国有企业为何倾向于边界扩张
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摘要
企业是现代经济社会的微观基础,企业边界也是现代企业理论中的基础问题。从企业性质、企业目标到企业边界的研究,一直贯穿西方经济理论的发展过程。综观西方经济理论对企业边界的研究,无论是交易角度、生产角度还是资源能力角度,都是将企业视为微观经济单元,大多是从微观层面寻找影响企业边界的因素,研究范围局限在企业的规模边界、组织边界或能力边界。其实,对企业性质不同角度的解释和对企业目标多元化的认识,已经说明了企业边界并非唯一的,企业具有多重边界。
单纯从微观影响因素分析企业的边界决定也是有局限性的,企业边界的变化是外部因素和内部因素共同作用的结果,也是宏观因素和微观因素共同作用的结果。经济学已经从交易成本、契约成本、投入产出、资源能力等微观因素研究了企业的边界,但这些因素仍然是微观的。从企业所在的产业这个宏观角度看,技术进步、社会分工、产业政策和制度等,都通过影响产业组织的演进,与产业内企业的边界发生联系,也是企业边界的决定因素之一,而传统经济理论对这部分影响因素的关注显然是不够的。
虽然经济理论已经注意到不同的企业性质会影响企业边界的决定,并试图从契约安排、团队生产、资源能力等多个角度去理解企业的性质,但不可否认的是,不同企业性质的研究,其出发点仍然是追求企业经济目标最大化,即仍然将企业视为追求经济利益最大化的主体。但是,归根结底,关于企业各种行为的决策还是由企业经理做出的,而现代经济学的发展已经揭示了决策主体不同于完全理性人的一些特征,那么,这种突破了传统经济人假设的经济主体,可能会将个人目标和行为偏好混同于企业边界决策当中,也会对企业最终边界的决定带来影响。
在竞争性的市场经济环境下诞生的西方企业理论,没有对国有企业投入太多的注视目光。国有企业由于在所有制结构上与一般意义上企业的差异,两者在企业性质、目标和经理人个人目标、行为偏好和小集体决策方面也会存在差异,企业内部也会存在各种非经济性质的约束,如果将企业边界看做是一种经济决策,那么在国有企业和非国有企业的边界决定问题上,虽然两者之间有一定的联系,但也会存在不同的特点。同时,如果将国有企业边界和非国有企业边界的演变纳入到中国经济改革和产业崛起的大背景之下,从产业组织演进的视角,两者也呈现出不同的动态演变特点。
本文认为,国有企业作为企业的一种特殊表现形式,考察国有企业的边界,可以从三个角度切入：一是研究国有企业的性质、目标和面临的各种非经济约束,在分析国有企业与一般意义上的企业之间存在的差异的基础上,提出国有企业的公共性目标和政企关系契约对国有企业边界的影响；二是从决策行为的角度出发,研究企业经理的行为偏好、非正式组织等小集团决策偏好对国有企业边界的影响；三是将国有企业的边界研究放在中国经济改革、产业振兴和调整的大背景下,关注影响产业组织演进的诸多因素,并考察这些因素的变化所引起的国有企业边界与非国有企业边界不同的动态演变路径。
本文共分为七章：
第一章导论部分,对论文选题背景、研究意义进行简要说明,对研究对象和论文中出现的主要概念进行界定和定义,介绍论文的主要内容和框架结构,最后就论文可能的创新之处简要说明,总领全文。
第二章文献综述部分,在回顾西方企业理论的基础上,分析关于企业性质和企业边界的理论脉络；在此基础上,总结国有企业的性质和边界的一些研究成果,为后文的展开分析奠定基础；阐述产业组织演进的有关概念和理论研究成果,简要分析经济约束和非经济约束的内涵和相应的研究成果。
第三章结合我国国有企业的实际情况,进一步阐述国有企业不同于一般意义上的边界概念,进一步研究细化研究对象,为后文提供研究模型基础；同时,选择实际经济生活中数据和案例进行讨论,说明国有企业边界扩张是实际存在的一种经济现象。
第四章在对企业面临的目标和约束进行分析的基础上,进一步扩展对非经济约束的理解,提出国有企业面临的综合性的目标体系以及国有企业内部特有的非经济约束因素,并从微观角度建立模型,首先在普遍意义上分析企业的边界决定,而后再针对国有企业和非国有企业的差别,引入差异因素,考察国有企业边界与一般意义上的企业边界有何差异,着重在国有企业边界和非国有企业边界之间做比较。
第五章将企业的边界决策视为企业经理的决策,引入简单的行为经济学的基础理论,研究决策主体心理和行为偏好,提出国有企业经理的个人目标、决策行为心理也会影响国有企业的最优边界,同时,继续以小集团和大集团不同的行为特征出发,将国有企业视为产业大集团内的小集团,引入产业公共产品的概念,分析国有企业由于提供了产业公共产品而对自身资源边界的影响。
第六章将国有企业边界的研究放入中国市场经济体制改革、从计划经济向市场经济过渡的背景下,首先分析了产业组织演进的影响因素,分析这些因素对产业内企业边界变动的影响。其次,在企业与产业间存在互动影响关系的假设下,从“产业特征与国有企业存在和分布”、“产业演进与国有企业变革”两个角度加以展开研究,最后从中观产业角度建立模型,回答国有企业体制边界的决定过程以及动态演变。
第七章全文总结,在理论分析和模型研究的基础上,对国有企业的边界决定做一总结,包括国有企业边界与非国有企业边界的差异以及动态演变过程,针对若干影响国有企业最优边界的因素,提出针对性的政策建议。针对本文研究过程中的不足,提出进一步研究的方向。
