建设监理人机会主义行为研究
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摘要
在整合国内外学者关于建设监理人行为研究成果的基础上,以监理人机会主义行为的构造,行为模型检验与行为模型应用为主线,以监理人行为影响因子和监理人行为绩效为研究视野,运用委托代理理论考察了建设监理人行为的理想状态及其必要条件,然后讨论建设监理人包括偷懒和合谋在内的机会主义行为,并建立相应理论模型。最后,运用管理学实证方法,检验主要影响因子对监理人行为影响,并就监理人在不同环境下的行为绩效展开实证研究,并得出相关结论,为优化建设监理人行为提供理论支持。
(1)监理人行为具有二维性,即监理人行为方向与监理人行为力度。分别从监理人行为的“二维性”定义监理人机会主义行为。将监理人偷懒定义为监理人行为方向正确,但行为力度不足的机会主义行为。将监理人合谋定义为监理人的行为方向与建设业主的利益发生偏离的机会主义行为。包括监理人偷懒行为产生条件,生成机理与监理人偷懒防范；监理人合谋行为产生原因,基于监理人信息结构的合谋分析；监理人声誉与合谋瓦解机理等。
(2)选择监理人行为影响因子,提出假设,假设检验,指标编制与描述性统计及检验结果；监理人行为绩效研究,包括检验思路,假设,方案,项目分析等,监理人行为绩效的结构方程模型分析,基于模糊识别的监理人行为绩效评价。工程性质(所有制,投资额度与级别)的不同会引起建设监理执业环境的变化,建设监理人行为绩效也存在着显著的差异。在不同性质的工程中,业主与承建人对建设监理行为的认可程度与配合力度不同。
(3)建设工程的特性是影响建设监理人机会主义行为的重要变量。建设监理人对工程质量控制与进度控制行为的绩效在国有特大型建设工程与国有大中型建设工程中存在明显差异。前者是由于建设监理人可能获得充分的监理授权,建设业主代表赋予建设监理更多的专业权限,建设监理人的责,权,利划分比较清晰,监理人更加相信自己的能力,并且具备通过监理能力的提升改善监理工作的制度保障,监理人与业主的显性契约约束对两者都具备充分效力。另外,在不同所有制性质中,监理行为绩效也存在差异,监理质量控制与进度控制行为在国有大中型工程中的绩效表现不如私有大型工程。这很可能是由于国有建设业主代表与私人建设业主的利益与目标约束存在差异。建设监理人工作的主动性和服务的专业性受到隐形契约的干扰,导致建设监理人的责,权,利界限模糊不清。
(4)良好的声誉机制是增强我国建设监理人的独立性,提高监理人行为绩效的重要条件。国有业主代表“内部人”控制使得监理人因为缺乏必要的独立性而被纵向合谋的可能性大大增加。当“内部人”控制强化时,监理人独立性变弱,而当声誉机制发挥作用时,监理人独立性增强,监理人独立性取决于声誉机制与“内部人”控制的相对强弱。而声誉对“内部人"控制的制衡是通过增强建设监理的独立性来实现的,其实质是市场力量与政府管制力量对比的结果。建立市场化的建设监理运作机制,充分发挥建设监理人市场声誉机制是提高监理独立性并遏制目前建设监理市场“劣币驱逐良币"不良局面的有效路径。
Abstract:On the basis of the research integration of domestic and foreign achievement in the construction supervisor, the opportunistic behavior model, influential factors and performance of construction supervisor fall in the scope of the main research. We apply the principal-agent theory to investigate the ideal state of construction supervisor's behavior, its conditions as well as the opportunistic behavior model of the construction supervisor:laziness model and collusion model. With the application of relevant principle of management, we have studied the behavior of antecedent and consequence variables of the construction supervisor on the basis of the actual results of the interviews and have provided the theoretical support to optimize the performance of construction supervisor's behavior.
(1) The construction supervisor's behavior has a feature of two-dimensional:direction and strength. We define the opportunistic behavior of construction supervisor according to the "two-dimensional". Laziness of the construction supervisor is considered to be one of opportunistic behaviors in terms of strength in a right direction but an insufficient one. Collusion of the construction supervisor is thought to be one of opportunistic behaviors, in which the construction supervisor's behavior may divert from the owner interest. Research includes the conditions of the lazy behavior,formation mechanism and laziness prevention. It has been studied in the paper in connection with the relationship between insider control, lack of independence and occurrence of collusion as well as the collusion analysis in terms of the information structure and construction supervisor reputation and collusion collapsing mechanism, etc.
