从技术标准引进到自主创新的进化机理研究
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摘要
技术标准作为技术创新链条中的重要环节和当今各国高新技术产业竞争的制高点,对其主导权的争夺,其实质已发展成为国家之间对国际市场利益的分割。但是,由于技术标准在研发过程中所需要的巨额资金以及嵌套其中的各种高精尖技术研发的高风险性,使得发达国家在其研发、推广和扩散过程中一直占据着主导地位。而存在着诸多“瓶颈”资源限制的发展中国家却面临着两难选择,要么承受巨额的专利费用进行技术标准的引进,要么克服种种困难进行技术标准的自主创新。两种策略如何选择,选择的依据又是什么?中国作为技术后发国家,在着力建设创新型国家的背景下,毅然的选择了技术标准的自主创新策略,其合理性依据又是什么?从技术标准的引进到自主创新,这无疑是一种技术进步策略的转变,这种转变的学理基础又是什么呢?从进化的视角出发寻找上述问题的答案就构成了本研究的主要内容。
通过对国内外相关文献的归纳和梳理,系统总结有关技术标准及其研发机制、技术进步策略选择和进化博弈理论等领域的研究文献,借鉴了相关的研究成果,并发现了现有研究的不足和需要解决的问题。在对技术标准、技术引进和自主创新等核心概念进行界定的基础之上,总结了技术标准的本质属性,辨析了技术标准和技术创新的联系和区别,并对其技术进步策略选择模式进行了归纳总结,从而奠定了本研究的理论基础。
在验证技术进步策略选择的生物进化性质基础之上,通过构建基于技术标准的技术进步策略的群进化模型和参数赋值分析得出:在进化过程建立在群体层面的假设条件下,技术标准的自主创新策略因为具有利他主义行为而使得群体整体适应性得到提高而最终获得选择。此结论为解释中国由于加入WTO而使其竞争环境从群内转变为群间,从而其基于技术标准的技术进步策略由技术标准引进转变为自主创新提供了理论根据。
以上述结论为前提,通过构建发达国家和发展中国家之间的进化博弈模型和复制动态方程分析,得出了一定比例的发展中国家选择技术标准自主创新策略为可行解,并通过雅可比矩阵方法验证此解为进化博弈模型的进化稳定策略,从而证明了技术后发国家选择技术标准自主创新策略的合理性和可能性。再从技术标准所具有的路径依赖特性、代际性出发,从成本和收益的角度分析,得出了技术后发国家基于技术标准的技术进步策略选择的最优路径,即尽早选择技术标准的自主创新策略为其收益最大化的最优选择,证明了技术后发国家选择技术标准自主创新策略的必然性。
技术后发国家选择技术标准的自主创新策略之后,还面临着两个问题:即如何研发出完全自主知识产权的技术标准,以及自主创新的技术标准如何同发达国家成熟的技术标准展开竞争而被市场选择。针对上述问题,根据实证结果提出了三点对策建议。一是技术后发国家可以采用构建技术标准联盟的方式弥补自身科研实力的不足,以实现技术标准的研发。二是通过剖析在扩散过程中不同技术标准之间的竞争机理,从市场营销学的角度,结合技术标准产品自身特点,提出了技术标准竞争的多策略组合。三是通过对政府在技术标准研发、扩散和推广过程中的行为分析,提出了实现自主创新技术标准的政府扶持和干预机制的若干措施。
当前,我国正在着力建设创新型国家,技术标准的自主创新作为创新链条中的重要环节和创新实践活动的重要形式,构成了创新型国家建设的一个非常重要的内容。因此,针对技术标准的引进策略到自主创新策略的演变机理的研究,对其动力、机制和模式的揭示,对于深刻认识技术标准的自主创新策略选择在国民经济发展中的战略地位,完善产业技术创新政策,加快高新技术产业发展,进而提升我国的综合创新能力和竞争力,具有重要的现实意义。
Tech-standard, as a critical element of technological innovation chain, occupies the commanding point in hi-tech industry in terms of competition. The competition boils down to the scramble among nations for dominance in industry and greater commercial interests. However, technically strong and well financed developed countries have long been dominating the R&D, technology transfer and diffusion due to the substantial costs and high risks related to the development of high and advanced technologies in the process of tech-standards R&D. The developing countries, however, constrained bottleneck resources, are put itself in dilemma, they would incur high patent royalty to import tech-standard if they do not innovate by themselves by overcoming difficulties. Which strategy would they select and what is the basic? China as the developing countries, select the independent innovation strategy of tech-standard in the trend of constructed innovation country, what is the rational course? Strategic choice of tech-standard importation transfer to independent innovation is a transformation to technology progress, and what is the scientific theory base of it. Looking for the answers of the above question is the main contents of the research based on evolutionary theory.
