从法律形式主义到法律现实主义
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摘要
任何部门法学的研究都是肤浅的,除非它深入到法理问题。本文尝试的就是对美国冲突法理论的法理分析。无疑,这是一个令人望而生畏的处女地。目前,无论是对美国法律现实主义的领悟,还是对美国冲突法理论的把握,国内学界都存在诸多片面理解甚至误解之处。把国外的理论贴上想象的可笑标签,然后一顿穷追猛打,这是不少学者普遍惯用的肤浅伎俩。在冲突法领域,这种现象也司空见惯。因而,深入理解美国冲突法理论的精髓,并从法理层面揭示其嬗变因缘,这类成果至今国内少见。个别成果偶有涉及,不过蜻蜓点水,且多差忒。美国学者囿于本土文化氛围,对冲突法理论背后的法理因素则习以为常;加之普通法学术传统,重微观求证而轻宏大叙事,罕有学者立足海外为他国学人详加阐释。本文力图正本清源,详加论证,揭开美国冲突法理论嬗变的神秘面纱,展示其动人心魄的理论魅力及其背后的法理基石。
本文主要运用历史分析和比较分析方法,力图证成:美国冲突法理论从传统向现代的嬗变,其实是法律形式主义和法律现实主义在冲突法舞台的轮番上演。相对于法理思潮的演变,冲突法理论的变迁似乎总是姗姗来迟的春天。细细思量,其实这是冲突法本质上为法理学和民商事实体法的婢女所致,不足为奇。美国的实践只不过再次证明了这一结论。因此,本论文首先从考察美国法律现实主义运动入手,在卷帙浩瀚的法律现实主义著述中重新找回其理论真相;随后揭示法律形式主义如何深入到比尔的既得权理论及其所编《第一次冲突法重述》的骨髓;接着是一批早期先知先觉的法律现实主义者对比尔理论及其规则的深刻批判,所发出的美国冲突法革命的理论先声;最后精选五种最具代表性的美国现代冲突法理论,浓笔重墨地分析法律现实主义如何在轰轰烈烈的冲突法革命中逐步占领冲突法理论阵地,并成功地具体化为《第二次冲突法重述》。
具体而言,本论文分八章逐步展开论证:
第一章“美国冲突法理论嬗变的法理基石”,是全文立论的基础,也是全部研究中的“硬骨头”。笔者一步跃入法理学的腹地,详细梳理了美国法律现实主义者为何以及如何推翻人们一时盲目信从的兰德尔法律形式主义。笔者在研究中惊奇地发现,法律现实主义具有丰富的内涵——规则怀疑主义、法律功能主义和规则细化主义莫不在其囊中。国内学者大多误将法律现实主义等同于规则怀疑主义,甚至以为法律现实主义者一时集体失忆,忘了法律为规则的常识。这种捕风捉影的见解实在有悖事实真相。不过,笔者也在最后指出,法律现实主义存在精于批判而疏于整体建构的致命缺陷。这一论断可与后文揭示的美国当代冲突法理论的类似缺陷相互印证。从此可以看出,法律现实主义与美国冲突法革命的命运密切相关。
第二章“冲突法领域的法律形式主义”,把视角转向美国传统冲突法理论及其法律形式主义特质,形成后文深入论证的根基。美国传统冲突法理论的代表人物比尔是美国哈佛法学院执教时间最长的教授之一,曾广泛涉足冲突法、法理学和刑法等领域,他执教的冲突法课程一度成为哈佛法学院的招牌。这样一位杰出的法学家为何后来成为众多冲突法学者冷嘲热讽的对象,他提出的既得权理论为何激起了一场震惊世界的美国冲突法革命?本章全面考证了既得权理论产生的法理基础和时代背景,并与比尔编纂的《第一次冲突法重述》相互印证。本章主要表明,比尔为何以及如何陷入法律形式主义而不可自拔。同时笔者也指出,比尔的理论和规则带有深刻的时代烙印,反映了部分时代需求,具有一定的合理之处,是美国冲突法本土化的重要阶段,不可全盘抹煞。《第二次冲突法重述》对《第一次冲突法重述》的合理吸收和保留可从侧面验证这一结论。
第三章“法律现实主义者的早期反击”,呈现了美国冲突法革命的逻辑基础和思想来源。在比尔的既得权理论裹挟法律形式主义和美国法学会的威名渐趋占据冲突法舞台时,一批坚定的法律现实主义者率先反击比尔的理论和规则。作为位居卢埃林所言二十位著名法律现实主义者代表之列的三位学者,库克、安特马和劳伦森以其令人惊叹的学识和智慧,娴熟地运用法律现实主义攻击比尔冲突法思想和规则中的种种漏洞与错误,不仅守住了冲突法理论的一方阵地,而且为后来者准备了批判的工具和范例,并且不乏构建规则的思想火花。凯弗斯是位后来居上的法律现实主义者,他来自法律形式主义者的大本营,却义无反顾地接受了法律现实主义,推陈出新地将过去所有法律选择方法称为“法域选择”,并谨慎地提出了“规则和结果选择”方法。
第四章“规则怀疑主义与特别的政策分析方法”,全面解析柯里的“支配兴趣分析说”。国内学界普遍将“支配兴趣分析”误译为“政府利益分析”,妨碍了对该学说真相和精髓的理解。柯里主要吸收了库克和凯弗斯的早期研究成果,基于少数美国判例,将法律现实主义的规则怀疑主义和政策分析推至极端,最后凝练成独树一帜的“支配兴趣分析”方法。他由此引申出的“真实冲突”、“虚假冲突”、“表面冲突”和“无冲突”的案件分类开辟出对法律冲突认识的新领域,“没有法律选择规则我们会更好些”几乎成为美国冲突法革命的符号和旗帜。但是,柯里的大器晚成和令人扼腕的短暂学术生命使其学说隐含了明显的漏洞甚至错误,引发了众多学者的批评。不过,柯里迷人的普通法分析风格令整整一代冲突法学者为之着迷,并在今天仍不乏追捧者,引发了冲突法阵营中的两军对垒。
第五章“寻找真实的规则”,全面揭示国内学界普遍忽视的艾伦茨威格“法院地法说”真相。艾伦茨威格早年在多所欧美一流法学院接受法学教育,学识贯通欧美法学。他将美国法律现实主义和德国维希特的“法院地法说”巧妙地结合在一起,立志寻找卢埃林所言的“真实规则”,强调法官不过是实现本地立法政策的工具以及法院地法才是法律选择的出发点和基础。他著作等身,在美国冲突法学界名噪一时。但是,他的大陆法系写作风格以及通篇不断的拉丁语、德语和法语词汇让不少美国学者望而生畏,其冲突法思想也渐渐淡出学者的视野。
第六章“从规则到原则”,再次直面冲突法革命的睿智先行者凯弗斯的冲突法思想。凯弗斯不仅是一位法律现实主义理论家,更是一位身体力行法律现实主义的实践者。他在华尔街的金融支柱倒下后不久就投身于罗斯福新政,二战后又力推法学研究新方法。不过,虽然对冲突法问题封笔多年,但他一直没有停止观察和思考冲突法的最新发展。60年代冲突法革命的乱象引发了他深深的忧虑,在早期的“规则和结果选择说”基础上,他吸收了柯里“支配兴趣分析说”和德国学者克格尔“冲突法正义”的合理成分,针对棘手的“真实冲突”案件示范性地提出了八条“优先选择原则”,防止不愿踏入个案分析荒野的法官重回比尔规则的老路。但是,“优先选择原则”只是过渡性和示范性的,规则细化依然是长期追求的目标。规则怀疑主义、政策分析仍然是其后期思想的主要色调。
第七章“揭示‘行动中的法律'”,探究法律舞台上的多面手莱弗拉的“五点考虑因素说”。作为一位法律现实主义者,莱弗拉拨开判例法表面说辞的迷雾,寻觅法官“行动中的法律”。他在里斯、戚特海姆和安特马著述的基础上,将影响法律选择的政策考量因素提炼成“易于掌控的简洁形式”,希冀成为法官裁判的指南。在五点考虑因素中,“适用较好的法律规则”最为法官所偏爱,同时也最为学者所诟病。因此,他的理论又被称为“较好法方法”。
