劳务派遣合约的政治经济学研究
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摘要
劳务派遣是近半个世纪以来新出现的一种用工形式。其区别于其他雇佣形式的雇佣关系特征主要表现为派遣机构“雇人不用人”、用工单位“用人不雇人”的三角雇佣形态。劳务派遣的出现满足了众多用工单位的灵活用工需求,并且对于解决失业人群就业有重要作用。然而劳务派遣发展中也出现许多问题,表现为派遣工就业质量差、待遇不公正、劳务派遣对正规就业“过渡挤出”等,这些问题集中表现为派遣工权益受到侵占问题。
由于劳务派遣出现较晚,对劳务派遣的研究还处于起步阶段。目前相关研究多将重心放在对劳务派遣合理性解释以及对其法律规制状况的分析与评价方面,而对于劳务派遣侵占劳动者权益的事实还缺乏足够重视以及充分的理论解释。基于目前我国劳务派遣已经严重影响人民就业质量、造成劳资关系紧张的现实状况,本文立足政治经济学分析视角,充分利用现代合约理论、利益关系理论等成熟理论体系,将劳务派遣合约作为研究对象,对围绕劳务派遣合约的相关利益主体之间的物质利益关系进行界定和分析,其中重点分析了在劳务派遣合约执行过程中的自我执行与第三方执行的内生缺陷,并据此讨论了劳务派遣合约与其他雇佣合约的边界,最终对我国劳务派遣合约中劳动者权益屡遭侵犯这一社会现实给出理论解释。总体而言,不同利益主体面临不同利益目标函数,他们之间相互影响,在劳务派遣合约中,某一利益主体的行为选择必然对其他利益主体的利益产生影响并依此实现自身利益最大化。我们的研究发现,如果缺乏有效的制衡手段,用工单位利益将得到更好的表达,结果是劳动者权益被过度侵占,同时这种局面也将导致劳务派遣行业偏离其健康发展路径,扰乱市场经济竞争秩序,不利于经济社会的包容性增长。
论文共有7章,其中第3章至第7章是本文主要内容。
第1章导论主要对论文研究背景、研究意义、研究框架、研究内容、研究视角、理论和方法以及主要创新点与不足进行了说明。为了后续研究的一致性,本章还对以劳务派遣为中心的相关概念包括劳务派遣、合约、不完全合约、劳资关系、劳资公正等进行了概念界定。
第2章对国内外有关劳务派遣的研究进行回顾与评述。论文认为目前国内外对劳务派遣的研究尚处于起步阶段,研究视角多集中于对劳务派遣近年来快速发展的解释分析,研究方法以经验研究为主。而对于劳务派遣侵占派遣工权益的事实,虽然已经有不少研究有所提及,但仍缺乏深入的理论剖析与解释。现有文献偏重于对法律规制缺陷的强调,忽视劳务派遣合约内部利益主体、政府等第三方的有限理性与机会主义行为的影响,本文正是致力于填补劳务派遣研究中在这方面的不足。
第3章对劳务派遣合约内部雇主自我履约行为进行分析。根据自我履约理论,当合约一方实施“敲竹杠”所获收益并不能弥补由对方私人惩罚给自身带来的损失时,将实现自我履约。对于劳务派遣合约而言,派遣工实施私人惩罚的对象主要为用工单位,方式主要以市场信誉贬值惩罚为主。在这一履约机制实现过程中,派遣机构的立场选择将对惩罚效果、进而对用工单位的履约行为产生重要作用。当派遣机构诚实时,用工单位选择履约的可能性较高,易于形成双诚实均衡；当派遣机构不诚实时,用工单位往往与其串谋,易于形成串谋均衡。通过对比双诚实均衡和串谋均衡对微观主体利益和宏观经济的影响,得出双城市均衡优于串谋均衡,应采取可行措施促进劳务派遣合约双诚实均衡的实现。
第4章对劳务派遣合约的第三方执行进行分析。第三方执行主要包括劳务派遣法律规制和政府的监管执行。劳务派遣法律规制是目前各国普遍实行的一种重要措施,用以规范劳务派遣发展、给出劳务派遣合约签约规范、促使劳务派遣合约履约,保障派遣工各项权益。法律规制作为社会秩序规范能够对社会活动参与者的行为起到引导、约束与威慑作用。但法律规制的有效性需要政府充足的执行力提供保障。政府作为有自己偏好和利益的理性经济人,将对是否严格执行法律规制进行成本收益分析。通过对政府与劳务派遣两雇主的博弈过程分析发现,政府的策略选择取决于其严格执行带来的社会收益与宽松执行时收获的额外税收与成本节省之间的权衡。
