航班起降时刻资源配置研究
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摘要
航空客货运输需求不断增长的同时,机场能力扩张却受到土地与环境的约束,从而导致航班起降时刻资源变得日益稀缺。如何配置这些稀缺的航班起降时刻资源成为世界航空运输业普遍关注的问题。
论文应用产权理论和租金消散理论,研究航班起降时刻资源的配置机制。并在理论分析的基础上,对欧美和中国航班起降时刻资源的配置实践进行了分析。论文的主要内容和结论有如下几个方面:
首先,对国内外航班起降时刻资源配置机制的相关研究进展进行了综述。国外研究主要集中在三个领域:航班起降时刻资源的产权归属、航班起降时刻资源行政性配置的效率评价、航班起降时刻资源配置的市场化方式。国内研究相对较少,基本上是对国外研究的介绍及对国内实践的启示。
第二,结合产权理论和租金消散理论,提出了航班起降时刻资源配置的理论基础。将那些由于价格规制而产生非排他性租金,并且具有消费竞争性和可拥挤性的资源界定为可拥挤的规制型资源。这类资源面临着资源提供、分配及使用等环节中的租金消散问题。它的治理机制除了私有化和国有化之外,还存在着第三种选择一自主治理模式。
第三,分析了航班起降时刻资源的特征。认为航班起降时刻资源是一种可拥挤的规制型资源,它具有消费的竞争性、非排他性租金、可拥挤性、下游企业的必需投入、需求的时间异质、不可储存的服务、使用中的时空配对以及供需的非完全竞争市场结构等特征。这些特征决定了航班起降时刻资源配置的特殊性。
第四,分析了价格机制在配置航班起降时刻资源中的局限性,认为价格机制并不适合于航班起降时刻资源的配置,原因在于三个方面:一是担忧机场实施垄断势力;二是影响航空公司对时刻资源及其相关配套设施的专用性投资;三是带来航班期望等待时间的不确定性。因此,世界各国政府对航班起降时刻资源都进行了价格规制,而政府规制的起降费与需求意愿价格之间的差额,在没有被明确界定归属的情况下,成为非排他性租金。此时,通常会考虑先来先得规则;但是如果是在繁忙机场,那么先来先得规则将会导致大量航班延误,从而抵消这些非排他性租金。因此,有必要采用其他配置机制来最小化租金消散。
第五,为了最小化租金消散,应该由谁来出面解决问题呢?即航班起降时刻资源的配置主体应该是谁。本文认为航班起降时刻资源的配置主体可能为机场、航空公司或政府机构。首先,如果机场成为配置主体,那么它会出于追求非航空性收入而没有限制航班数量的激励,从而将导致航班拥挤程度偏最优水平,因此机场不应该成为配置主体。其次,航空公司群体存在不借助于行政力量而是借助于内部协商来实现航班起降时刻资源的自主治理配置情形,情形之一是航空公司群体通过购入外部仲裁者的监督与惩罚来实现合作,情形之二是航空公司群体通过重复博弈中的可信威胁来促进合作。最后,如果航空公司之间的分配协议无法达成与实施,那么政府将出面充当仲裁者或者直接成为配置主体;如果再考虑到公平和反竞争行为的需要,那么政府会对时刻资源配置进行必要的干预。
第六,确定了航班起降时刻资源配置主体之后,面临的问题是如何配置?即配置方式选择问题。无论配置主体是航空公司、政府或二者混合,时刻资源的配置都会经过初次配置和二次配置两个阶段。首先,初次配置方式主要有三种:祖父权利、拍卖和抽签。它们各具优点和缺点。祖父权利的优点在于促进产权稳定、保护航空公司的专用性投资,以及分配成本较低,缺点是不能确保将时刻资源分配给对其评价最高者;与此相反,拍卖的优点体现在能够将时刻资源分配给对其评价最高者,但具有无法促进产权稳定、保护专用性投资的缺点;与之相比,抽签的优点是绝对公平,但是缺乏经济效率。因此,航班起降时刻资源初始配置方式的选择,主要取决于效率和公平间的权衡。如果从效率考虑,可以选择拍卖或祖父权利;如果从公平考虑,可以选择抽签。并且,如果与时刻资源相关的专用性投资比较大,那么就应考虑选择祖父权利,而不是拍卖。
二次配置方式主要有二级市场交易和一对一交换。二级市场交易具有促进航班时刻资源流向对其评价更高的航空公司的优点,但是在航空运输市场结构为寡头的情况下,容易导致时刻资源的囤积和反竞争行为;与其相反,一对一交换虽然能够抑制时刻资源的囤积,但是却抑制航班时刻资源的自由流动。因此,二次配置方式的选择受到航空运输市场结构和二级市场运行效率的影响。并且中介市场的发育程度也影响时刻资源二级市场运行效率。
第七,在上述理论分析的基础上,对欧美和中国的航班起降时刻资源配置进行了实证考察。美国和欧盟的时刻资源配置机制既有相同点,也有不同点。前者体现在欧美都没有采取价格机制,而是采取了数量限额、祖父权利、不用即失以及时刻池制度。后者体现在配置主体和二次配置方式的不同,美国时刻资源配置的主体是政府机构FAA,而欧盟则是政府与时刻表委员会;美国在二级配置方式上选择了流动性较强的二级市场交易,而欧盟则采取流动性较弱的一对一交换。
中国航班起降时刻资源目前的配置机制与欧盟类似。但与欧美不同的是,中国航空运输业正处于快速发展时期,航班起降时刻资源需求日益增长,新机场的不断建设正在增加大量新的时刻资源。因此,我国时刻资源配置机制需要在借鉴欧美经验基础上,对已存时刻资源和新产生时刻资源采取不同的配置方式,同时建立规范的二级交易市场,并加强政府对时刻资源的产权保护和市场监管。
Along with demand increase of aviation passenger and cargo, airport capacity expansion is subject to more scarce land and stricter environment protection. These facts make airport slot resources be scarcer. How to allocate those resources is to be a topic issue in world aviation industry.
This dissertation uses theory of rent dissipation and property rights economics, analyses allocation mechanism of airport slot resources. On the base of the analysis, the dissertation does demonstration reviews on allocation mechanism of airport slot resources on USA, EU and china. The main contents and conclusions are listed in follow texts:
