量子密码实际安全性与应用研究
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摘要
量子密码分配技术为通信双方提供了一种获得无条件安全密钥的分发手段。量子密码的安全性和应用是其研究的核心内容。
在安全性方面,目前,大部分量子密钥分配协议在最普适的相干攻击下,其安全性已经得到了完全的证明。但是这不代表实际系统也是安全的。实际量子密钥分配系统与理论协议存在一定的差异,比如,实际器件存在非理想特性,难以满足协议严格要求的条件,这些差异可能被窃听者利用来获取部分甚至全部的密钥信息。另外,有限的密钥长度与理想协议的假设条件也不同,需要对安全性分析进行修正。因此实际系统需要更严格的安全性分析和论证,这是当前的研究热点。
在量子密钥分配系统的应用研究方面,经过几十年的发展,量子密钥分配技术已经能满足建立网络的要求,将量子密钥分配技术融合到经典网络中,更能充分发挥量子密码的优势,能更有效地保证数据的安全性。现实生活环境下的量子密钥分配应用受到了越来越多的关注。量子密码的应用需要结合具体的网络特点和用户需求进行设计。
本文重点介绍了量子密钥分配系统的实际安全性和它的相关应用。这篇论文主要完成了以下几个工作。
在实际安全性方面,论文首先研究了部分分束攻击下诱骗态BB84协议的安全性,详细分析了部分分束攻击策略,从光子概率分布的角度给出了部分分束攻击的模型,得到被攻击后到达接收端脉冲的光子数分布以及攻击后的计数率；分几种情况讨论了攻击参数的优化选择问题；通过比较单光子计数率的理论值和估计值,指出诱骗态BB84协议在该攻击下也是安全的。
其次论文研究了诱骗态协议中用于态制备的随机数对安全性的影响,假设态制备随机数泄露的比例为p,结合部分分束攻击提出了两种不同的攻击策略并分析了攻击者获得的信息量；我们给出了随机数泄露比的下限,结果显示当攻击者利用策略二想获取全部的密钥信息时,它至少需要知道的随机数比例的下限随着传输距离的增加指数衰减。
然后论文研究了系统设置死时间后的码率估算问题,利用蒙特卡洛的方法来模拟探测过程,能便捷地给出密钥率最大时的最优死时间；该数值方法能够充分考虑探测器的暗计数和后脉冲等的影响,为实际系统的研制和应用奠定了基础。
在安全性方面,我们最后分析了真空态+单诱骗态协议下真空态的统计涨落对密钥率的影响,结果表明给定总脉冲数时,存在一个最优的真空态比例使得密钥率达到极大值。
本文的第二部分主要侧重于研究量子密钥分配系统应用于电力通信网的可行性,结合电网的特殊环境(架空光纤等),本文从编码方式、同步模式等方面提出了适合电网的量子密钥分配方案。
然后分析了电力通信网的安全需求,设计了将量子密码用在电网中的两个应用实例,第一个是利用量子密码来提高电网SSL VPN数据传输的安全性。论文分析了电网数据传输的特点,提出量子密码的四种应用模式,并设计了协议过程进行量子密钥的使用模式和相关控制信息的协商。第二个是利用量子密码来提高电网WiMAX无线通信的安全性。该应用中,量子密钥的存储和读取是按分段方式进行的。论文提出了双重加密的方法并设计了数据传输格式,先利用量子密钥加密数据,然后利用WiMAX无线通信传输该加密信息。
Quantum key distribution(QKD) provides the two parties in the communication a method of sharing unconditionally secure keys. The security analysis and practical application are two major researches of QKD.
Now the security of most QKD protocols under coherent attack has been proven theoreritically. However, this doesn't necessarily represent the security of its practical implementation. For example, the actual device may work not perfectly the same as it is assumed in a theoretical analysis. This non-perfect performance of device may be utilized by the eavesdropper to secretly get part of or even all the keys. What's more, in practical situation the length of keys is always limited, while in the theoretical analysis it is considered to be infinitely long, which means that the key rate formula needs to be corrected to incorporate the fluctuation due to the limited length. Therefore, the security of a practical QKD system requires more rigorous and more complex analysis than in the theoretical scenario. This is the hot field of QKD now.
In the aspect of QKD's application, after decades of development, QKD has been made to meet the networking requirements. The combination of QKD technology and classical network is able to take full advantage of quantum cryptography and effectively protect the user's privacy. And the application of QKD in real-life circumstances has aroused more and more interest worldwide. It needs to consider the characteristics of the network and the user requirements
This paper focuses on the study of practical security of the QKD system and its real-life application.The paper's structure is as follows.
