金融危机、产权背景与企业融资能力研究
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摘要
2008年的金融危机袭来,引来不少学者对金融危机背景下,企业经济与管理的相关领域展开研究。然而,国有企业融资约束问题一直是财务研究的热点话题之一,加之在金融危机的冲击下,国有企业融资能力是如何变化,目前有待于讨论。本文基于2005-2009年度的经济数据,对我国制造业融资能力是否因为产权的差异而不同,另外,在金融危机背景下,企业的融资能力是否改变以及如何改变。
经过本次研究,作者发现在制造业企业中,国有产权相对于私有产权的企业具有更大的融资能力,也就是较小的融资约束。在常态环境下,国有企业拥有更多的融资优势,并且过度融资。但在金融危机下,这些融资优势受到负面冲击,处于缩小的状态,但从总体而言,融资优势并没有完全消除。另外,私有企业在金融危机下融资能力下降,并且一定程度上出现外部现金流短缺的情况。
另外,企业的经营能力、盈利能力成长性、股权结构、企业特征(如资产与员工人数)等都会受到企业产权背景不同的影响,而以往的研究并没有充分的考虑这一点。并且作为外部冲击的金融危机,产权的差异会作为一种缓冲或者放大机制,对企业的融资能力进行不同程度的修正。
在金融危机下,国有企业的融资能力进一步提高,说明国有企业在金融危机下的融资能力并没有下降,反而上升,这明显不符合一个作为市场经济为主体的国家的特征,说明政府进行了过度的干预。另外,金融危机下,企业在整体上的融资能力有所下降,但下降的幅度并不明显,说明我国政府在执行宏观经济刺激计划下,我国的企业的融资能力并没有随着金融危机的出现造成显著的下降。
基于已有的研究,本文提出的建议是减少大型国有企业的融资干预,将资金用于高成长性的企业,以帮助其避免成长性破产以及因为融资不足导致的成长性下降的非效率问题。因子分析的结果表明,私有企业拥有较高的经营能力与盈利能力,政府的政策倾向于私有企业是一个有效率的选择。并且,政府在对国有企业提供援助之手时应该考虑企业有动机加大盈余的管理,以获取政府支持,实证结果也表明金融危机背景下,国有企业较一般情况下多融资4609万,国有企业有动机利用金融危机这个外部冲击作为“借口”以获取政府的扶持。
2008 financial crisis hit, attracted many scholars of the context of the financial crisis, business economics and management of related areas. However, financing constraints of state-owned enterprises has been the hot topic in financial research, combined with the impact of the financial crisis, the financing capacity of state-owned enterprises is how to change, now to be discussed. Based on 2005-2009 annual economic data, whether the financing capacity of the manufacturing sector because of differences in property rights is different from another, in the context of the financial crisis, whether the financing capacity of companies to change and how to change.
Through this study, we found in the manufacturing enterprise, private property rights relative to the state-owned property companies with greater financial capacity, which is smaller financing constraints. In normal circumstances, the financing of state-owned enterprises have more advantages, and the over-financing. However, the financial crisis, these advantages have a negative impact on the financing, in the reduced state, but overall, the financing advantage and not completely eliminated. In addition, the private sector financing capacity of the financial crisis fell, and appeared to some extent the external cash flow shortage.
In addition, the company's management ability, profitability, growth, ownership structure, firm characteristics (such as assets and number of employees), and other background of enterprise property rights are subject to different effects, but previous studies did not adequately consider this point. External shocks and as the financial crisis, differences in property rights will serve as a buffer or zoom mechanism, the financing capacity of enterprises with different degrees of correction.
In the financial crisis, state-owned enterprises to further improve the financing capacity, indicating that the state-owned enterprises in the financing capacity of the financial crisis did not fall, but rise, which is obviously not consistent with a market economy as the main characteristics of the countries, indicating that excessive government intervention.In addition, the financial crisis, companies in the financing capacity of the overall decline, but the decrease is not obvious, that our government in the implementation of macro-economic stimulus plan, the financing capacity of the enterprises did not appear as the financial crisis caused a significant decline.
Based on existing research, this proposal is to reduce intervention in the financing of large state-owned enterprises, the funds for high-growth enterprises, to help them avoid bankruptcy and growth because of insufficient financing decreased the growth of non-efficiency. Factor analysis results showed that private companies have higher operating capacity and profitability, the government's policy towards private enterprises is an efficient choice. Moreover, the Government provided assistance in the hands of state-owned enterprises should be considered when companies have an incentive to increase earnings management in order to obtain government support, empirical results also show that the context of the financial crisis, the state-owned enterprises more than the general Rongzi 46,090,000, so companies motivated by financial crisis and the external shock as the "excuse" to get government support.
