基于盈余管理视角的中国上市公司管理层收购绩效研究
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摘要
自1997年我国第一例上市公司管理层收购—大众公用出现至今,管理层收购在我国已经经历了过渡和发展的阶段。我国经济学家对于是否适宜在中国,尤其是国有企业改革中大规模实施管理层收购形成泾渭分明的两派。支持者(王巍、钟伟,2003)认为现阶段我国实施管理层收购具有特殊的现实意义：一是可以改善国有股一股独大、所有者虚置所带来的问题,拓宽国有资本从竞争性领域退出的渠道；二是通过明晰产权,对企业的经营者进行激励,可以充分激发企业家的才能与热情,提高企业的经营效率；三是有利于建立现代公司制度,完善公司治理结构。反对者(刘纪鹏、朗咸平,2004)则认为：一是我国国有企业在实施管理层收购时资产转让价格偏低,容易造成国有资产流失：二是管理层实施收购的资金来源不明,存在违规、违法的现象；三是管理层收购后,上市公司的管理层可能会利用对上市公司的控制权损害相关利益主体,尤其是中小股东的合法权益。虽然现阶段在我国企业管理层收购的运作过程中,存在着一些不公平、不规范的现象,但这并不意味着管理层收购和国有资产流失存在必然的联系,更不能就此全盘否定管理层收购这种方式。作为一种企业并购制度创新,管理层收购在国外发达国家经济体制改革(如英国),尤其是在有效解决企业代理成本、完善管理层的激励机制等方面扮演了重要角色。随着我国市场经济的发展,完善的制度体系和有效的监管措施将使管理层收购这种方式在促进我国国有企业产权多元化改革、推动民营经济进一步发展以及建立完善的公司治理结构等方面发挥积极作用。
本文在国内外相关理论和实证研究的基础上,运用规范分析和实证分析的方法研究管理层收购事件对我国上市公司经营绩效的影响。通过案例分析和比较分析对我国上市公司管理层收购的现状以及中外企业管理层收购的差异进行研究,发现我国上市公司在实施MBO的过程中存在定价不合理、融资不规范、信息披露不全面等诸多问题,极有可能产生盈余管理行为。因此,本文采用修正的琼斯模型对实施MBO的上市公司的盈余管理行为进行实证研究,并运用因子分析方法综合评价管理层收购事件对上市公司经营绩效的影响。最后本文从股利政策和关联交易两方面对上市公司MBO前后过度的盈余管理行为对经营绩效的影响进行了分析。经过研究,本文得出以下五个结论：
第一、实施管理层收购的上市公司当年及前一年均存在人为调减盈余的行为,在完成收购后的第二年存在人为调增盈余的行为。
在管理层收购前后存在盈余管理的行为说明在我国上市公司管理层收购中存在明显的财富转移效应。上市公司的管理层在收购前一年实施盈余管理就是为了降低收购上市公司股权的成本。而我国现有的制度缺陷,机构投资者的缺失,以及中小投资者的自我保护意识淡薄均为管理层在实施收购过程中进行盈余管理提供了便利条件。
第二、实施MBO后,上市公司的规模显著扩大,盈利能力显著降低,但总体绩效没有发生显著变化。
上市公司的规模扩大并不是由于公司盈利能力增强使得公司的留存收益增加所致,而是由于上市公司增加了向银行借款以及规模扩大引起的经营负债的增长导致的。但上市公司规模扩张的同时,并没有取得预期的规模效益,反而使得收购后的营业成本率和管理费用率大幅上涨,公司的主营业务盈利能力显著下降。
第三、上市公司在实施MBO前后均存在过度派现的行为,这种行为在管理层实施收购的前一年至后一年尤为突出。
上市公司在实施MBO前后的过度派现行为是上市公司的管理层利用控制权实施过度盈余管理的重要表现形式。上市公司在实施MBO前过度派现可以降低上市公司的每股净资产,在收购当年及随后一年过度派现,可以为管理层筹集资金偿还实施MBO的借款。上市公司MBO前后的过度派现行为不仅增加了上市公司的经营风险和成本同时也降低了上市公司的发展潜力。
第四、实施MBO后,上市公司平均的关联交易金额均高于管理层收购前,并且上市公司的关联交易行为与盈余管理程度的相关性显著。
实施MBO的上市公司平均的关联方销售与采购金额、关联方出售与收购资产金额以及关联方担保金额在收购后均高于收购前的金额,并且在关联交易中普遍存在协议定价而不是市场定价的现象。通过实证研究发现,实施MBO的上市公司关联交易的额度与实施盈余管理的程度的相关性显著。实施MBO的上市公司关联方的销售与采购、产权交易以及租赁行为均显著提高了上市公司盈余管理的程度。
第五、制度与监管的双重缺失导致我国上市公司管理层收购的动机发生变异,收购后,上市公司的管理层更倾向于追求公司的控制权收益。
我国现有的MBO制度体系不够完善、监管不到位,导致我国上市公司管理层实施MBO的动机主要是为了以较低的价格收购上市公司的股权,但是巨额的收购资金以及有限的融资渠道使得管理层不得不违规运作或者通过民间借贷融资。实施收购后,上市公司的管理层没有足够的压力和动力去改善公司的经营绩效,反而迫于偿债压力,更倾向于以牺牲上市公司的整体利益和其它股东的利益为代价追求控制权收益。
本文的创新之处主要体现在以下三个方面：
第一、本文对我国上市公司管理层收购的行为特征进行了归纳总结,发现导致我国上市公司管理层收购动机发生变异的原因。本文从我国上市公司管理层收购的现状分析入手,通过案例分析和比较分析对国内外企业实施管理层收购的收购动因、定价方式、融资模式、退出渠道等关键环节进行比较分析,归纳总结我国上市公司管理层收购的行为特征,构建我国现有的制度体系与管理层收购过程中存在盈余管理行为之间的逻辑关系,发现我国上市公司管理层实施收购的动机并不是企业存在潜在的效率提升的空间,而是可以低价购买上市公司的股权。