First, this dissertation reviews on related research on allocation mechanism of airport slot resources in world. Foreign researches focus on three issues: ownership rights of airport slot resources, efficiency of administrational allocation mechanism on airport slot resources, market methods of allocation mechanism on airport slot resources. China research is scare, and focus on introducing foreign allocation mechanism and apocalypse for china.
Second, through synthesizing rent dissipation theory with property theory, the dissertation brings forward theory base of airport slot resources. the dissertation defines congestible regulatory resources which has nonexclusive rent and congestible and rival attributes. This kind of resources is faced with rent dissipation in process of supply and allocation and use. The governance of the resources not only includes privatization and nationalization, but also self-governance..
Third, attribute of airport slot resources is analyzed. Airport slot resource is a kind of congestible regulatory resource. It is rival and nonexclusive rent and congestible. And airport slot resource is a kind of no storable service, heterogeneity in time, monopoly in demand and supply market.
Fourth, price mechanism has shortcoming in allocating airport slot resources. There be three causes: be afraid of airport monopoly force, affect airline special invest on related facility, raise uncertainty of waiting time. So price of airport slot resources is regulated in the world. The gap between regulated price and supply desire price, if not being define property rights, will become non-excludable rent. When rule of first-come -and- first serviced is adopted in busy airports, the rule will bring up heavy delay, which wastes much non-excludable rent. So some other mechanism must be adopted to minimize rent dissipation.
Fifth, to minimize rent dissipation, who should be in charge of resolve the problem? In other words, who should be main body in airport slot resources allocation? The main body may be airport, airline and government. If airport is main body, the airport may have little incentive to limit movement amount, because airport income is positive relative to movement amount. So airport should not be main body. For airlines, they may realize allocation by inner negotiation arrangement. And they implement arrangement by buying an exterior arbitrator or punishment in repeat games. At last, when airlines can not agree on this arrangement, government may act as an arbitrator or be main body. If considering fair and competition, government should intervene.