第5章对劳务派遣合约与其他雇佣合约的边界进行分析。根据合约选择理论,不同合约有不同的交易成本,其边界取决于交易费用的对比。劳务派遣合约与非正规直接雇佣合约对应的交易性质相同,因此二者可以发生完全替代。劳务派遣合约与正规雇佣合约对应的交易性质有所差异,当专用性投资数量较高时,两者交易费用差别明显,劳务派遣合约不能替代正规雇佣合约。只有当专用型投资数量较少时,劳务派遣合约才可能以其制度优势对正规雇佣合约发生一定程度的挤占。因此对于威廉姆森意义上的“纵向一体化”合约,劳务派遣合约将不能产生“挤出效应”从而不能构成威胁。然而如果当劳务派遣合约因存在自我履约与第三方执行困难而导致雇主方可以侵占派遣工利益时,则会产生劳务派遣对正规用工“过渡挤出”的现象,这一现象的根源来自于派遣工权益受损所带来的用工单位用工成本节省。
第6章对我国劳务派遣发展实践中劳务派遣履约问题进行分析。首先依次对我国劳务派遣合约自我履约、第三方执行过程中的履约障碍进行分析。其次,基于对《劳动合同法》实施后我国劳务派遣履约情况的现状调查结果得出,当前我国劳务派遣中,用工单位与派遣机构雇主责任履行不到位、对派遣工权益侵占问题仍比较严重,对前述理论分析进行验证。再次,基于包容性增长审视我国劳务派遣发展,得出我国劳务派遣履约现状亟需进行改善。
第7章是政策建议和研究展望部分。基于保障劳务派遣工权益、促进劳务派遣行业健康、可持续发展的出发点,从调整我国目前劳务派遣各相关利益主体之间物质利益关系视角提出相应政策建议。并对论文研究中存在的不足以及未来需要进一步研究的方向和问题进行展望。
论文的主要结论是劳务派遣合约由于在雇主自我履约、第三方履约方面存在一些制度内生障碍和问题,将导致派遣工权益受到来自用工单位和派遣机构的侵占,这一侵占也成为劳务派遣“过度挤出”正规用工市场的主要诱因。本文的最大创新在于论文全文贯彻运用政治经济学研究视角,对劳务派遣相关利益主体之间的物质利益关系展开分析,丰富了有关劳务派遣研究的研究视角和内容,并为政治经济学研究提供了新的实践支撑。论文的不足主要体现在对我国劳务派遣合约履约困境的调研分析中,由于劳务派遣现实问题较多,调研过程十分困难,使得微观上的调研内容和结果没有达到预期效果,还有待后续研究的进一步提高。
The labor dispatch is a new form of employment in recent fifty years. There is an especial characteristic of the labor dispatch in employment relationship which differs from other employment forms that is the triangle employment with the representation of labor agency's hiring-with-no-using and employing organization's using-with-no-hiring. The labor dispatch not only satisfies the demand of numerical flexibility for employing organizations, but also plays an important role in absorbing the unemployed. Nevertheless, in the development of labor dispatch, there is also many problems constantly emerging such as the low employment quality and unfair treatment of dispatched labors, the "over crowd out" of labor dispatch to formal employment and so on, which all can be described as the issue of occupation of dispatched labor's right.