第八章“从政策分析到规则构建”,详尽分析美国冲突法革命的集大成者里斯的冲突法思想及其编撰的《第二次冲突法重述》。里斯行文简洁有力、见解深邃全面,颇具“海明威的风格”。他深得法律现实主义真传,兼收并蓄了美国主流冲突法理论的精华,密切关注判例法的最新发展,最后提炼出其冲突法思想:政策分析为基础、规则细化为目标、“原则”或“方法”为过渡。在冲突法革命的乱局中,他的过渡性方案“最重要关系原则”构成《第二次冲突法重述》的鲜明特色,但同时引发了学界的广泛争论,被诸多学者称为“虚空规则”。里斯理论上的折中主义奠定了今天美国冲突法学界的基调,他编纂的《第二次冲突法重述》成为美国司法界最受欢迎的一套规则。
由于罕有可用的中文资料,本文几乎全部借用了英文资料。从法理视角全面分析美国冲突法理论的演变,在国内首开先河。对劳伦森、安特马和里斯冲突法思想的总结国内尚没有先例。将“governmental interests analysis”翻译为“支配兴趣分析”、将“unprovided-for case”翻译为“无兴趣案件”、将“nonrule”翻译为“虚空规则”等为本文独创。对“本地法说”、“支配兴趣分析说”、“法院地法说”的分析结论同国内冲突法学界的普遍观点大相径庭。当然,这些新方法和新观点是否正确还有待学界的进一步验证。
Any legal research is superficial, unless it reaches the level of jurisprudence. The dissertation tries to analyze the American conflicts theories from the perspective of jurisprudence. Without doubt, it is a formidable virgin area, because there are so many misunderstandings either of the American Legal Realism or of the American conflicts theories in China now. It is a common trick for many Chinese scholars to make foreign theories seem naive and then attack upon them heavily. So do many scholars in the conflicts law area. Therefore, there are few works which fully comprehend the spirit of American conflicts theories and reveal the true reasons of its evolution from the perspective of jurisprudence. Even though a few scholars deal with such issues occasionally, their research is superficial and many errors have occurred. On the other hand, American scholars are restricted by their cultural atmosphere and consider that such questions are so commonplace that it is not worth of doing such kinds of research. In addition, they are inclined to focus on micro questions rather than macro ones. As a result, few American scholars have made efforts to introduce American conflicts theories to foreigners from the perspective of jurisprudence. The dissertation attempts to find the resources and nature of American conflicts theories, exposes the mysterious veil of their evolution and reveals their surprising fascination and jurisprudential cornerstone by the author's detailed reasoning.
With the method of historical analysis and comparative analysis, the dissertation strives to demonstrate that the evolution of American conflicts theories from the past to the present is in fact the play of legal formalism and legal realism in turn on the arena of conflicts law. In comparison with the evolution of jurisprudence, the evolution of conflicts theories have always arrived late. This phenomenon is in fact due to the conclusion that conflicts law is the maidservant of jurisprudence and civil law. The American practice only demonstrates it once again. Therefore, the dissertation first analyzes the American Legal Realist Movement and aspires to find the truth of American legal realism in the numerous works and articles on it; then reveals that how the legal formalism influenced Beale's vested rights theory and the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws; then shows how the early legal realists critiqued Beale's theory and rules; finally selects the five most prevalent modern conflict theories to demonstrate that how the legal realism has gradually dominated the arena of conflicts law in Conflicts Revolution and was incorporated into the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws.
