关系契约与农产品交易稳定性研究
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摘要
“公司+农户”作为一种在小规模生产基础上实现农业规模化经营的组织形态,通过龙头企业与农户间的长期稳定的契约关系,对合作剩余和风险的进行合理分配,能够解决“小农户”与“大市场”的联结问题,因而得到理论界的普遍认可和政府政策的广泛支持。实践中,这种组织模式虽不乏成功案例,但高违约率导致的农产品交易①契约的弱稳定性一直是农业产业化健康发展的主要障碍,提高契约稳定性是推动农业产业化发展的关键之一。
提高农产品交易稳定性的根本在于农产品交易契约的选择和履约机制的优化。农产品交易高违约率的直接诱因是交易过程中双方的机会主义行为。但从根源上看,农产品交易弱稳定性源于交易中的高度不确定性(包括农户和企业面临的不确定性)②,而这种不确定性又源自于交易方的有限理性、信息不对称和信息不完全、双方交易地位(谈判力量)的不对称性,以及由此导致的机会主义行为。这种不确定性制约着交易剩余的实现及分配,从而影响农产品交易的稳定性。作为对不确定性进行适应的制度安排,关系契约是农产品交易的必然选择③。因此,不确定性到关系契约的逻辑自然成为研究农产品交易提升稳定性的基本出发点,而受制于第三方实施的困难,关系契约的自我实施机制是农产品交易治理的关键。
基于上述考虑,本文以农产品交易的关系契约分析作为切入点,探讨农产品交易的稳定性问题,并尝试进行以下几个方面的研究:1)对农产品交易中的不确定性与相应的契约选择(关系契约)之间的逻辑关系进行分析,构建相应的契约模型;2)作为对不确定性进行适应的制度安排,关系契约仅给出农户和公司交易的一个简化框架,在交易环境发生变化时,交易剩余及其分配关系必然会发生改变,此时双方的争议不可避免。因而本文分析了关系契约中的争议解决机制问题;3)关系契约对农产品交易治理的基石是自我实施机制。本文分析了基于农户“风险厌恶”和“有限理性”假设下的农产品交易关系契约自我实施机制问题。4)通过问卷调查的数据,比较了支持不同专用性农产品交易的关系规范,并根据共性的关系规范,探讨基于互惠诱发信任农产品交易治理模式。
具体来说,论文主要开展以下几个方面的研究工作:
首先,识别农产品交易中可能存在的各种不确定性形式;分析这些不确定性的具体来源及其表现形式、对农产品交易产生的影响,以及农产品交易中的不确定性与相应的契约选择(关系契约)的逻辑联系。
其次,将关系契约的相关理论及研究成果应用到中国农业产业化的具体实践中,在农户“风险厌恶”假设下,在Levin (2003)构建的模型的基础上,考虑农户关系专用投资、外部环境不确定性等因素,对其稳定契约的概念进行了修正,构建了基于事后保留收益等概念的关系契约模型,讨论了谈判能力及资产专用性对农产品交易关系契约结构和效率的影响。
再次,比较了作为争议解决机制的正式价格契约和广义纳什谈判解(GNBS)各自的适用范围和局限。在分析正式固定价格契约对农产品交易治理的局限性的基础上,将广义纳什谈判解(GNBS)和正式价格契约引入到关系契约中,作为解决争议的途径,比较了二者在强化关系契约稳定性方面的功能,提供了一个解决重复交易下的双方机会主义问题的框架。
最后,论证了基于重复博弈的契约自我实施机制在农产品交易中的局限性和非现实性,以及基于“关系规范嵌入性”的自我实施机制对我国农产品交易治理的现实性,并基于具体的调研数据,通过实证分析,寻找针对不同专用性农产品交易的关键关系规范,并据此提出基于互惠诱发信任的农产品交易关系治理思路。
论文的创新之处主要体现在以下三个方面:
①本文在农户“风险厌恶”和“有限理性”假设下,基于农产品交易面临的不确定性到关系契约的逻辑关系的分析,考虑农户关系专用投资、外部环境不确定性等因素,构建了基于事后保留收益等概念的关系契约模型,讨论了谈判能力及资产专用性对龙头企业与农户间的关系契约结构和效率的影响,对稳定契约的概念进行了修正,从而拓展了Levin (2003)关系契约模型。并将广义纳什谈判解(GNBS)和正式价格契约作为交易争议解决机制引入到关系契约中,比较二者在促进关系契约自我实施的范围和条件,提供了一个解决重复交易下的双方机会主义问题的框架。现有文献注意到了关系契约对提升农产品交易契约稳定性的作用,但局限于对关系契约的特征、存在意义、关系规范的治理作用等层面的探讨。本文对农产品交易关系契约模型的构建、争议解决机制的探讨是对现有研究成果的深入和发展,具有创新意义。
②关系契约的本质在于可自我实施性。本文将关系契约自我实施机制归纳为基于重复博弈的机制和基于社会规范嵌入性的机制两类。在农户“有限理性”和“风险厌恶”假设下,论证了基于重复博弈的关系契约自我实施机制在农产品交易中的局限性,以及基于“关系规范嵌入性”的自我实施机制(社会学和管理学的视角)对农产品交易治理的现实性和有效性。国内现有文献侧重于对基于“重复博弈机制”的契约自我实施机制的探讨,对农户理性能力和风险态度的关注不足(这对农产品交易契约选择及自我实施至关重要)。因而,本文对农产品交易关系契约自我实施机制的探讨强化了关系契约的针对性和现实性。
③本文注意到了支持不同种类农产品契约的关系规范随着时间和情境而变化、发展,因而产生治理作用的关系规范因农产品类型的不同而不同,同一类农产品交易的关系契约也会随其所处的社会经济环境和参与者个体因素而发生变化,并根据专用性(外部选择大小)将农产品分为专用性较强和专用性较弱两类,并根据调研数据,比较支持不同专用性农产品交易的关系规范,为提升农产品交易稳定性提供了微观决策依据,据此给出了基于互惠诱发信任的农产品交易治理模型。现有多数相关文献从普遍意义上将关系规范的治理作用视为是固定不变。本文针对基于农产品专用性的探讨具有创新意义。
As an organization of scale business of agriculture under the condition of small-sized family production, the form of“Dragon Head Enterprise+Farmer”gained the supporting by the government’s policy and recognizing by the theoreticians because it facilitated the development of agricultural industrialization developing by linking the“small farmers”and“lagre market”together through the long lasting contract butweem Dragon Head Enterprise and farmers, and the reasonable allocating of exchange residuals and the related risks to the transaction. However, the weak stability of agricultural products transaction contract caused by high rate of contract breaching has long being the obstacle to the agricultural industrialization developing despite there were successful cases in practice, so upgrading the stability of transaction contract is the key to facilitate the development of agricultural industrialization.