本文的主要结论是：在企业的交易边界和资源边界之间,存在过渡区域,会出现许多介于市场和企业之间的新型产业组织形式；资源边界方面,国有企业偏好大而全,占有资源但不能充分有效利用,并且资源和交易多元化边界明显；政企边界方面,国有企业偏好政企关系,政企边界改革困难重重,并且可能正由于政企关系的历史路径依赖,导致国有企业的边界存在刚性,偏离最优边界且调整过程漫长。
Enterprise is the microeconomic foundation of our economy and society, and enterprise boundary is the foundation problem of the modern enterprise theory. The research of the nature, the goals and boundary about enterprise, has been throughout the development process of Western Economics Theory. To make a comprehensive survey of the boundary of enterprise, as transaction, production and resource capacity, researchers all look the enterprise as a microeconomic unit, and investigate enterprise boundary mostly from micro viewpoint with research scope limitation in the scale boundary, organization boundary and ability boundary of enterpris. In fact, in view of the enterprise nature different explanation and multi-goals understanding, that the enterprise boundary is not single but with multiple boundary.
It is limited to analyze the influential factors of enterpris boundaries only from micro viewpoint. The changes of enterprise boundary are the integrated result of external factors and internal factors, the macro factors and micro factor. Economics theory has studied enterprise boundary from the transaction cost, contract costs, input and output, resource ability factors,ect. But these factors are still micro. From the viewpoint of the industry which enterprise in, technological progress, social division, and the industrial policy are all the factors which influence the enterprise boundary through industrial organizations evolution, and traditional economics theories of these influence factors is obviously not enough.
Although economics theory paid more attention on the different characteristics of the enterprise affect the enterprise boundary decisions, and tries to understand different enterprise nature through contract arrangements, team production, resource capacity, it is still undeniable that different characteristics of the enterprise of research, its starting point is still the economic gain maximization. In the final analysis, it is the manager who make decision of enterprise, and modern economics development has revealed that the decision-making is different from the hypothesis of totally rational.Therefore, manager will likely to bind personal goals with the enterprise boundary decision.
