基于合约理论的公私合作制（PPP）研究
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摘要
公私合作制(PPP)作为全世界近十几年来在基础设施及公共服务供给方面增长最快的一种改革机制,指的是由政府发起的,在公共部门和民营机构之间针对特定的新建公共(基础设施)项目所建立的长期性合作伙伴关系,其中主要涉及项目的投融资、建设、运营等责任的授权分配。PPP作为制度创新具有责任整合、风险转移及不完全缔约等三个特征。PPP将市场机制引入公共领域,旨在对公私部门的资源进行有效整合,发挥民营部门的金融及管理资源优势,缓解公共部门的资金约束,实现更高的经济效率。公私合作制有助于解决目前我国经济发展所面临的瓶颈,通过促进基础设施建设的完善以及改进公共服务供给的效率,为经济的可持续发展提供坚实基础。自本世纪初以来,我国政府积极推行公共事业市场化的政策,然而PPP实践却停滞不前甚至出现倒退。究其原因,中国政府、民营投资者及公众对PPP的作用及其运行机制尚缺乏深刻的认识,政策法规方面也存在诸多欠缺,而公共部门本身的机构改革更显得滞后。
本文在已有研究成果的基础上,结合我国的具体经济及制度环境的特点,从PPP最基本的缔约特性出发,以合约不完全为贯穿全文的基本假设,通过构建PPP制度及合约的理论模型,深入分析PPP在实际应用中面临的核心问题,从最优机制设计的角度来探求能够实现社会福利最大化的公共基础设施项目的缔约形式,其中包括控制权如何安排、投资计划如何确定、收益如何分配、风险如何控制,以及如何促进事后的协调。本文的研究不仅静态与动态相结合,而且综合经济因素和政治因素,以求能够切实的为PPP机制应用于中国这样一个特殊的发展中国家提供必要的理论依据,也为政府和民营机构的决策提供重要的参考。
本文主要采用以理论研究为主,案例分析为辅的方法。基本的思路是:对大量文献及案例资料进行调查研究及归纳总结,并确定中国进行公共事业市场化时所具有的制度特征,在此基础上提出本文的研究视角及其主要研究的问题。综合运用博弈论、组织经济学、不完全合约理论、规制经济学、政治经济学等理论,通过构建模型来深入讨论我国在基础设施项目中通过引入民营机构参与进行合理制度创新的必要性,可行性,复杂性;系统研究PPP的合约设计及治理问题,并突出考虑中国的特殊经济与政治环境对于PPP应用的影响。最后总结研究的最终结论,并对未来的研究方向进行展望。
本文主要的研究工作及成果包括:
第二章对PPP的概念、理论基础及相关研究进行系统的梳理总结。通过对PPP的效率来源进行全面考察,确定PPP在一定条件下可以成为有效提供基础设施及公共服务的制度创新,并促进公民所享有的社会福利。由于PPP制度的复杂性,它的实施效率不仅受到政治环境及制度效率的影响,还与PPP的基本特性、具体的合约与规制体系设计、项目风险的配置方式密切相关。合约经济学作为近几十年来迅速发展的经济理论,有助于对公私部门之间所建立的这种综合性的合作模式及其社会效率进行全面深入细致的分析。
第三章将PPP与传统公共供给模式的制度效率进行深入比较,以确定PPP的比较优势以及PPP改革的必要性。在不完全合约的框架内,将建设阶段基础设施的质量及运营阶段公共服务的水平作为构成公共服务供给的社会福利的两个主要方面。通过比较不同的公共服务供给模式,确定PPP制度更有利于激励基础设施项目建设及运营创新从而增进社会福利的条件。结果得到建设创新对运营收益的外部性,创新的社会价值与经济价值之间的一致性,以及公共部门和民营部门的创新能力对比是重要的影响因素,由此确定PPP优于传统公共供给模式的范围。
第四章对以资金计划为核心的PPP合约的政府选择问题展开分析,其中包括资本金投资及项目收益分配的确定,以此探讨实施PPP的可行性。假定资金约束是政府引入民营资本的基础,着重研究不同的合约条件对PPP合约设计的影响。结果发现不论经营收益可否缔约,资金约束和项目风险都是政府引入民营资本的重要因素,更高的民营投资将伴随更多的收益分享。当经营收益不可缔约时,民营资本全额投资并获取全部经营收益的PPP典型合约是有效的政府均衡选择。制度保障的缺失则会导致初始合约的无效并降低民营资本参与的意愿。
第五章对PPP政府信用风险的重要概念进行明确诠释,通过区分两种应用最普遍的PPP合约的政府责任,从制度根源的角度解释政府信用风险产生的前因后果,以此强调PPP改革的复杂性。在政府购买型PPP合约中,假定政府存在私人控制权收益,且在事后再谈判中拥有完全谈判力;在特许经营型PPP合约中,引入政府协助性努力对于经营收益的影响,并构建政府道德风险模型,从而得到不同的政府信用风险作用机理以及社会无效率结果。
第六章针对PPP普遍存在民营机构努力不足以及项目变更导致再谈判成本的情况,探索动态环境下通过缔结隐性合约机制来增进PPP效率的途径,以正式合约与隐性合约互补的形式解决PPP所面临的激励约束和事后不协调问题。结果发现,出于对未来交易收益的考虑,PPP有可能维持隐性合约以促进社会有效的民营机构努力,并使得政府在合约再谈判时获得更多的剩余份额,从而实现更高的社会效率。合约变更概率及其所增加的收益水平更高,或是民营机构通过努力可获得的货币收益更高,都能促进双方隐性合约的建立。。
本文主要具有以下几个创新点:
第一,本文结合现实情况对Hart(2003)和Bennett & Iossa(2006)建立的PPP理论进行扩展,对可提高社会福利的创新性努力的特性以及进行市场化的公共机构目标进行了修正,同时强调公共部门和民营部门在实施创新的经验禀赋方面可能存在系统性的差别,从而更加系统的解释了公私合作制相对于传统公共供给模式的比较优势。
第二,以往对于如何确定公共部门和私人部门之间所建立的资金合约的研究较为缺乏,而往往强调公私合作制的私人融资特性。本文在强调政府面临资金约束的条件下,从政府角度出发解决了在不同合约条件下如何选择PPP资金合约的问题,并证明民营资本进行全额投资并获取全部经营收益的典型PPP合约在一定条件下是一种社会有效率的均衡。
第三,不仅将合约不完全统一作为PPP政府信用风险产生的根源,还区分出两种典型的PPP合约——政府购买PPP合约与基于用户费的特许经营合约中存在的不同的政府信用风险及由此产生的社会无效率,有助于我们理解哪些项目更有利于政府信用风险的控制,并为PPP的实施效率带来更多有益的洞见。
