从美国公司丑闻谈公司治理和市场监督
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摘要
以安然ENRON公司为代表的不断发生的美国公司丑闻，暴露出来美国经济中的诸多问题，比如财务报告造假、上市公司欺诈、市场中介利益冲突、当局监管不力、投资者盲目投机等，这些可以归结为公司治理和市场监督问题。本文的研究对象是董事会、管理层和股东的内部公司治理安排，以及市场中介、政府和监管当局等公司治理外部市场环境。本文以定性分析为主，通过对ENRON丑闻的分析；通过对董事会、管理层和机构投资者在公司治理中的现状和存在问题的分析；通过对财务报告供应链和热点会计问题的分析；通过对政府、监管当局、审计师、分析师、投资银行等各个市场参与者激励和约束的处境分析、以及他们存在问题及改进方法的分析，揭示出公司治理这一系统工程涉及的诸多制衡方面，揭示出公司治理改革需要公司董事会、管理层、股东、政府、监管当局和各个市场中介的共同努力和利益协调，揭示出完善公司治理和市场监督需要在观念、方法、程序、法令和规则上进行制度化改变和创新。最后，本文就美国公司丑闻及公司治理对我国的启发、我国上市公司治理结构存在的问题及解决途径进行了简单阐述
The ongoing corporate scandals in USA, represented by Enron's scandal, have disclosed many problems, such as financial reporting falsity、corporate fraud、conflict of interest in many market watchdogs、insufficiency of market supervision and stock speculation of investors etc. All of those issues can be boiled down to corporate governance and market supervision. This paper workes over two major objects, internal corporate governance arrangements and external corporate governance market and environment, the first one focused on board of directors、management and stockholders, the latter focused on those market watchdogs, like government、security and exchange commission、auditors、financial analysts and investment bankers. The study is conducted, mainly through qualitative analysis, to investigate Enron's scandal, to analyse the status quo and problems of board of directors、management and stockholders, to analyse financial reporting supply chain and three hot topics in accounting, to analyse the circumstances and present questions of all those market watchdogs, both in their motivation and constraints, and introduce ways of improvement about their roles playing on market supervision. The conclusions are: firstly,those stakeholders and market watchdogs relevant to corporate governance are interconnectedly checked and balanced; secondly, reform on corporate governance, like systems engineering, requires all those parties' endeavor and delicate coordination of their interests; thirdly, improvement on corporate governance and market supervision demands systematic changes and innovations on the perspective、methods、processes、rules and laws. In the end, this paper sets forth some suggestions on corporate governance in China, using US's reference, and briefly summarizes present problems in China and approaches to resolve them
The ongoing corporate scandals in USA, represented by Enron's scandal, have disclosed many problems, such as financial reporting falsity、corporate fraud、conflict of interest in many market watchdogs、insufficiency of market supervision and stock speculation of investors etc. All of those issues can be boiled down to corporate governance and market supervision. This paper workes over two major objects, internal corporate governance arrangements and external corporate governance market and environment, the first one focused on board of directors、management and stockholders, the latter focused on those market watchdogs, like government、security and exchange commission、auditors、financial analysts and investment bankers. The study is conducted, mainly through qualitative analysis, to investigate Enron's scandal, to analyse the status quo and problems of board of directors、management and stockholders, to analyse financial reporting supply chain and three hot topics in accounting, to analyse the circumstances and present questions of all those market watchdogs, both in their motivation and constraints, and introduce ways of improvement about their roles playing on market supervision. The conclusions are: firstly,those stakeholders and market watchdogs relevant to corporate governance are interconnectedly checked and balanced; secondly, reform on corporate governance, like systems engineering, requires all those parties' endeavor and delicate coordination of their interests; thirdly, improvement on corporate governance and market supervision demands systematic changes and innovations on the perspective、methods、processes、rules and laws. In the end, this paper sets forth some suggestions on corporate governance in China, using US's reference, and briefly summarizes present problems in China and approaches to resolve them
