保荐代表人、证券监管与保荐质量的提高
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摘要
自2004年核准制下的保荐制度成为我国A股市场股票发行制度至今已有八年,保荐制度的实行对证券公司开展股票保荐与承销业务以及培养股票发行专业人才起到了重要作用。同时,保荐制度的设立也是股票发行由行政审批进一步向市场化转变的结果,为我国A股市场的健康发展发挥了积极的促进作用。
但是自保荐制度实行以来,新股发行后上市公司屡因保荐工作不力而产生问题,保荐质量不稳定且难以得到保证,再者保荐制度内部矛盾也逐渐显露,制度中涉及的各行为主体之间的矛盾和冲突进一步制约了保荐工作的开展,造成新股发行效率持续走低的结果。2011年10月以来,证监会在换届后希望通过制度改革解决A股市场中存在的诸多问题。投资者对新股发行制度的改革呼声日渐强烈,证监会也把股票发行制度纳入改革范围。证监会主席郭树清在2011年末的一次内部会议中向证监会发行部官员和发审委委员们提出了“IPO不审行不行?”的疑问。新一轮的股票发行制度改革即将启动,保荐制度与监管机构对IPO项目采用的核准制都成为备受瞩目的改革目标。
本文希望通过分析得出保荐制度和新股发行环节监管模式的改革路径。首先从制度的历史沿革出发对中国A股市场股票发行制度进行回顾,在分析股票发行制度源起和保荐制度实行的历史背景和设计理念后,从两个角度对保荐制度展开分析：一是从A股市场整体出发探究外部制度对保荐制度的影响,二是通过分析保荐制度中各方主体的行动策略,诠释各行为主体在不同利益诉求下的相互影响。通过上述两个角度明确保荐制度在实行过程中出现问题的外部动因和内部动因,发现保荐制度呈现出的问题并不能仅归因于制度设计缺陷,围绕A股市场的外部制度不健全也是造成保荐不力的原因。一直以来,我国A股市场监管体系中行政监管独大的局面造成了市场机制和司法机制不能在事前监管阶段和事后监管阶段发挥应有的作用,单一的行政监管策略不仅不能对A股市场起到全面保护的作用,其市场干预行为也阻碍了A股市场的健康发展,过度的行政管制造成了上市公司成为稀缺资源、保荐责任不明确、事前监管干预市场化选择和事后监管不足造成惩罚不足和规则不明等问题的出现。由此,在核准制下的保荐制度作为新股发行制度后,仍然存在着一些问题需要进一步地修正。
其次对其他国家和地区使用保荐制度的证券市场进行介绍,并分析其实行保荐制度的动因和制度设计特点。选取三个特点鲜明的国家及地区——英国、香港和美国进行主要介绍。英国是第一个实行保荐制度的国家。香港则是中国保荐制度的参考模版。美国的NASDAQ市场实行的股票发行监管制度虽不是保荐制度,但是具有保荐制度的特点并对保荐制有积极的参考价值。该制度相对于传统的保荐制做出了更为详细的分工,权责分明、风险分散。在分析上述三个国家的基础上,对加拿大、韩国和新加坡三个国家进行简略分析,重点描述其保荐制度中独有的特色。然后对上述六国保荐制度特点与中国A股市场中的相关制度设计进行比较分析,进而探讨其对中国保荐制度起到的借鉴作用。研究结论理清了我国保荐制度与其所在市场环境之间的关系,明晰了保荐制度与外部市场环境的变革方向。
再次以博弈分析为前文论述提供理论依据,第一个模型分析保荐代表人在优选上市公司的过程中监管机构对其的控制机制,模型化监管机构对保荐代表人的业务要求,将事前监管与事后监管纳入到博弈模型中,在监管机构合理应用既有制度的条件下,设计最优监管策略来规范保荐代表人的行为。设计该模型的基于如下两个目的,一是考察保荐代表人的义务——如何才能通过制度设计使保荐代表人履职尽责；二是通过分析证监会的监管措施和相关政策,进一步研究监管策略的实用性及出现的问题,并讨论监管发行制度去行政化的可行性。从模型分析得出,监管机构对问题IPO项目的相关责任人轻罚进一步造成了保荐不力的结果,模型还证明了监管机构只要能够合理配置事后监管的有效惩罚措施,就可以起到替代事前监管效用,减少行政监管对保荐工作的干预。第二个模型在上述模型的基础上加入了对保荐代表人能力的刻画,以此分析保荐代表人由于保荐能力不同对监管机制及对新股发行效率的影响。模型中建立的分析变量为今后建立保荐综合信息披露平台提供了关于保荐代表人能力的评价标准。