第四,跳出通常研究的PPP正式合约的框架,基于PPP合作的长期性中所包含的重复交易的可能性,探求能够促进PPP事后协调与民营机构努力的隐性合约机制,从而以正式合约与隐性合约互补的形式发掘PPP制度的自我完善途径,解决PPP所面临的激励约束和事后不协调问题。
Being as a reform in infrastructure and public service supply mechanism increasing most rapidly worldwide in the last 10-20 years, Public-Private Partnerships are long-term partnerships between the public sector and private organization launched by the government, which involve assignment of the responsibilities of financing, construction and operation in specific infrastructure project. As institutional innovation, PPPs have three features, responsibility integration, risk transfer and incomplete contract. PPPs lead marketization into public realm in order to integrate the resources in the public and private sectors, take the advantage of private finance and management resources, relax the public financing restriction, so as to fulfill the VFM(Value-For-Money). They contribute to solution to the bottleneck of China’s economy, and provide solid foundation for the persistent economic development through improvement of infrastructure and efficiency of public service. Since the beginning of this century, China’s government actively put the marketization policy of the public sector into effect, in sharp contrast to the status of bog down of PPPs. The reason is that China’s government, investors and citizens all lack deep understanding to the function and its processing mechanism of PPPs. Besides, both the deficiencies of laws and policies and the lag of organizational reform of the public section result in the failure of PPPs’expansion up to now.
The thesis considers concretely the economic and institutional characteristics of China on the foundation of the present literatures. Regarding contracting as the foundation of PPPs, with the basic hypothesis of contractual incompletion throughout the thesis, and by setting up theory models of PPPs institutions and contracts, we investigate the core problem with practical application of PPPs, so as in the direction of superior mechanism design to argue contracting form that fulfills social welfare maximization in an infrastructure project. The contracting solution includes the arrangement of control rights, the decision of investment plan, the allocation of returns and risks, and the promotion of ex post coordination. We not only combines the static and dynamic analysis, but also put economic and political factors together, in order to actually provide necessary theories for PPPs application to such a special developing country as China, together with offering an important reference for the decision-making of government and private organizations.