Upgrading the stability of transaction contract depends on contract choice and the optimizing of enforcing mechanism of contract. The high rate of contract breaching is motivated by the opportunistic behavior of the contract parties. This dissertation hold that the uncertainties in the agricultural products transaction①was the root of the weak stability of agricultural products transaction, the uncertainties in agricultural products transaction including the uncertainties that farmers and enterprises confronted with, which origined form“bounded rationality”of bargainers, asymmetric information, incomplete information and asymmetric station of bargainers (caused the asymmetric negotiation power). These uncertainties determined the stability of agricultural products transaction by restricting the achievement and allocation of exchange residuals.As an institutional arrangement to fit uncertainties, relational contract is inevitable for agricultural products transaction②. So the logic from uncertainties to relational contract is the logical starting point involuntarily, and due to the difficulty of the enforcing by the third party, the self-enforcement mechanisms of relational contract are the keys to agricultural products transaction governance.
Accordingly, the agricultural products transaction relational contract is proper access to the research. This dissertation discuss the problem of weak stability of agricultural products transaction, and carry out the research including the following aspects: 1)Analysing the logic between the uncertainties in the agricultural products transaction and corresponding contract choice(relational contract), designing the corresponding model of contract;2)As the the institutional arrangements, relational contract give a terse framework of agricultural products transaction. The achievement and allocation of exchange residuals changed with the circumstance of transaction, and the disputes are inevitably. The dispute-settlement mechanism of relational contract was discussed following; 3)the governance of agricultural products transaction by relational contract through the self-enforcing mechanism. The dissertation analysed the self-enforcing mechanism of agricultural products transaction relational contract under the hypotheses that farmers are risk adverseness and bounded rationality; 4)Cmpared the relational forms supporting the transaction of agricultural products with different specificity based on suvery data, and the model of agricultural products transaction governance mode based on trust induced by reciprocity are also gived.