In the past, Western Enterprise Theory paid less attention to state-owned enterprises. State-owned enterprises are different from the of enterprise with the general sense in the ownership structure, enterprise nature, objectives, managers' personal goals, behavior preferences and non-economic limitations, which can lead to the difference boundary between State-owned enterprises and others. Looking the enterprise boundary as an economic decision, boundary of the state-owned enterprises and the non-state-owned enterprises, has different features. Meanwhile, under the environment of economic reform, the advancement of industrial and industrial organization evolution, the state-owned enterprise boundary and non-state-owned enterprises boundary, are also present different dynamic evolution characteristics.
The mainpoint of this paper is that state-owned enterprise is a kind of special enterprise.We can analyse its boundary from two perspectives:one is to study the nature, objectives, and non-economic constraint of state-owned enterprises, and to present the influence to the boundary of the state-owned enterprises.The other is to put state-owned enterprise boundary research under China's economic reforms and industrial developments, and to identify the factors which influet industry organization evolution, and review how these factors can effect the different dynamic evolution path of boundary between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned ones.
The factors to enterprise boundary include nature, target, constraint, industrial organization evolution, managers' decision-making behavior and collective decision-making behavior, etc. This paper elaborates the influence of various factors with the length of three chapters. At the same time, because enterprise boundary is multi-dimensional, it is not realistic and feasibleis to put all factors into one. Therefore, this paper establishes three models.The first one is from microcosmic viewpoint, combinding transaction attribute (contract) and production attributes (resources) into unified model, and gradually adding constraint conditions, examining the different influence of state-owned enterprise boundary and non-state-owned enterprises boundary. The second one is from colletive decision-maker's behavior, with the state-owned enterprise as a small group relative to the industry large group, to investigate the characteristics of decision-maker's behavior of small group, and to find how to affect large group by group of macro-performance to influence the border. The third one is from macroscopic viewpoint of industry, examining effects of the industrial division and the industrial system to the boundary of state-owned enterprise and the others, and laying out dynamic evolution path of these two different nature enterprise boundaries for the first time.
The whole paper is divided into seven chapters:
Chapter 1, as a introduction, briefly explains the research significance, objects and the main concept,and also introduces the main contents,the paper's frame structure, and the main novelty.
Chapter 2 is the literature review. Based on the theory of Western Enterprise, this chapter analyzes the enterprise's character and boundary theoretical contexts.then, summarizes the research of state-owned enterprises' properties and their boundary. This chapter also analyses industry organization evolution relevant concepts, the theoretical research, the economic constraints and the connotation of non-economic constraints.
Chapter 3, combined with the actual situation of state-owned enterprises in China, further elaborates the difference between state-owned enterprises' boundary and the the general enterprises for further research. This chapter then provides research model for later foundation. Meanwhile, by choosing the actual economic life data and case discussion, explain the state-owned enterprise boundary expansion is actually exists as an economic phenomenon.
Chapter 4 puts forward the non-economic constraints of state-owned enterprises, facing the the comprehensive target system and internal characters of them.From microcosmic angle, analysises enterprise's border in an common sense, and reaseaches state-owned enterprises' boundary by introducing the difference of factors between state-owned enterprises and the others,then investigates and compares the boundary of two different ownership enterprises.
Chapter 5 introduces the psychology and behavior of state-owned enterprise managers.Given that the psychological factors will also affect the decision-maker's behavior.Continuing to ring and large group of different behavior characteristics of large state-owned enterprise as industry will be introduced group of internal group, the concept of public products, industrial analysis of state-owned enterprise will provide industry with their own resources of public product and then influence of boundary.
Chapter 6 combines the state-owned enterprises'boundary research with the reforming of China's market economy. Firstly, this chapter analyzes the influence factors of industrial organization evolution and the factors that influence of boundary changes in enterprise. Secondly, this chapter explains the relationship between the enterprise and industrs from two angles.By establishing models, answers the state-owned enterprise system boundary decision process and dynamic evolution.