This thesis is mainly of theoretical research assisted with case study. The essential reasoning in this thesis is, firstly processing research and review of massive literature, and then bringing forward the research standpoint and the issue we mainly investigate, with comprehensive utilization of game theory, organization economics, incomplete contract theory, regulation economics and political economics. We propose theoretical models with references to interrelated literatures, and discuss the necessity, possibility and complexity of private participation in infrastructure as a reasonable institutional innovation in China, with the characteristic of China taking into account. The end passes to the concluding remarks of the thesis.
The main contents and conclusions of the thesis are summarized as follows:
(1) An overview of the concept, theory foundation and related research of PPPs is presented firstly. By review of sources of PPPs’efficiency, we find that PPP can introduce market mechanism to public realm, and utilize the management and financial resources in the private sector. Under certain condition PPPs could be the institutional innovation to improve the efficiency of infrastructure and public service supply, and then to promote social welfare citizens possess. According to the complexity of PPPs, The implemented efficiency of PPPs is not only under the influence of political environment and institutional quality, but also is connected with the essential characteristics of PPPs, contracts and regulations design, and allocation of project risks. As an economic theory developed rapidly in the last several dacades, contract economics is really helpful to investigate the integrated cooperative mechanism established between public and private section.
(2) Chaper 3 investigates the relative advantage of PPPs as an institutional choice, so as to ensure the necessity of the PPP reform. Assume the contract is incomplete, and quality of the infrastructure and the public service are both source of social welfare in public service supply. We analyze when PPP is more favorable to promote the innovations in the infrastructure project by comparing different modes of public services supply. We find that the positive externality of the construction innovation to the operations revenue, the consistency of the social value and the financial value of the innovations, and the innovational capability advantage of the private partner are important factors. The scope of PPP dominating traditional public supply mode is hence induced.
(3) Chaper 4 solves the PPP financial contract choice for the government, including the investment arrangement and operational revenue allocation, in order to prove the feasibility of PPP implementation. Assuming that financial restriction is main reason of cooperation between the government and the private finance, we focus on the effect of informational contracting condition on a PPP contract and its efficiency. The result shows that, no matter whether the operational revenue is contractible, the financial restriction and project risks are both factors influencing the choice the government makes to introduce private finance. More private finance means more revenue sharing. When the operational revenue is uncontractible, the typical PPP contract that private organizations finance all the project investment and gain all the operational revenues is both optimal choice of the government and social efficient. Besides, the limitation of institutional guarantee could cause invalidation of the initial contract and reduce the participation desire of the private finance.
(4) Chapter 5 classifies two different kinds of government responsibilities in the most prevalent contract forms of PPPs on the foundation of explicit definition of government commitment risk, and explains the reason why government commitment risk arises by analyzing the institutional origin. Assuming that the government agent has private benefit of control rights and has full bargaining power in renegotiation, we analyze the logics of PPP commitment risk and the social inefficiency it causes. In concession contracts of PPPs, by introducing government’s assistant effort which influence the operational payoff, we propose a moral hazard model with the government to induce another kind of social inefficiency of PPPs.
(5) Due to the suboptimal effort level of the private agent and the renegotiation cost of project modification in the formal PPP contracts, chapter 6 investigates the likelihood of implicit contracting mechanism of PPPs in dynamic setting, and solves the incentive restriction and ex post maladjustment problems of PPPs with the interplay of implicit contract and explicit contract. The result shows that, considering the potential transaction payoffs in the future, the implicit contract can sustain in PPPs to promote the social effective effort level of private agent under certain conditions, and endow the government with more surplus share when renegotiation, therefore to fulfill more effective social welfare. Higher possibility of contract modification or more surplus improved, or higher monetary payoff share the private agent can gain via her effort, are the driving force to establish implicit contract in PPPs.
The main innovations of this thesis include:
(1) This thesis extends the theories of PPPs founded by Hart(2003)and Bennett & Iossa(2006), making reasonable modifications to the innovative efforts of private agents and reformed public agents, emphasizing at the same time possibility of systemic distinction in the public and private sectors when implementing innovations. The relative advantage of PPPs is hence clarified, along with the necessay conditions to establish a PPP.
(2) Literature in financial contracts of PPPs between public and private sector are almost absent, and the private financing character of PPPs is always overemphasized. So the thesis solve how to choose the optimal financial contract of PPPs in different contracting conditions as a government agent with financial difficulty, and prove that the typical PPP contract that the private organizations finance all the project investment and gain all the operational revenues is a social efficient equilibrium.
