建筑节能服务市场培育的政府行为研究
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摘要
我国是能源消耗量巨大的国家，而在总耗能中，建筑能耗占到了接近30%，无论是新建建筑还是既有建筑的能耗居高不下，建筑的节能改造工作已经刻不容缓。我国政府为解决这一难题，引进了在发达国家发展相对成熟的基于市场化、全新的节能新机制——合同能源管理，我国政府尤其注重运用价格、财政、税收、金融等经济激励政策试图用市场机制来加快我国建筑节能改造的步伐，并因此而取得了一定的成果，建筑节能服务市场已初具规模。但是由于节能服务领域属于非纯公共物品，加之全社会的节能服务意识薄弱，以及政府制定的激励政策落实受阻、激励资金使用不当，同时，受到精力、财力以及政绩的制约，往往会过分注重总产值、投资额等硬性指标等原因，使得建筑节能服务市场在供需两端都存在问题，需要政府改革以往的单一培育方式，引入新机制来应对上述问题。因此，如何以高效、规范的政府市场培育行为为保证节能服务市场资源的有效、合理配置，解决供需问题，成为了具有重大意义的科学问题。
本文立足于我国建筑节能服务市场发展的现实状况，深度挖掘建筑节能服务市场培育政府行为的动因及行为机理，系统研究了基于监督和基于文化建设的建筑节能服务市场培育政府行为。本文主要目的是在探索政府当前市场培育模式下市场参与人行为及政府自身行为机理的基础上，将基于监督和基于文化建设的政府培育行为嵌入到现有模式中，改善原有培育模式中供需问题，并为建筑节能服务市场培育政府行为提供理论依据，推动建筑节能服务市场的可持续发展。
在研究现有研究成果的基础上，本文围绕着建筑节能服务市场培育政府培育行为这一主题，分别从市场供需两端的政府市场培育问题展开研究，明确政府培育建筑节能服务市场的动因，构建了政府培育行为模式的理论框架，并在此基础上提出政府市场培育的两个关键行为，即基于监督和基于文化建设的政府市场培育行为。
基于监督和基于文化建设的政府市场培育行为是分别解决建筑节能节能服务市场供应与需求的政府培育行为。在定性分析其行为产生的制度原因基础上，运用博弈论、群体选择理论等相关知识构建了基于监督和基于文化建设的市场培育政府行为模型，阐释了基于监督和基于文化建设的建筑节能服务市场培育的政府行为，并在此基础上，运用委托-代理理论，设计了基于监督的建筑节能服务市场培育政府行为合约，分析了各参数对模型的影响，提出了相应的治理措施，为促进我国建筑节能服务市场的可持续发展奠定基础。
通过行为模型建立及合约设计，本文进一步提出了可行的基于监督与文化建设的建筑节能服务市场培育政府的行为模式。即，将监督和文化建设嵌入到以建筑节能服务市场激励机制为核心的政府培育行为当中，以基于监督和文化建设的政府培育行为促进建筑节能服务市场健康有序发展。
为验证基于监督和文化建设政府行为模型的有效性，运用元胞自动机的相关理论知识，对基于监督和文化建设的政府行为进行仿真研究，通过建立仿真模型，设计仿真实验，实现了对政府培育行为的仿真，清晰直观地观察到了政府培育行为的演化过程，验证了各参数对建筑节能服务市场培育政府行为的影响，并有针对性地提出建筑节能服务市场培育政府行为的对策建议。
本文针对当前我国建筑节能服务市场培育方面存在的问题，围绕建筑节能服务市场培育政府行为进行研究，可以进一步丰富我国建筑节能服务市场培育的理论和方法，其中基于监督和文化建设政府行为模型对建筑节能服务市场培育具有一定的借鉴意义。
Our country is the nation that has huge energy consumption and especiallythat the building energy consumption accounts for nearly30%in the total energyconsumption, whether new or existing buildings, which is the urgent work thatshould be solved right now. The new and market-based energy efficiencymechanism introduced from relatively mature in the developed countries, calledEnergy Performance Contracting, is began to work out to solve this problem byour government. And comprehensive using of legal, economic, technical andnecessary administrative means, based on specific needs of our government,issued a series of policies and measures to promote energy efficiency market,especially with particular emphasis on the use of price, finance, taxation,banking and other economic incentives trying to use market mechanisms toaccelerate the pace of building energy efficiency, and the energy efficiencyservices market has taken to great achievements. However, due to energyefficiency are non-pure public goods, coupled with weak energy efficiencyawareness of the whole society and incentive policies implementation obstacle,incentive funds inefficient using, and at the same time, the government tend toover-focus on hard targets, as output, investment, restricted by the energy,financial and government performance, there are many problems in the supplyand demand of building energy efficiency services market, which needsgovernment reform in single nurturing way of the past, and introducing of newmechanisms to deal with these issues. Therefore, how to efficiently andstandardized government behavior to cultivate energy efficiency services marketto ensure the effective and rational allocation, to solve the problem of supply anddemand, has become a significant scientific problems.