Sixth, after allocation main body research, the next issue is how to allocate airport slot resources? No matter who is main body, resources allocation includes two processes: initial allocation and secondary allocation. initial allocation includes three main methods: Grandfather right, Auction, Lot. Every method has its merit and shortcoming. Grandfather right can promote stabilization of property right, protect special investment, lower direct allocation cost, but little direct allocation efficiency. Auction opposes to grandfather. Lot is quite fair, lowers direct allocation cost, but has no efficiency. So initial allocation methods choice depends on take off between efficiency and fair.
Secondary allocation method includes two main kinds: secondary market and one-for-one swap. The benefit and cost of property right transfer decides which method will be choice. secondary market has promote airport slot resources flow to airline that has higher value on the slot resources, but if there be a oligopoly market in airline industry, secondary market may result in slot comer and monopoly action. One-for-one swap opposes to secondary market. So airline industry structure and market efficiency affect on secondary allocation methods. And the development of intermediatory organization is also affect on second market efficiency.
Seventh, on base of above theory analyses, allocation mechanism of EU, USA and china are demonstration review. USA and EU give up price mechanism, but adopt amount limit, grandfather right, lost it and use it, slot pool. At the same time, they have different main body and methods. FAA is main body in USA, but government and slot committee is main body in EU. USA adopts secondary market, but EU adopts one-for-one swap. The former has more liquidity.
Now china Allocation mechanism is similar with EU. China aviation industry locate in rapid increase period, demand of slot resources is rapidly rising. Apart from existed slot resource, there are much new supply capacity. So china allocation methods not only perfect present mechanism like EU, but also establish and regulate secondary market. There should be different governance between existed slot resources and new. The former should adopted EU present mechanism, but the latter may adopts market mechanism such as auction. In the process, government should assist to perfect slot resources property rights and regulate allocation process and secondary market.
论文应用产权理论和租金消散理论,研究航班起降时刻资源的配置机制。并在理论分析的基础上,对欧美和中国航班起降时刻资源的配置实践进行了分析。论文的主要内容和结论有如下几个方面:
首先,对国内外航班起降时刻资源配置机制的相关研究进展进行了综述。国外研究主要集中在三个领域:航班起降时刻资源的产权归属、航班起降时刻资源行政性配置的效率评价、航班起降时刻资源配置的市场化方式。国内研究相对较少,基本上是对国外研究的介绍及对国内实践的启示。
第二,结合产权理论和租金消散理论,提出了航班起降时刻资源配置的理论基础。将那些由于价格规制而产生非排他性租金,并且具有消费竞争性和可拥挤性的资源界定为可拥挤的规制型资源。这类资源面临着资源提供、分配及使用等环节中的租金消散问题。它的治理机制除了私有化和国有化之外,还存在着第三种选择一自主治理模式。