第二、本文从盈余管理的角度出发,对管理层收购事件对上市公司经营绩效的影响进行实证研究。现有的关于管理层收购绩效的实证研究中,并没有考虑上市公司管理层收购中可能存在的盈余管理行为及其对公司经营绩效的影响,并且现有研究对上市公司MBO过程中是否实施盈余管理行为的意见分歧较大。鉴于管理层收购过程中的盈余管理行为会对上市公司的会计利润和相关财务数据产生重大影响,进而影响上市公司MBO的绩效研究。为更加客观真实地对上市公司管理层收购的绩效进行分析,本文对上市公司管理层收购中是否存在盈余管理行为进行实证研究后,将基于权责发生制的传统财务指标与基于收付实现制的现金流量指标相结合,构建上市公司财务指标综合评价体系,从规模、盈余质量、盈利能力、运营能力、偿债能力和发展能力六方面选取19个指标,其中包括6个与现金流量相关的财务指标用以反映上市公司的盈余质量和偿债能力,以便更加真实的反映上市公司管理层收购事件对上市公司绩效的影响。
第三、本文深度剖析了上市公司管理层收购后绩效变化不显著的原因,并从实施MBO前后存在过度盈余管理行为的角度对此进行了进一步解释。本文通过因子分析发现实施MBO的上市公司的整体经营绩效没有发生根本改变,在此基础上,本文进一步分析了实施MBO后上市公司的规模、盈余质量、盈利能力和运营能力的变化,发现实施MBO后,上市公司规模扩张的同时,主营业务盈利能力显著降低。为了探寻实施MBO的上市公司总体经营绩效没有发生变化的原因,本文对上市公司MBO前后的过度盈余管理行为进行了研究,发现实施MBO后,上市公司存在过度分红及频繁的关联交易的行为,这些行为增加了上市公司的经营成本和风险,降低了上市公司的发展潜力,这在一定程度上解释了实施MBO后上市公司经营绩效变化不显著的原因,并进一步验证了本文的结论,即我国上市公司的管理层实施收购是为了低价购买上市公司的股权,收购后,迫于偿债压力,上市公司的管理层更倾向于追求控制权收益。
由于企业绩效评价的复杂性以及本人的能力有限,在未来的研究中仍有许多问题有待进一步完善：一是由于我国上市公司管理层收购的时间短、样本少,本文没有考虑行业差异对上市公司经营绩效的影响；二是在本文的研究区间,虽然中国上市公司实施了股权分置改革,但管理层所持上市公司股份并未解除限售,因此,本文未考虑股权分置改革对公司绩效的影响；三是在本文研究区间内,中国会计制度发生多次调整,尤其是2006年2月15日中国新会计准则体系正式发布实施,对上市公司的财务数据产生一定影响,本文没有全面系统的分析会计政策变化对上市公司业绩的影响,只是根据会计政策的变化对本文实证研究模型中采用的财务指标进行了修正；四是在实证研究中,考虑到我国的实际情况,非财务指标的选取标准、量化以及数据的收集存在诸多困难,企业之间非财务指标绩效评价可比性较差,因此,在构建绩效评价指标体系时,本文全部采用上市公司财务指标,未采用非财务指标,这可能在一定程度影响本文对上市公司绩效评价的客观性。
MBO has experienced transition and development stages in China, from1997, the first implementation of Chinese listed company MBO, till now. Chinese economists do not get an agreement with the suitability of MBO in reform of state-owned enterprises. Supporters (Wei Wang, Wei Zhong,2003) believe that there is practical significance in implementing MBO in China. First, that can resolve the problems of great amount of state-owned shares and create the channels for state-owned capital withdrawing from the competitive fields. Second, that can inspire entrepreneurs'passion and enthusiasm and push them to improve the company's performance. Third, that will help to construct modern company system and improve the company's corporate governance structure. However, the opponents (Xipeng Liu, Xianpin Lang,2004) insist that the lower price induces the loss of state-owned assets, the funds raising in implementing MBO are illegal, and after MBO, the managers will use the rights of control to invade the legitimate rights and interests of the company's minority shareholders. Although there are some unfair and illegal behaviors in implementing MBO in China, there are no direct connections between MBO and the loss of state-owned assets, furthermore, totally denying the validity of MBO in China. As a system innovation in organization structure, MBO has positive effects in economic system reform, reducing enterprise agency costs, and promoting management incentive mechanism. Along with the development of Chinese economy market, perfecting the system of systems and effective regulatory measures will play an active role in state-owned enterprises reform, civilian-run economy development, and the corporate governance structure improvement.