Since the labor dispatch only emerges for decades, the study on labor dispatch is still in the initial stage. Currently related researches pay more attention on providing explanation for the rationality of the labor dispatch and giving an analysis or evaluation on the legal regulation of it. Meanwhile, little attention is payed for the fact that the situation of dispatched labors is getting worse which results in an lack of adequate theoretical explanation for this issue. According to the realistic condition that the labor dispatch has been affect labors'employment quality and led to the tight labor relations in the labor market, based on the political economy analysis method, using mature theoretical system including modern contract theory and interests relations theory, regarding the labor dispatching contract as the research object, this paper clarifies and analyzes the material interests relationships among the related interest subjects, especially analyzes the endogenous defects both in the self-enforcing process and in the third-enforcing process and discusses the boundary between the labor dispatching contract and other employment contracts. Combined the conclusions of above analysis with our country's social reality, paper focus on explaining the social issue of occupation of dispatched labors'right in China at last. In general, different interests subject are facing different objective interests function. Consequently, rational interests subjects will affect other ones through behavior selection so as to maximize their own interests. In this process, if there is no effective means to check and balance, the employing organization will get a better expression of their interests which will directly lead to an excessive occupation of the labors' rights and interests.At the same time, this situation will also bring the labor dispatch industry deviating from the healthy path, disturbing the competition order of market economy, and bring negative influence to the inclusive growth of economy and society.
This paper has7chapters. The chapters from3th to7th are the main parts.
Chapter one mainly illustrates the background, significance, research framework, main content, research view, methods and theories, innovations and shortcomings. As to keep the consistency of subsequent research, this chapter also define the relevant concepts around labor dispatch including labor dispatch, contract, incomplete contract, labor relations, labor justice.
Chapter two reviews the literatures about labor dispatch. According to this study, in recent years, the research of labor dispatch。at home and abroad just started as most researches focus on explaining the rapid development of labor dispatch with empirical method. And for the issue of occupation of labors' right in labor dispatch, although several researches mentioned it, the theoretical analysis and explanation are still insufficient. The literatures pay much attention to the flaws of legal regulation, ignoring the affects from the limited rationality and opportunism behavior from related subjects including agency, employer, labor, government. And this study is trying filling the gaps in this aspect.
Chapter three analyzes the employers'self-enforcing behavior in a labor dispatch contract. Based on the Self-enforcing theory, the Self-enforcing behavior will realize when the revenues from "hold-up" behavior are less than the loss result from the private punishment performing by counterparty. For the labor dispatch contract, the labors will give the private punishment to the labor user by the way of diminish its market reputation. In this operation mechanism, the position choice of agency will affect the punishment effect and the behavior of labor user. Honest agency will drive labor user choose the the self-enforcing behavior, and this will result in double honesty equilibrium. Otherwise, dishonest agency will match the labor user who breach the agreement with labors, and this will result in collusion equilibrium. From the comparison analysis of effects to the microcosmic subjects and macro economy from the two types of performance equilibrium of labor dispatch contract, the conclusion shows that double honesty equilibrium is superior to the collusion one. Therefore, it is necessary to take feasible measures to achieve the double honesty equilibrium.
Chapter four analyze the performance from the third party's strength. The third party includes the legal regulation and the government's supervision. The legal regulation is an important measure in many countries. It is useful in providing specification to the development of labor dispatch, promoting the contract performance and protecting the right of labors(including dispatch labors). As social order specification, the legal regulation can affect the behavior of asocial participants. And at the same time, the above influence needs the guarantee of adequate execution from government. The government, being the rational economic man with its own preferences and interests, will make the cost-benefit analysis whether supervise strictly. Though analyzing the gaming process between government and the subjects of labor dispatch, the choice that government makes will depend on the comparison between the social benefits receiving from supervising loosely and the extra taxes and cost savings receiving from supervising strictly.