Chapter 7, as a summary of the whole paper, baseing on the theoretical analysis and models, is to summarize the boudnary of state-owned enterprise and the differences with non-state-owned enterprises.According to evolutionary process which influence the optimal boundary state-owned enterprises, the specific factors of policy proposals and the direction of further research are put forward.
In the end of the paper, the main conclusion is put forward:between the contract boundary and resources boundary, there exists a transition zone in which there are many new forms of industrial organization between market and enterprises. The state-owned enterprises take the resource preference perfect but cannot fully and effectively use it, and diversified boundary is obvious. The relationship between the government and the state-owned enterprise influences greatly the state-owned enterprise boundary and results in the rigid boundary, which deviated widely from the optimal boundary of the state-owned enterprise probably because of the path dependency,
单纯从微观影响因素分析企业的边界决定也是有局限性的,企业边界的变化是外部因素和内部因素共同作用的结果,也是宏观因素和微观因素共同作用的结果。经济学已经从交易成本、契约成本、投入产出、资源能力等微观因素研究了企业的边界,但这些因素仍然是微观的。从企业所在的产业这个宏观角度看,技术进步、社会分工、产业政策和制度等,都通过影响产业组织的演进,与产业内企业的边界发生联系,也是企业边界的决定因素之一,而传统经济理论对这部分影响因素的关注显然是不够的。
虽然经济理论已经注意到不同的企业性质会影响企业边界的决定,并试图从契约安排、团队生产、资源能力等多个角度去理解企业的性质,但不可否认的是,不同企业性质的研究,其出发点仍然是追求企业经济目标最大化,即仍然将企业视为追求经济利益最大化的主体。但是,归根结底,关于企业各种行为的决策还是由企业经理做出的,而现代经济学的发展已经揭示了决策主体不同于完全理性人的一些特征,那么,这种突破了传统经济人假设的经济主体,可能会将个人目标和行为偏好混同于企业边界决策当中,也会对企业最终边界的决定带来影响。
在竞争性的市场经济环境下诞生的西方企业理论,没有对国有企业投入太多的注视目光。国有企业由于在所有制结构上与一般意义上企业的差异,两者在企业性质、目标和经理人个人目标、行为偏好和小集体决策方面也会存在差异,企业内部也会存在各种非经济性质的约束,如果将企业边界看做是一种经济决策,那么在国有企业和非国有企业的边界决定问题上,虽然两者之间有一定的联系,但也会存在不同的特点。同时,如果将国有企业边界和非国有企业边界的演变纳入到中国经济改革和产业崛起的大背景之下,从产业组织演进的视角,两者也呈现出不同的动态演变特点。
本文认为,国有企业作为企业的一种特殊表现形式,考察国有企业的边界,可以从三个角度切入：一是研究国有企业的性质、目标和面临的各种非经济约束,在分析国有企业与一般意义上的企业之间存在的差异的基础上,提出国有企业的公共性目标和政企关系契约对国有企业边界的影响；二是从决策行为的角度出发,研究企业经理的行为偏好、非正式组织等小集团决策偏好对国有企业边界的影响；三是将国有企业的边界研究放在中国经济改革、产业振兴和调整的大背景下,关注影响产业组织演进的诸多因素,并考察这些因素的变化所引起的国有企业边界与非国有企业边界不同的动态演变路径。
本文共分为七章：
第一章导论部分,对论文选题背景、研究意义进行简要说明,对研究对象和论文中出现的主要概念进行界定和定义,介绍论文的主要内容和框架结构,最后就论文可能的创新之处简要说明,总领全文。
第二章文献综述部分,在回顾西方企业理论的基础上,分析关于企业性质和企业边界的理论脉络；在此基础上,总结国有企业的性质和边界的一些研究成果,为后文的展开分析奠定基础；阐述产业组织演进的有关概念和理论研究成果,简要分析经济约束和非经济约束的内涵和相应的研究成果。
第三章结合我国国有企业的实际情况,进一步阐述国有企业不同于一般意义上的边界概念,进一步研究细化研究对象,为后文提供研究模型基础；同时,选择实际经济生活中数据和案例进行讨论,说明国有企业边界扩张是实际存在的一种经济现象。
第四章在对企业面临的目标和约束进行分析的基础上,进一步扩展对非经济约束的理解,提出国有企业面临的综合性的目标体系以及国有企业内部特有的非经济约束因素,并从微观角度建立模型,首先在普遍意义上分析企业的边界决定,而后再针对国有企业和非国有企业的差别,引入差异因素,考察国有企业边界与一般意义上的企业边界有何差异,着重在国有企业边界和非国有企业边界之间做比较。
第五章将企业的边界决策视为企业经理的决策,引入简单的行为经济学的基础理论,研究决策主体心理和行为偏好,提出国有企业经理的个人目标、决策行为心理也会影响国有企业的最优边界,同时,继续以小集团和大集团不同的行为特征出发,将国有企业视为产业大集团内的小集团,引入产业公共产品的概念,分析国有企业由于提供了产业公共产品而对自身资源边界的影响。