Based on domestic and foreign-related theories and empirical studies about MBO, this article uses specification analysis and empirical analysis to analyze the effects of MBO in improving the performance of Chinese listed companies. By analyzing the present situation of Chinese listed companies MBO and the differences between domestic and foreign companies MBO by case studies and comparative studies, there are many problems in Chinese listed companies implementing MBO, such as unreasonable pricing, illegal borrowing, and incomplete information disclosure etc., which will most likely induce earnings management behaviors during MBO. Therefore, this article uses Modified Jones Model to evaluate the earnings management of listed companies during MBO, and uses factor analysis to evaluate the effects of MBO to improve the operating efficiency of Chinese listed companies. Finally, this article analyzes the behaviors of excessive earnings management of listed companies before and after MBO. Based on the empirical studies, this article draws five conclusions:
First, there exits earnings management behaviors decreasing the profits during the year of and before implementing MBO, and increasing the profits the second year after implementing MBO.
The phenomenon of earnings management during MBO proves the existence of wealth transferring effect. The managers manipulate earnings of the listed companies before implementing MBO in order to lower the price of the listed company's shares. The system defects, lack of institutional investors, and weak awareness of small and medium-sized investors provide the convenient conditions for managers to manipulate earnings during MBO.
Second, after MBO, the listed company's size increases, and the profitability decreases, which result the listed company's performances changing not significantly.
The increase in size of listed companies is not caused by the improvements of profitability of listed companies, but caused by borrowing loans from banks and the increases of operating liabilities. The size increasing of listed companies does not achieve scale efficiency, but increase the operating cost rate and management cost rate. Therefore the profitability of listed companies decreases after MBO.
