基于公司治理的管理会计方法创新研究
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摘要
公司治理的初衷是对代理者的分权制衡。董事会接受股东大会的委托对经营者实行监督和对企业的战略决策进行指导，经营者接受董事会的任命对企业的日常经营活动进行管理。可事实上却是：经营者不仅承担了管理企业日常经营活动的任务，而且成为企业事实上的战略决策者，董事会远离了企业的战略决策过程，成为一个“橡皮图章”。我们称这种公司治理为管理型公司治理。由于管理型公司治理建立的是一种以经营者为中心的封闭的决策体系，致使公司治理中产生不了有效的管理会计信息需求，从而使得管理会计只是充当了一个“内部警察”角色——满足公司管理的需求。经济的发展、科技的进步，使得传统的依赖于管理者个人能力的封闭的决策体系日益不能适应复杂多变的经营环境，客观上要求决策以制度化的方式独立出来，逐渐地一种新的公司治理理念凸现——治理型公司治理。随着管理型公司治理向治理型公司治理的演进，公司治理的核心功能从权力制衡转移到决策科学化，公司治理的对象从管理者个人转移到决策，决策成为不同利益相关者交换信息、增进沟通的平台。由于治理型公司治理建立的是一种开放的决策体系，因此使公司治理中产生了有效的管理会计信息需求，在需求的驱动下使管理会计面临着角色转换——从“内部警察”上升为“决策者的战略性伙伴”。
反观我国国有上市公司内部治理弱化、外部治理虚化及我国管理会计学术研究兴趣不高、实务界不重视的现状，完善公司治理，构建治理型公司治理，造就有效的管理会计信息需求；进行基于公司治理层面的管理会计方法创新，提供有效的管理会计信息供给，就成为我们的理智选择。
打破“股东至上主义”逻辑，构造共同治理模式；加强董事会、监事会的建设及职责定位；改善公司外部环境是我们完善公司治理的基本思路。构建可持续发展的战略业绩评价体系和基薪+风险收入+股票期权三位一体的报酬契约，以及把董事会业绩评价提上议事日程，是我们进行的基于公司治理层面的管理会计方法创新。
The original intention of corporate governance is the decentralization of agents. The Board of directors, who is entrusted by stockholder's meeting, supervises the manager and supply directions for strategic decisions .The manager, who is appointed by the board of directors, manages the daily activities of a corporation. But in fact, the manager not only undertakes the task of daily activities, but also becomes the person who makes strategic decisions, In this occasion, board of directors go far away the process of strategic decisions and become a "rubber stamp". This kind of corporate governance is called managed corporate governance. Because this kind of corporate governance is a closed decision-making system, and the manager is the center of this system. So effective managerial accounting information can't appear in corporate governance, and management accountant only acts as "internal police" -meaning the demand of corporate management. With the development of economics and advancement of technology, the
traditional closed decision-making system, which is dependent on the manager's ability, can't adapt to the variable activity environment. It demands objectively that decision-making should separate as a style of systematization. Gradually a new kind of corporate governance appears -governed corporate governance. With the change from managed corporate governance to governed corporate governance, the core function of corporate governance changes from decentralization to decision-making scientifically. The object of corporate governance changes from management individual to decision-making and decision-making becomes the flat form of different benefit-related persons exchanging their information and increasing communication, and because governed corporate governance sets up an open decision-making system, so the effective demand of managerial accounting information come out in corporate governance. Under the drive of demand, management accountants have to change their roles-from "internal police" to "strategic
partner of decision makers".
Looking back at the weakness of internal governance in corporation and on the market, the nominal external governance, and the present situation of little interest in managerial accounting academic research and practice, our wise choices are perfecting corporate governance, constructing governed corporate governance, creating demand of
effective managerial accounting information, making innovations on managerial accounting method based on corporate governance and supplying effective managerial accounting information.