第六章将国有企业边界的研究放入中国市场经济体制改革、从计划经济向市场经济过渡的背景下,首先分析了产业组织演进的影响因素,分析这些因素对产业内企业边界变动的影响。其次,在企业与产业间存在互动影响关系的假设下,从“产业特征与国有企业存在和分布”、“产业演进与国有企业变革”两个角度加以展开研究,最后从中观产业角度建立模型,回答国有企业体制边界的决定过程以及动态演变。
第七章全文总结,在理论分析和模型研究的基础上,对国有企业的边界决定做一总结,包括国有企业边界与非国有企业边界的差异以及动态演变过程,针对若干影响国有企业最优边界的因素,提出针对性的政策建议。针对本文研究过程中的不足,提出进一步研究的方向。
本文的主要结论是：在企业的交易边界和资源边界之间,存在过渡区域,会出现许多介于市场和企业之间的新型产业组织形式；资源边界方面,国有企业偏好大而全,占有资源但不能充分有效利用,并且资源和交易多元化边界明显；政企边界方面,国有企业偏好政企关系,政企边界改革困难重重,并且可能正由于政企关系的历史路径依赖,导致国有企业的边界存在刚性,偏离最优边界且调整过程漫长。
Enterprise is the microeconomic foundation of our economy and society, and enterprise boundary is the foundation problem of the modern enterprise theory. The research of the nature, the goals and boundary about enterprise, has been throughout the development process of Western Economics Theory. To make a comprehensive survey of the boundary of enterprise, as transaction, production and resource capacity, researchers all look the enterprise as a microeconomic unit, and investigate enterprise boundary mostly from micro viewpoint with research scope limitation in the scale boundary, organization boundary and ability boundary of enterpris. In fact, in view of the enterprise nature different explanation and multi-goals understanding, that the enterprise boundary is not single but with multiple boundary.
It is limited to analyze the influential factors of enterpris boundaries only from micro viewpoint. The changes of enterprise boundary are the integrated result of external factors and internal factors, the macro factors and micro factor. Economics theory has studied enterprise boundary from the transaction cost, contract costs, input and output, resource ability factors,ect. But these factors are still micro. From the viewpoint of the industry which enterprise in, technological progress, social division, and the industrial policy are all the factors which influence the enterprise boundary through industrial organizations evolution, and traditional economics theories of these influence factors is obviously not enough.
Although economics theory paid more attention on the different characteristics of the enterprise affect the enterprise boundary decisions, and tries to understand different enterprise nature through contract arrangements, team production, resource capacity, it is still undeniable that different characteristics of the enterprise of research, its starting point is still the economic gain maximization. In the final analysis, it is the manager who make decision of enterprise, and modern economics development has revealed that the decision-making is different from the hypothesis of totally rational.Therefore, manager will likely to bind personal goals with the enterprise boundary decision.