This paper comments comprehensively on the current research situation both at home and abroad at the background of this issue, and aggregates literature on the fields of tech-standard and its R&D mechanism, strategic choice between technology importation and independent innovation, and evolutionary gmae theory and its application. Reference some study results, finds out some inadequate of them and some problems which should be resolved. On the base of defining core concepts including tech-standard, technology importation and independent innovation etc, this paper aggregates the essence characteristics of tech-standard, and analysis same and different points between tech-standard and technology innovation, and summarizes its mode choice of technology progress, and lays the theory basis of this study at last.
On the base of testified the characteristics of biological evolutionary which belongs to strategic choice of technology progress basing on tech-standard, we can get that independent innovation strategy of tech-standard can generate induced effectiveness for its altruism behavior which significantly improve its overall adaptability and is preferred by constructing multi-population evolution model of stragety of technology progress and assigning value to parameters in the assumption that biological evolution lay on the level of multi-population. Hence, this conclusion testifies to the selection of independent innovation strategy of tech-standard in China due to its competition environment transferred from within population to inter population groups in basic as it joined WTO.
Premising on the above conclusion, we get the conclusion that the some ratio of populations in developing countries select the independent innovation strategy of tech-standard is feasible solution by constructed evolutionary game model between developing countries and developed counties and replicated dynamic equation analysis, and testified that the conclusion is ESS of this evolutionary game model by Jacobian Matrix, so we testified that the developing countries select tech-standard independent innovation stragety is rational. Analysis from the characteristics of path-dependence and multi-generation of tech-standard, we get the best path of strategic choice of technology progress of tech-standard in developing countries in the direction of cost and profits, which is select independent innovation strategy as fast as they can which would let their profits maximization is the best choice, so we testified that the developing countries select tech-standard independent innovation stragety is inevitability.
The developing countries will face two issues after they selected independent innovation strategy of tech-standard, and one is how to research tech-standard which is perfected of proprietary intellectual property rights, the other is how to win in the competition between the independent innovation tech-standard of developing countries and mature tech-standard of developed countries, and would be selected by market at last. In view of above questions, we take out of three countermeasures base on real diagnosis. The first is that the developing countries can construct tech-standard union to supply R&D power, and realize the tech-standard. The second is that analysis the competition mechanism between the different tech-standards in the proceeding of diffusion, we take out the multi-strategies for tech-standard competition, related the characteristics of tech-standard in the direction of market theory. The third is that we take out many countermeasures in the helping and inferioring mechanism of government to realize independent innovation tech-standard by analysising the behavior of government in the proceedings of tech-standard R&D, diffusion and promotion.
We are constructing innovation country diligently now, and the independent innovation of tech-standard constitute the important contents in construction innovation country as the important link in innovation chain and important form in innovation practice. Therefore, it has important practical significance to realize the strategic position of stragetic choice of tech-standard independent innovation in the national economic development deeply, perfect industry technology innovation policy, fasten hi-tech industry development, and then promote synthesis innovation power and competitive power of our country by studying on transformation mechanism from tech-standrad importation strategy to independent innovation, and promulgate its power, mechanism and mode.
通过对国内外相关文献的归纳和梳理,系统总结有关技术标准及其研发机制、技术进步策略选择和进化博弈理论等领域的研究文献,借鉴了相关的研究成果,并发现了现有研究的不足和需要解决的问题。在对技术标准、技术引进和自主创新等核心概念进行界定的基础之上,总结了技术标准的本质属性,辨析了技术标准和技术创新的联系和区别,并对其技术进步策略选择模式进行了归纳总结,从而奠定了本研究的理论基础。
在验证技术进步策略选择的生物进化性质基础之上,通过构建基于技术标准的技术进步策略的群进化模型和参数赋值分析得出:在进化过程建立在群体层面的假设条件下,技术标准的自主创新策略因为具有利他主义行为而使得群体整体适应性得到提高而最终获得选择。此结论为解释中国由于加入WTO而使其竞争环境从群内转变为群间,从而其基于技术标准的技术进步策略由技术标准引进转变为自主创新提供了理论根据。
以上述结论为前提,通过构建发达国家和发展中国家之间的进化博弈模型和复制动态方程分析,得出了一定比例的发展中国家选择技术标准自主创新策略为可行解,并通过雅可比矩阵方法验证此解为进化博弈模型的进化稳定策略,从而证明了技术后发国家选择技术标准自主创新策略的合理性和可能性。再从技术标准所具有的路径依赖特性、代际性出发,从成本和收益的角度分析,得出了技术后发国家基于技术标准的技术进步策略选择的最优路径,即尽早选择技术标准的自主创新策略为其收益最大化的最优选择,证明了技术后发国家选择技术标准自主创新策略的必然性。
技术后发国家选择技术标准的自主创新策略之后,还面临着两个问题:即如何研发出完全自主知识产权的技术标准,以及自主创新的技术标准如何同发达国家成熟的技术标准展开竞争而被市场选择。针对上述问题,根据实证结果提出了三点对策建议。一是技术后发国家可以采用构建技术标准联盟的方式弥补自身科研实力的不足,以实现技术标准的研发。二是通过剖析在扩散过程中不同技术标准之间的竞争机理,从市场营销学的角度,结合技术标准产品自身特点,提出了技术标准竞争的多策略组合。三是通过对政府在技术标准研发、扩散和推广过程中的行为分析,提出了实现自主创新技术标准的政府扶持和干预机制的若干措施。
当前,我国正在着力建设创新型国家,技术标准的自主创新作为创新链条中的重要环节和创新实践活动的重要形式,构成了创新型国家建设的一个非常重要的内容。因此,针对技术标准的引进策略到自主创新策略的演变机理的研究,对其动力、机制和模式的揭示,对于深刻认识技术标准的自主创新策略选择在国民经济发展中的战略地位,完善产业技术创新政策,加快高新技术产业发展,进而提升我国的综合创新能力和竞争力,具有重要的现实意义。