第三个模型用以进一步明晰在新股发行阶段各行为主体之间的博弈关系。以该模型为核心较为系统的阐述了监管机构对保荐制度的作用机制,并通过分析不同情况的发行人对保荐能力不同的保荐代表人的选择,明确其选择机制以找到进一步提高保荐质量的途径。该模型解决以下两个问题,一是得出在最优监管强度下监管机构应如何解决新股发行中有关发行人与保荐代表人的合谋问题；二是给出合理的监管模式以确保高能力保荐代表人维持高水平保荐能力的同时,也能给予低能力保荐代表人提升能力的机会,提高保荐代表人市场的整体实力。通过模型分析还可以得出,现阶段并不具备取消核准制的条件,因为首先对保荐代表人的考核制度还未建立,保荐能力不同的保荐代表人无法区分,低能力保荐代表人的保荐行为需要核准制兜底；其次事后监管体系仍未发挥对事前监管的替代作用,低位阶的惩罚措施和惩罚不连贯性导致监管行为无法对保荐过程中的违法违规问题产生有效威慑。
本文的主要理论贡献是：
第一,丰富了学界关于保荐制度的研究,特别是保荐代表人这一制度设计的理论研究。分析指出事前行政监管的干预、事后监管的多层次监管体系尚未建立、A股市场板块设计问题、外部辅助制度不健全和IPO项目出现问题后对相关责任人的轻罚行为等问题都造成了保荐质量无法保证的现状。文章基于上述问题,根据中国股票发行监管制度的变革过程以及外国保荐制度中的先进经验对中国核准制下的保荐制度提出改革建议,使改革方向在兼顾中国当前国情的基础上,向高效率股票发行制度的方向转变。
第二,在股票发行流程中明晰我国在不同历史阶段所采取的不同发行制度的运行机制。在与之前制度对比的过程中,分析各相关主体权力与义务的改变。然后逐步分析证监会监管政策的发展、保荐制度中保荐代表人的权力与义务以及保荐代表人与保荐公司的关系。把保荐代表人作为新股发行中的独立参与主体展开分析,并将其纳入到新股发行各方权力角逐中,提供关于新股发行阶段更为完善的理论分析框架。发现保荐制度运行效率过低不仅源于其制度设计中固有的漏洞,更与政府行政监管与保荐制度不能互补合作保证保荐质量有关。通过分析政府行政监管的监管策略,解释目前监管机构“重事前监管、轻事后监管”的原因,提出建立以行政监管为主导,市场机制和司法机制同时发挥作用的多层次事后监管体系以替代事前监管,这样既能解决事前监管对新股发行的干预问题,同时还能保证IPO项目的保荐质量。
第三,构建博弈模型对保荐过程中各参与主体展开分析也是本文的创新之处。诚然在这方面已有相关文献涉及,但已有模型关于发行环节的设计不够全面,参与主体之间的互动不够真实。本文建立的理论分析模型不仅把保荐代表人作为分析主体,刻画其在新股发行阶段优选上市公司的行为,还通过在模型中引入监管机构作为保荐质量和保荐制度实行效率的控制者,刻画监管机构的作用。通过求解满足纳什均衡条件的保荐要求,作为监管机构控制保荐代表人行为的依据,从而将监管机构的作用内生于模型之中。另外,模型中涵盖证监会截至2011年4月出台的监管方案,模型对该方案的实行效果进行了理论预测,认为若不对证监会的具体监管行为和处罚力度进行改进,新实行的监管方案将不会对保荐代表人的保荐质量产生促进作用。
It has been eight years since Sponsor representatives system under Authorized System turned into Stock issue system of A share market in2004. The implementation of Sponsor system has vital function for Security Company to develop stock sponsor and underwriting services, as well as cultivate stock issuing professionals. Besides, Sponsor system is also the result of further transition of stock issue from administrative examination and approval to marketization, and it promotes healthy development of A share market.