Breaking out the logic of " shareholders are supreme", constructing a model of co-governance, strengthening the construction and duty location of board of directors and board of supervisors, and improving the external environment of corporation are our basic thoughts of improving corporate governance. Constructing sustained development strategic performance appraisal system and the compensation contract of basic salary plus risk revenue plus stock options as a whole and placing the performance appraisal of board of directors on the agenda are our managerial accounting method innovations based on corporate governance.
反观我国国有上市公司内部治理弱化、外部治理虚化及我国管理会计学术研究兴趣不高、实务界不重视的现状，完善公司治理，构建治理型公司治理，造就有效的管理会计信息需求；进行基于公司治理层面的管理会计方法创新，提供有效的管理会计信息供给，就成为我们的理智选择。
打破“股东至上主义”逻辑，构造共同治理模式；加强董事会、监事会的建设及职责定位；改善公司外部环境是我们完善公司治理的基本思路。构建可持续发展的战略业绩评价体系和基薪+风险收入+股票期权三位一体的报酬契约，以及把董事会业绩评价提上议事日程，是我们进行的基于公司治理层面的管理会计方法创新。
The original intention of corporate governance is the decentralization of agents. The Board of directors, who is entrusted by stockholder's meeting, supervises the manager and supply directions for strategic decisions .The manager, who is appointed by the board of directors, manages the daily activities of a corporation. But in fact, the manager not only undertakes the task of daily activities, but also becomes the person who makes strategic decisions, In this occasion, board of directors go far away the process of strategic decisions and become a "rubber stamp". This kind of corporate governance is called managed corporate governance. Because this kind of corporate governance is a closed decision-making system, and the manager is the center of this system. So effective managerial accounting information can't appear in corporate governance, and management accountant only acts as "internal police" -meaning the demand of corporate management. With the development of economics and advancement of technology, the
traditional closed decision-making system, which is dependent on the manager's ability, can't adapt to the variable activity environment. It demands objectively that decision-making should separate as a style of systematization. Gradually a new kind of corporate governance appears -governed corporate governance. With the change from managed corporate governance to governed corporate governance, the core function of corporate governance changes from decentralization to decision-making scientifically. The object of corporate governance changes from management individual to decision-making and decision-making becomes the flat form of different benefit-related persons exchanging their information and increasing communication, and because governed corporate governance sets up an open decision-making system, so the effective demand of managerial accounting information come out in corporate governance. Under the drive of demand, management accountants have to change their roles-from "internal police" to "strategic
partner of decision makers".
Looking back at the weakness of internal governance in corporation and on the market, the nominal external governance, and the present situation of little interest in managerial accounting academic research and practice, our wise choices are perfecting corporate governance, constructing governed corporate governance, creating demand of
effective managerial accounting information, making innovations on managerial accounting method based on corporate governance and supplying effective managerial accounting information.
Breaking out the logic of " shareholders are supreme", constructing a model of co-governance, strengthening the construction and duty location of board of directors and board of supervisors, and improving the external environment of corporation are our basic thoughts of improving corporate governance. Constructing sustained development strategic performance appraisal system and the compensation contract of basic salary plus risk revenue plus stock options as a whole and placing the performance appraisal of board of directors on the agenda are our managerial accounting method innovations based on corporate governance.