Tech-standard, as a critical element of technological innovation chain, occupies the commanding point in hi-tech industry in terms of competition. The competition boils down to the scramble among nations for dominance in industry and greater commercial interests. However, technically strong and well financed developed countries have long been dominating the R&D, technology transfer and diffusion due to the substantial costs and high risks related to the development of high and advanced technologies in the process of tech-standards R&D. The developing countries, however, constrained bottleneck resources, are put itself in dilemma, they would incur high patent royalty to import tech-standard if they do not innovate by themselves by overcoming difficulties. Which strategy would they select and what is the basic? China as the developing countries, select the independent innovation strategy of tech-standard in the trend of constructed innovation country, what is the rational course? Strategic choice of tech-standard importation transfer to independent innovation is a transformation to technology progress, and what is the scientific theory base of it. Looking for the answers of the above question is the main contents of the research based on evolutionary theory.
This paper comments comprehensively on the current research situation both at home and abroad at the background of this issue, and aggregates literature on the fields of tech-standard and its R&D mechanism, strategic choice between technology importation and independent innovation, and evolutionary gmae theory and its application. Reference some study results, finds out some inadequate of them and some problems which should be resolved. On the base of defining core concepts including tech-standard, technology importation and independent innovation etc, this paper aggregates the essence characteristics of tech-standard, and analysis same and different points between tech-standard and technology innovation, and summarizes its mode choice of technology progress, and lays the theory basis of this study at last.
On the base of testified the characteristics of biological evolutionary which belongs to strategic choice of technology progress basing on tech-standard, we can get that independent innovation strategy of tech-standard can generate induced effectiveness for its altruism behavior which significantly improve its overall adaptability and is preferred by constructing multi-population evolution model of stragety of technology progress and assigning value to parameters in the assumption that biological evolution lay on the level of multi-population. Hence, this conclusion testifies to the selection of independent innovation strategy of tech-standard in China due to its competition environment transferred from within population to inter population groups in basic as it joined WTO.
Premising on the above conclusion, we get the conclusion that the some ratio of populations in developing countries select the independent innovation strategy of tech-standard is feasible solution by constructed evolutionary game model between developing countries and developed counties and replicated dynamic equation analysis, and testified that the conclusion is ESS of this evolutionary game model by Jacobian Matrix, so we testified that the developing countries select tech-standard independent innovation stragety is rational. Analysis from the characteristics of path-dependence and multi-generation of tech-standard, we get the best path of strategic choice of technology progress of tech-standard in developing countries in the direction of cost and profits, which is select independent innovation strategy as fast as they can which would let their profits maximization is the best choice, so we testified that the developing countries select tech-standard independent innovation stragety is inevitability.
The developing countries will face two issues after they selected independent innovation strategy of tech-standard, and one is how to research tech-standard which is perfected of proprietary intellectual property rights, the other is how to win in the competition between the independent innovation tech-standard of developing countries and mature tech-standard of developed countries, and would be selected by market at last. In view of above questions, we take out of three countermeasures base on real diagnosis. The first is that the developing countries can construct tech-standard union to supply R&D power, and realize the tech-standard. The second is that analysis the competition mechanism between the different tech-standards in the proceeding of diffusion, we take out the multi-strategies for tech-standard competition, related the characteristics of tech-standard in the direction of market theory. The third is that we take out many countermeasures in the helping and inferioring mechanism of government to realize independent innovation tech-standard by analysising the behavior of government in the proceedings of tech-standard R&D, diffusion and promotion.
We are constructing innovation country diligently now, and the independent innovation of tech-standard constitute the important contents in construction innovation country as the important link in innovation chain and important form in innovation practice. Therefore, it has important practical significance to realize the strategic position of stragetic choice of tech-standard independent innovation in the national economic development deeply, perfect industry technology innovation policy, fasten hi-tech industry development, and then promote synthesis innovation power and competitive power of our country by studying on transformation mechanism from tech-standrad importation strategy to independent innovation, and promulgate its power, mechanism and mode.
引文
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