However, since the implementation of Sponsor system, repeated problems have arised in Listed Companies after IPO caused by unfavorable performance of sponsor system, namely unsecured sponsor quality. Moreover, internal contradictions of sponsor work become obvious gradually. Contradictions and conflicts among behavior subjects in the system restrict the development of sponsor work and give rise to continuous low efficiency of IPO. Newly elected CSRC has expected to solve problems existing in A share market by institutional reform since October,2011. Investors have called for IPO system reform, and CSRC brought stock issue system into reform range. Chairman of CSRC Mr. Guo Shuqing posed the question in internal meeting in late2011to officials of CSRC issue department and committee members of the service hall:is it acceptable for not having examination for IPO? A new round of stock issue system reform is to start. Sponsor representatives system and authorized system implemented by regulator to IPO will become the high-profile reform targets
This article attempts to find the reforming way for sponsor system and IPO link examining mode. Firstly, starting from historical evolution of the system, the stock issue system of A share market in china is reviewed. After analyzing the origin of stock issue system and historical background, as well as design concept of sponsor system implementation, the sponsor system is studies from two angles:one is observing the influence of exploring external system on sponsor system from the point of entire A share market. The other is interpreting the interaction of all behavior subjects in the situation of different profit appeals by analyzing behavior strategy of every behavior subject in sponsor system. The internal and external causes of problems in implementing sponsor system become explicit by analyses from the above two angles. It's found that the problems of sponsor system are not only caused by design deficiency of the system, but also by imperfect of external system in A share market. Historically, the dominating position of administrative supervision domains all in A share market in china causes the situation that market mechanism and judicial system play little role at the stage of both pre-supervision and post-supervision. Single administrative supervision strategy cannot protect fully A share market; Moreover, its market intervention blocks the healthy development of A share market. Excessive administrative supervision caused the problems, such as scarcity of listed companies, indeterminacy of sponsor responsibility, interference of pre-supervision to marketization choice, lack of punishment and regulations caused by lack of post-supervision. Therefore, even after sponsor system under authorized system becomes IPO system, problems still exist and require solutions.
Then, other countries and districts'store market of using sponsor system are introduced with analysis of motives and system design features of implementing sponsor system. Three countries with distinctive features are selected, namely, Britain, America, and Hong Kong. Britain is the first country implementing sponsor system. Hong Kong is the template for Chinese sponsor system. Stock issue supervision system in NASDAQ market in America is not sponsor system to be exact, but it has features of sponsor system and reference value. Compared to traditional sponsor system, this system makes detailed division of labor with distinct rights and liabilities and scattered risks. Apart from studies on the above three countries, cases in Canada, Korea and Singapore are analyzed with emphasis on particular feature in sponsor system. It explores the reference value of experience of above six countries to Chinese sponsor system by comparing different features with Chinese situation. The outcomes clarify the relationship between sponsor representatives system and its market environment and elaborate reform direction of external market environment of sponsor system.