Chapter five analyzes the "borders" between labor dispatch contract and other employment contracts. Based on the contract choice theory, the existence of different contracts means that their transaction costs are different, and the establishment of the borders between different contracts depends on the comparison of transaction cost. Because the labor dispatch contract and the atypical employment contracts has the similar trading nature, they can entirely replace each other. Comparatively, there are differences between the labor dispatch contract and the typical employment contracts in trading nature. While specific investment amount is higher, the transaction cost gap is larger. In this case, the labor dispatch contract will not substitute the typical employment contracts. Only when specific investment amount is small, the substitution will happen as the labor dispatch contract gets its advantages. Therefore, the labor dispatch will not threaten the development of typical employment. However, if there is occupation of labors'right resulting from the difficulty of making the labor users to fulfill their commitments, then there will be "excessive squeezing out" phenomenon from the labor dispatch to the typical employment. The underlying reason of this phenomenon is that the occupation of labors'right leads to a lower transaction costs of the labor dispatch. Chapter six analyzes the labor dispatch contract performance in China. First of all, this chapter analyzes the difficulty in both achieving the self-enforcing result and ensuring the performance guarantee with the third party's strength in China. Secondly, based on the investigation results analysis to the labor dispatch status after "Labor Contract Law" promulgated, the conclusion demonstrates that in the labor dispatch practice in China, the problem of occupying labors'right from the agency and the labor user is serious. In addition, based on the inclusive growth theory, it is necessary to take measures to improve the performance status of labor dispatch in China. Chapter seven includes policy recommendations and future prospects of research. From the point of guaranteeing the labors'right and leading the labor dispatch industry to develop healthy and sustainable, this chapter puts forward the policy recommendations from the angle of adjusting the material interests relationships among the related interest subjects in labor dispatch. At last, the shortage of the research and future prospects of this topic is discussed. The main conclusion of this paper is that due to the endogenetic barriers and problems in the employers'self-enforcing behavior and the performance from the third party's strength, it will lead to a result of occupying labors' right, which is the primary cause of the "excessive squeezing out" phenomenon from the labor dispatch to the typical employment. The main innovation of this paper is to analyze the material interests relationships among the related interest subjects in labor dispatch with political economics'viewing angle so as to enrich the perspective and content of labor dispatch research, as well as to provides a new practical support for political economics research. The main shortage of this paper lies in the investigation of the labor dispatch status in China. As there are many problems of labor dispatch in practice which makes the investigating process very hard, the contents and the results of the investigation do not achieve the desired effect. The further improvement of this area is needed.