Concretely, the following aspects were researched in this dissertation.
Firstly, the uncertainties and their exhibit forms existing in agricultural products transaction were distinguished and analysed, their impacts upon the agricultural products transaction was analysed, and the corresponding contract choice problem was concluded.
Sceondly, under the hypothesis that farmers are risk adverseness, based on the model made by Levin (2003), and take the relational specific investment by farmers, and circumstance uncertainties and so on into account, applied the relational contract theory to the pratices of chinese agricultural industrialization developing, modify the concept of stationary contract, conceive agricultural products transaction relational model based on ex-post retained earnings, and the influnces by negociation power and specific assets on the structure and the effectiveness of relational contract were also analysed .
Thirdly, the applying scope and limitedness of GNBS and the fixed-price contract as the dispute-settlement mechanisms were compared. On the base of analyses the limitedness of fixed-price contract in agricultural products transaction, GNBS and the fixed-price contract were induced into the relational contract as the dispute-settlement mechanisms, and their function of enhancing the stability of relational contract, and their applying scope and limitedness were compared. So, a framework of settling the opportunism behaviors under repeat transaction was set up.
Lastly, the limitation and fabulosity of self-enforcing mechanism based on repeated geme in governing the transaction of agricultural products is analysed. While the self-enforcing mechanism based on“relational forms embedness”can be the choice of governance of agricultural products transaction in China consequentially. An factor analysis based on the survey data to acquire the the critical relational forms supporting different sorts of agricultural products transaction were given, and the governance mode based on the trust inspired by reciprocity were given.
In conclusion, the innovation of this dissertation can be summarized three aspects:
①Under the hypotheses of“risk averseness”and“bounded rationality”, and the basic of the logic of the uncertainties in agricultural products transaction, the dissertation designed the agricultural products transaction relational contract models based on ex-post retained earnings considering specific investment by farmer ande the uncertainties of surroundings confronted with farmer. The impacts on the structure and efficiency of relational contract by negotiation power and the specialty asset were analysed the concept of Stationary Contracts was modified, so the model conceived by Levin (2003) was developed.The dissertation also inducted the GNBS and formal fixed-price into the relational contract as the approaches to settle disputes, analysed their functions to strengthen the self–enforcement of relational contract, and their applied ranges and pre-conditions to strengthen the self–enforcing of relational contract, so a framework to settle the problem of opportunism was given. The existing related literatures noticed the stability-upgrading function of relational contract, whereas, they are focused on the analyses of the character, the significance, the relational forms’governance function, and so forth. The re-designingof the model of relational contract and the analyses of dispute settlement mechanisms have deepened and developed the researches of the existing literatures.
②The self–enforcement is the foundation of governance of agricultural products transaction by relational contract. The dissertation sorted the self–enforcement mechanisms of relational contract into two types, one is based on repeated game, the other is based on“social forms embedness”. Under the hypotheses of“risk averseness”and“bounded rationality”, the dissertation analysed the limitedness of mechanism based on repeated game ( in the view of economics), and the realism and validity of mechanism based on“social forms embedness”. The existing related literatures emphasized particularly on the mechanism based on repeated game, and did not paid enough attention to the farmers’rationality ability and attitude to the risk (which are critical to the chontract choice of agricultural products transaction). The probing into the mechanism of governance of agricultural products transaction by relational contract in this dissertation have strengthened the pertinency and reality of relational contract.
③The dissertation noticed the fact that critical forms supporting different sorts of agricultural products transaction changed and developed with circumstance, that is, the forms governing agricultural products transaction changed with the agricultural products sort, even the forms governing same type of agricultural products changed with the social and economic circumstance and the parties’individual factors. The datas for analyzing is sort into two types according to agricultural products’s specificity(the range of outside choice), so the key forms supporting different sorts of agricultural products are acquired as the gists to upgrade the stability of agricultural products transaction, and the model of agricultural products transaction governance based on trust inspired by reciprocity are also gived. The existing related literatures take the function of governance of relational forms as fixed and universal, so the research of key forms supporting different sorts of agricultural products transaction is innovative.