引文
[1] 吴敬链．现代公司与企业改革．第一版．天津：天津人民出版社，1994
[2] 施路，对我国公司治理结构与模式的思考．世界经济文汇，2001(4)：10～11
[3] 李维安，武立东，公司治理教程．第一版．上海：上海人民出版社，2002
[4] 吴淑琨，席酉民．公司治理与中国企业改革．第一版．北京：机械工业出版社，2001
[5] [日]青木昌彦，钱颖一．转轨经济中的公司治理结构．第一版．北京：中国经济出版社，1995
[6] Barton K, Boyd. Board Control and CEO Compensation. Strategic Management Journal, 1994, 30(6): 18～20
[7] John Pound. The Promise of the Governed Corporation. Harvard Business Review, 1995,40(8): 30～40
[8] 李维安．公司治理．第一版．天津：南开大学出版社，2001
[9] Brancato, Carolyn Kay. Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance. The First Edition. New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc, 1997
[10] Stanley C., Vanc. Corporate Governance: Assessing Corporate Performance By Board Room Attributes. Journal of Business Research, 1978, 70(6):200～203
[11] 杨惠敏．公司治理、企业管理与会计信息系统．会计研究，2000(6)：20～23
[12] William R. Scott. Financial Accounting Theory. The First Edition. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall International, Inc, 1998
[13] 周其仁．市场里的企业：一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约．经济研究，1996(6)：30～35
[14] 胡玉明，高级成本管理会计．第一版．厦门：厦门出版社，2002
[15] 史习民．完善公司治理与管理会计创新．会计研究，2001(4)：20～23
[16] 石本仁．公司治理与中国会计改革．第一版．广东：广东人民出版社，2000
[17] Robert S. Kaplan. Anthony A. Atkinson. Advanced Management Accounting. The Third Edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1998
[18] Yakor Amihud, B. Lev. Risk Reduction as A Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers. Bell Journal of Economics, 1987, 60(3):50～55
[19] 梁能．公司治理结构：中国的实践与美国的经验．第一版．北京：中国人民大学出版社，2000
[20]Prentice D. Some Aspects of the Corporate Governance Debate. Contemporary Issues in Corernance. The Secend Edition. Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1993
[21]朱启明，肖省成．论管理思想演变与管理会计创新．湖南财经专科学校学报，2002(2)：15～18
[22]芮明杰．管理学—现代的观点．第一版．上海：上海人民出版社，1999
[23]曹元坤．管理方式变革论．第一版．北京：经济科学出版社，1999
[24]Michael Useem, Edward H. Bowman. Us Institutional Investors Look at Corporate Governance In the 1990s. European Management Journal, 1993, 100(9): 20～25
[25]Hart. Oliver. Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implication. The Economic Journal, 1995, 105(5): 56～59
[26]朱启明，肖省成．论公司治理与管理会计—从公司治理演变看管理会计发展．理财与效益，2002(4)：20～23
[27]Kuhne R. J. Co-dermination in Business: Worker's Representatives in the Board Room. The First Edition. New York: Prager, 1989,
[28]Siegel. The Practice Analysis of Management Accounting. Institute of Management Accountants, 1986, 80(3): 15～17
[29]蔡建春，李汉铃．中国上市公司治理的演进、现状及其改善．管理世界，2002(9)：30～35
[30]杨瑞龙，周业安．企业利益相关者理论及其应用．第一版．北京：经济科学出版社，2000
[31]孟焰．面向二十一世纪的中国管理会计．见：管理会计与应用专题(1999)．北京：中国财政经济出版社，2000
[32]暨南大学管理会计课题组．中国管理会计——透视与展望．会计研究，1995(11)：40～43
[33]南京大学国际会计系课题组．会计在工业企业管理决策与控制中地位与作用调查总报告．会计研究，1997(12)：20～25
[34]杨雄胜．中国管理会计作用：现状与基本出路．见：管理会计与应用专题(1999)．北京：中国财政经济出版社，2000