Third, there exits excessive paying cash dividends of Chinese listed companies before and after MBO, especially one year before MBO till one year after MBO.
The behavior of excessive paying cash dividends before and after MBO is one of the most important methods that the listed company's managers pursue the rights of control to achieve excessive earnings management. The excessive cash dividends paid before MBO can decrease the net income per share of listed companies, and after MBO can raise the money for managers to repay the loans because of MBO. Paying excessive cash dividends increases the operational risks and costs, and decreases the potential capacity of development of listed companies.
Forth, the listed companies'average related party transaction amounts after MBO are far more than before MBO, and the extent of earning management is related to the related party transactions.
The average amounts of purchasing and selling goods, services, and assets, and guarantee on related transactions after MBO are more than before MBO. Furthermore, the pricing agreements are common in related party transactions of purchasing and selling goods, services, and assets, and renting. The extent of earnings management of listed companies during MBO is related to the related party transactions. The more amount of related party transactions of purchasing and selling goods, services, and assets, and renting, the more earnings management of listed companies during MBO.
Finally, lack of regulations and policies, the motivations of Chinese listed companies MBO are not the same as foreign companies MBO. After MBO, the managers of Chinese listed companies are clining to achieve the rights of control.
The motivation of MBO of Chinese listed companies is to buy the shares of listed companies in lower price. The managers have to lend from private or illegal because of the great amount of purchasing funds and limited channels for raising money. After MBO, there are no enough incentives and pressures for listed companies' managers to improve the performance of listed companies. Under the pressure of repaying loans, the managers are more clining to achieve the rights of control even if that will damage the legitimate rights and interests of the company and other shareholders.
This article has three innovation points:
First, this article points out the reason of the change of motivation of Chinese listed companies MBO by analyzing the behaviors of Chinese listed companies in MBO. By analyzing the present situation of Chinese listed companies MBO, this article uses case study and comparative study to analyze the differences between domestic and foreign companies MBO, especially in pricing, loaning, exit, and supervision etc., to conclude the behaviors of Chinese liseted companies in MBO. This article finds out the relationship between the regulation system and earnings management during MBO, and the motivation of Chinese listed companies MBO is to buy the listed companies' shares in lower prices rather than the existence of potential improvement capacity of listed companies.
Second, this article evaluates the peformance of listed companies MBO based on earnings management. The empirical studies do not consider the potential influence of earnings management to the performance of listed companies during MBO. The conclusions of empirical studies about earnings management duiring MBO are totally different. However earnings management during MBO will definitely influence the accounting profits and financial data of listed companies, therefore impacting the effects of MBO toward the performance of listed companies. Since the available empirical studies get different conclusions about the earnings management of Chinese listed companies during MBO period, in order to obviously reflect the effects of MBO toward the performance of listed companies, this article combines the traditional financial ratios based on accrual basis with financial ratios based on cash flow to construct an analysis system. Finally, based on19financial indicators in size, earnings quality, the capacity of profitability, operation, solvency and development, this article uses factor analysis to evaluate the effects of MBO toward the operating efficiency of Chinese listed companies.
Third, this article analyzes why the listed companies'performance do not change after MBO based on the existence of excessive earnings management behaviors of listed companies before and after MBO. By facter analysis, this article draws the conclusion that the listed company's performance does not change significantly after MBO. Therefore, by further analyzing the changes of size, earnings quality, capacity of profitability and operation, this article proves that after MBO, the sizes of listed companies increase and the profitability of main business of listed companies decrease. In order to find why the performance of listed companies does not change after MBO, this article analyzes the excessive earnings management behaviors of listed companies during MBO. There exist excessive paying cash dividends and related party transitons, which will increase the operating risks and costs of listed companies and decrease the potential development of listed companies. That can partly explain why the performance of listed companies does not change significantly after MBO and further proves the conclusions of this article. The purpose of Chinese listed companies MBO is to purchase the listed companies'shares in lower prices and after MBO, the managers of listed companies are more clining to pursuing rights of control under the pressure of repaying loans.