由于劳务派遣出现较晚,对劳务派遣的研究还处于起步阶段。目前相关研究多将重心放在对劳务派遣合理性解释以及对其法律规制状况的分析与评价方面,而对于劳务派遣侵占劳动者权益的事实还缺乏足够重视以及充分的理论解释。基于目前我国劳务派遣已经严重影响人民就业质量、造成劳资关系紧张的现实状况,本文立足政治经济学分析视角,充分利用现代合约理论、利益关系理论等成熟理论体系,将劳务派遣合约作为研究对象,对围绕劳务派遣合约的相关利益主体之间的物质利益关系进行界定和分析,其中重点分析了在劳务派遣合约执行过程中的自我执行与第三方执行的内生缺陷,并据此讨论了劳务派遣合约与其他雇佣合约的边界,最终对我国劳务派遣合约中劳动者权益屡遭侵犯这一社会现实给出理论解释。总体而言,不同利益主体面临不同利益目标函数,他们之间相互影响,在劳务派遣合约中,某一利益主体的行为选择必然对其他利益主体的利益产生影响并依此实现自身利益最大化。我们的研究发现,如果缺乏有效的制衡手段,用工单位利益将得到更好的表达,结果是劳动者权益被过度侵占,同时这种局面也将导致劳务派遣行业偏离其健康发展路径,扰乱市场经济竞争秩序,不利于经济社会的包容性增长。
论文共有7章,其中第3章至第7章是本文主要内容。
第1章导论主要对论文研究背景、研究意义、研究框架、研究内容、研究视角、理论和方法以及主要创新点与不足进行了说明。为了后续研究的一致性,本章还对以劳务派遣为中心的相关概念包括劳务派遣、合约、不完全合约、劳资关系、劳资公正等进行了概念界定。
第2章对国内外有关劳务派遣的研究进行回顾与评述。论文认为目前国内外对劳务派遣的研究尚处于起步阶段,研究视角多集中于对劳务派遣近年来快速发展的解释分析,研究方法以经验研究为主。而对于劳务派遣侵占派遣工权益的事实,虽然已经有不少研究有所提及,但仍缺乏深入的理论剖析与解释。现有文献偏重于对法律规制缺陷的强调,忽视劳务派遣合约内部利益主体、政府等第三方的有限理性与机会主义行为的影响,本文正是致力于填补劳务派遣研究中在这方面的不足。
第3章对劳务派遣合约内部雇主自我履约行为进行分析。根据自我履约理论,当合约一方实施“敲竹杠”所获收益并不能弥补由对方私人惩罚给自身带来的损失时,将实现自我履约。对于劳务派遣合约而言,派遣工实施私人惩罚的对象主要为用工单位,方式主要以市场信誉贬值惩罚为主。在这一履约机制实现过程中,派遣机构的立场选择将对惩罚效果、进而对用工单位的履约行为产生重要作用。当派遣机构诚实时,用工单位选择履约的可能性较高,易于形成双诚实均衡；当派遣机构不诚实时,用工单位往往与其串谋,易于形成串谋均衡。通过对比双诚实均衡和串谋均衡对微观主体利益和宏观经济的影响,得出双城市均衡优于串谋均衡,应采取可行措施促进劳务派遣合约双诚实均衡的实现。
第4章对劳务派遣合约的第三方执行进行分析。第三方执行主要包括劳务派遣法律规制和政府的监管执行。劳务派遣法律规制是目前各国普遍实行的一种重要措施,用以规范劳务派遣发展、给出劳务派遣合约签约规范、促使劳务派遣合约履约,保障派遣工各项权益。法律规制作为社会秩序规范能够对社会活动参与者的行为起到引导、约束与威慑作用。但法律规制的有效性需要政府充足的执行力提供保障。政府作为有自己偏好和利益的理性经济人,将对是否严格执行法律规制进行成本收益分析。通过对政府与劳务派遣两雇主的博弈过程分析发现,政府的策略选择取决于其严格执行带来的社会收益与宽松执行时收获的额外税收与成本节省之间的权衡。
第5章对劳务派遣合约与其他雇佣合约的边界进行分析。根据合约选择理论,不同合约有不同的交易成本,其边界取决于交易费用的对比。劳务派遣合约与非正规直接雇佣合约对应的交易性质相同,因此二者可以发生完全替代。劳务派遣合约与正规雇佣合约对应的交易性质有所差异,当专用性投资数量较高时,两者交易费用差别明显,劳务派遣合约不能替代正规雇佣合约。只有当专用型投资数量较少时,劳务派遣合约才可能以其制度优势对正规雇佣合约发生一定程度的挤占。因此对于威廉姆森意义上的“纵向一体化”合约,劳务派遣合约将不能产生“挤出效应”从而不能构成威胁。然而如果当劳务派遣合约因存在自我履约与第三方执行困难而导致雇主方可以侵占派遣工利益时,则会产生劳务派遣对正规用工“过渡挤出”的现象,这一现象的根源来自于派遣工权益受损所带来的用工单位用工成本节省。
第6章对我国劳务派遣发展实践中劳务派遣履约问题进行分析。首先依次对我国劳务派遣合约自我履约、第三方执行过程中的履约障碍进行分析。其次,基于对《劳动合同法》实施后我国劳务派遣履约情况的现状调查结果得出,当前我国劳务派遣中,用工单位与派遣机构雇主责任履行不到位、对派遣工权益侵占问题仍比较严重,对前述理论分析进行验证。再次,基于包容性增长审视我国劳务派遣发展,得出我国劳务派遣履约现状亟需进行改善。
第7章是政策建议和研究展望部分。基于保障劳务派遣工权益、促进劳务派遣行业健康、可持续发展的出发点,从调整我国目前劳务派遣各相关利益主体之间物质利益关系视角提出相应政策建议。并对论文研究中存在的不足以及未来需要进一步研究的方向和问题进行展望。
论文的主要结论是劳务派遣合约由于在雇主自我履约、第三方履约方面存在一些制度内生障碍和问题,将导致派遣工权益受到来自用工单位和派遣机构的侵占,这一侵占也成为劳务派遣“过度挤出”正规用工市场的主要诱因。本文的最大创新在于论文全文贯彻运用政治经济学研究视角,对劳务派遣相关利益主体之间的物质利益关系展开分析,丰富了有关劳务派遣研究的研究视角和内容,并为政治经济学研究提供了新的实践支撑。论文的不足主要体现在对我国劳务派遣合约履约困境的调研分析中,由于劳务派遣现实问题较多,调研过程十分困难,使得微观上的调研内容和结果没有达到预期效果,还有待后续研究的进一步提高。
The labor dispatch is a new form of employment in recent fifty years. There is an especial characteristic of the labor dispatch in employment relationship which differs from other employment forms that is the triangle employment with the representation of labor agency's hiring-with-no-using and employing organization's using-with-no-hiring. The labor dispatch not only satisfies the demand of numerical flexibility for employing organizations, but also plays an important role in absorbing the unemployed. Nevertheless, in the development of labor dispatch, there is also many problems constantly emerging such as the low employment quality and unfair treatment of dispatched labors, the "over crowd out" of labor dispatch to formal employment and so on, which all can be described as the issue of occupation of dispatched labor's right.