[35]冯巧根．管理会计应用与发展的典型案例研究—一种理论与实践综合的视角．第一版．北京：经济科学出版社，2002
[36]戴铭川．我国管理会计发展滞后的需求供给观．广东财会，2002(3)：10～13
[37]李维安．中国上市公司内部治理的实证分析．管理世界，1996(6)：30～33
[38]何浚．上市公司治理结构的实证分析．经济研究，1998(5)：10～15
[39]王智慧．上市公司治理结构与战略绩效研究．第一版．北京：对外经济贸易大学出版社，2002
[40]杨瑞龙，周业安．企业共同治理的经济学分析．第一版．北京：经济科学出版社，2001
[41]Milgron. Paul, Roberts. Economics、Organization and Management. The Second Edition. New Jersey: Prentic-Hall International, 1992
[42]Walter J, Salmon. Corporate Governance. The First Edition. New York: Basil Blackwell, Inc, 1995
[43]Fredman. Strategic Management: A-Stokeholder Approach. The Second Edition. Boston: Pitman, 1984
[44]黄群慧．企业家激励约束与国有企业改革．第一版．北京：中国人民大学出版社，2000
[45]李苹莉，宁超．关于经营者业绩评价的思考．会计研究，2000(5)：22～27
[46]财政部统计评价司．企业效绩评价问答．第一版．北京：经济科学出版社，1999
[47]宋力，王艳飞．浅论企业战略性业绩评价的指标设置．财经问题研究，2000(8)：5～8
[48]潘飞．管理会计应用与发展的典型案例研究—预算管理与绩效评估案例．第一版．北京：中国财政经济出版社，2002
[49]孙茂竹．管理会计的理论思考与架构．第一版．北京：中国人民大学出版社，2002
[50]陈共荣，刘应文．修订后企业效绩评价指标体系解读．四川会计，2003(1)：20～22
[51]Jay A. Conger, David Finegold, Edward E. LaMer. Appraising Boardroom Performance. Harvard Business Review, 1998, 70(3): 24～26
[52]Robertk, Muller. Are Directors Boardworthy?-A Report Card for Board Members. Management Review. American Management Association, 1976, 58(4): 40～46
[53]Ada Demb, Friedrich, Neubauer. How Can the Board Add Value. European Management Journal, 1990, 90(6): 30～36
[54]潘秀丽．业绩衡量标准与管理人员报酬契约．会计研究，2002(7)：10～15
[2] 施路，对我国公司治理结构与模式的思考．世界经济文汇，2001(4)：10～11
[3] 李维安，武立东，公司治理教程．第一版．上海：上海人民出版社，2002
[4] 吴淑琨，席酉民．公司治理与中国企业改革．第一版．北京：机械工业出版社，2001
[5] [日]青木昌彦，钱颖一．转轨经济中的公司治理结构．第一版．北京：中国经济出版社，1995
[6] Barton K, Boyd. Board Control and CEO Compensation. Strategic Management Journal, 1994, 30(6): 18～20
[7] John Pound. The Promise of the Governed Corporation. Harvard Business Review, 1995,40(8): 30～40
[8] 李维安．公司治理．第一版．天津：南开大学出版社，2001
[9] Brancato, Carolyn Kay. Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance. The First Edition. New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc, 1997
[10] Stanley C., Vanc. Corporate Governance: Assessing Corporate Performance By Board Room Attributes. Journal of Business Research, 1978, 70(6):200～203
[11] 杨惠敏．公司治理、企业管理与会计信息系统．会计研究，2000(6)：20～23
[12] William R. Scott. Financial Accounting Theory. The First Edition. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall International, Inc, 1998
[13] 周其仁．市场里的企业：一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约．经济研究，1996(6)：30～35
[14] 胡玉明，高级成本管理会计．第一版．厦门：厦门出版社，2002
[15] 史习民．完善公司治理与管理会计创新．会计研究，2001(4)：20～23
[16] 石本仁．公司治理与中国会计改革．第一版．广东：广东人民出版社，2000
[17] Robert S. Kaplan. Anthony A. Atkinson. Advanced Management Accounting. The Third Edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1998