Game analysis is used as theoretical basis of above discussion. The first model analyzes regulators'control mechanism on sponsor representatives during their selection of listed companies, and also modelizes business requests of regulators for sponsor representatives. Both pre-supervision and post-supervision are brought into Game Model. Under the condition of regulators'reasonable implementation of the system, optimal supervision strategies are designed to regularize sponsor representatives'behaviors. There are two aims for designing this model:one is to inspect the obligation of sponsor representatives—how can the system be designed for sponsor representatives to meet commitment. The other is to further study practicability and drawbacks of supervision strategies, and discuss the feasibility of de-administration of supervision issue system. The model reaches the conclusion that lack of punishment on people in charge of IPO project with problems causes ineffectiveness of sponsor, and proves that as long as regulators reasonably distributes efficient punitive action at post-supervision stage, pre-supervision can be replaced and intervention of administrative supervision on sponsor work can be reduced. Based on the above model, in the second model, sponsor representatives'qualification is added to analyze their influence on regulators and implementation efficiency of IPO. Variables in the model provide evaluation criterion in sponsor representatives'qualification for future establishment of comprehensive information disclosure platform
The third model is used to clarify the Game action relationship among behavior subjects at IPO stage. Based on this model, the action mechanism of regulators on sponsor system is systematically elaborated. By analyzing different issuers'choices of sponsor representatives with different qualifications, selection mechanism can be found to improve sponsor quality. This model solves the following two problems:One is that how regulators can solve the conspiring problem between IPO issuers and sponsor representatives under the optimal supervision strength. The other is that while qualified sponsor representatives can be guaranteed to exert high-level sponsor capability, less qualified sponsor representatives can also be provided with opportunity to increase their qualification, which can improve overall capacity of sponsor representatives market. With this model, we can also conclude that authorized system cannot be cancelled at this stage for two reasons:one is that a assessment system for sponsor representatives has not be established and it is difficult to distinguish sponsor representatives'qualification. Sponsor behavior of sponsor representatives with lower ability need to be made up by authorized system. Another reason is that post-supervision system also hasn't substituted pre-supervision. Low-rate punitive action and incoherence of punishment lead to the result that supervision behavior can not have efficient deterrence on illegal problems.
The main theoretical contributions of this article are as following:
(1) Studies on sponsor system in academic field are increased, particularly theoretical research on sponsor representatives system. The present situation which leads to failure in guaranteeing sponsor quality is analyzed, namely intervention of pre-supervision, no establishment of multilevel system in post-supervision, imperfect of plate design in A share market and external supplementary system, lack punishment on people responsible for IPO project with problems. This article proposes some suggestion on Chinese sponsor representatives system under authorized system, based on the above problems, development of Chinese securities issue supervision system and advanced experience of other countries'sponsor system. It attempts to help turn the reform direction to high efficiency stock issue system in the consideration of Chinese situation.
(2) Operating mechanisms of diverse issue systems at different Chinese historic stages are recognized during issue system procedure. At review of different stages, changes of related rights and obligation of main subjects are analyzed, which is followed by analyses of supervision policy development of CSRC, right and obligation of sponsor representatives in sponsor system, and the relationship between sponsor representatives and Sponsor Company. Then, sponsor representatives is viewed as independent participation in IPO and brought into power struggle of related subjects, which provides a better analysis framework at the stage of IPO implementation. The finding is that low operating efficiency of sponsor system is not only caused by inherent loopholes of system design, but also failure of complementary cooperation between government's administrative supervision and sponsor system to guarantee sponsor quality. By analyzing supervision strategies in government's administrative supervision, causes of present phenomenon in regulators like "take pre-supervision seriously and neglect post-supervision" is explained. The proposed view is that establishment of multilevel post-supervision system in replacement of pre-supervision, which is dominated by administrative supervision and can play a role in both market mechanism and judicial mechanism, can terminate the intervention of pre-supervision for IPO implementation and in the mean time, ensure sponsor quality of IPO project.
(3) Constructing Game Model to analyze main part of sponsor system reflects creativity of this article. Though some literatures referred to this aspect, their issue lacks entirety and real interaction among main subjects. The theoretical models in this article not only analyze the sponsor representatives as main subject with description of their behaviors of choosing optimal listed companies in IPO stage, but also analyze the role of regulators by bringing regulators as the controller of sponsor quality and system implementing efficiency. By solving sponsor requirements of Nash Equilibrium condition and taking the outcome as a basis of regulators controlling sponsor representatives, the effect of regulators is inset this model. Moreover, the model includes the latest supervision project of CSRC up to June,2011. The model predicts trial effect of this project in theory, and assumes that if there is no improvement on specific supervision action and penalties of CSRC, the new supervision project will not enhance the sponsor quality of sponsor representatives.
