转型时期政府规制失灵与规制改革路径分析
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摘要
在全球经济一体化的推动下,转轨国家纷纷开始政府规制改革及规制制度建设的民主化和法治化进程。在从计划经济向市场经济过渡时期,由于受到制度禀赋的约束,在转轨国家中市场经济发挥作用的方式和效果与发达国家有很大不同,作为政府对市场微观经济主体进行干预的手段,政府规制既有一般市场经济条件下的共同点,也呈现出转型时期的特殊性。越来越多的发展中国家实践证明,规制改革不仅要解决信息不对称的困扰,更要面临来自规制执行过程的挑战。因此,解决转型时期中国政府规制失灵问题,必须从我国实际情况出发,从转型时期政府规制面临的制度环境和规制失灵的特殊成因出发,充分考虑制度约束对于选择规制改革的途径和方法的重要性。本文从当前我国政府规制的现状分析出发,总结了市场经济得以依存的制度基础的现状及其存在的问题,阐述了政府规制失灵的评价标准,在此基础上归纳总结了转型时期政府规制失灵的特点和成因,并在统计意义上将政府规制与其他改革措施的作用加以区别,对转型时期政府规制效果和规制失灵进行实证检验。为了借鉴其他国家规制改革的成果,对美国、俄罗斯两国政府规制实践的经验进行分析和比较,最后,探讨了在现有制度环境下,如何通过重构规制治理制度和完善规制激励制度推进规制改革,总结了转型时期政府规制改革的路径选择。
Government regulation in China's economic transition is studied in this paper. During the transition period, government regulation is faced with both common problems of market failure under normal market conditions, and the special problems of the traditional system, involving price regulations, subsidies, competition and market access issues of regulatory incentives, and regulatory governance issues such as the rational allocation of regulatory authority and norms.Therefore, the problem of regulatory failures in economic transition can not be simply attributed to regulation or deregulation. To solve the problem, we must study the actual situation in China's economic transition, the institutional environment and the special causes of regulatory failure,pay attention to the institutional constraints to regulatory reform.
On the basis of a general description of China's market economy, legal system and the characteristics of regulation problems, from the analysis of historical changes and current situation, the characteristics and causes of regulatory failure is summarized, relevant indicators and data are used for empirical analysis and test, then the institutional constraints and regulatory mechanism are analysed. Through comparative analysis of regulatory reform in the United States and Russia, suggestions are made in two aspects to reform regulatory systems by the perfect regulatory incentive systems and reconstruction of regulatory governance reform.This paper is divided into seven parts.
Introduction includes the background of subject, relative research, the basic framework and main contents of the paper, methods and major innovations, relevant concepts are also defined in this part.
Chapter 1 is a general description of theories, mainly on the theory of transition economies, the theoretical basis of government regulation, regulation theory and the evolutionary process, and regulatory reform and institutional constraints in developing and transition economies. According to research in this paper, an analytical framework of government regulation in transition period is summarized.
Chapter 2 analyzes the basis of the current system of government regulation. After 30 years of market-oriented reforms, China has initially established a market economic system, but there are a variety of problems in market order and market system building. In addition, imperfections of the legal system and government management system has constrained the implementation of regulation.
Chapter 3 analyzes the characteristics and causes of failure of government regulation in transition period. Through analyzing regulatory objectives, regulatory body and regulatory agencies, the problems of regulatory failure are summarized such as the existence of regulatory excess and regulatory lack, inconsistency of regulatory approaches and measures, lack of relevant legal systems. Regulation failure is linked with the institutional constraints in transition period, such as long-term planning economy, intertwined natural monopoly and administrative monopoly, and the absence of proper government regulation.
Chapter 4 is an empirical analysis of government regulations. In the field of economic regulation, using 1982-2007 annual statistical data to test the real effect of government regulation in electricity industry, according to gross indicators, efficiency indicators, and profit indicators. In the field of social regulation, through environmental cases that seriously endanger life and damage citizens property and public interest, to analyzes the performance of government regulation and problems caused by regulatory failure.
Chapter 5 is comparison of government regulations in the U.S. and Russian. Government regulation practice is based on a country's specific political, economic and legal system.The experience and policy is unique, but also has a general law and common trends. Through the analysis and comparison of government regulation of the United States and Russia, experience obtained is to strengthen the regulatory supervision, improve the regulatory system, legal system, promote the central and local regulatory agencies to coordinate government regulation.
Chapter 6 summarizes the policy of government regulation reform through reconstructing regulatory governance systems and improve the regulatory incentive systems. In current institutional environment, reform regulatory systems by selecting the regulatory model of governance, improving regulatory management tools to reconstruct regulatory governance system; and strengthening the incentives of market structure, ownership structure, and corporate behavior incentive to improve the regulatory incentive systems.
The main theoretical innovation of this paper are in the following areas:
First, innovation of research perspective. The study of regulatory economics by Western scholars are mainly on the technical aspects of regulation, which concerns on selection of incentives.These studies are based on perfect economic, political, legal systems in developed countries,which is different from the background of China's regulatory reform during the transition period. Therefore, to solve the current problems of government regulation, we must give full consideration to the existing system conditions and advance regulatory reform from both regulatory governance and regulatory incentives. From this perspective, this is an innovation of research.