In the past, Western Enterprise Theory paid less attention to state-owned enterprises. State-owned enterprises are different from the of enterprise with the general sense in the ownership structure, enterprise nature, objectives, managers' personal goals, behavior preferences and non-economic limitations, which can lead to the difference boundary between State-owned enterprises and others. Looking the enterprise boundary as an economic decision, boundary of the state-owned enterprises and the non-state-owned enterprises, has different features. Meanwhile, under the environment of economic reform, the advancement of industrial and industrial organization evolution, the state-owned enterprise boundary and non-state-owned enterprises boundary, are also present different dynamic evolution characteristics.
The mainpoint of this paper is that state-owned enterprise is a kind of special enterprise.We can analyse its boundary from two perspectives:one is to study the nature, objectives, and non-economic constraint of state-owned enterprises, and to present the influence to the boundary of the state-owned enterprises.The other is to put state-owned enterprise boundary research under China's economic reforms and industrial developments, and to identify the factors which influet industry organization evolution, and review how these factors can effect the different dynamic evolution path of boundary between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned ones.
The factors to enterprise boundary include nature, target, constraint, industrial organization evolution, managers' decision-making behavior and collective decision-making behavior, etc. This paper elaborates the influence of various factors with the length of three chapters. At the same time, because enterprise boundary is multi-dimensional, it is not realistic and feasibleis to put all factors into one. Therefore, this paper establishes three models.The first one is from microcosmic viewpoint, combinding transaction attribute (contract) and production attributes (resources) into unified model, and gradually adding constraint conditions, examining the different influence of state-owned enterprise boundary and non-state-owned enterprises boundary. The second one is from colletive decision-maker's behavior, with the state-owned enterprise as a small group relative to the industry large group, to investigate the characteristics of decision-maker's behavior of small group, and to find how to affect large group by group of macro-performance to influence the border. The third one is from macroscopic viewpoint of industry, examining effects of the industrial division and the industrial system to the boundary of state-owned enterprise and the others, and laying out dynamic evolution path of these two different nature enterprise boundaries for the first time.
The whole paper is divided into seven chapters:
Chapter 1, as a introduction, briefly explains the research significance, objects and the main concept,and also introduces the main contents,the paper's frame structure, and the main novelty.
Chapter 2 is the literature review. Based on the theory of Western Enterprise, this chapter analyzes the enterprise's character and boundary theoretical contexts.then, summarizes the research of state-owned enterprises' properties and their boundary. This chapter also analyses industry organization evolution relevant concepts, the theoretical research, the economic constraints and the connotation of non-economic constraints.
Chapter 3, combined with the actual situation of state-owned enterprises in China, further elaborates the difference between state-owned enterprises' boundary and the the general enterprises for further research. This chapter then provides research model for later foundation. Meanwhile, by choosing the actual economic life data and case discussion, explain the state-owned enterprise boundary expansion is actually exists as an economic phenomenon.
Chapter 4 puts forward the non-economic constraints of state-owned enterprises, facing the the comprehensive target system and internal characters of them.From microcosmic angle, analysises enterprise's border in an common sense, and reaseaches state-owned enterprises' boundary by introducing the difference of factors between state-owned enterprises and the others,then investigates and compares the boundary of two different ownership enterprises.
Chapter 5 introduces the psychology and behavior of state-owned enterprise managers.Given that the psychological factors will also affect the decision-maker's behavior.Continuing to ring and large group of different behavior characteristics of large state-owned enterprise as industry will be introduced group of internal group, the concept of public products, industrial analysis of state-owned enterprise will provide industry with their own resources of public product and then influence of boundary.