This article has been deeply excavated building energy services marketcultivation government behavior and its motivation mechanisms based on thedevelopment of building energy efficiency service market realities, andsystematically research the market cultivation government behavior based onsupervision and cultural construction. Main purpose of this article is to embedgovernment behavior as supervision and cultural construction into the existingmodel to improve the existing supply and demand issues, based on the explosionof the government and participants’ behavior mechanism in the current marketmode cultivation of the market. This would provide a theoretical basis topromote building energy efficiency services market development sustainably.
Based on existing research, this paper revolved around the subjects of thebuilding energy efficiency services market government cultivation behavior,researching respectively from market development issues of the supply anddemand of the market cultivation. It cleared the government motivation ofbuilding energy efficiency services market, and proposed theoretical framework.On this basis of analysis, the government behavior based on supervision andcultural construction are two key markets cultivation behavior.
The government cultivation behavior based on supervision and culturalconstruction is addressed separately the supply and demand building energysaving service market. On the basis qualitative analysis of the institutionalreasons, the use of game theory, group selection theory and other relatedknowledge constructed government behavior model based on supervision andcultural construction, which explained the government behavior, and thendesigned market cultivation government behavior contracts based on agency byagreement and analyzed the influence of various parameters on the model, to putforward the corresponding control measures to promote construction energyservices market development healthily and orderly.
Feasible building energy services market cultivation government behaviorpatterns is proposed further, which is, the behaviors based on the supervision andcultural construction embedded into the core of government incentives tomonitor and promote the building energy services market healthy development.
To validate effectiveness of the mode of government cultivation behaviorbased on supervision and cultural construction, by relative theory of CellularAutomata, government cultivation behavior based on supervision and culturalconstruction is simulated. The evolutionary process of government cultivationbehavior based on supervision and cultural construction and the influence of eachparameter to government behavior are observed clearly and directly so that thesuggestion to regulate the government behavior is proposed pertinently.
In this paper, focus on current energy efficiency service market developmentproblems and surround the research of the building energy services marketcultivation government behavior, which can further enrich our energy efficiencyservice market cultivation theory and method, in which the supervision andcultural construction of the government behavioral model will be certainsignificance for the building energy efficiency services market.
本文立足于我国建筑节能服务市场发展的现实状况，深度挖掘建筑节能服务市场培育政府行为的动因及行为机理，系统研究了基于监督和基于文化建设的建筑节能服务市场培育政府行为。本文主要目的是在探索政府当前市场培育模式下市场参与人行为及政府自身行为机理的基础上，将基于监督和基于文化建设的政府培育行为嵌入到现有模式中，改善原有培育模式中供需问题，并为建筑节能服务市场培育政府行为提供理论依据，推动建筑节能服务市场的可持续发展。
在研究现有研究成果的基础上，本文围绕着建筑节能服务市场培育政府培育行为这一主题，分别从市场供需两端的政府市场培育问题展开研究，明确政府培育建筑节能服务市场的动因，构建了政府培育行为模式的理论框架，并在此基础上提出政府市场培育的两个关键行为，即基于监督和基于文化建设的政府市场培育行为。
基于监督和基于文化建设的政府市场培育行为是分别解决建筑节能节能服务市场供应与需求的政府培育行为。在定性分析其行为产生的制度原因基础上，运用博弈论、群体选择理论等相关知识构建了基于监督和基于文化建设的市场培育政府行为模型，阐释了基于监督和基于文化建设的建筑节能服务市场培育的政府行为，并在此基础上，运用委托-代理理论，设计了基于监督的建筑节能服务市场培育政府行为合约，分析了各参数对模型的影响，提出了相应的治理措施，为促进我国建筑节能服务市场的可持续发展奠定基础。
通过行为模型建立及合约设计，本文进一步提出了可行的基于监督与文化建设的建筑节能服务市场培育政府的行为模式。即，将监督和文化建设嵌入到以建筑节能服务市场激励机制为核心的政府培育行为当中，以基于监督和文化建设的政府培育行为促进建筑节能服务市场健康有序发展。
为验证基于监督和文化建设政府行为模型的有效性，运用元胞自动机的相关理论知识，对基于监督和文化建设的政府行为进行仿真研究，通过建立仿真模型，设计仿真实验，实现了对政府培育行为的仿真，清晰直观地观察到了政府培育行为的演化过程，验证了各参数对建筑节能服务市场培育政府行为的影响，并有针对性地提出建筑节能服务市场培育政府行为的对策建议。
本文针对当前我国建筑节能服务市场培育方面存在的问题，围绕建筑节能服务市场培育政府行为进行研究，可以进一步丰富我国建筑节能服务市场培育的理论和方法，其中基于监督和文化建设政府行为模型对建筑节能服务市场培育具有一定的借鉴意义。