The dissertation consists of eight chapters in detail:
Chapter One, The Jurisprudential Cornerstone of the Evolution of American Conflicts Theories, is the basis of the whole dissertation and the most difficult part to work on. The author turns to the history of American jurisprudence and analyzes in detail why and how the American legal realists reverted against and finally overthrew Langdell's legal formalism which had dominated American legal community for decades. The author is surprised to find out that the contents of legal realism are abundant and consist of legal skepticism, legal functionalism and particularism of rules. Most Chinese scholars mistook legal realism as legal skepticism and even criticize legal realists as overlooking the fact that law is comprised of rules. However such arguments catch the wrong objects and do not conform to the historical truth. On the other hand, the author finally points out that the fatal defects of legal realism actually exist in the fact that the legal realists usually paid more attention to attacks upon old theories and neglected the construction of new ones. The conclusion will be demonstrated again in the American modern conflicts theories, which were deeply influenced by legal realism. This fact can show that the fates of legal realism and Conflicts Revolution are similar.
Chapter Two, Formalism in Conflicts Law, is devoted to American traditional conflicts theory and its nature of legal formalism and is the basis of latter parts. As the representative of American traditional conflicts theory, Beale was one of the professors who taught for the longest period at Harvard Law School, and his research area covered conflicts law, jurisprudence and penal law, and the conflicts course which he taught was once a while the pride of Harvard Law School. Why was such an eminent law professor so maligned by many conflicts scholars? Why did his vested rights theory even led to the Conflicts Revolution which astonished the world? This part fully examines the jurisprudential basis and historical background of vested rights theory. The First Restatement, Beale as its reporter, is also explored so as to demonstrate Beale's theory. This Chapter tries to explain that why and how Beale was deeply influenced by legal formalism. Meanwhile, the author points out that Beale's theory and rules reflected the demands of his times, many parts are reasonable in themselves, and they are representative of the important phase of the localization of American conflicts law. That is the reason why the Second Restatement absorbed and reserved many parts of the First Restatement.