(2) Empirical study on the influential factors of construction supervisor's behavior includes the selection of behavior influential factors related assumptions, hypothesis testing, the indicators in line with descriptive statistics and test results; Performance research includes test ideas, related assumptions, method and project analysis, structural equation model analysis on the performance of construction supervisor's behavior and performance evaluation of the behavior based on fuzzy recognition analysis. Difference in project nature (ownership, investment volume and level) will lead to the changes of the construction supervisor's working environment, in which the performance of the construction supervisors varies significantly. The owner and the builder have different attitude of acceptance and cooperation towards the construction supervisor's behavior in the project of different nature.
The characteristics of the construction project plays an important role in the behavior of the construction supervisor. The difference of engineering properties (ownership, investment and level) will cause environment changes of construction supervisor, and the performance of the construction supervisor also varies significantly different. In the different nature of the project, the owner and the builder have different recognition degree on the construction supervisor's behavior. As for the work performance and social performance, the construction supervisor has high performance in state-owned super-size project, lower performance in private construction projects and lowest in the state-owned large and medium-sized engineering. Construction supervisor's quality control and progress control shows great differences between the state-owned large construction projects and the state-owned large and medium-sized construction projects. The reason may be that the construction supervisor could obtain sufficient supervision authority in former condition.In addition, under different condition of ownership, supervisor's behavior performance seems to be different, and supervisor's quality control and progress control is weak in the state-owned large and medium-sized engineering performance of the private large-scale project. This is likely to the reason that there are differences in the interests and target constraints between the owner representative of state-owned construction and private construction owner.
(4) Good reputation mechanism is regarded as an important condition of enhancing the China's construction supervisor's independence and improving the supervisor's behavior performance.The "insider control" of State-owned employer representative may increase the possibility of collusion because of the lack of necessary independence of the supervisor. When "insider control" becomes strengthening, the supervisor's independence becomes weaker. When the reputation mechanism acts on, the construction supervisor's independence becomes strengthening. The Supervisor's independence depends on the relative power of reputation mechanism.Reputation forcing on the "insider control" are realized by means of enhancing the independence of the construction supervisor, which is in essence the result of power comparison between the market force and the government force. A free market-oriented mechanism of construction supervisor will provide a full independence to the construction supervisor with the help of reputation mechanism. It is an effective path to curb the adverse situation of "bad money over good money" and obtain an effective performance of construction supervisor's behavior.
(1)监理人行为具有二维性,即监理人行为方向与监理人行为力度。分别从监理人行为的“二维性”定义监理人机会主义行为。将监理人偷懒定义为监理人行为方向正确,但行为力度不足的机会主义行为。将监理人合谋定义为监理人的行为方向与建设业主的利益发生偏离的机会主义行为。包括监理人偷懒行为产生条件,生成机理与监理人偷懒防范；监理人合谋行为产生原因,基于监理人信息结构的合谋分析；监理人声誉与合谋瓦解机理等。
(2)选择监理人行为影响因子,提出假设,假设检验,指标编制与描述性统计及检验结果；监理人行为绩效研究,包括检验思路,假设,方案,项目分析等,监理人行为绩效的结构方程模型分析,基于模糊识别的监理人行为绩效评价。工程性质(所有制,投资额度与级别)的不同会引起建设监理执业环境的变化,建设监理人行为绩效也存在着显著的差异。在不同性质的工程中,业主与承建人对建设监理行为的认可程度与配合力度不同。
(3)建设工程的特性是影响建设监理人机会主义行为的重要变量。建设监理人对工程质量控制与进度控制行为的绩效在国有特大型建设工程与国有大中型建设工程中存在明显差异。前者是由于建设监理人可能获得充分的监理授权,建设业主代表赋予建设监理更多的专业权限,建设监理人的责,权,利划分比较清晰,监理人更加相信自己的能力,并且具备通过监理能力的提升改善监理工作的制度保障,监理人与业主的显性契约约束对两者都具备充分效力。另外,在不同所有制性质中,监理行为绩效也存在差异,监理质量控制与进度控制行为在国有大中型工程中的绩效表现不如私有大型工程。这很可能是由于国有建设业主代表与私人建设业主的利益与目标约束存在差异。建设监理人工作的主动性和服务的专业性受到隐形契约的干扰,导致建设监理人的责,权,利界限模糊不清。
(4)良好的声誉机制是增强我国建设监理人的独立性,提高监理人行为绩效的重要条件。国有业主代表“内部人”控制使得监理人因为缺乏必要的独立性而被纵向合谋的可能性大大增加。当“内部人”控制强化时,监理人独立性变弱,而当声誉机制发挥作用时,监理人独立性增强,监理人独立性取决于声誉机制与“内部人”控制的相对强弱。而声誉对“内部人"控制的制衡是通过增强建设监理的独立性来实现的,其实质是市场力量与政府管制力量对比的结果。建立市场化的建设监理运作机制,充分发挥建设监理人市场声誉机制是提高监理独立性并遏制目前建设监理市场“劣币驱逐良币"不良局面的有效路径。