Chapter 6 combines the state-owned enterprises'boundary research with the reforming of China's market economy. Firstly, this chapter analyzes the influence factors of industrial organization evolution and the factors that influence of boundary changes in enterprise. Secondly, this chapter explains the relationship between the enterprise and industrs from two angles.By establishing models, answers the state-owned enterprise system boundary decision process and dynamic evolution.
Chapter 7, as a summary of the whole paper, baseing on the theoretical analysis and models, is to summarize the boudnary of state-owned enterprise and the differences with non-state-owned enterprises.According to evolutionary process which influence the optimal boundary state-owned enterprises, the specific factors of policy proposals and the direction of further research are put forward.
In the end of the paper, the main conclusion is put forward:between the contract boundary and resources boundary, there exists a transition zone in which there are many new forms of industrial organization between market and enterprises. The state-owned enterprises take the resource preference perfect but cannot fully and effectively use it, and diversified boundary is obvious. The relationship between the government and the state-owned enterprise influences greatly the state-owned enterprise boundary and results in the rigid boundary, which deviated widely from the optimal boundary of the state-owned enterprise probably because of the path dependency,
引文
1 R.Coase, "The Nature of the Firm", Economica,1937, vol.4, P403
1风险的特征是可以通过确定的概率估计的,因此可以预先进行成本分担,而不确定性是指人们缺乏对事件基本性质的知识,对事件可能的结果知之甚少,难以通过现有理论或经验进行预见和定量分析。
2不确定性越大,内置化倾向越明显：交易频率越高,越需内在化；资产专用性越强,越需要内在化。
3 Stven N.S.cheung, "The Contractual Nature of the Firm",Journal of Law and Economics,vol.ⅩⅩⅩⅪ(April 1983)。
1 Penrose, "the theory of the growth of the Firm", p88, Oxford University Press,1997
1T·W·舒尔茨.“制度与人的经济价值的不断提高”.《财产权利与制度变迁》中文版,上海三联书店,1991,p34
1马克思,资本论：第一卷[M].中共中央马克思恩格斯列宁斯大林著作编译局译
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1参见Williamson,the theory of the Firm as Governance Structure:from Choice to Contract,Journal of Economic Persperctives,2002a,16(3):171-195.
2古典契约强调的是法律原则、正式文件以及自我清算,即使是陌生人之间也可放心地交易,因为一旦有争议可以提交法律来完美地仲裁,因此适合通过市场来完成。
3一项资产的最优使用与次优使用所产生的价值差额。
1诺思,《经济史中的结构与变迁》,上海三联书店,1991,P148
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1风险的特征是可以通过确定的概率估计的,因此可以预先进行成本分担,而不确定性是指人们缺乏对事件基本性质的知识,对事件可能的结果知之甚少,难以通过现有理论或经验进行预见和定量分析。
2不确定性越大,内置化倾向越明显：交易频率越高,越需内在化；资产专用性越强,越需要内在化。
3 Stven N.S.cheung, "The Contractual Nature of the Firm",Journal of Law and Economics,vol.ⅩⅩⅩⅪ(April 1983)。
1 Penrose, "the theory of the growth of the Firm", p88, Oxford University Press,1997
1T·W·舒尔茨.“制度与人的经济价值的不断提高”.《财产权利与制度变迁》中文版,上海三联书店,1991,p34
1马克思,资本论：第一卷[M].中共中央马克思恩格斯列宁斯大林著作编译局译
2马克思：资本论,第一卷,384页,2004年
1参见Williamson,the theory of the Firm as Governance Structure:from Choice to Contract,Journal of Economic Persperctives,2002a,16(3):171-195.
2古典契约强调的是法律原则、正式文件以及自我清算,即使是陌生人之间也可放心地交易,因为一旦有争议可以提交法律来完美地仲裁,因此适合通过市场来完成。
3一项资产的最优使用与次优使用所产生的价值差额。
1诺思,《经济史中的结构与变迁》,上海三联书店,1991,P148
1芮明杰,《产业经济学》P9,上海财经大学出版社,2005年8月第一版
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