Chapter Three, The Early Critique by the Legal Realists, explores the logical basis and ideological resources of American Conflicts Revolution. When Beale's vested rights theory dominated the arena of conflicts law with the influence of legal formalism and the authority of American Law Institute, several legal realists first criticized Beale's theory and rules. Cook, Yntema and Lorenzen, who were among the 20 most well-known legal realists listed by Llewellyn in his article, adeptly applied legal realism to attack upon Beale's theory and rules with their erudite knowledge and deep wisdom. They not only diminished the domain of Beale's influence, but also provided different methods and perspectives to solve conflicts problems. Cavers, who studied conflicts law from Beale at Harvard Law School, chose to love truth more than his master. His classic article, 'A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem' was published in 1933, a year before Beale's First Restatement was published. He concluded that all the old choice-of-law approaches are jurisdiction-selecting and proposed a brand-new approach of choosing among the conflicting rules of law in light of the result that the application of each rule would yield in a particular case.
Chapter Four, Skepticism of Rules and One Special Approach of Policy Analysis, comprehensively inquires Currie's "theory of governmental interest analysis". The mistranslation of "governmental interest analysis" in China has impeded the comprehension of the truth and spirit of Currie's theory. Currie put the skepticism and policy analysis of legal realism to the extreme and suggested a special approach of "governmental interest analysis" mainly on the basis of Cavers' and Cook's research and some selected cases. The new approach would lead to a fresh classification of conflicts into "true conflict", "false conflict", "apparent conflict" and "unprovided-for case", which provides a brand-new perspective to the conflicts cases. "We would be better off without choice-of-law rules." Currie's famous aphorism had once been the symbol and banner of American Conflicts Revolution. However, his belated success and early death implied that his theory might be full of defects and errors which drew many sharp criticism. Nevertheless his "seductive style" of common law "hypnotized a whole generation of American lawyers". Even nowadays, there are still some followers who argued for his theory. Needless to say, Currie' s theory is the main cause which divides the conflicts scholars into two different groups.
Chapter Five, Searching the True Rules, examines the truth of Ehrenzweig's lex-fori theory which was generally neglected by Chinese scholars. Ehrenzweig had studied law at several top European and American law schools from his youth, so it is not surprising that he knew well both civil law and Anglo-American law. He skillfully combined American legal realism with German Wachter's "lex-fori theory", aspired to find "true rules" advocated by Llewellyn, and emphasized that judges were the instruments of local legislative polices and the law of the forum were the starting point and the basis of choice of law. He was prolific and his works were once popular for several years. However, his civil law writing style and unrestricted use of Latin, German and French words in his works have frustrated a lot of scholars. Gradually his theory has been put aside in several textbooks.
Chapter Six, From Rules to Principles, returns to Caver's conflicts theory. As a protagonist of Conflicts Revolution, he was not only good at theorizing conflicts problems, but also eager to fulfill legal realism. Soon after the Great Depression in 1929, he was devoted to Roosevelt's New Deal. After World War II, he began to advocate new approaches of legal research. Although no articles on conflicts law were published for many years, he had never stopped to observe and contemplate the new developments in this area. The uncertainty unleashed by the revolution caused his deep concern about the future of conflicts law. He therefore proposed eight "principles of preference" to solve the intractable choice-of-law problems in "true conflict cases" after absorbing the reasonable factors in Currie' s theory and German Kegel's "conflicts justice", in order that judges who are reluctant to jump into the wild field of ad hoc approaches would not return to Beale's rules. However, "principles of preference" are only transitional and demonstrative. Particularism of rules remains the long-term aim. Skepticism of rules and policy analysis are still the basis of his theory in the latter part of his life.
Chapter Seven, Revealing "Law in Action", probes Leflar's theory of "five choice-influencing considerations". As a legal realist, Leflar penetrated the mist of words in case law and searched "law in action". Based on the works of Reese, Cheatham and Yntema, he refined all kinds of choice-influencing policies into "manageably compact form" and expected that judges would make use of them to guide their adjudication. Among the five considerations, "application of better rule of law" was well received by judges but seriously criticized by scholars. Therefore, his theory is also referred to as "better law approach".
Chapter Eight, From Policy Analysis to the Developing New Rules, analyzes Reese's legal thought in conflicts law and the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. His "exceptionally lucid and straightforward Hemingway style" makes his works "direct and to the point": He grasped the spirit of legal realism, refined the dominant conflicts theories, focused on the new developments of case law, and finally proposed his own conflicts theory. Its main points are that policy analysis is the basis, particular rules are the aim, "principles" and "approaches" are transitional. During Conflicts Revolution, his principle of "most significant relationship" as a transitional approach is the most outstanding feature of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. But this principle provoked heated discussions and even criticism among scholars. Some scholars call it "no-rule rule". The eclecticism in his theory constitutes the mainstream in American conflicts community and Reese's Second Restatement is the most popular regime in judiciary.