Because of the capacity of author, some points need further study and improve. First, because of few Chinese listed companies MBO and the short study period, this article does not analyze the industry differences toward the performance of listed companies. Second, during study period, the Chinese government starts the split share structure reform. Since the shares holding by managers still cannot circulate in stock market during the study period, this article does not consider this factor. Third, the accounting policies change many times during study period, especially the Accounting Standards on15Feb,2006, which will definitely influence the performance of listed companies. However, this article just analyzes the influence of accounting policies changes toward the financial data of listed companies, rather than completely analyze the changes of accounting policies to the performance of listed companies. Finally, since there is so difficult to collect and analyze non-financial indicators of Chinese listed companies, this article uses financial data only to analyze the performance of listed companies, which may influence the objectivity of evaluation of the performance of listed companies.
本文在国内外相关理论和实证研究的基础上,运用规范分析和实证分析的方法研究管理层收购事件对我国上市公司经营绩效的影响。通过案例分析和比较分析对我国上市公司管理层收购的现状以及中外企业管理层收购的差异进行研究,发现我国上市公司在实施MBO的过程中存在定价不合理、融资不规范、信息披露不全面等诸多问题,极有可能产生盈余管理行为。因此,本文采用修正的琼斯模型对实施MBO的上市公司的盈余管理行为进行实证研究,并运用因子分析方法综合评价管理层收购事件对上市公司经营绩效的影响。最后本文从股利政策和关联交易两方面对上市公司MBO前后过度的盈余管理行为对经营绩效的影响进行了分析。经过研究,本文得出以下五个结论：
第一、实施管理层收购的上市公司当年及前一年均存在人为调减盈余的行为,在完成收购后的第二年存在人为调增盈余的行为。
在管理层收购前后存在盈余管理的行为说明在我国上市公司管理层收购中存在明显的财富转移效应。上市公司的管理层在收购前一年实施盈余管理就是为了降低收购上市公司股权的成本。而我国现有的制度缺陷,机构投资者的缺失,以及中小投资者的自我保护意识淡薄均为管理层在实施收购过程中进行盈余管理提供了便利条件。
第二、实施MBO后,上市公司的规模显著扩大,盈利能力显著降低,但总体绩效没有发生显著变化。
上市公司的规模扩大并不是由于公司盈利能力增强使得公司的留存收益增加所致,而是由于上市公司增加了向银行借款以及规模扩大引起的经营负债的增长导致的。但上市公司规模扩张的同时,并没有取得预期的规模效益,反而使得收购后的营业成本率和管理费用率大幅上涨,公司的主营业务盈利能力显著下降。
第三、上市公司在实施MBO前后均存在过度派现的行为,这种行为在管理层实施收购的前一年至后一年尤为突出。
上市公司在实施MBO前后的过度派现行为是上市公司的管理层利用控制权实施过度盈余管理的重要表现形式。上市公司在实施MBO前过度派现可以降低上市公司的每股净资产,在收购当年及随后一年过度派现,可以为管理层筹集资金偿还实施MBO的借款。上市公司MBO前后的过度派现行为不仅增加了上市公司的经营风险和成本同时也降低了上市公司的发展潜力。
第四、实施MBO后,上市公司平均的关联交易金额均高于管理层收购前,并且上市公司的关联交易行为与盈余管理程度的相关性显著。
实施MBO的上市公司平均的关联方销售与采购金额、关联方出售与收购资产金额以及关联方担保金额在收购后均高于收购前的金额,并且在关联交易中普遍存在协议定价而不是市场定价的现象。通过实证研究发现,实施MBO的上市公司关联交易的额度与实施盈余管理的程度的相关性显著。实施MBO的上市公司关联方的销售与采购、产权交易以及租赁行为均显著提高了上市公司盈余管理的程度。
第五、制度与监管的双重缺失导致我国上市公司管理层收购的动机发生变异,收购后,上市公司的管理层更倾向于追求公司的控制权收益。
我国现有的MBO制度体系不够完善、监管不到位,导致我国上市公司管理层实施MBO的动机主要是为了以较低的价格收购上市公司的股权,但是巨额的收购资金以及有限的融资渠道使得管理层不得不违规运作或者通过民间借贷融资。实施收购后,上市公司的管理层没有足够的压力和动力去改善公司的经营绩效,反而迫于偿债压力,更倾向于以牺牲上市公司的整体利益和其它股东的利益为代价追求控制权收益。
本文的创新之处主要体现在以下三个方面：
第一、本文对我国上市公司管理层收购的行为特征进行了归纳总结,发现导致我国上市公司管理层收购动机发生变异的原因。本文从我国上市公司管理层收购的现状分析入手,通过案例分析和比较分析对国内外企业实施管理层收购的收购动因、定价方式、融资模式、退出渠道等关键环节进行比较分析,归纳总结我国上市公司管理层收购的行为特征,构建我国现有的制度体系与管理层收购过程中存在盈余管理行为之间的逻辑关系,发现我国上市公司管理层实施收购的动机并不是企业存在潜在的效率提升的空间,而是可以低价购买上市公司的股权。