Since the labor dispatch only emerges for decades, the study on labor dispatch is still in the initial stage. Currently related researches pay more attention on providing explanation for the rationality of the labor dispatch and giving an analysis or evaluation on the legal regulation of it. Meanwhile, little attention is payed for the fact that the situation of dispatched labors is getting worse which results in an lack of adequate theoretical explanation for this issue. According to the realistic condition that the labor dispatch has been affect labors'employment quality and led to the tight labor relations in the labor market, based on the political economy analysis method, using mature theoretical system including modern contract theory and interests relations theory, regarding the labor dispatching contract as the research object, this paper clarifies and analyzes the material interests relationships among the related interest subjects, especially analyzes the endogenous defects both in the self-enforcing process and in the third-enforcing process and discusses the boundary between the labor dispatching contract and other employment contracts. Combined the conclusions of above analysis with our country's social reality, paper focus on explaining the social issue of occupation of dispatched labors'right in China at last. In general, different interests subject are facing different objective interests function. Consequently, rational interests subjects will affect other ones through behavior selection so as to maximize their own interests. In this process, if there is no effective means to check and balance, the employing organization will get a better expression of their interests which will directly lead to an excessive occupation of the labors' rights and interests.At the same time, this situation will also bring the labor dispatch industry deviating from the healthy path, disturbing the competition order of market economy, and bring negative influence to the inclusive growth of economy and society.
This paper has7chapters. The chapters from3th to7th are the main parts.
Chapter one mainly illustrates the background, significance, research framework, main content, research view, methods and theories, innovations and shortcomings. As to keep the consistency of subsequent research, this chapter also define the relevant concepts around labor dispatch including labor dispatch, contract, incomplete contract, labor relations, labor justice.
Chapter two reviews the literatures about labor dispatch. According to this study, in recent years, the research of labor dispatch。at home and abroad just started as most researches focus on explaining the rapid development of labor dispatch with empirical method. And for the issue of occupation of labors' right in labor dispatch, although several researches mentioned it, the theoretical analysis and explanation are still insufficient. The literatures pay much attention to the flaws of legal regulation, ignoring the affects from the limited rationality and opportunism behavior from related subjects including agency, employer, labor, government. And this study is trying filling the gaps in this aspect.