Almost all the materials used in the dissertation are in English because of the lack of useful Chinese materials. It is brand-new in China to explore the American conflicts theory from the perspective of jurisprudence. It is also the first time to fully examine Lorenzen, Yntema and Reese's conflicts theories. The Chinese translations of "governmental interest analysis", "unprovided-for case" and "nonrule" are innovative. The introductions and reviews on "local law theory", "the theory of governmental interest analysis", "the theory of lex fori" are unique compared with the prevailing views about them. Certainly, whether these new points are right or hold water needs to be testified by the future research.
本文主要运用历史分析和比较分析方法,力图证成:美国冲突法理论从传统向现代的嬗变,其实是法律形式主义和法律现实主义在冲突法舞台的轮番上演。相对于法理思潮的演变,冲突法理论的变迁似乎总是姗姗来迟的春天。细细思量,其实这是冲突法本质上为法理学和民商事实体法的婢女所致,不足为奇。美国的实践只不过再次证明了这一结论。因此,本论文首先从考察美国法律现实主义运动入手,在卷帙浩瀚的法律现实主义著述中重新找回其理论真相;随后揭示法律形式主义如何深入到比尔的既得权理论及其所编《第一次冲突法重述》的骨髓;接着是一批早期先知先觉的法律现实主义者对比尔理论及其规则的深刻批判,所发出的美国冲突法革命的理论先声;最后精选五种最具代表性的美国现代冲突法理论,浓笔重墨地分析法律现实主义如何在轰轰烈烈的冲突法革命中逐步占领冲突法理论阵地,并成功地具体化为《第二次冲突法重述》。
具体而言,本论文分八章逐步展开论证:
第一章“美国冲突法理论嬗变的法理基石”,是全文立论的基础,也是全部研究中的“硬骨头”。笔者一步跃入法理学的腹地,详细梳理了美国法律现实主义者为何以及如何推翻人们一时盲目信从的兰德尔法律形式主义。笔者在研究中惊奇地发现,法律现实主义具有丰富的内涵——规则怀疑主义、法律功能主义和规则细化主义莫不在其囊中。国内学者大多误将法律现实主义等同于规则怀疑主义,甚至以为法律现实主义者一时集体失忆,忘了法律为规则的常识。这种捕风捉影的见解实在有悖事实真相。不过,笔者也在最后指出,法律现实主义存在精于批判而疏于整体建构的致命缺陷。这一论断可与后文揭示的美国当代冲突法理论的类似缺陷相互印证。从此可以看出,法律现实主义与美国冲突法革命的命运密切相关。
第二章“冲突法领域的法律形式主义”,把视角转向美国传统冲突法理论及其法律形式主义特质,形成后文深入论证的根基。美国传统冲突法理论的代表人物比尔是美国哈佛法学院执教时间最长的教授之一,曾广泛涉足冲突法、法理学和刑法等领域,他执教的冲突法课程一度成为哈佛法学院的招牌。这样一位杰出的法学家为何后来成为众多冲突法学者冷嘲热讽的对象,他提出的既得权理论为何激起了一场震惊世界的美国冲突法革命?本章全面考证了既得权理论产生的法理基础和时代背景,并与比尔编纂的《第一次冲突法重述》相互印证。本章主要表明,比尔为何以及如何陷入法律形式主义而不可自拔。同时笔者也指出,比尔的理论和规则带有深刻的时代烙印,反映了部分时代需求,具有一定的合理之处,是美国冲突法本土化的重要阶段,不可全盘抹煞。《第二次冲突法重述》对《第一次冲突法重述》的合理吸收和保留可从侧面验证这一结论。
第三章“法律现实主义者的早期反击”,呈现了美国冲突法革命的逻辑基础和思想来源。在比尔的既得权理论裹挟法律形式主义和美国法学会的威名渐趋占据冲突法舞台时,一批坚定的法律现实主义者率先反击比尔的理论和规则。作为位居卢埃林所言二十位著名法律现实主义者代表之列的三位学者,库克、安特马和劳伦森以其令人惊叹的学识和智慧,娴熟地运用法律现实主义攻击比尔冲突法思想和规则中的种种漏洞与错误,不仅守住了冲突法理论的一方阵地,而且为后来者准备了批判的工具和范例,并且不乏构建规则的思想火花。凯弗斯是位后来居上的法律现实主义者,他来自法律形式主义者的大本营,却义无反顾地接受了法律现实主义,推陈出新地将过去所有法律选择方法称为“法域选择”,并谨慎地提出了“规则和结果选择”方法。
第四章“规则怀疑主义与特别的政策分析方法”,全面解析柯里的“支配兴趣分析说”。国内学界普遍将“支配兴趣分析”误译为“政府利益分析”,妨碍了对该学说真相和精髓的理解。柯里主要吸收了库克和凯弗斯的早期研究成果,基于少数美国判例,将法律现实主义的规则怀疑主义和政策分析推至极端,最后凝练成独树一帜的“支配兴趣分析”方法。他由此引申出的“真实冲突”、“虚假冲突”、“表面冲突”和“无冲突”的案件分类开辟出对法律冲突认识的新领域,“没有法律选择规则我们会更好些”几乎成为美国冲突法革命的符号和旗帜。但是,柯里的大器晚成和令人扼腕的短暂学术生命使其学说隐含了明显的漏洞甚至错误,引发了众多学者的批评。不过,柯里迷人的普通法分析风格令整整一代冲突法学者为之着迷,并在今天仍不乏追捧者,引发了冲突法阵营中的两军对垒。
第五章“寻找真实的规则”,全面揭示国内学界普遍忽视的艾伦茨威格“法院地法说”真相。艾伦茨威格早年在多所欧美一流法学院接受法学教育,学识贯通欧美法学。他将美国法律现实主义和德国维希特的“法院地法说”巧妙地结合在一起,立志寻找卢埃林所言的“真实规则”,强调法官不过是实现本地立法政策的工具以及法院地法才是法律选择的出发点和基础。他著作等身,在美国冲突法学界名噪一时。但是,他的大陆法系写作风格以及通篇不断的拉丁语、德语和法语词汇让不少美国学者望而生畏,其冲突法思想也渐渐淡出学者的视野。