经过本次研究,作者发现在制造业企业中,国有产权相对于私有产权的企业具有更大的融资能力,也就是较小的融资约束。在常态环境下,国有企业拥有更多的融资优势,并且过度融资。但在金融危机下,这些融资优势受到负面冲击,处于缩小的状态,但从总体而言,融资优势并没有完全消除。另外,私有企业在金融危机下融资能力下降,并且一定程度上出现外部现金流短缺的情况。
另外,企业的经营能力、盈利能力成长性、股权结构、企业特征(如资产与员工人数)等都会受到企业产权背景不同的影响,而以往的研究并没有充分的考虑这一点。并且作为外部冲击的金融危机,产权的差异会作为一种缓冲或者放大机制,对企业的融资能力进行不同程度的修正。
在金融危机下,国有企业的融资能力进一步提高,说明国有企业在金融危机下的融资能力并没有下降,反而上升,这明显不符合一个作为市场经济为主体的国家的特征,说明政府进行了过度的干预。另外,金融危机下,企业在整体上的融资能力有所下降,但下降的幅度并不明显,说明我国政府在执行宏观经济刺激计划下,我国的企业的融资能力并没有随着金融危机的出现造成显著的下降。
基于已有的研究,本文提出的建议是减少大型国有企业的融资干预,将资金用于高成长性的企业,以帮助其避免成长性破产以及因为融资不足导致的成长性下降的非效率问题。因子分析的结果表明,私有企业拥有较高的经营能力与盈利能力,政府的政策倾向于私有企业是一个有效率的选择。并且,政府在对国有企业提供援助之手时应该考虑企业有动机加大盈余的管理,以获取政府支持,实证结果也表明金融危机背景下,国有企业较一般情况下多融资4609万,国有企业有动机利用金融危机这个外部冲击作为“借口”以获取政府的扶持。
2008 financial crisis hit, attracted many scholars of the context of the financial crisis, business economics and management of related areas. However, financing constraints of state-owned enterprises has been the hot topic in financial research, combined with the impact of the financial crisis, the financing capacity of state-owned enterprises is how to change, now to be discussed. Based on 2005-2009 annual economic data, whether the financing capacity of the manufacturing sector because of differences in property rights is different from another, in the context of the financial crisis, whether the financing capacity of companies to change and how to change.
Through this study, we found in the manufacturing enterprise, private property rights relative to the state-owned property companies with greater financial capacity, which is smaller financing constraints. In normal circumstances, the financing of state-owned enterprises have more advantages, and the over-financing. However, the financial crisis, these advantages have a negative impact on the financing, in the reduced state, but overall, the financing advantage and not completely eliminated. In addition, the private sector financing capacity of the financial crisis fell, and appeared to some extent the external cash flow shortage.
In addition, the company's management ability, profitability, growth, ownership structure, firm characteristics (such as assets and number of employees), and other background of enterprise property rights are subject to different effects, but previous studies did not adequately consider this point. External shocks and as the financial crisis, differences in property rights will serve as a buffer or zoom mechanism, the financing capacity of enterprises with different degrees of correction.
In the financial crisis, state-owned enterprises to further improve the financing capacity, indicating that the state-owned enterprises in the financing capacity of the financial crisis did not fall, but rise, which is obviously not consistent with a market economy as the main characteristics of the countries, indicating that excessive government intervention.In addition, the financial crisis, companies in the financing capacity of the overall decline, but the decrease is not obvious, that our government in the implementation of macro-economic stimulus plan, the financing capacity of the enterprises did not appear as the financial crisis caused a significant decline.
Based on existing research, this proposal is to reduce intervention in the financing of large state-owned enterprises, the funds for high-growth enterprises, to help them avoid bankruptcy and growth because of insufficient financing decreased the growth of non-efficiency. Factor analysis results showed that private companies have higher operating capacity and profitability, the government's policy towards private enterprises is an efficient choice. Moreover, the Government provided assistance in the hands of state-owned enterprises should be considered when companies have an incentive to increase earnings management in order to obtain government support, empirical results also show that the context of the financial crisis, the state-owned enterprises more than the general Rongzi 46,090,000, so companies motivated by financial crisis and the external shock as the "excuse" to get government support.
引文
6详见CSMAR数据库的《中国上市公司股东研究数据库2010》。
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[1]安瑞娟.2001.国有企业经营效率低下原因探析.北方经贸,7：49-50
[2]白重恩、刘俏、陆洲、宋敏、张俊喜.2005.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究.经济研究,2：81-91
[3]白重恩、路江涌、陶志刚.2006.国有企业改制效果的实证研究,经济研究,8：4-13
[4]巴曙松、刘孝红、牛播坤.2005.转型时期中国金融体系中的地方治理与银行改革的互动研究.金融研究,5：25-37
[5]陈磊、李颖、张桂莲.2010.景气形势、物价与宏观调控——利用STR模型对经济形势的分析.数量经济技术经济研究,8：3-17
[6]邓博夫、陈伟军、张欢、丁倩、贾飞.2010.后金融危机时代公允价值计量的稳健性改进.财会通讯,8(上)：27-29
[7]方军雄.2007.所有制、制度环境与信贷资金配置.经济研究,12：82-92
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