提高农产品交易稳定性的根本在于农产品交易契约的选择和履约机制的优化。农产品交易高违约率的直接诱因是交易过程中双方的机会主义行为。但从根源上看,农产品交易弱稳定性源于交易中的高度不确定性(包括农户和企业面临的不确定性)②,而这种不确定性又源自于交易方的有限理性、信息不对称和信息不完全、双方交易地位(谈判力量)的不对称性,以及由此导致的机会主义行为。这种不确定性制约着交易剩余的实现及分配,从而影响农产品交易的稳定性。作为对不确定性进行适应的制度安排,关系契约是农产品交易的必然选择③。因此,不确定性到关系契约的逻辑自然成为研究农产品交易提升稳定性的基本出发点,而受制于第三方实施的困难,关系契约的自我实施机制是农产品交易治理的关键。
基于上述考虑,本文以农产品交易的关系契约分析作为切入点,探讨农产品交易的稳定性问题,并尝试进行以下几个方面的研究:1)对农产品交易中的不确定性与相应的契约选择(关系契约)之间的逻辑关系进行分析,构建相应的契约模型;2)作为对不确定性进行适应的制度安排,关系契约仅给出农户和公司交易的一个简化框架,在交易环境发生变化时,交易剩余及其分配关系必然会发生改变,此时双方的争议不可避免。因而本文分析了关系契约中的争议解决机制问题;3)关系契约对农产品交易治理的基石是自我实施机制。本文分析了基于农户“风险厌恶”和“有限理性”假设下的农产品交易关系契约自我实施机制问题。4)通过问卷调查的数据,比较了支持不同专用性农产品交易的关系规范,并根据共性的关系规范,探讨基于互惠诱发信任农产品交易治理模式。
具体来说,论文主要开展以下几个方面的研究工作:
首先,识别农产品交易中可能存在的各种不确定性形式;分析这些不确定性的具体来源及其表现形式、对农产品交易产生的影响,以及农产品交易中的不确定性与相应的契约选择(关系契约)的逻辑联系。
其次,将关系契约的相关理论及研究成果应用到中国农业产业化的具体实践中,在农户“风险厌恶”假设下,在Levin (2003)构建的模型的基础上,考虑农户关系专用投资、外部环境不确定性等因素,对其稳定契约的概念进行了修正,构建了基于事后保留收益等概念的关系契约模型,讨论了谈判能力及资产专用性对农产品交易关系契约结构和效率的影响。
再次,比较了作为争议解决机制的正式价格契约和广义纳什谈判解(GNBS)各自的适用范围和局限。在分析正式固定价格契约对农产品交易治理的局限性的基础上,将广义纳什谈判解(GNBS)和正式价格契约引入到关系契约中,作为解决争议的途径,比较了二者在强化关系契约稳定性方面的功能,提供了一个解决重复交易下的双方机会主义问题的框架。
最后,论证了基于重复博弈的契约自我实施机制在农产品交易中的局限性和非现实性,以及基于“关系规范嵌入性”的自我实施机制对我国农产品交易治理的现实性,并基于具体的调研数据,通过实证分析,寻找针对不同专用性农产品交易的关键关系规范,并据此提出基于互惠诱发信任的农产品交易关系治理思路。
论文的创新之处主要体现在以下三个方面:
①本文在农户“风险厌恶”和“有限理性”假设下,基于农产品交易面临的不确定性到关系契约的逻辑关系的分析,考虑农户关系专用投资、外部环境不确定性等因素,构建了基于事后保留收益等概念的关系契约模型,讨论了谈判能力及资产专用性对龙头企业与农户间的关系契约结构和效率的影响,对稳定契约的概念进行了修正,从而拓展了Levin (2003)关系契约模型。并将广义纳什谈判解(GNBS)和正式价格契约作为交易争议解决机制引入到关系契约中,比较二者在促进关系契约自我实施的范围和条件,提供了一个解决重复交易下的双方机会主义问题的框架。现有文献注意到了关系契约对提升农产品交易契约稳定性的作用,但局限于对关系契约的特征、存在意义、关系规范的治理作用等层面的探讨。本文对农产品交易关系契约模型的构建、争议解决机制的探讨是对现有研究成果的深入和发展,具有创新意义。
②关系契约的本质在于可自我实施性。本文将关系契约自我实施机制归纳为基于重复博弈的机制和基于社会规范嵌入性的机制两类。在农户“有限理性”和“风险厌恶”假设下,论证了基于重复博弈的关系契约自我实施机制在农产品交易中的局限性,以及基于“关系规范嵌入性”的自我实施机制(社会学和管理学的视角)对农产品交易治理的现实性和有效性。国内现有文献侧重于对基于“重复博弈机制”的契约自我实施机制的探讨,对农户理性能力和风险态度的关注不足(这对农产品交易契约选择及自我实施至关重要)。因而,本文对农产品交易关系契约自我实施机制的探讨强化了关系契约的针对性和现实性。
③本文注意到了支持不同种类农产品契约的关系规范随着时间和情境而变化、发展,因而产生治理作用的关系规范因农产品类型的不同而不同,同一类农产品交易的关系契约也会随其所处的社会经济环境和参与者个体因素而发生变化,并根据专用性(外部选择大小)将农产品分为专用性较强和专用性较弱两类,并根据调研数据,比较支持不同专用性农产品交易的关系规范,为提升农产品交易稳定性提供了微观决策依据,据此给出了基于互惠诱发信任的农产品交易治理模型。现有多数相关文献从普遍意义上将关系规范的治理作用视为是固定不变。本文针对基于农产品专用性的探讨具有创新意义。
As an organization of scale business of agriculture under the condition of small-sized family production, the form of“Dragon Head Enterprise+Farmer”gained the supporting by the government’s policy and recognizing by the theoreticians because it facilitated the development of agricultural industrialization developing by linking the“small farmers”and“lagre market”together through the long lasting contract butweem Dragon Head Enterprise and farmers, and the reasonable allocating of exchange residuals and the related risks to the transaction. However, the weak stability of agricultural products transaction contract caused by high rate of contract breaching has long being the obstacle to the agricultural industrialization developing despite there were successful cases in practice, so upgrading the stability of transaction contract is the key to facilitate the development of agricultural industrialization.