第二、本文从盈余管理的角度出发,对管理层收购事件对上市公司经营绩效的影响进行实证研究。现有的关于管理层收购绩效的实证研究中,并没有考虑上市公司管理层收购中可能存在的盈余管理行为及其对公司经营绩效的影响,并且现有研究对上市公司MBO过程中是否实施盈余管理行为的意见分歧较大。鉴于管理层收购过程中的盈余管理行为会对上市公司的会计利润和相关财务数据产生重大影响,进而影响上市公司MBO的绩效研究。为更加客观真实地对上市公司管理层收购的绩效进行分析,本文对上市公司管理层收购中是否存在盈余管理行为进行实证研究后,将基于权责发生制的传统财务指标与基于收付实现制的现金流量指标相结合,构建上市公司财务指标综合评价体系,从规模、盈余质量、盈利能力、运营能力、偿债能力和发展能力六方面选取19个指标,其中包括6个与现金流量相关的财务指标用以反映上市公司的盈余质量和偿债能力,以便更加真实的反映上市公司管理层收购事件对上市公司绩效的影响。
第三、本文深度剖析了上市公司管理层收购后绩效变化不显著的原因,并从实施MBO前后存在过度盈余管理行为的角度对此进行了进一步解释。本文通过因子分析发现实施MBO的上市公司的整体经营绩效没有发生根本改变,在此基础上,本文进一步分析了实施MBO后上市公司的规模、盈余质量、盈利能力和运营能力的变化,发现实施MBO后,上市公司规模扩张的同时,主营业务盈利能力显著降低。为了探寻实施MBO的上市公司总体经营绩效没有发生变化的原因,本文对上市公司MBO前后的过度盈余管理行为进行了研究,发现实施MBO后,上市公司存在过度分红及频繁的关联交易的行为,这些行为增加了上市公司的经营成本和风险,降低了上市公司的发展潜力,这在一定程度上解释了实施MBO后上市公司经营绩效变化不显著的原因,并进一步验证了本文的结论,即我国上市公司的管理层实施收购是为了低价购买上市公司的股权,收购后,迫于偿债压力,上市公司的管理层更倾向于追求控制权收益。
由于企业绩效评价的复杂性以及本人的能力有限,在未来的研究中仍有许多问题有待进一步完善：一是由于我国上市公司管理层收购的时间短、样本少,本文没有考虑行业差异对上市公司经营绩效的影响；二是在本文的研究区间,虽然中国上市公司实施了股权分置改革,但管理层所持上市公司股份并未解除限售,因此,本文未考虑股权分置改革对公司绩效的影响；三是在本文研究区间内,中国会计制度发生多次调整,尤其是2006年2月15日中国新会计准则体系正式发布实施,对上市公司的财务数据产生一定影响,本文没有全面系统的分析会计政策变化对上市公司业绩的影响,只是根据会计政策的变化对本文实证研究模型中采用的财务指标进行了修正；四是在实证研究中,考虑到我国的实际情况,非财务指标的选取标准、量化以及数据的收集存在诸多困难,企业之间非财务指标绩效评价可比性较差,因此,在构建绩效评价指标体系时,本文全部采用上市公司财务指标,未采用非财务指标,这可能在一定程度影响本文对上市公司绩效评价的客观性。
MBO has experienced transition and development stages in China, from1997, the first implementation of Chinese listed company MBO, till now. Chinese economists do not get an agreement with the suitability of MBO in reform of state-owned enterprises. Supporters (Wei Wang, Wei Zhong,2003) believe that there is practical significance in implementing MBO in China. First, that can resolve the problems of great amount of state-owned shares and create the channels for state-owned capital withdrawing from the competitive fields. Second, that can inspire entrepreneurs'passion and enthusiasm and push them to improve the company's performance. Third, that will help to construct modern company system and improve the company's corporate governance structure. However, the opponents (Xipeng Liu, Xianpin Lang,2004) insist that the lower price induces the loss of state-owned assets, the funds raising in implementing MBO are illegal, and after MBO, the managers will use the rights of control to invade the legitimate rights and interests of the company's minority shareholders. Although there are some unfair and illegal behaviors in implementing MBO in China, there are no direct connections between MBO and the loss of state-owned assets, furthermore, totally denying the validity of MBO in China. As a system innovation in organization structure, MBO has positive effects in economic system reform, reducing enterprise agency costs, and promoting management incentive mechanism. Along with the development of Chinese economy market, perfecting the system of systems and effective regulatory measures will play an active role in state-owned enterprises reform, civilian-run economy development, and the corporate governance structure improvement.