第六章“从规则到原则”,再次直面冲突法革命的睿智先行者凯弗斯的冲突法思想。凯弗斯不仅是一位法律现实主义理论家,更是一位身体力行法律现实主义的实践者。他在华尔街的金融支柱倒下后不久就投身于罗斯福新政,二战后又力推法学研究新方法。不过,虽然对冲突法问题封笔多年,但他一直没有停止观察和思考冲突法的最新发展。60年代冲突法革命的乱象引发了他深深的忧虑,在早期的“规则和结果选择说”基础上,他吸收了柯里“支配兴趣分析说”和德国学者克格尔“冲突法正义”的合理成分,针对棘手的“真实冲突”案件示范性地提出了八条“优先选择原则”,防止不愿踏入个案分析荒野的法官重回比尔规则的老路。但是,“优先选择原则”只是过渡性和示范性的,规则细化依然是长期追求的目标。规则怀疑主义、政策分析仍然是其后期思想的主要色调。
第七章“揭示‘行动中的法律'”,探究法律舞台上的多面手莱弗拉的“五点考虑因素说”。作为一位法律现实主义者,莱弗拉拨开判例法表面说辞的迷雾,寻觅法官“行动中的法律”。他在里斯、戚特海姆和安特马著述的基础上,将影响法律选择的政策考量因素提炼成“易于掌控的简洁形式”,希冀成为法官裁判的指南。在五点考虑因素中,“适用较好的法律规则”最为法官所偏爱,同时也最为学者所诟病。因此,他的理论又被称为“较好法方法”。
第八章“从政策分析到规则构建”,详尽分析美国冲突法革命的集大成者里斯的冲突法思想及其编撰的《第二次冲突法重述》。里斯行文简洁有力、见解深邃全面,颇具“海明威的风格”。他深得法律现实主义真传,兼收并蓄了美国主流冲突法理论的精华,密切关注判例法的最新发展,最后提炼出其冲突法思想:政策分析为基础、规则细化为目标、“原则”或“方法”为过渡。在冲突法革命的乱局中,他的过渡性方案“最重要关系原则”构成《第二次冲突法重述》的鲜明特色,但同时引发了学界的广泛争论,被诸多学者称为“虚空规则”。里斯理论上的折中主义奠定了今天美国冲突法学界的基调,他编纂的《第二次冲突法重述》成为美国司法界最受欢迎的一套规则。
由于罕有可用的中文资料,本文几乎全部借用了英文资料。从法理视角全面分析美国冲突法理论的演变,在国内首开先河。对劳伦森、安特马和里斯冲突法思想的总结国内尚没有先例。将“governmental interests analysis”翻译为“支配兴趣分析”、将“unprovided-for case”翻译为“无兴趣案件”、将“nonrule”翻译为“虚空规则”等为本文独创。对“本地法说”、“支配兴趣分析说”、“法院地法说”的分析结论同国内冲突法学界的普遍观点大相径庭。当然,这些新方法和新观点是否正确还有待学界的进一步验证。
Any legal research is superficial, unless it reaches the level of jurisprudence. The dissertation tries to analyze the American conflicts theories from the perspective of jurisprudence. Without doubt, it is a formidable virgin area, because there are so many misunderstandings either of the American Legal Realism or of the American conflicts theories in China now. It is a common trick for many Chinese scholars to make foreign theories seem naive and then attack upon them heavily. So do many scholars in the conflicts law area. Therefore, there are few works which fully comprehend the spirit of American conflicts theories and reveal the true reasons of its evolution from the perspective of jurisprudence. Even though a few scholars deal with such issues occasionally, their research is superficial and many errors have occurred. On the other hand, American scholars are restricted by their cultural atmosphere and consider that such questions are so commonplace that it is not worth of doing such kinds of research. In addition, they are inclined to focus on micro questions rather than macro ones. As a result, few American scholars have made efforts to introduce American conflicts theories to foreigners from the perspective of jurisprudence. The dissertation attempts to find the resources and nature of American conflicts theories, exposes the mysterious veil of their evolution and reveals their surprising fascination and jurisprudential cornerstone by the author's detailed reasoning.