但是自保荐制度实行以来,新股发行后上市公司屡因保荐工作不力而产生问题,保荐质量不稳定且难以得到保证,再者保荐制度内部矛盾也逐渐显露,制度中涉及的各行为主体之间的矛盾和冲突进一步制约了保荐工作的开展,造成新股发行效率持续走低的结果。2011年10月以来,证监会在换届后希望通过制度改革解决A股市场中存在的诸多问题。投资者对新股发行制度的改革呼声日渐强烈,证监会也把股票发行制度纳入改革范围。证监会主席郭树清在2011年末的一次内部会议中向证监会发行部官员和发审委委员们提出了“IPO不审行不行?”的疑问。新一轮的股票发行制度改革即将启动,保荐制度与监管机构对IPO项目采用的核准制都成为备受瞩目的改革目标。
本文希望通过分析得出保荐制度和新股发行环节监管模式的改革路径。首先从制度的历史沿革出发对中国A股市场股票发行制度进行回顾,在分析股票发行制度源起和保荐制度实行的历史背景和设计理念后,从两个角度对保荐制度展开分析：一是从A股市场整体出发探究外部制度对保荐制度的影响,二是通过分析保荐制度中各方主体的行动策略,诠释各行为主体在不同利益诉求下的相互影响。通过上述两个角度明确保荐制度在实行过程中出现问题的外部动因和内部动因,发现保荐制度呈现出的问题并不能仅归因于制度设计缺陷,围绕A股市场的外部制度不健全也是造成保荐不力的原因。一直以来,我国A股市场监管体系中行政监管独大的局面造成了市场机制和司法机制不能在事前监管阶段和事后监管阶段发挥应有的作用,单一的行政监管策略不仅不能对A股市场起到全面保护的作用,其市场干预行为也阻碍了A股市场的健康发展,过度的行政管制造成了上市公司成为稀缺资源、保荐责任不明确、事前监管干预市场化选择和事后监管不足造成惩罚不足和规则不明等问题的出现。由此,在核准制下的保荐制度作为新股发行制度后,仍然存在着一些问题需要进一步地修正。
其次对其他国家和地区使用保荐制度的证券市场进行介绍,并分析其实行保荐制度的动因和制度设计特点。选取三个特点鲜明的国家及地区——英国、香港和美国进行主要介绍。英国是第一个实行保荐制度的国家。香港则是中国保荐制度的参考模版。美国的NASDAQ市场实行的股票发行监管制度虽不是保荐制度,但是具有保荐制度的特点并对保荐制有积极的参考价值。该制度相对于传统的保荐制做出了更为详细的分工,权责分明、风险分散。在分析上述三个国家的基础上,对加拿大、韩国和新加坡三个国家进行简略分析,重点描述其保荐制度中独有的特色。然后对上述六国保荐制度特点与中国A股市场中的相关制度设计进行比较分析,进而探讨其对中国保荐制度起到的借鉴作用。研究结论理清了我国保荐制度与其所在市场环境之间的关系,明晰了保荐制度与外部市场环境的变革方向。
再次以博弈分析为前文论述提供理论依据,第一个模型分析保荐代表人在优选上市公司的过程中监管机构对其的控制机制,模型化监管机构对保荐代表人的业务要求,将事前监管与事后监管纳入到博弈模型中,在监管机构合理应用既有制度的条件下,设计最优监管策略来规范保荐代表人的行为。设计该模型的基于如下两个目的,一是考察保荐代表人的义务——如何才能通过制度设计使保荐代表人履职尽责；二是通过分析证监会的监管措施和相关政策,进一步研究监管策略的实用性及出现的问题,并讨论监管发行制度去行政化的可行性。从模型分析得出,监管机构对问题IPO项目的相关责任人轻罚进一步造成了保荐不力的结果,模型还证明了监管机构只要能够合理配置事后监管的有效惩罚措施,就可以起到替代事前监管效用,减少行政监管对保荐工作的干预。第二个模型在上述模型的基础上加入了对保荐代表人能力的刻画,以此分析保荐代表人由于保荐能力不同对监管机制及对新股发行效率的影响。模型中建立的分析变量为今后建立保荐综合信息披露平台提供了关于保荐代表人能力的评价标准。