We first studied the security of the BB84protocol with decoy state under partial photon number splitting(PNS) attack. The strategy of partial PNS attack is analysed in detail and an abstract model of this attack based on the photon number distribution is given. By comparing the theoretical result and lower bound of the single-photon's gain, it is shown that the BB84protocol with decoy state is secure under partial PNS attack.
As another investigation into the decoy state, we studied the influence of the random number, which is used to randomly prepare the state in decoy protocol, on the security. In this study we proposed two kinds of random number attack strategies and studied the amount of information the eavesdropper can get. Among these two strategies the second one enables the eavesdropper to know all the information about the keys with the knowledge of only a fraction p of the random number. We found that the fraction of random numbers which is needed for the eavesdropper to fully know the keys decreases exponentially with increase in distance.
Then we studied the key rate at the presence of dead time in the detector. With Monte Carlo method, we conveniently simulated the process and obtained the optimal dead time for the highest key rate. The method takes into account the dark counts and after-pulses, which is very instructive for practical experiments.
In the last part of security analysis, we conducted a research into the effect of the vacuum state fluctuation on the key rate for the vacuum+decoy state protocol. The results shows that, given the overall pulse number, there exists an optimal ratio of vacuum state in the pulses that leads to the highest key rate.
The second major part of this paper focuses on the feasibility of applying the QKD system into the electricity grid system. Considering the specific environment in the electricity grid system(for example, the aerial fiber), we proposed the solution that is suitable for the electricity grid system, including many detailed aspects such as the encoding method and synchronizing mode.
Next we analysed the security requirements of electricity system and designed two sample circumstances of applying the QKD. The first is to utilize the QKD to enhance the security of the SSL VPN data transmission. We studied the characteristics of data transmission in electricity grid system and proposed four modes for practical QKD application, and designed the protocol for the utilization and management of secret keys. The second circumstance is to improve the security of WiMAX wireless communication in electricity grid system. In this circumstance, the secret keys are stored and read out in blocks. A twofold encryption method is proposed and its related data formats are also given. The data is first encrypted with secret keys obtained from QKD and then transmitted by WiMAX.
在安全性方面,目前,大部分量子密钥分配协议在最普适的相干攻击下,其安全性已经得到了完全的证明。但是这不代表实际系统也是安全的。实际量子密钥分配系统与理论协议存在一定的差异,比如,实际器件存在非理想特性,难以满足协议严格要求的条件,这些差异可能被窃听者利用来获取部分甚至全部的密钥信息。另外,有限的密钥长度与理想协议的假设条件也不同,需要对安全性分析进行修正。因此实际系统需要更严格的安全性分析和论证,这是当前的研究热点。
在量子密钥分配系统的应用研究方面,经过几十年的发展,量子密钥分配技术已经能满足建立网络的要求,将量子密钥分配技术融合到经典网络中,更能充分发挥量子密码的优势,能更有效地保证数据的安全性。现实生活环境下的量子密钥分配应用受到了越来越多的关注。量子密码的应用需要结合具体的网络特点和用户需求进行设计。
本文重点介绍了量子密钥分配系统的实际安全性和它的相关应用。这篇论文主要完成了以下几个工作。
在实际安全性方面,论文首先研究了部分分束攻击下诱骗态BB84协议的安全性,详细分析了部分分束攻击策略,从光子概率分布的角度给出了部分分束攻击的模型,得到被攻击后到达接收端脉冲的光子数分布以及攻击后的计数率；分几种情况讨论了攻击参数的优化选择问题；通过比较单光子计数率的理论值和估计值,指出诱骗态BB84协议在该攻击下也是安全的。
其次论文研究了诱骗态协议中用于态制备的随机数对安全性的影响,假设态制备随机数泄露的比例为p,结合部分分束攻击提出了两种不同的攻击策略并分析了攻击者获得的信息量；我们给出了随机数泄露比的下限,结果显示当攻击者利用策略二想获取全部的密钥信息时,它至少需要知道的随机数比例的下限随着传输距离的增加指数衰减。
然后论文研究了系统设置死时间后的码率估算问题,利用蒙特卡洛的方法来模拟探测过程,能便捷地给出密钥率最大时的最优死时间；该数值方法能够充分考虑探测器的暗计数和后脉冲等的影响,为实际系统的研制和应用奠定了基础。
在安全性方面,我们最后分析了真空态+单诱骗态协议下真空态的统计涨落对密钥率的影响,结果表明给定总脉冲数时,存在一个最优的真空态比例使得密钥率达到极大值。
本文的第二部分主要侧重于研究量子密钥分配系统应用于电力通信网的可行性,结合电网的特殊环境(架空光纤等),本文从编码方式、同步模式等方面提出了适合电网的量子密钥分配方案。
然后分析了电力通信网的安全需求,设计了将量子密码用在电网中的两个应用实例,第一个是利用量子密码来提高电网SSL VPN数据传输的安全性。论文分析了电网数据传输的特点,提出量子密码的四种应用模式,并设计了协议过程进行量子密钥的使用模式和相关控制信息的协商。第二个是利用量子密码来提高电网WiMAX无线通信的安全性。该应用中,量子密钥的存储和读取是按分段方式进行的。论文提出了双重加密的方法并设计了数据传输格式,先利用量子密钥加密数据,然后利用WiMAX无线通信传输该加密信息。
Quantum key distribution(QKD) provides the two parties in the communication a method of sharing unconditionally secure keys. The security analysis and practical application are two major researches of QKD.