Second, the innovation of research content. In this paper, the importance of regulation governance in the regulatory reform of transitional period is revealed by both theoretical and empirical analysis. According to the institutional basis in transition period, the specific innovation of regulation governance systems has been studied such as regulatory governance mechanisms, regulatory governance model, and regulatory governance tools.
Third, innovative of research methods. Effects of regulation incentives and regulation governance are tested by empirical analysis in this paper. Most domestic studies of empirical analysis of regulation effects in electricity industry analysis is only about one aspect and lack a more comprehensive empirical research. To reflect the regulatory effects of the electricity industry, the real effect of government regulation is tested in this paper according to gross indicators, efficiency indicators, and profit indicators.
Government regulation in China's economic transition is studied in this paper. During the transition period, government regulation is faced with both common problems of market failure under normal market conditions, and the special problems of the traditional system, involving price regulations, subsidies, competition and market access issues of regulatory incentives, and regulatory governance issues such as the rational allocation of regulatory authority and norms.Therefore, the problem of regulatory failures in economic transition can not be simply attributed to regulation or deregulation. To solve the problem, we must study the actual situation in China's economic transition, the institutional environment and the special causes of regulatory failure,pay attention to the institutional constraints to regulatory reform.
On the basis of a general description of China's market economy, legal system and the characteristics of regulation problems, from the analysis of historical changes and current situation, the characteristics and causes of regulatory failure is summarized, relevant indicators and data are used for empirical analysis and test, then the institutional constraints and regulatory mechanism are analysed. Through comparative analysis of regulatory reform in the United States and Russia, suggestions are made in two aspects to reform regulatory systems by the perfect regulatory incentive systems and reconstruction of regulatory governance reform.This paper is divided into seven parts.
Introduction includes the background of subject, relative research, the basic framework and main contents of the paper, methods and major innovations, relevant concepts are also defined in this part.
Chapter 1 is a general description of theories, mainly on the theory of transition economies, the theoretical basis of government regulation, regulation theory and the evolutionary process, and regulatory reform and institutional constraints in developing and transition economies. According to research in this paper, an analytical framework of government regulation in transition period is summarized.
Chapter 2 analyzes the basis of the current system of government regulation. After 30 years of market-oriented reforms, China has initially established a market economic system, but there are a variety of problems in market order and market system building. In addition, imperfections of the legal system and government management system has constrained the implementation of regulation.
Chapter 3 analyzes the characteristics and causes of failure of government regulation in transition period. Through analyzing regulatory objectives, regulatory body and regulatory agencies, the problems of regulatory failure are summarized such as the existence of regulatory excess and regulatory lack, inconsistency of regulatory approaches and measures, lack of relevant legal systems. Regulation failure is linked with the institutional constraints in transition period, such as long-term planning economy, intertwined natural monopoly and administrative monopoly, and the absence of proper government regulation.
Chapter 4 is an empirical analysis of government regulations. In the field of economic regulation, using 1982-2007 annual statistical data to test the real effect of government regulation in electricity industry, according to gross indicators, efficiency indicators, and profit indicators. In the field of social regulation, through environmental cases that seriously endanger life and damage citizens property and public interest, to analyzes the performance of government regulation and problems caused by regulatory failure.
Chapter 5 is comparison of government regulations in the U.S. and Russian. Government regulation practice is based on a country's specific political, economic and legal system.The experience and policy is unique, but also has a general law and common trends. Through the analysis and comparison of government regulation of the United States and Russia, experience obtained is to strengthen the regulatory supervision, improve the regulatory system, legal system, promote the central and local regulatory agencies to coordinate government regulation.
Chapter 6 summarizes the policy of government regulation reform through reconstructing regulatory governance systems and improve the regulatory incentive systems. In current institutional environment, reform regulatory systems by selecting the regulatory model of governance, improving regulatory management tools to reconstruct regulatory governance system; and strengthening the incentives of market structure, ownership structure, and corporate behavior incentive to improve the regulatory incentive systems.
The main theoretical innovation of this paper are in the following areas:
First, innovation of research perspective. The study of regulatory economics by Western scholars are mainly on the technical aspects of regulation, which concerns on selection of incentives.These studies are based on perfect economic, political, legal systems in developed countries,which is different from the background of China's regulatory reform during the transition period. Therefore, to solve the current problems of government regulation, we must give full consideration to the existing system conditions and advance regulatory reform from both regulatory governance and regulatory incentives. From this perspective, this is an innovation of research.
Second, the innovation of research content. In this paper, the importance of regulation governance in the regulatory reform of transitional period is revealed by both theoretical and empirical analysis. According to the institutional basis in transition period, the specific innovation of regulation governance systems has been studied such as regulatory governance mechanisms, regulatory governance model, and regulatory governance tools.
Third, innovative of research methods. Effects of regulation incentives and regulation governance are tested by empirical analysis in this paper. Most domestic studies of empirical analysis of regulation effects in electricity industry analysis is only about one aspect and lack a more comprehensive empirical research. To reflect the regulatory effects of the electricity industry, the real effect of government regulation is tested in this paper according to gross indicators, efficiency indicators, and profit indicators.
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