第三个模型用以进一步明晰在新股发行阶段各行为主体之间的博弈关系。以该模型为核心较为系统的阐述了监管机构对保荐制度的作用机制,并通过分析不同情况的发行人对保荐能力不同的保荐代表人的选择,明确其选择机制以找到进一步提高保荐质量的途径。该模型解决以下两个问题,一是得出在最优监管强度下监管机构应如何解决新股发行中有关发行人与保荐代表人的合谋问题；二是给出合理的监管模式以确保高能力保荐代表人维持高水平保荐能力的同时,也能给予低能力保荐代表人提升能力的机会,提高保荐代表人市场的整体实力。通过模型分析还可以得出,现阶段并不具备取消核准制的条件,因为首先对保荐代表人的考核制度还未建立,保荐能力不同的保荐代表人无法区分,低能力保荐代表人的保荐行为需要核准制兜底；其次事后监管体系仍未发挥对事前监管的替代作用,低位阶的惩罚措施和惩罚不连贯性导致监管行为无法对保荐过程中的违法违规问题产生有效威慑。
本文的主要理论贡献是：
第一,丰富了学界关于保荐制度的研究,特别是保荐代表人这一制度设计的理论研究。分析指出事前行政监管的干预、事后监管的多层次监管体系尚未建立、A股市场板块设计问题、外部辅助制度不健全和IPO项目出现问题后对相关责任人的轻罚行为等问题都造成了保荐质量无法保证的现状。文章基于上述问题,根据中国股票发行监管制度的变革过程以及外国保荐制度中的先进经验对中国核准制下的保荐制度提出改革建议,使改革方向在兼顾中国当前国情的基础上,向高效率股票发行制度的方向转变。
第二,在股票发行流程中明晰我国在不同历史阶段所采取的不同发行制度的运行机制。在与之前制度对比的过程中,分析各相关主体权力与义务的改变。然后逐步分析证监会监管政策的发展、保荐制度中保荐代表人的权力与义务以及保荐代表人与保荐公司的关系。把保荐代表人作为新股发行中的独立参与主体展开分析,并将其纳入到新股发行各方权力角逐中,提供关于新股发行阶段更为完善的理论分析框架。发现保荐制度运行效率过低不仅源于其制度设计中固有的漏洞,更与政府行政监管与保荐制度不能互补合作保证保荐质量有关。通过分析政府行政监管的监管策略,解释目前监管机构“重事前监管、轻事后监管”的原因,提出建立以行政监管为主导,市场机制和司法机制同时发挥作用的多层次事后监管体系以替代事前监管,这样既能解决事前监管对新股发行的干预问题,同时还能保证IPO项目的保荐质量。
第三,构建博弈模型对保荐过程中各参与主体展开分析也是本文的创新之处。诚然在这方面已有相关文献涉及,但已有模型关于发行环节的设计不够全面,参与主体之间的互动不够真实。本文建立的理论分析模型不仅把保荐代表人作为分析主体,刻画其在新股发行阶段优选上市公司的行为,还通过在模型中引入监管机构作为保荐质量和保荐制度实行效率的控制者,刻画监管机构的作用。通过求解满足纳什均衡条件的保荐要求,作为监管机构控制保荐代表人行为的依据,从而将监管机构的作用内生于模型之中。另外,模型中涵盖证监会截至2011年4月出台的监管方案,模型对该方案的实行效果进行了理论预测,认为若不对证监会的具体监管行为和处罚力度进行改进,新实行的监管方案将不会对保荐代表人的保荐质量产生促进作用。
It has been eight years since Sponsor representatives system under Authorized System turned into Stock issue system of A share market in2004. The implementation of Sponsor system has vital function for Security Company to develop stock sponsor and underwriting services, as well as cultivate stock issuing professionals. Besides, Sponsor system is also the result of further transition of stock issue from administrative examination and approval to marketization, and it promotes healthy development of A share market.