Our country is the nation that has huge energy consumption and especiallythat the building energy consumption accounts for nearly30%in the total energyconsumption, whether new or existing buildings, which is the urgent work thatshould be solved right now. The new and market-based energy efficiencymechanism introduced from relatively mature in the developed countries, calledEnergy Performance Contracting, is began to work out to solve this problem byour government. And comprehensive using of legal, economic, technical andnecessary administrative means, based on specific needs of our government,issued a series of policies and measures to promote energy efficiency market,especially with particular emphasis on the use of price, finance, taxation,banking and other economic incentives trying to use market mechanisms toaccelerate the pace of building energy efficiency, and the energy efficiencyservices market has taken to great achievements. However, due to energyefficiency are non-pure public goods, coupled with weak energy efficiencyawareness of the whole society and incentive policies implementation obstacle,incentive funds inefficient using, and at the same time, the government tend toover-focus on hard targets, as output, investment, restricted by the energy,financial and government performance, there are many problems in the supplyand demand of building energy efficiency services market, which needsgovernment reform in single nurturing way of the past, and introducing of newmechanisms to deal with these issues. Therefore, how to efficiently andstandardized government behavior to cultivate energy efficiency services marketto ensure the effective and rational allocation, to solve the problem of supply anddemand, has become a significant scientific problems.
This article has been deeply excavated building energy services marketcultivation government behavior and its motivation mechanisms based on thedevelopment of building energy efficiency service market realities, andsystematically research the market cultivation government behavior based onsupervision and cultural construction. Main purpose of this article is to embedgovernment behavior as supervision and cultural construction into the existingmodel to improve the existing supply and demand issues, based on the explosionof the government and participants’ behavior mechanism in the current marketmode cultivation of the market. This would provide a theoretical basis topromote building energy efficiency services market development sustainably.
Based on existing research, this paper revolved around the subjects of thebuilding energy efficiency services market government cultivation behavior,researching respectively from market development issues of the supply anddemand of the market cultivation. It cleared the government motivation ofbuilding energy efficiency services market, and proposed theoretical framework.On this basis of analysis, the government behavior based on supervision andcultural construction are two key markets cultivation behavior.
The government cultivation behavior based on supervision and culturalconstruction is addressed separately the supply and demand building energysaving service market. On the basis qualitative analysis of the institutionalreasons, the use of game theory, group selection theory and other relatedknowledge constructed government behavior model based on supervision andcultural construction, which explained the government behavior, and thendesigned market cultivation government behavior contracts based on agency byagreement and analyzed the influence of various parameters on the model, to putforward the corresponding control measures to promote construction energyservices market development healthily and orderly.
Feasible building energy services market cultivation government behaviorpatterns is proposed further, which is, the behaviors based on the supervision andcultural construction embedded into the core of government incentives tomonitor and promote the building energy services market healthy development.
To validate effectiveness of the mode of government cultivation behaviorbased on supervision and cultural construction, by relative theory of CellularAutomata, government cultivation behavior based on supervision and culturalconstruction is simulated. The evolutionary process of government cultivationbehavior based on supervision and cultural construction and the influence of eachparameter to government behavior are observed clearly and directly so that thesuggestion to regulate the government behavior is proposed pertinently.
In this paper, focus on current energy efficiency service market developmentproblems and surround the research of the building energy services marketcultivation government behavior, which can further enrich our energy efficiencyservice market cultivation theory and method, in which the supervision andcultural construction of the government behavioral model will be certainsignificance for the building energy efficiency services market.
引文
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