Upgrading the stability of transaction contract depends on contract choice and the optimizing of enforcing mechanism of contract. The high rate of contract breaching is motivated by the opportunistic behavior of the contract parties. This dissertation hold that the uncertainties in the agricultural products transaction①was the root of the weak stability of agricultural products transaction, the uncertainties in agricultural products transaction including the uncertainties that farmers and enterprises confronted with, which origined form“bounded rationality”of bargainers, asymmetric information, incomplete information and asymmetric station of bargainers (caused the asymmetric negotiation power). These uncertainties determined the stability of agricultural products transaction by restricting the achievement and allocation of exchange residuals.As an institutional arrangement to fit uncertainties, relational contract is inevitable for agricultural products transaction②. So the logic from uncertainties to relational contract is the logical starting point involuntarily, and due to the difficulty of the enforcing by the third party, the self-enforcement mechanisms of relational contract are the keys to agricultural products transaction governance.
Accordingly, the agricultural products transaction relational contract is proper access to the research. This dissertation discuss the problem of weak stability of agricultural products transaction, and carry out the research including the following aspects: 1)Analysing the logic between the uncertainties in the agricultural products transaction and corresponding contract choice(relational contract), designing the corresponding model of contract;2)As the the institutional arrangements, relational contract give a terse framework of agricultural products transaction. The achievement and allocation of exchange residuals changed with the circumstance of transaction, and the disputes are inevitably. The dispute-settlement mechanism of relational contract was discussed following; 3)the governance of agricultural products transaction by relational contract through the self-enforcing mechanism. The dissertation analysed the self-enforcing mechanism of agricultural products transaction relational contract under the hypotheses that farmers are risk adverseness and bounded rationality; 4)Cmpared the relational forms supporting the transaction of agricultural products with different specificity based on suvery data, and the model of agricultural products transaction governance mode based on trust induced by reciprocity are also gived.