(3) The thesis takes the contractual incompleteness as a common origin of different government commitment problems based on two kinds of PPP contracts--- government purchasing contracts and concession contracts, and clarify the social inefficiency it causes. The research is helpful for the control of government commitment risk, and provides insights to the efficiency of PPPs reform.
(4) The thesis investigates the implicit contracting mechanism to facilitate ex post adaptation and private effort on the foundation of repeat transactions possibility in PPPs long-term cooperation. This is a breakthrough from the formal contracting research of PPP. Therefore, the interplay of implicit contract and explicit contract is a effective way to improve PPPs’to solve the incentive restriction and ex post maladjustment problems.
本文在已有研究成果的基础上,结合我国的具体经济及制度环境的特点,从PPP最基本的缔约特性出发,以合约不完全为贯穿全文的基本假设,通过构建PPP制度及合约的理论模型,深入分析PPP在实际应用中面临的核心问题,从最优机制设计的角度来探求能够实现社会福利最大化的公共基础设施项目的缔约形式,其中包括控制权如何安排、投资计划如何确定、收益如何分配、风险如何控制,以及如何促进事后的协调。本文的研究不仅静态与动态相结合,而且综合经济因素和政治因素,以求能够切实的为PPP机制应用于中国这样一个特殊的发展中国家提供必要的理论依据,也为政府和民营机构的决策提供重要的参考。
本文主要采用以理论研究为主,案例分析为辅的方法。基本的思路是:对大量文献及案例资料进行调查研究及归纳总结,并确定中国进行公共事业市场化时所具有的制度特征,在此基础上提出本文的研究视角及其主要研究的问题。综合运用博弈论、组织经济学、不完全合约理论、规制经济学、政治经济学等理论,通过构建模型来深入讨论我国在基础设施项目中通过引入民营机构参与进行合理制度创新的必要性,可行性,复杂性;系统研究PPP的合约设计及治理问题,并突出考虑中国的特殊经济与政治环境对于PPP应用的影响。最后总结研究的最终结论,并对未来的研究方向进行展望。
本文主要的研究工作及成果包括:
第二章对PPP的概念、理论基础及相关研究进行系统的梳理总结。通过对PPP的效率来源进行全面考察,确定PPP在一定条件下可以成为有效提供基础设施及公共服务的制度创新,并促进公民所享有的社会福利。由于PPP制度的复杂性,它的实施效率不仅受到政治环境及制度效率的影响,还与PPP的基本特性、具体的合约与规制体系设计、项目风险的配置方式密切相关。合约经济学作为近几十年来迅速发展的经济理论,有助于对公私部门之间所建立的这种综合性的合作模式及其社会效率进行全面深入细致的分析。
第三章将PPP与传统公共供给模式的制度效率进行深入比较,以确定PPP的比较优势以及PPP改革的必要性。在不完全合约的框架内,将建设阶段基础设施的质量及运营阶段公共服务的水平作为构成公共服务供给的社会福利的两个主要方面。通过比较不同的公共服务供给模式,确定PPP制度更有利于激励基础设施项目建设及运营创新从而增进社会福利的条件。结果得到建设创新对运营收益的外部性,创新的社会价值与经济价值之间的一致性,以及公共部门和民营部门的创新能力对比是重要的影响因素,由此确定PPP优于传统公共供给模式的范围。
第四章对以资金计划为核心的PPP合约的政府选择问题展开分析,其中包括资本金投资及项目收益分配的确定,以此探讨实施PPP的可行性。假定资金约束是政府引入民营资本的基础,着重研究不同的合约条件对PPP合约设计的影响。结果发现不论经营收益可否缔约,资金约束和项目风险都是政府引入民营资本的重要因素,更高的民营投资将伴随更多的收益分享。当经营收益不可缔约时,民营资本全额投资并获取全部经营收益的PPP典型合约是有效的政府均衡选择。制度保障的缺失则会导致初始合约的无效并降低民营资本参与的意愿。
第五章对PPP政府信用风险的重要概念进行明确诠释,通过区分两种应用最普遍的PPP合约的政府责任,从制度根源的角度解释政府信用风险产生的前因后果,以此强调PPP改革的复杂性。在政府购买型PPP合约中,假定政府存在私人控制权收益,且在事后再谈判中拥有完全谈判力;在特许经营型PPP合约中,引入政府协助性努力对于经营收益的影响,并构建政府道德风险模型,从而得到不同的政府信用风险作用机理以及社会无效率结果。
第六章针对PPP普遍存在民营机构努力不足以及项目变更导致再谈判成本的情况,探索动态环境下通过缔结隐性合约机制来增进PPP效率的途径,以正式合约与隐性合约互补的形式解决PPP所面临的激励约束和事后不协调问题。结果发现,出于对未来交易收益的考虑,PPP有可能维持隐性合约以促进社会有效的民营机构努力,并使得政府在合约再谈判时获得更多的剩余份额,从而实现更高的社会效率。合约变更概率及其所增加的收益水平更高,或是民营机构通过努力可获得的货币收益更高,都能促进双方隐性合约的建立。。
本文主要具有以下几个创新点:
第一,本文结合现实情况对Hart(2003)和Bennett & Iossa(2006)建立的PPP理论进行扩展,对可提高社会福利的创新性努力的特性以及进行市场化的公共机构目标进行了修正,同时强调公共部门和民营部门在实施创新的经验禀赋方面可能存在系统性的差别,从而更加系统的解释了公私合作制相对于传统公共供给模式的比较优势。
第二,以往对于如何确定公共部门和私人部门之间所建立的资金合约的研究较为缺乏,而往往强调公私合作制的私人融资特性。本文在强调政府面临资金约束的条件下,从政府角度出发解决了在不同合约条件下如何选择PPP资金合约的问题,并证明民营资本进行全额投资并获取全部经营收益的典型PPP合约在一定条件下是一种社会有效率的均衡。
第三,不仅将合约不完全统一作为PPP政府信用风险产生的根源,还区分出两种典型的PPP合约——政府购买PPP合约与基于用户费的特许经营合约中存在的不同的政府信用风险及由此产生的社会无效率,有助于我们理解哪些项目更有利于政府信用风险的控制,并为PPP的实施效率带来更多有益的洞见。
第四,跳出通常研究的PPP正式合约的框架,基于PPP合作的长期性中所包含的重复交易的可能性,探求能够促进PPP事后协调与民营机构努力的隐性合约机制,从而以正式合约与隐性合约互补的形式发掘PPP制度的自我完善途径,解决PPP所面临的激励约束和事后不协调问题。