Abstract:On the basis of the research integration of domestic and foreign achievement in the construction supervisor, the opportunistic behavior model, influential factors and performance of construction supervisor fall in the scope of the main research. We apply the principal-agent theory to investigate the ideal state of construction supervisor's behavior, its conditions as well as the opportunistic behavior model of the construction supervisor:laziness model and collusion model. With the application of relevant principle of management, we have studied the behavior of antecedent and consequence variables of the construction supervisor on the basis of the actual results of the interviews and have provided the theoretical support to optimize the performance of construction supervisor's behavior.
(1) The construction supervisor's behavior has a feature of two-dimensional:direction and strength. We define the opportunistic behavior of construction supervisor according to the "two-dimensional". Laziness of the construction supervisor is considered to be one of opportunistic behaviors in terms of strength in a right direction but an insufficient one. Collusion of the construction supervisor is thought to be one of opportunistic behaviors, in which the construction supervisor's behavior may divert from the owner interest. Research includes the conditions of the lazy behavior,formation mechanism and laziness prevention. It has been studied in the paper in connection with the relationship between insider control, lack of independence and occurrence of collusion as well as the collusion analysis in terms of the information structure and construction supervisor reputation and collusion collapsing mechanism, etc.
(2) Empirical study on the influential factors of construction supervisor's behavior includes the selection of behavior influential factors related assumptions, hypothesis testing, the indicators in line with descriptive statistics and test results; Performance research includes test ideas, related assumptions, method and project analysis, structural equation model analysis on the performance of construction supervisor's behavior and performance evaluation of the behavior based on fuzzy recognition analysis. Difference in project nature (ownership, investment volume and level) will lead to the changes of the construction supervisor's working environment, in which the performance of the construction supervisors varies significantly. The owner and the builder have different attitude of acceptance and cooperation towards the construction supervisor's behavior in the project of different nature.
The characteristics of the construction project plays an important role in the behavior of the construction supervisor. The difference of engineering properties (ownership, investment and level) will cause environment changes of construction supervisor, and the performance of the construction supervisor also varies significantly different. In the different nature of the project, the owner and the builder have different recognition degree on the construction supervisor's behavior. As for the work performance and social performance, the construction supervisor has high performance in state-owned super-size project, lower performance in private construction projects and lowest in the state-owned large and medium-sized engineering. Construction supervisor's quality control and progress control shows great differences between the state-owned large construction projects and the state-owned large and medium-sized construction projects. The reason may be that the construction supervisor could obtain sufficient supervision authority in former condition.In addition, under different condition of ownership, supervisor's behavior performance seems to be different, and supervisor's quality control and progress control is weak in the state-owned large and medium-sized engineering performance of the private large-scale project. This is likely to the reason that there are differences in the interests and target constraints between the owner representative of state-owned construction and private construction owner.
(4) Good reputation mechanism is regarded as an important condition of enhancing the China's construction supervisor's independence and improving the supervisor's behavior performance.The "insider control" of State-owned employer representative may increase the possibility of collusion because of the lack of necessary independence of the supervisor. When "insider control" becomes strengthening, the supervisor's independence becomes weaker. When the reputation mechanism acts on, the construction supervisor's independence becomes strengthening. The Supervisor's independence depends on the relative power of reputation mechanism.Reputation forcing on the "insider control" are realized by means of enhancing the independence of the construction supervisor, which is in essence the result of power comparison between the market force and the government force. A free market-oriented mechanism of construction supervisor will provide a full independence to the construction supervisor with the help of reputation mechanism. It is an effective path to curb the adverse situation of "bad money over good money" and obtain an effective performance of construction supervisor's behavior.
引文
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