基于DK动机公平模型的互惠效应研究
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摘要
如何有效激励员工，调和企业内部矛盾是管理学研究的主要问题。传统经济理论从完全理性“经济人”假定出发，通过精美的契约安排来达到这一目的；然而大量的生活现象、心理直觉以及实验证据都表明，人们不仅仅关心自身的物质利益，还关心他人的福利水平，并对他人行为背后的动机感兴趣。Rabin最先捕捉到了这种心理博弈的过程，并将其刻画为“以善报善，以恶报恶”的动机公平偏好，建立了著名的动机公平博弈模型，开创了行为博弈理论的新方向。Dufwenberg和Kirchsteiger继承了Rabin的思想，将动机公平模型扩展到动态策略环境中，而本文正是在Dufwenberg和Kirchsteiger动机公平模型基础上，从激励与利益协调两个角度对参与者的互惠偏好效应进行刻画，一方面为经典激励契约的理论与实践不一致的现象提供解释，另一方面为我国企业的激励机制设计、决策制定以及企业文化构建等提供建议。
首先，本文在Dufwenberg和Kirchsteiger动机公平模型基础上，研究在完全信息条件和不完全信息条件下，参与者在动态策略环境中的互惠激励效应。结果表明，在完全信息条件下，当代理人具有足够的互惠偏好时，委托人将放弃强制契约，并赋予代理人更大的自由；当委托人具有互惠偏好时，代理人在最后一期博弈之前将产生讨好委托人的动机，并且这种动机将有效激励代理人努力工作。在不完全信息条件下，相对于理性假设下的最优情况而言，代理人互惠偏好的植入能够在不降低其努力水平的前提下，使委托人获得改善其物质效用收益的可能。从本质上而言，这一结论描述了在不同信息条件下合作性均衡的存在性，明确了人性化管理在企业中的重要性。
其次，本文对互惠偏好的利益协调效应研究集中在利益差距收敛与消极互惠弱化两个领域，前者从委托人互惠角度论证，后者从代理人互惠角度阐述。在利益差距收敛效应研究中，本文在Dufwenberg和Kirchsteiger动机公平模型的基础上，构建了互惠性管理者与员工策略选择的两阶段序贯博弈模型，模型结果表明，在动态策略坏境中，委托人互惠依然具有显著的激励作用，管理者的互惠性偏好会迫使员工的最优策略选择发生局部的收敛，从而缩小管理者与员工之间的利益差距，并在一定程度上替代契约的功效，而且在一定条件下，委托人的收益将大于理性条件下的收益水平。在消极互惠弱化的研究中，本文对Dufwenberg和Kirchsteiger动机公平模型进行适当修改，引入客观第三方的行为策略，结果证明在一定条件下，参与者的消极互惠行为会被弱化，从而为我国社会的纠纷化解机制提供新的研究角度。
最后，作为扩展性研究，本文在Charness和Rabin社会性偏好模型基础上，从纯分布社会性偏好角度研究了团队生产的效率问题。Holmstrom经典团队生产理论假定参与人具有完全自利的偏好，进而得出“在团队生产中预算平衡与帕累托最优二者不可兼得”的定理。本文证明，当人们具有社会性偏好时，团队的生产效率要比Holmstrom的经典模型预言的要高。因此，在团队生产中引入具有社会性偏好的参与人可以实现团队生产的帕累托改进，Holmstrom关于“团队生产中预算平衡与帕累托最优二者不可兼得”的定理在引入社会性偏好后不再成立，这为经典契约理论与实证研究结果不一致的现象提供了某种理论上的解释，进而丰富了行为经济学视角下团队生产效率研究的内涵。
How to motivate employee and reconcile the internal contradiction in an enterprise is the mainproblem of Management. To solve the problems, the traditional economics which assume thatpeople are purely selfish and only pursue personal material interests develops beautifulincentive contract theories. But many life phenomena, psychic intuition andexperimental evidences have demonstrated that people not only concern their materialgain, but also concern others welfare and behavioral motivation. Rabin first captured thepsychological game process and portrayed it as “returning the favor, tooth for a tooth”,established the famous motivational fairness game model and make great achievementin behavior game theory. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger inherited the idea of Rabin andextended the motivation fairness model to dynamic strategy environment. The paper isbased on Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger motivation fairness model and researches thereciprocal preference effect from incentive and benefit coordination two perspectives,which on one hand provides a new explanation for the inconsistencies between theoryand reality, on the other hand provides useful suggestions for the enterprise incentivemechanism design, decision making, culture construction and so on.