第三,分析了航班起降时刻资源的特征。认为航班起降时刻资源是一种可拥挤的规制型资源,它具有消费的竞争性、非排他性租金、可拥挤性、下游企业的必需投入、需求的时间异质、不可储存的服务、使用中的时空配对以及供需的非完全竞争市场结构等特征。这些特征决定了航班起降时刻资源配置的特殊性。
第四,分析了价格机制在配置航班起降时刻资源中的局限性,认为价格机制并不适合于航班起降时刻资源的配置,原因在于三个方面:一是担忧机场实施垄断势力;二是影响航空公司对时刻资源及其相关配套设施的专用性投资;三是带来航班期望等待时间的不确定性。因此,世界各国政府对航班起降时刻资源都进行了价格规制,而政府规制的起降费与需求意愿价格之间的差额,在没有被明确界定归属的情况下,成为非排他性租金。此时,通常会考虑先来先得规则;但是如果是在繁忙机场,那么先来先得规则将会导致大量航班延误,从而抵消这些非排他性租金。因此,有必要采用其他配置机制来最小化租金消散。
第五,为了最小化租金消散,应该由谁来出面解决问题呢?即航班起降时刻资源的配置主体应该是谁。本文认为航班起降时刻资源的配置主体可能为机场、航空公司或政府机构。首先,如果机场成为配置主体,那么它会出于追求非航空性收入而没有限制航班数量的激励,从而将导致航班拥挤程度偏最优水平,因此机场不应该成为配置主体。其次,航空公司群体存在不借助于行政力量而是借助于内部协商来实现航班起降时刻资源的自主治理配置情形,情形之一是航空公司群体通过购入外部仲裁者的监督与惩罚来实现合作,情形之二是航空公司群体通过重复博弈中的可信威胁来促进合作。最后,如果航空公司之间的分配协议无法达成与实施,那么政府将出面充当仲裁者或者直接成为配置主体;如果再考虑到公平和反竞争行为的需要,那么政府会对时刻资源配置进行必要的干预。
第六,确定了航班起降时刻资源配置主体之后,面临的问题是如何配置?即配置方式选择问题。无论配置主体是航空公司、政府或二者混合,时刻资源的配置都会经过初次配置和二次配置两个阶段。首先,初次配置方式主要有三种:祖父权利、拍卖和抽签。它们各具优点和缺点。祖父权利的优点在于促进产权稳定、保护航空公司的专用性投资,以及分配成本较低,缺点是不能确保将时刻资源分配给对其评价最高者;与此相反,拍卖的优点体现在能够将时刻资源分配给对其评价最高者,但具有无法促进产权稳定、保护专用性投资的缺点;与之相比,抽签的优点是绝对公平,但是缺乏经济效率。因此,航班起降时刻资源初始配置方式的选择,主要取决于效率和公平间的权衡。如果从效率考虑,可以选择拍卖或祖父权利;如果从公平考虑,可以选择抽签。并且,如果与时刻资源相关的专用性投资比较大,那么就应考虑选择祖父权利,而不是拍卖。
二次配置方式主要有二级市场交易和一对一交换。二级市场交易具有促进航班时刻资源流向对其评价更高的航空公司的优点,但是在航空运输市场结构为寡头的情况下,容易导致时刻资源的囤积和反竞争行为;与其相反,一对一交换虽然能够抑制时刻资源的囤积,但是却抑制航班时刻资源的自由流动。因此,二次配置方式的选择受到航空运输市场结构和二级市场运行效率的影响。并且中介市场的发育程度也影响时刻资源二级市场运行效率。
第七,在上述理论分析的基础上,对欧美和中国的航班起降时刻资源配置进行了实证考察。美国和欧盟的时刻资源配置机制既有相同点,也有不同点。前者体现在欧美都没有采取价格机制,而是采取了数量限额、祖父权利、不用即失以及时刻池制度。后者体现在配置主体和二次配置方式的不同,美国时刻资源配置的主体是政府机构FAA,而欧盟则是政府与时刻表委员会;美国在二级配置方式上选择了流动性较强的二级市场交易,而欧盟则采取流动性较弱的一对一交换。
中国航班起降时刻资源目前的配置机制与欧盟类似。但与欧美不同的是,中国航空运输业正处于快速发展时期,航班起降时刻资源需求日益增长,新机场的不断建设正在增加大量新的时刻资源。因此,我国时刻资源配置机制需要在借鉴欧美经验基础上,对已存时刻资源和新产生时刻资源采取不同的配置方式,同时建立规范的二级交易市场,并加强政府对时刻资源的产权保护和市场监管。
Along with demand increase of aviation passenger and cargo, airport capacity expansion is subject to more scarce land and stricter environment protection. These facts make airport slot resources be scarcer. How to allocate those resources is to be a topic issue in world aviation industry.
This dissertation uses theory of rent dissipation and property rights economics, analyses allocation mechanism of airport slot resources. On the base of the analysis, the dissertation does demonstration reviews on allocation mechanism of airport slot resources on USA, EU and china. The main contents and conclusions are listed in follow texts:
First, this dissertation reviews on related research on allocation mechanism of airport slot resources in world. Foreign researches focus on three issues: ownership rights of airport slot resources, efficiency of administrational allocation mechanism on airport slot resources, market methods of allocation mechanism on airport slot resources. China research is scare, and focus on introducing foreign allocation mechanism and apocalypse for china.