Being as a reform in infrastructure and public service supply mechanism increasing most rapidly worldwide in the last 10-20 years, Public-Private Partnerships are long-term partnerships between the public sector and private organization launched by the government, which involve assignment of the responsibilities of financing, construction and operation in specific infrastructure project. As institutional innovation, PPPs have three features, responsibility integration, risk transfer and incomplete contract. PPPs lead marketization into public realm in order to integrate the resources in the public and private sectors, take the advantage of private finance and management resources, relax the public financing restriction, so as to fulfill the VFM(Value-For-Money). They contribute to solution to the bottleneck of China’s economy, and provide solid foundation for the persistent economic development through improvement of infrastructure and efficiency of public service. Since the beginning of this century, China’s government actively put the marketization policy of the public sector into effect, in sharp contrast to the status of bog down of PPPs. The reason is that China’s government, investors and citizens all lack deep understanding to the function and its processing mechanism of PPPs. Besides, both the deficiencies of laws and policies and the lag of organizational reform of the public section result in the failure of PPPs’expansion up to now.
The thesis considers concretely the economic and institutional characteristics of China on the foundation of the present literatures. Regarding contracting as the foundation of PPPs, with the basic hypothesis of contractual incompletion throughout the thesis, and by setting up theory models of PPPs institutions and contracts, we investigate the core problem with practical application of PPPs, so as in the direction of superior mechanism design to argue contracting form that fulfills social welfare maximization in an infrastructure project. The contracting solution includes the arrangement of control rights, the decision of investment plan, the allocation of returns and risks, and the promotion of ex post coordination. We not only combines the static and dynamic analysis, but also put economic and political factors together, in order to actually provide necessary theories for PPPs application to such a special developing country as China, together with offering an important reference for the decision-making of government and private organizations.
This thesis is mainly of theoretical research assisted with case study. The essential reasoning in this thesis is, firstly processing research and review of massive literature, and then bringing forward the research standpoint and the issue we mainly investigate, with comprehensive utilization of game theory, organization economics, incomplete contract theory, regulation economics and political economics. We propose theoretical models with references to interrelated literatures, and discuss the necessity, possibility and complexity of private participation in infrastructure as a reasonable institutional innovation in China, with the characteristic of China taking into account. The end passes to the concluding remarks of the thesis.
