of supply chain management.
引文
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