With the method of historical analysis and comparative analysis, the dissertation strives to demonstrate that the evolution of American conflicts theories from the past to the present is in fact the play of legal formalism and legal realism in turn on the arena of conflicts law. In comparison with the evolution of jurisprudence, the evolution of conflicts theories have always arrived late. This phenomenon is in fact due to the conclusion that conflicts law is the maidservant of jurisprudence and civil law. The American practice only demonstrates it once again. Therefore, the dissertation first analyzes the American Legal Realist Movement and aspires to find the truth of American legal realism in the numerous works and articles on it; then reveals that how the legal formalism influenced Beale's vested rights theory and the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws; then shows how the early legal realists critiqued Beale's theory and rules; finally selects the five most prevalent modern conflict theories to demonstrate that how the legal realism has gradually dominated the arena of conflicts law in Conflicts Revolution and was incorporated into the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws.
The dissertation consists of eight chapters in detail:
Chapter One, The Jurisprudential Cornerstone of the Evolution of American Conflicts Theories, is the basis of the whole dissertation and the most difficult part to work on. The author turns to the history of American jurisprudence and analyzes in detail why and how the American legal realists reverted against and finally overthrew Langdell's legal formalism which had dominated American legal community for decades. The author is surprised to find out that the contents of legal realism are abundant and consist of legal skepticism, legal functionalism and particularism of rules. Most Chinese scholars mistook legal realism as legal skepticism and even criticize legal realists as overlooking the fact that law is comprised of rules. However such arguments catch the wrong objects and do not conform to the historical truth. On the other hand, the author finally points out that the fatal defects of legal realism actually exist in the fact that the legal realists usually paid more attention to attacks upon old theories and neglected the construction of new ones. The conclusion will be demonstrated again in the American modern conflicts theories, which were deeply influenced by legal realism. This fact can show that the fates of legal realism and Conflicts Revolution are similar.
Chapter Two, Formalism in Conflicts Law, is devoted to American traditional conflicts theory and its nature of legal formalism and is the basis of latter parts. As the representative of American traditional conflicts theory, Beale was one of the professors who taught for the longest period at Harvard Law School, and his research area covered conflicts law, jurisprudence and penal law, and the conflicts course which he taught was once a while the pride of Harvard Law School. Why was such an eminent law professor so maligned by many conflicts scholars? Why did his vested rights theory even led to the Conflicts Revolution which astonished the world? This part fully examines the jurisprudential basis and historical background of vested rights theory. The First Restatement, Beale as its reporter, is also explored so as to demonstrate Beale's theory. This Chapter tries to explain that why and how Beale was deeply influenced by legal formalism. Meanwhile, the author points out that Beale's theory and rules reflected the demands of his times, many parts are reasonable in themselves, and they are representative of the important phase of the localization of American conflicts law. That is the reason why the Second Restatement absorbed and reserved many parts of the First Restatement.