However, since the implementation of Sponsor system, repeated problems have arised in Listed Companies after IPO caused by unfavorable performance of sponsor system, namely unsecured sponsor quality. Moreover, internal contradictions of sponsor work become obvious gradually. Contradictions and conflicts among behavior subjects in the system restrict the development of sponsor work and give rise to continuous low efficiency of IPO. Newly elected CSRC has expected to solve problems existing in A share market by institutional reform since October,2011. Investors have called for IPO system reform, and CSRC brought stock issue system into reform range. Chairman of CSRC Mr. Guo Shuqing posed the question in internal meeting in late2011to officials of CSRC issue department and committee members of the service hall:is it acceptable for not having examination for IPO? A new round of stock issue system reform is to start. Sponsor representatives system and authorized system implemented by regulator to IPO will become the high-profile reform targets
This article attempts to find the reforming way for sponsor system and IPO link examining mode. Firstly, starting from historical evolution of the system, the stock issue system of A share market in china is reviewed. After analyzing the origin of stock issue system and historical background, as well as design concept of sponsor system implementation, the sponsor system is studies from two angles:one is observing the influence of exploring external system on sponsor system from the point of entire A share market. The other is interpreting the interaction of all behavior subjects in the situation of different profit appeals by analyzing behavior strategy of every behavior subject in sponsor system. The internal and external causes of problems in implementing sponsor system become explicit by analyses from the above two angles. It's found that the problems of sponsor system are not only caused by design deficiency of the system, but also by imperfect of external system in A share market. Historically, the dominating position of administrative supervision domains all in A share market in china causes the situation that market mechanism and judicial system play little role at the stage of both pre-supervision and post-supervision. Single administrative supervision strategy cannot protect fully A share market; Moreover, its market intervention blocks the healthy development of A share market. Excessive administrative supervision caused the problems, such as scarcity of listed companies, indeterminacy of sponsor responsibility, interference of pre-supervision to marketization choice, lack of punishment and regulations caused by lack of post-supervision. Therefore, even after sponsor system under authorized system becomes IPO system, problems still exist and require solutions.
Then, other countries and districts'store market of using sponsor system are introduced with analysis of motives and system design features of implementing sponsor system. Three countries with distinctive features are selected, namely, Britain, America, and Hong Kong. Britain is the first country implementing sponsor system. Hong Kong is the template for Chinese sponsor system. Stock issue supervision system in NASDAQ market in America is not sponsor system to be exact, but it has features of sponsor system and reference value. Compared to traditional sponsor system, this system makes detailed division of labor with distinct rights and liabilities and scattered risks. Apart from studies on the above three countries, cases in Canada, Korea and Singapore are analyzed with emphasis on particular feature in sponsor system. It explores the reference value of experience of above six countries to Chinese sponsor system by comparing different features with Chinese situation. The outcomes clarify the relationship between sponsor representatives system and its market environment and elaborate reform direction of external market environment of sponsor system.