Concretely, the following aspects were researched in this dissertation.
Firstly, the uncertainties and their exhibit forms existing in agricultural products transaction were distinguished and analysed, their impacts upon the agricultural products transaction was analysed, and the corresponding contract choice problem was concluded.
Sceondly, under the hypothesis that farmers are risk adverseness, based on the model made by Levin (2003), and take the relational specific investment by farmers, and circumstance uncertainties and so on into account, applied the relational contract theory to the pratices of chinese agricultural industrialization developing, modify the concept of stationary contract, conceive agricultural products transaction relational model based on ex-post retained earnings, and the influnces by negociation power and specific assets on the structure and the effectiveness of relational contract were also analysed .
Thirdly, the applying scope and limitedness of GNBS and the fixed-price contract as the dispute-settlement mechanisms were compared. On the base of analyses the limitedness of fixed-price contract in agricultural products transaction, GNBS and the fixed-price contract were induced into the relational contract as the dispute-settlement mechanisms, and their function of enhancing the stability of relational contract, and their applying scope and limitedness were compared. So, a framework of settling the opportunism behaviors under repeat transaction was set up.
Lastly, the limitation and fabulosity of self-enforcing mechanism based on repeated geme in governing the transaction of agricultural products is analysed. While the self-enforcing mechanism based on“relational forms embedness”can be the choice of governance of agricultural products transaction in China consequentially. An factor analysis based on the survey data to acquire the the critical relational forms supporting different sorts of agricultural products transaction were given, and the governance mode based on the trust inspired by reciprocity were given.
In conclusion, the innovation of this dissertation can be summarized three aspects:
①Under the hypotheses of“risk averseness”and“bounded rationality”, and the basic of the logic of the uncertainties in agricultural products transaction, the dissertation designed the agricultural products transaction relational contract models based on ex-post retained earnings considering specific investment by farmer ande the uncertainties of surroundings confronted with farmer. The impacts on the structure and efficiency of relational contract by negotiation power and the specialty asset were analysed the concept of Stationary Contracts was modified, so the model conceived by Levin (2003) was developed.The dissertation also inducted the GNBS and formal fixed-price into the relational contract as the approaches to settle disputes, analysed their functions to strengthen the self–enforcement of relational contract, and their applied ranges and pre-conditions to strengthen the self–enforcing of relational contract, so a framework to settle the problem of opportunism was given. The existing related literatures noticed the stability-upgrading function of relational contract, whereas, they are focused on the analyses of the character, the significance, the relational forms’governance function, and so forth. The re-designingof the model of relational contract and the analyses of dispute settlement mechanisms have deepened and developed the researches of the existing literatures.
②The self–enforcement is the foundation of governance of agricultural products transaction by relational contract. The dissertation sorted the self–enforcement mechanisms of relational contract into two types, one is based on repeated game, the other is based on“social forms embedness”. Under the hypotheses of“risk averseness”and“bounded rationality”, the dissertation analysed the limitedness of mechanism based on repeated game ( in the view of economics), and the realism and validity of mechanism based on“social forms embedness”. The existing related literatures emphasized particularly on the mechanism based on repeated game, and did not paid enough attention to the farmers’rationality ability and attitude to the risk (which are critical to the chontract choice of agricultural products transaction). The probing into the mechanism of governance of agricultural products transaction by relational contract in this dissertation have strengthened the pertinency and reality of relational contract.
③The dissertation noticed the fact that critical forms supporting different sorts of agricultural products transaction changed and developed with circumstance, that is, the forms governing agricultural products transaction changed with the agricultural products sort, even the forms governing same type of agricultural products changed with the social and economic circumstance and the parties’individual factors. The datas for analyzing is sort into two types according to agricultural products’s specificity(the range of outside choice), so the key forms supporting different sorts of agricultural products are acquired as the gists to upgrade the stability of agricultural products transaction, and the model of agricultural products transaction governance based on trust inspired by reciprocity are also gived. The existing related literatures take the function of governance of relational forms as fixed and universal, so the research of key forms supporting different sorts of agricultural products transaction is innovative.
引文
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