Now the security of most QKD protocols under coherent attack has been proven theoreritically. However, this doesn't necessarily represent the security of its practical implementation. For example, the actual device may work not perfectly the same as it is assumed in a theoretical analysis. This non-perfect performance of device may be utilized by the eavesdropper to secretly get part of or even all the keys. What's more, in practical situation the length of keys is always limited, while in the theoretical analysis it is considered to be infinitely long, which means that the key rate formula needs to be corrected to incorporate the fluctuation due to the limited length. Therefore, the security of a practical QKD system requires more rigorous and more complex analysis than in the theoretical scenario. This is the hot field of QKD now.
In the aspect of QKD's application, after decades of development, QKD has been made to meet the networking requirements. The combination of QKD technology and classical network is able to take full advantage of quantum cryptography and effectively protect the user's privacy. And the application of QKD in real-life circumstances has aroused more and more interest worldwide. It needs to consider the characteristics of the network and the user requirements
This paper focuses on the study of practical security of the QKD system and its real-life application.The paper's structure is as follows.
We first studied the security of the BB84protocol with decoy state under partial photon number splitting(PNS) attack. The strategy of partial PNS attack is analysed in detail and an abstract model of this attack based on the photon number distribution is given. By comparing the theoretical result and lower bound of the single-photon's gain, it is shown that the BB84protocol with decoy state is secure under partial PNS attack.
As another investigation into the decoy state, we studied the influence of the random number, which is used to randomly prepare the state in decoy protocol, on the security. In this study we proposed two kinds of random number attack strategies and studied the amount of information the eavesdropper can get. Among these two strategies the second one enables the eavesdropper to know all the information about the keys with the knowledge of only a fraction p of the random number. We found that the fraction of random numbers which is needed for the eavesdropper to fully know the keys decreases exponentially with increase in distance.
Then we studied the key rate at the presence of dead time in the detector. With Monte Carlo method, we conveniently simulated the process and obtained the optimal dead time for the highest key rate. The method takes into account the dark counts and after-pulses, which is very instructive for practical experiments.
In the last part of security analysis, we conducted a research into the effect of the vacuum state fluctuation on the key rate for the vacuum+decoy state protocol. The results shows that, given the overall pulse number, there exists an optimal ratio of vacuum state in the pulses that leads to the highest key rate.
The second major part of this paper focuses on the feasibility of applying the QKD system into the electricity grid system. Considering the specific environment in the electricity grid system(for example, the aerial fiber), we proposed the solution that is suitable for the electricity grid system, including many detailed aspects such as the encoding method and synchronizing mode.
Next we analysed the security requirements of electricity system and designed two sample circumstances of applying the QKD. The first is to utilize the QKD to enhance the security of the SSL VPN data transmission. We studied the characteristics of data transmission in electricity grid system and proposed four modes for practical QKD application, and designed the protocol for the utilization and management of secret keys. The second circumstance is to improve the security of WiMAX wireless communication in electricity grid system. In this circumstance, the secret keys are stored and read out in blocks. A twofold encryption method is proposed and its related data formats are also given. The data is first encrypted with secret keys obtained from QKD and then transmitted by WiMAX.
引文
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