引文
1、Corporate governance in a post-enron environment，Keith W. Rubin，may
2002
2、Building public trust: the future of corporate reporting, Samuel A. Dipiazza Jr. and Robert G. Eccles，John Wiley&Sons 2002
3、Signs that help spot an “objective”research report，Richard J. Wayman，December 2001, www.researchstock.com
4、Integration of lending and underwriting：implication of scope economies，George Kanatas and Jianping Qi，February 2002
5、Corporate governance in finance: concepts and international observations, Gerard Caprio Jr. and Ross Levine，april 2002
6、www.forbes.com
7、www.mckinseyquarterly.com
8、www.nytimes.com
9、www.washingtonpost.com
10、www.wharton.upenn.edu/governance
11、www.corpgov.net
12、www.fortune.com/confidence
13、www.orggroup.com
14、www.pwcglobal.com
15、www.thecorporatelibrary.com
16、www.ocf.berkeley.edu
17、www.pais.org/hottopics
18、www.investment-banking-resources.com
19、www.cnn.com/business
20、www.economics.com
1 数据来自纽约时报有关报道。
2 同上。
3 数据来自华盛顿邮报的有关报道。
4 分析部分的有关内容来自corporate governance in a post-enron environment,keith w. rubin,may 2002。
5 数据来自华盛顿邮报的有关报道。
6 资料来自福布斯网站。
7 资料及部分分析来自沃顿商学院网站中有关公司治理的评论。
8 资料来自麦肯锡网站中的有关报道。
9 资料来自directors&boards 杂志2002年12月的有关调查报告。
10 资料来自财富网站中的有关评论。
11 资料来自纽约时报及华盛顿邮报的有关报道
12 部分分析来自以下网站的有关内容，www.corpgov net,www.thecorporatelibrary.com,www orggroup.com.
13 资料来自building public trust: the future of corporate reporting, Samuel a. dipiazza jr. and Robert g. eccles, john wiley&sons 2002
14 资料来自www.pwcglobal.com
15 有关数据来自财富fortune网站。
16 资料来自signs that help spot an "objective" research report, Richard j. wayman, December 2001, www.researchstock.com
17 资料来自integration of lending and underwriting: implications of scope economies, George kanatas, Jianping qi,February 2002
18 资料来自纽约时报的相关报道和分析
2002
2、Building public trust: the future of corporate reporting, Samuel A. Dipiazza Jr. and Robert G. Eccles，John Wiley&Sons 2002
3、Signs that help spot an “objective”research report，Richard J. Wayman，December 2001, www.researchstock.com
4、Integration of lending and underwriting：implication of scope economies，George Kanatas and Jianping Qi，February 2002
5、Corporate governance in finance: concepts and international observations, Gerard Caprio Jr. and Ross Levine，april 2002
6、www.forbes.com
7、www.mckinseyquarterly.com
8、www.nytimes.com
9、www.washingtonpost.com
10、www.wharton.upenn.edu/governance
11、www.corpgov.net
12、www.fortune.com/confidence
13、www.orggroup.com
14、www.pwcglobal.com
15、www.thecorporatelibrary.com
16、www.ocf.berkeley.edu
17、www.pais.org/hottopics
18、www.investment-banking-resources.com
19、www.cnn.com/business
20、www.economics.com
1 数据来自纽约时报有关报道。
2 同上。
3 数据来自华盛顿邮报的有关报道。
4 分析部分的有关内容来自corporate governance in a post-enron environment,keith w. rubin,may 2002。
5 数据来自华盛顿邮报的有关报道。
6 资料来自福布斯网站。
7 资料及部分分析来自沃顿商学院网站中有关公司治理的评论。
8 资料来自麦肯锡网站中的有关报道。
9 资料来自directors&boards 杂志2002年12月的有关调查报告。
10 资料来自财富网站中的有关评论。
11 资料来自纽约时报及华盛顿邮报的有关报道
12 部分分析来自以下网站的有关内容，www.corpgov net,www.thecorporatelibrary.com,www orggroup.com.
13 资料来自building public trust: the future of corporate reporting, Samuel a. dipiazza jr. and Robert g. eccles, john wiley&sons 2002
14 资料来自www.pwcglobal.com
15 有关数据来自财富fortune网站。
16 资料来自signs that help spot an "objective" research report, Richard j. wayman, December 2001, www.researchstock.com
17 资料来自integration of lending and underwriting: implications of scope economies, George kanatas, Jianping qi,February 2002
18 资料来自纽约时报的相关报道和分析