Chapter three analyzes the employers'self-enforcing behavior in a labor dispatch contract. Based on the Self-enforcing theory, the Self-enforcing behavior will realize when the revenues from "hold-up" behavior are less than the loss result from the private punishment performing by counterparty. For the labor dispatch contract, the labors will give the private punishment to the labor user by the way of diminish its market reputation. In this operation mechanism, the position choice of agency will affect the punishment effect and the behavior of labor user. Honest agency will drive labor user choose the the self-enforcing behavior, and this will result in double honesty equilibrium. Otherwise, dishonest agency will match the labor user who breach the agreement with labors, and this will result in collusion equilibrium. From the comparison analysis of effects to the microcosmic subjects and macro economy from the two types of performance equilibrium of labor dispatch contract, the conclusion shows that double honesty equilibrium is superior to the collusion one. Therefore, it is necessary to take feasible measures to achieve the double honesty equilibrium.
Chapter four analyze the performance from the third party's strength. The third party includes the legal regulation and the government's supervision. The legal regulation is an important measure in many countries. It is useful in providing specification to the development of labor dispatch, promoting the contract performance and protecting the right of labors(including dispatch labors). As social order specification, the legal regulation can affect the behavior of asocial participants. And at the same time, the above influence needs the guarantee of adequate execution from government. The government, being the rational economic man with its own preferences and interests, will make the cost-benefit analysis whether supervise strictly. Though analyzing the gaming process between government and the subjects of labor dispatch, the choice that government makes will depend on the comparison between the social benefits receiving from supervising loosely and the extra taxes and cost savings receiving from supervising strictly.
Chapter five analyzes the "borders" between labor dispatch contract and other employment contracts. Based on the contract choice theory, the existence of different contracts means that their transaction costs are different, and the establishment of the borders between different contracts depends on the comparison of transaction cost. Because the labor dispatch contract and the atypical employment contracts has the similar trading nature, they can entirely replace each other. Comparatively, there are differences between the labor dispatch contract and the typical employment contracts in trading nature. While specific investment amount is higher, the transaction cost gap is larger. In this case, the labor dispatch contract will not substitute the typical employment contracts. Only when specific investment amount is small, the substitution will happen as the labor dispatch contract gets its advantages. Therefore, the labor dispatch will not threaten the development of typical employment. However, if there is occupation of labors'right resulting from the difficulty of making the labor users to fulfill their commitments, then there will be "excessive squeezing out" phenomenon from the labor dispatch to the typical employment. The underlying reason of this phenomenon is that the occupation of labors'right leads to a lower transaction costs of the labor dispatch. Chapter six analyzes the labor dispatch contract performance in China. First of all, this chapter analyzes the difficulty in both achieving the self-enforcing result and ensuring the performance guarantee with the third party's strength in China. Secondly, based on the investigation results analysis to the labor dispatch status after "Labor Contract Law" promulgated, the conclusion demonstrates that in the labor dispatch practice in China, the problem of occupying labors'right from the agency and the labor user is serious. In addition, based on the inclusive growth theory, it is necessary to take measures to improve the performance status of labor dispatch in China. Chapter seven includes policy recommendations and future prospects of research. From the point of guaranteeing the labors'right and leading the labor dispatch industry to develop healthy and sustainable, this chapter puts forward the policy recommendations from the angle of adjusting the material interests relationships among the related interest subjects in labor dispatch. At last, the shortage of the research and future prospects of this topic is discussed. The main conclusion of this paper is that due to the endogenetic barriers and problems in the employers'self-enforcing behavior and the performance from the third party's strength, it will lead to a result of occupying labors' right, which is the primary cause of the "excessive squeezing out" phenomenon from the labor dispatch to the typical employment. The main innovation of this paper is to analyze the material interests relationships among the related interest subjects in labor dispatch with political economics'viewing angle so as to enrich the perspective and content of labor dispatch research, as well as to provides a new practical support for political economics research. The main shortage of this paper lies in the investigation of the labor dispatch status in China. As there are many problems of labor dispatch in practice which makes the investigating process very hard, the contents and the results of the investigation do not achieve the desired effect. The further improvement of this area is needed.
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