Firstly, this paper studies the reciprocal incentive effect under different informationconditions based on Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger motivation fairness model. Themodel concludes that under complete information condition, when agent have enoughreciprocal preference, principal will quit enforceable contract and give agent morefreedom, and when principal have reciprocal preference, agent will have incentive toblandish principal before the final game, which motivating agent to hard work. Inaddition, under incomplete information condition, relative to the optimization ofrational condition, it gives principal the opportunity to obtain more material utility onthe premise that agent’s effort level is not reduced to incorporate agent’s reciprocalpreference. Essentially, this conclusion describes the existence of cooperativeequilibrium under different information conditions, emphasizes the importance ofhuman management in the enterprise.
Secondly, the research of interest coordinate effect is concentrated in two areas:convergence of interest disagreement and weakening of negative reciprocity, the formeris considered from principal reciprocity angle, the latter is described from theperspective of agent reciprocity. Considering the convergence of interest disagreement, this paper constructs a two-period dynamic game model based on Dufwenberg andKirchsteiger motivation fairness model. The result shows that in a dynamic strategyenvironment, reciprocity still has significant incentive effect, principal’s reciprocitymotivation may make employees’ optimal decision behavior occur some degree ofconvergence, which plays a role of contracts to some extent, and under certainconditions, principal’s profit will be greater than the income level under the condition ofrationality. In the study of weakening negative reciprocity, this paper, from theperspective of behavioral game theory, proves that under certain conditions,participants’ negative reciprocity behavior will be weakened by incorporating moves ofthe objective third party based on the Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger motivation fairnessmodel, so as to provide a new research angle for China's social disputes resolutionmechanism.
Finally, as an extension study, this paper analyzes the team production basedCharness and Rabin social preferences model. Holmstrom classic team productionmodel assumes that participants have a purely self-interest preferences, and proves suchimpossibility theorem that ‘a team can not achieve Pareto optimality with the budgetbalance’. When members of a team have Charness and Rabin social preferences, theteam's productivity is higher than that the classical model predicts. So the team hiresmembers with Charness and Rabin social preferences can achieve Pareto improvementand Pareto optimal. Therefore, Holmstrom’s theorem that ‘a team can not achievePareto optimality with the budget balance’ does not hold when considering Charnessand Rabin social preferences. So it explains the confliction between the theory andreality, and enriches the team productivity research from behavioral economicsperspective.
首先，本文在Dufwenberg和Kirchsteiger动机公平模型基础上，研究在完全信息条件和不完全信息条件下，参与者在动态策略环境中的互惠激励效应。结果表明，在完全信息条件下，当代理人具有足够的互惠偏好时，委托人将放弃强制契约，并赋予代理人更大的自由；当委托人具有互惠偏好时，代理人在最后一期博弈之前将产生讨好委托人的动机，并且这种动机将有效激励代理人努力工作。在不完全信息条件下，相对于理性假设下的最优情况而言，代理人互惠偏好的植入能够在不降低其努力水平的前提下，使委托人获得改善其物质效用收益的可能。从本质上而言，这一结论描述了在不同信息条件下合作性均衡的存在性，明确了人性化管理在企业中的重要性。
其次，本文对互惠偏好的利益协调效应研究集中在利益差距收敛与消极互惠弱化两个领域，前者从委托人互惠角度论证，后者从代理人互惠角度阐述。在利益差距收敛效应研究中，本文在Dufwenberg和Kirchsteiger动机公平模型的基础上，构建了互惠性管理者与员工策略选择的两阶段序贯博弈模型，模型结果表明，在动态策略坏境中，委托人互惠依然具有显著的激励作用，管理者的互惠性偏好会迫使员工的最优策略选择发生局部的收敛，从而缩小管理者与员工之间的利益差距，并在一定程度上替代契约的功效，而且在一定条件下，委托人的收益将大于理性条件下的收益水平。在消极互惠弱化的研究中，本文对Dufwenberg和Kirchsteiger动机公平模型进行适当修改，引入客观第三方的行为策略，结果证明在一定条件下，参与者的消极互惠行为会被弱化，从而为我国社会的纠纷化解机制提供新的研究角度。
最后，作为扩展性研究，本文在Charness和Rabin社会性偏好模型基础上，从纯分布社会性偏好角度研究了团队生产的效率问题。Holmstrom经典团队生产理论假定参与人具有完全自利的偏好，进而得出“在团队生产中预算平衡与帕累托最优二者不可兼得”的定理。本文证明，当人们具有社会性偏好时，团队的生产效率要比Holmstrom的经典模型预言的要高。因此，在团队生产中引入具有社会性偏好的参与人可以实现团队生产的帕累托改进，Holmstrom关于“团队生产中预算平衡与帕累托最优二者不可兼得”的定理在引入社会性偏好后不再成立，这为经典契约理论与实证研究结果不一致的现象提供了某种理论上的解释，进而丰富了行为经济学视角下团队生产效率研究的内涵。