[18] Yakor Amihud, B. Lev. Risk Reduction as A Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers. Bell Journal of Economics, 1987, 60(3):50～55
[19] 梁能．公司治理结构：中国的实践与美国的经验．第一版．北京：中国人民大学出版社，2000
[20]Prentice D. Some Aspects of the Corporate Governance Debate. Contemporary Issues in Corernance. The Secend Edition. Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1993
[21]朱启明，肖省成．论管理思想演变与管理会计创新．湖南财经专科学校学报，2002(2)：15～18
[22]芮明杰．管理学—现代的观点．第一版．上海：上海人民出版社，1999
[23]曹元坤．管理方式变革论．第一版．北京：经济科学出版社，1999
[24]Michael Useem, Edward H. Bowman. Us Institutional Investors Look at Corporate Governance In the 1990s. European Management Journal, 1993, 100(9): 20～25
[25]Hart. Oliver. Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implication. The Economic Journal, 1995, 105(5): 56～59
[26]朱启明，肖省成．论公司治理与管理会计—从公司治理演变看管理会计发展．理财与效益，2002(4)：20～23
[27]Kuhne R. J. Co-dermination in Business: Worker's Representatives in the Board Room. The First Edition. New York: Prager, 1989,
[28]Siegel. The Practice Analysis of Management Accounting. Institute of Management Accountants, 1986, 80(3): 15～17
[29]蔡建春，李汉铃．中国上市公司治理的演进、现状及其改善．管理世界，2002(9)：30～35
[30]杨瑞龙，周业安．企业利益相关者理论及其应用．第一版．北京：经济科学出版社，2000
[31]孟焰．面向二十一世纪的中国管理会计．见：管理会计与应用专题(1999)．北京：中国财政经济出版社，2000
[32]暨南大学管理会计课题组．中国管理会计——透视与展望．会计研究，1995(11)：40～43
[33]南京大学国际会计系课题组．会计在工业企业管理决策与控制中地位与作用调查总报告．会计研究，1997(12)：20～25
[34]杨雄胜．中国管理会计作用：现状与基本出路．见：管理会计与应用专题(1999)．北京：中国财政经济出版社，2000
[35]冯巧根．管理会计应用与发展的典型案例研究—一种理论与实践综合的视角．第一版．北京：经济科学出版社，2002
[36]戴铭川．我国管理会计发展滞后的需求供给观．广东财会，2002(3)：10～13
[37]李维安．中国上市公司内部治理的实证分析．管理世界，1996(6)：30～33
[38]何浚．上市公司治理结构的实证分析．经济研究，1998(5)：10～15
[39]王智慧．上市公司治理结构与战略绩效研究．第一版．北京：对外经济贸易大学出版社，2002
[40]杨瑞龙，周业安．企业共同治理的经济学分析．第一版．北京：经济科学出版社，2001
[41]Milgron. Paul, Roberts. Economics、Organization and Management. The Second Edition. New Jersey: Prentic-Hall International, 1992
[42]Walter J, Salmon. Corporate Governance. The First Edition. New York: Basil Blackwell, Inc, 1995
[43]Fredman. Strategic Management: A-Stokeholder Approach. The Second Edition. Boston: Pitman, 1984
[44]黄群慧．企业家激励约束与国有企业改革．第一版．北京：中国人民大学出版社，2000
[45]李苹莉，宁超．关于经营者业绩评价的思考．会计研究，2000(5)：22～27
[46]财政部统计评价司．企业效绩评价问答．第一版．北京：经济科学出版社，1999
[47]宋力，王艳飞．浅论企业战略性业绩评价的指标设置．财经问题研究，2000(8)：5～8
[48]潘飞．管理会计应用与发展的典型案例研究—预算管理与绩效评估案例．第一版．北京：中国财政经济出版社，2002
[49]孙茂竹．管理会计的理论思考与架构．第一版．北京：中国人民大学出版社，2002
[50]陈共荣，刘应文．修订后企业效绩评价指标体系解读．四川会计，2003(1)：20～22
[51]Jay A. Conger, David Finegold, Edward E. LaMer. Appraising Boardroom Performance. Harvard Business Review, 1998, 70(3): 24～26
[52]Robertk, Muller. Are Directors Boardworthy?-A Report Card for Board Members. Management Review. American Management Association, 1976, 58(4): 40～46
[53]Ada Demb, Friedrich, Neubauer. How Can the Board Add Value. European Management Journal, 1990, 90(6): 30～36
[54]潘秀丽．业绩衡量标准与管理人员报酬契约．会计研究，2002(7)：10～15