Based on domestic and foreign-related theories and empirical studies about MBO, this article uses specification analysis and empirical analysis to analyze the effects of MBO in improving the performance of Chinese listed companies. By analyzing the present situation of Chinese listed companies MBO and the differences between domestic and foreign companies MBO by case studies and comparative studies, there are many problems in Chinese listed companies implementing MBO, such as unreasonable pricing, illegal borrowing, and incomplete information disclosure etc., which will most likely induce earnings management behaviors during MBO. Therefore, this article uses Modified Jones Model to evaluate the earnings management of listed companies during MBO, and uses factor analysis to evaluate the effects of MBO to improve the operating efficiency of Chinese listed companies. Finally, this article analyzes the behaviors of excessive earnings management of listed companies before and after MBO. Based on the empirical studies, this article draws five conclusions:
First, there exits earnings management behaviors decreasing the profits during the year of and before implementing MBO, and increasing the profits the second year after implementing MBO.
The phenomenon of earnings management during MBO proves the existence of wealth transferring effect. The managers manipulate earnings of the listed companies before implementing MBO in order to lower the price of the listed company's shares. The system defects, lack of institutional investors, and weak awareness of small and medium-sized investors provide the convenient conditions for managers to manipulate earnings during MBO.
Second, after MBO, the listed company's size increases, and the profitability decreases, which result the listed company's performances changing not significantly.
The increase in size of listed companies is not caused by the improvements of profitability of listed companies, but caused by borrowing loans from banks and the increases of operating liabilities. The size increasing of listed companies does not achieve scale efficiency, but increase the operating cost rate and management cost rate. Therefore the profitability of listed companies decreases after MBO.
Third, there exits excessive paying cash dividends of Chinese listed companies before and after MBO, especially one year before MBO till one year after MBO.
The behavior of excessive paying cash dividends before and after MBO is one of the most important methods that the listed company's managers pursue the rights of control to achieve excessive earnings management. The excessive cash dividends paid before MBO can decrease the net income per share of listed companies, and after MBO can raise the money for managers to repay the loans because of MBO. Paying excessive cash dividends increases the operational risks and costs, and decreases the potential capacity of development of listed companies.
Forth, the listed companies'average related party transaction amounts after MBO are far more than before MBO, and the extent of earning management is related to the related party transactions.