Second, through synthesizing rent dissipation theory with property theory, the dissertation brings forward theory base of airport slot resources. the dissertation defines congestible regulatory resources which has nonexclusive rent and congestible and rival attributes. This kind of resources is faced with rent dissipation in process of supply and allocation and use. The governance of the resources not only includes privatization and nationalization, but also self-governance..
Third, attribute of airport slot resources is analyzed. Airport slot resource is a kind of congestible regulatory resource. It is rival and nonexclusive rent and congestible. And airport slot resource is a kind of no storable service, heterogeneity in time, monopoly in demand and supply market.
Fourth, price mechanism has shortcoming in allocating airport slot resources. There be three causes: be afraid of airport monopoly force, affect airline special invest on related facility, raise uncertainty of waiting time. So price of airport slot resources is regulated in the world. The gap between regulated price and supply desire price, if not being define property rights, will become non-excludable rent. When rule of first-come -and- first serviced is adopted in busy airports, the rule will bring up heavy delay, which wastes much non-excludable rent. So some other mechanism must be adopted to minimize rent dissipation.
Fifth, to minimize rent dissipation, who should be in charge of resolve the problem? In other words, who should be main body in airport slot resources allocation? The main body may be airport, airline and government. If airport is main body, the airport may have little incentive to limit movement amount, because airport income is positive relative to movement amount. So airport should not be main body. For airlines, they may realize allocation by inner negotiation arrangement. And they implement arrangement by buying an exterior arbitrator or punishment in repeat games. At last, when airlines can not agree on this arrangement, government may act as an arbitrator or be main body. If considering fair and competition, government should intervene.
Sixth, after allocation main body research, the next issue is how to allocate airport slot resources? No matter who is main body, resources allocation includes two processes: initial allocation and secondary allocation. initial allocation includes three main methods: Grandfather right, Auction, Lot. Every method has its merit and shortcoming. Grandfather right can promote stabilization of property right, protect special investment, lower direct allocation cost, but little direct allocation efficiency. Auction opposes to grandfather. Lot is quite fair, lowers direct allocation cost, but has no efficiency. So initial allocation methods choice depends on take off between efficiency and fair.
Secondary allocation method includes two main kinds: secondary market and one-for-one swap. The benefit and cost of property right transfer decides which method will be choice. secondary market has promote airport slot resources flow to airline that has higher value on the slot resources, but if there be a oligopoly market in airline industry, secondary market may result in slot comer and monopoly action. One-for-one swap opposes to secondary market. So airline industry structure and market efficiency affect on secondary allocation methods. And the development of intermediatory organization is also affect on second market efficiency.
Seventh, on base of above theory analyses, allocation mechanism of EU, USA and china are demonstration review. USA and EU give up price mechanism, but adopt amount limit, grandfather right, lost it and use it, slot pool. At the same time, they have different main body and methods. FAA is main body in USA, but government and slot committee is main body in EU. USA adopts secondary market, but EU adopts one-for-one swap. The former has more liquidity.
Now china Allocation mechanism is similar with EU. China aviation industry locate in rapid increase period, demand of slot resources is rapidly rising. Apart from existed slot resource, there are much new supply capacity. So china allocation methods not only perfect present mechanism like EU, but also establish and regulate secondary market. There should be different governance between existed slot resources and new. The former should adopted EU present mechanism, but the latter may adopts market mechanism such as auction. In the process, government should assist to perfect slot resources property rights and regulate allocation process and secondary market.
引文
[1] A.Sentence.Airport slot auctions: desirable or feasible?.Utilities Policy.2003.11: 53-57.
[2] Achim I. Czerny, Andreas Brenck.Slot allocation under uncertainty.working paper.2003.
[3] Achim I. Czerny. Congestion Pricing vs. Slot Constraints to Airport Networks.Working paper.2006.
[4] Achim I. Czerny.Airport Slots: International Experiences and Options for Reform. Ashgate Publishing.2008.
[5] Achim I.Czerny, Henning.Tegner. Secondary Markets for Runway Capacity.working paper. 2002.
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