The main contents and conclusions of the thesis are summarized as follows:
(1) An overview of the concept, theory foundation and related research of PPPs is presented firstly. By review of sources of PPPs’efficiency, we find that PPP can introduce market mechanism to public realm, and utilize the management and financial resources in the private sector. Under certain condition PPPs could be the institutional innovation to improve the efficiency of infrastructure and public service supply, and then to promote social welfare citizens possess. According to the complexity of PPPs, The implemented efficiency of PPPs is not only under the influence of political environment and institutional quality, but also is connected with the essential characteristics of PPPs, contracts and regulations design, and allocation of project risks. As an economic theory developed rapidly in the last several dacades, contract economics is really helpful to investigate the integrated cooperative mechanism established between public and private section.
(2) Chaper 3 investigates the relative advantage of PPPs as an institutional choice, so as to ensure the necessity of the PPP reform. Assume the contract is incomplete, and quality of the infrastructure and the public service are both source of social welfare in public service supply. We analyze when PPP is more favorable to promote the innovations in the infrastructure project by comparing different modes of public services supply. We find that the positive externality of the construction innovation to the operations revenue, the consistency of the social value and the financial value of the innovations, and the innovational capability advantage of the private partner are important factors. The scope of PPP dominating traditional public supply mode is hence induced.
(3) Chaper 4 solves the PPP financial contract choice for the government, including the investment arrangement and operational revenue allocation, in order to prove the feasibility of PPP implementation. Assuming that financial restriction is main reason of cooperation between the government and the private finance, we focus on the effect of informational contracting condition on a PPP contract and its efficiency. The result shows that, no matter whether the operational revenue is contractible, the financial restriction and project risks are both factors influencing the choice the government makes to introduce private finance. More private finance means more revenue sharing. When the operational revenue is uncontractible, the typical PPP contract that private organizations finance all the project investment and gain all the operational revenues is both optimal choice of the government and social efficient. Besides, the limitation of institutional guarantee could cause invalidation of the initial contract and reduce the participation desire of the private finance.
(4) Chapter 5 classifies two different kinds of government responsibilities in the most prevalent contract forms of PPPs on the foundation of explicit definition of government commitment risk, and explains the reason why government commitment risk arises by analyzing the institutional origin. Assuming that the government agent has private benefit of control rights and has full bargaining power in renegotiation, we analyze the logics of PPP commitment risk and the social inefficiency it causes. In concession contracts of PPPs, by introducing government’s assistant effort which influence the operational payoff, we propose a moral hazard model with the government to induce another kind of social inefficiency of PPPs.
(5) Due to the suboptimal effort level of the private agent and the renegotiation cost of project modification in the formal PPP contracts, chapter 6 investigates the likelihood of implicit contracting mechanism of PPPs in dynamic setting, and solves the incentive restriction and ex post maladjustment problems of PPPs with the interplay of implicit contract and explicit contract. The result shows that, considering the potential transaction payoffs in the future, the implicit contract can sustain in PPPs to promote the social effective effort level of private agent under certain conditions, and endow the government with more surplus share when renegotiation, therefore to fulfill more effective social welfare. Higher possibility of contract modification or more surplus improved, or higher monetary payoff share the private agent can gain via her effort, are the driving force to establish implicit contract in PPPs.
The main innovations of this thesis include:
(1) This thesis extends the theories of PPPs founded by Hart(2003)and Bennett & Iossa(2006), making reasonable modifications to the innovative efforts of private agents and reformed public agents, emphasizing at the same time possibility of systemic distinction in the public and private sectors when implementing innovations. The relative advantage of PPPs is hence clarified, along with the necessay conditions to establish a PPP.
(2) Literature in financial contracts of PPPs between public and private sector are almost absent, and the private financing character of PPPs is always overemphasized. So the thesis solve how to choose the optimal financial contract of PPPs in different contracting conditions as a government agent with financial difficulty, and prove that the typical PPP contract that the private organizations finance all the project investment and gain all the operational revenues is a social efficient equilibrium.
(3) The thesis takes the contractual incompleteness as a common origin of different government commitment problems based on two kinds of PPP contracts--- government purchasing contracts and concession contracts, and clarify the social inefficiency it causes. The research is helpful for the control of government commitment risk, and provides insights to the efficiency of PPPs reform.
(4) The thesis investigates the implicit contracting mechanism to facilitate ex post adaptation and private effort on the foundation of repeat transactions possibility in PPPs long-term cooperation. This is a breakthrough from the formal contracting research of PPP. Therefore, the interplay of implicit contract and explicit contract is a effective way to improve PPPs’to solve the incentive restriction and ex post maladjustment problems.
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