The average amounts of purchasing and selling goods, services, and assets, and guarantee on related transactions after MBO are more than before MBO. Furthermore, the pricing agreements are common in related party transactions of purchasing and selling goods, services, and assets, and renting. The extent of earnings management of listed companies during MBO is related to the related party transactions. The more amount of related party transactions of purchasing and selling goods, services, and assets, and renting, the more earnings management of listed companies during MBO.
Finally, lack of regulations and policies, the motivations of Chinese listed companies MBO are not the same as foreign companies MBO. After MBO, the managers of Chinese listed companies are clining to achieve the rights of control.
The motivation of MBO of Chinese listed companies is to buy the shares of listed companies in lower price. The managers have to lend from private or illegal because of the great amount of purchasing funds and limited channels for raising money. After MBO, there are no enough incentives and pressures for listed companies' managers to improve the performance of listed companies. Under the pressure of repaying loans, the managers are more clining to achieve the rights of control even if that will damage the legitimate rights and interests of the company and other shareholders.
This article has three innovation points:
First, this article points out the reason of the change of motivation of Chinese listed companies MBO by analyzing the behaviors of Chinese listed companies in MBO. By analyzing the present situation of Chinese listed companies MBO, this article uses case study and comparative study to analyze the differences between domestic and foreign companies MBO, especially in pricing, loaning, exit, and supervision etc., to conclude the behaviors of Chinese liseted companies in MBO. This article finds out the relationship between the regulation system and earnings management during MBO, and the motivation of Chinese listed companies MBO is to buy the listed companies' shares in lower prices rather than the existence of potential improvement capacity of listed companies.
Second, this article evaluates the peformance of listed companies MBO based on earnings management. The empirical studies do not consider the potential influence of earnings management to the performance of listed companies during MBO. The conclusions of empirical studies about earnings management duiring MBO are totally different. However earnings management during MBO will definitely influence the accounting profits and financial data of listed companies, therefore impacting the effects of MBO toward the performance of listed companies. Since the available empirical studies get different conclusions about the earnings management of Chinese listed companies during MBO period, in order to obviously reflect the effects of MBO toward the performance of listed companies, this article combines the traditional financial ratios based on accrual basis with financial ratios based on cash flow to construct an analysis system. Finally, based on19financial indicators in size, earnings quality, the capacity of profitability, operation, solvency and development, this article uses factor analysis to evaluate the effects of MBO toward the operating efficiency of Chinese listed companies.
Third, this article analyzes why the listed companies'performance do not change after MBO based on the existence of excessive earnings management behaviors of listed companies before and after MBO. By facter analysis, this article draws the conclusion that the listed company's performance does not change significantly after MBO. Therefore, by further analyzing the changes of size, earnings quality, capacity of profitability and operation, this article proves that after MBO, the sizes of listed companies increase and the profitability of main business of listed companies decrease. In order to find why the performance of listed companies does not change after MBO, this article analyzes the excessive earnings management behaviors of listed companies during MBO. There exist excessive paying cash dividends and related party transitons, which will increase the operating risks and costs of listed companies and decrease the potential development of listed companies. That can partly explain why the performance of listed companies does not change significantly after MBO and further proves the conclusions of this article. The purpose of Chinese listed companies MBO is to purchase the listed companies'shares in lower prices and after MBO, the managers of listed companies are more clining to pursuing rights of control under the pressure of repaying loans.
Because of the capacity of author, some points need further study and improve. First, because of few Chinese listed companies MBO and the short study period, this article does not analyze the industry differences toward the performance of listed companies. Second, during study period, the Chinese government starts the split share structure reform. Since the shares holding by managers still cannot circulate in stock market during the study period, this article does not consider this factor. Third, the accounting policies change many times during study period, especially the Accounting Standards on15Feb,2006, which will definitely influence the performance of listed companies. However, this article just analyzes the influence of accounting policies changes toward the financial data of listed companies, rather than completely analyze the changes of accounting policies to the performance of listed companies. Finally, since there is so difficult to collect and analyze non-financial indicators of Chinese listed companies, this article uses financial data only to analyze the performance of listed companies, which may influence the objectivity of evaluation of the performance of listed companies.
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