How to motivate employee and reconcile the internal contradiction in an enterprise is the mainproblem of Management. To solve the problems, the traditional economics which assume thatpeople are purely selfish and only pursue personal material interests develops beautifulincentive contract theories. But many life phenomena, psychic intuition andexperimental evidences have demonstrated that people not only concern their materialgain, but also concern others welfare and behavioral motivation. Rabin first captured thepsychological game process and portrayed it as “returning the favor, tooth for a tooth”,established the famous motivational fairness game model and make great achievementin behavior game theory. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger inherited the idea of Rabin andextended the motivation fairness model to dynamic strategy environment. The paper isbased on Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger motivation fairness model and researches thereciprocal preference effect from incentive and benefit coordination two perspectives,which on one hand provides a new explanation for the inconsistencies between theoryand reality, on the other hand provides useful suggestions for the enterprise incentivemechanism design, decision making, culture construction and so on.
Firstly, this paper studies the reciprocal incentive effect under different informationconditions based on Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger motivation fairness model. Themodel concludes that under complete information condition, when agent have enoughreciprocal preference, principal will quit enforceable contract and give agent morefreedom, and when principal have reciprocal preference, agent will have incentive toblandish principal before the final game, which motivating agent to hard work. Inaddition, under incomplete information condition, relative to the optimization ofrational condition, it gives principal the opportunity to obtain more material utility onthe premise that agent’s effort level is not reduced to incorporate agent’s reciprocalpreference. Essentially, this conclusion describes the existence of cooperativeequilibrium under different information conditions, emphasizes the importance ofhuman management in the enterprise.
Secondly, the research of interest coordinate effect is concentrated in two areas:convergence of interest disagreement and weakening of negative reciprocity, the formeris considered from principal reciprocity angle, the latter is described from theperspective of agent reciprocity. Considering the convergence of interest disagreement, this paper constructs a two-period dynamic game model based on Dufwenberg andKirchsteiger motivation fairness model. The result shows that in a dynamic strategyenvironment, reciprocity still has significant incentive effect, principal’s reciprocitymotivation may make employees’ optimal decision behavior occur some degree ofconvergence, which plays a role of contracts to some extent, and under certainconditions, principal’s profit will be greater than the income level under the condition ofrationality. In the study of weakening negative reciprocity, this paper, from theperspective of behavioral game theory, proves that under certain conditions,participants’ negative reciprocity behavior will be weakened by incorporating moves ofthe objective third party based on the Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger motivation fairnessmodel, so as to provide a new research angle for China's social disputes resolutionmechanism.
Finally, as an extension study, this paper analyzes the team production basedCharness and Rabin social preferences model. Holmstrom classic team productionmodel assumes that participants have a purely self-interest preferences, and proves suchimpossibility theorem that ‘a team can not achieve Pareto optimality with the budgetbalance’. When members of a team have Charness and Rabin social preferences, theteam's productivity is higher than that the classical model predicts. So the team hiresmembers with Charness and Rabin social preferences can achieve Pareto improvementand Pareto optimal. Therefore, Holmstrom’s theorem that ‘a team can not achievePareto optimality with the budget balance’ does not hold when considering Charnessand Rabin social preferences. So it explains the confliction between the theory andreality, and enriches the team productivity research from behavioral economicsperspective.
引文
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