Game analysis is used as theoretical basis of above discussion. The first model analyzes regulators'control mechanism on sponsor representatives during their selection of listed companies, and also modelizes business requests of regulators for sponsor representatives. Both pre-supervision and post-supervision are brought into Game Model. Under the condition of regulators'reasonable implementation of the system, optimal supervision strategies are designed to regularize sponsor representatives'behaviors. There are two aims for designing this model:one is to inspect the obligation of sponsor representatives—how can the system be designed for sponsor representatives to meet commitment. The other is to further study practicability and drawbacks of supervision strategies, and discuss the feasibility of de-administration of supervision issue system. The model reaches the conclusion that lack of punishment on people in charge of IPO project with problems causes ineffectiveness of sponsor, and proves that as long as regulators reasonably distributes efficient punitive action at post-supervision stage, pre-supervision can be replaced and intervention of administrative supervision on sponsor work can be reduced. Based on the above model, in the second model, sponsor representatives'qualification is added to analyze their influence on regulators and implementation efficiency of IPO. Variables in the model provide evaluation criterion in sponsor representatives'qualification for future establishment of comprehensive information disclosure platform
The third model is used to clarify the Game action relationship among behavior subjects at IPO stage. Based on this model, the action mechanism of regulators on sponsor system is systematically elaborated. By analyzing different issuers'choices of sponsor representatives with different qualifications, selection mechanism can be found to improve sponsor quality. This model solves the following two problems:One is that how regulators can solve the conspiring problem between IPO issuers and sponsor representatives under the optimal supervision strength. The other is that while qualified sponsor representatives can be guaranteed to exert high-level sponsor capability, less qualified sponsor representatives can also be provided with opportunity to increase their qualification, which can improve overall capacity of sponsor representatives market. With this model, we can also conclude that authorized system cannot be cancelled at this stage for two reasons:one is that a assessment system for sponsor representatives has not be established and it is difficult to distinguish sponsor representatives'qualification. Sponsor behavior of sponsor representatives with lower ability need to be made up by authorized system. Another reason is that post-supervision system also hasn't substituted pre-supervision. Low-rate punitive action and incoherence of punishment lead to the result that supervision behavior can not have efficient deterrence on illegal problems.
The main theoretical contributions of this article are as following:
(1) Studies on sponsor system in academic field are increased, particularly theoretical research on sponsor representatives system. The present situation which leads to failure in guaranteeing sponsor quality is analyzed, namely intervention of pre-supervision, no establishment of multilevel system in post-supervision, imperfect of plate design in A share market and external supplementary system, lack punishment on people responsible for IPO project with problems. This article proposes some suggestion on Chinese sponsor representatives system under authorized system, based on the above problems, development of Chinese securities issue supervision system and advanced experience of other countries'sponsor system. It attempts to help turn the reform direction to high efficiency stock issue system in the consideration of Chinese situation.
(2) Operating mechanisms of diverse issue systems at different Chinese historic stages are recognized during issue system procedure. At review of different stages, changes of related rights and obligation of main subjects are analyzed, which is followed by analyses of supervision policy development of CSRC, right and obligation of sponsor representatives in sponsor system, and the relationship between sponsor representatives and Sponsor Company. Then, sponsor representatives is viewed as independent participation in IPO and brought into power struggle of related subjects, which provides a better analysis framework at the stage of IPO implementation. The finding is that low operating efficiency of sponsor system is not only caused by inherent loopholes of system design, but also failure of complementary cooperation between government's administrative supervision and sponsor system to guarantee sponsor quality. By analyzing supervision strategies in government's administrative supervision, causes of present phenomenon in regulators like "take pre-supervision seriously and neglect post-supervision" is explained. The proposed view is that establishment of multilevel post-supervision system in replacement of pre-supervision, which is dominated by administrative supervision and can play a role in both market mechanism and judicial mechanism, can terminate the intervention of pre-supervision for IPO implementation and in the mean time, ensure sponsor quality of IPO project.
(3) Constructing Game Model to analyze main part of sponsor system reflects creativity of this article. Though some literatures referred to this aspect, their issue lacks entirety and real interaction among main subjects. The theoretical models in this article not only analyze the sponsor representatives as main subject with description of their behaviors of choosing optimal listed companies in IPO stage, but also analyze the role of regulators by bringing regulators as the controller of sponsor quality and system implementing efficiency. By solving sponsor requirements of Nash Equilibrium condition and taking the outcome as a basis of regulators controlling sponsor representatives, the effect of regulators is inset this model. Moreover, the model includes the latest supervision project of CSRC up to June,2011. The model predicts trial effect of this project in theory, and assumes that if there is no improvement on specific supervision action and penalties of CSRC, the new supervision project will not enhance the sponsor quality of sponsor representatives.
引文
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