Chapter Three, The Early Critique by the Legal Realists, explores the logical basis and ideological resources of American Conflicts Revolution. When Beale's vested rights theory dominated the arena of conflicts law with the influence of legal formalism and the authority of American Law Institute, several legal realists first criticized Beale's theory and rules. Cook, Yntema and Lorenzen, who were among the 20 most well-known legal realists listed by Llewellyn in his article, adeptly applied legal realism to attack upon Beale's theory and rules with their erudite knowledge and deep wisdom. They not only diminished the domain of Beale's influence, but also provided different methods and perspectives to solve conflicts problems. Cavers, who studied conflicts law from Beale at Harvard Law School, chose to love truth more than his master. His classic article, 'A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem' was published in 1933, a year before Beale's First Restatement was published. He concluded that all the old choice-of-law approaches are jurisdiction-selecting and proposed a brand-new approach of choosing among the conflicting rules of law in light of the result that the application of each rule would yield in a particular case.
Chapter Four, Skepticism of Rules and One Special Approach of Policy Analysis, comprehensively inquires Currie's "theory of governmental interest analysis". The mistranslation of "governmental interest analysis" in China has impeded the comprehension of the truth and spirit of Currie's theory. Currie put the skepticism and policy analysis of legal realism to the extreme and suggested a special approach of "governmental interest analysis" mainly on the basis of Cavers' and Cook's research and some selected cases. The new approach would lead to a fresh classification of conflicts into "true conflict", "false conflict", "apparent conflict" and "unprovided-for case", which provides a brand-new perspective to the conflicts cases. "We would be better off without choice-of-law rules." Currie's famous aphorism had once been the symbol and banner of American Conflicts Revolution. However, his belated success and early death implied that his theory might be full of defects and errors which drew many sharp criticism. Nevertheless his "seductive style" of common law "hypnotized a whole generation of American lawyers". Even nowadays, there are still some followers who argued for his theory. Needless to say, Currie' s theory is the main cause which divides the conflicts scholars into two different groups.
Chapter Five, Searching the True Rules, examines the truth of Ehrenzweig's lex-fori theory which was generally neglected by Chinese scholars. Ehrenzweig had studied law at several top European and American law schools from his youth, so it is not surprising that he knew well both civil law and Anglo-American law. He skillfully combined American legal realism with German Wachter's "lex-fori theory", aspired to find "true rules" advocated by Llewellyn, and emphasized that judges were the instruments of local legislative polices and the law of the forum were the starting point and the basis of choice of law. He was prolific and his works were once popular for several years. However, his civil law writing style and unrestricted use of Latin, German and French words in his works have frustrated a lot of scholars. Gradually his theory has been put aside in several textbooks.
Chapter Six, From Rules to Principles, returns to Caver's conflicts theory. As a protagonist of Conflicts Revolution, he was not only good at theorizing conflicts problems, but also eager to fulfill legal realism. Soon after the Great Depression in 1929, he was devoted to Roosevelt's New Deal. After World War II, he began to advocate new approaches of legal research. Although no articles on conflicts law were published for many years, he had never stopped to observe and contemplate the new developments in this area. The uncertainty unleashed by the revolution caused his deep concern about the future of conflicts law. He therefore proposed eight "principles of preference" to solve the intractable choice-of-law problems in "true conflict cases" after absorbing the reasonable factors in Currie' s theory and German Kegel's "conflicts justice", in order that judges who are reluctant to jump into the wild field of ad hoc approaches would not return to Beale's rules. However, "principles of preference" are only transitional and demonstrative. Particularism of rules remains the long-term aim. Skepticism of rules and policy analysis are still the basis of his theory in the latter part of his life.
Chapter Seven, Revealing "Law in Action", probes Leflar's theory of "five choice-influencing considerations". As a legal realist, Leflar penetrated the mist of words in case law and searched "law in action". Based on the works of Reese, Cheatham and Yntema, he refined all kinds of choice-influencing policies into "manageably compact form" and expected that judges would make use of them to guide their adjudication. Among the five considerations, "application of better rule of law" was well received by judges but seriously criticized by scholars. Therefore, his theory is also referred to as "better law approach".
Chapter Eight, From Policy Analysis to the Developing New Rules, analyzes Reese's legal thought in conflicts law and the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. His "exceptionally lucid and straightforward Hemingway style" makes his works "direct and to the point": He grasped the spirit of legal realism, refined the dominant conflicts theories, focused on the new developments of case law, and finally proposed his own conflicts theory. Its main points are that policy analysis is the basis, particular rules are the aim, "principles" and "approaches" are transitional. During Conflicts Revolution, his principle of "most significant relationship" as a transitional approach is the most outstanding feature of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. But this principle provoked heated discussions and even criticism among scholars. Some scholars call it "no-rule rule". The eclecticism in his theory constitutes the mainstream in American conflicts community and Reese's Second Restatement is the most popular regime in judiciary.
Almost all the materials used in the dissertation are in English because of the lack of useful Chinese materials. It is brand-new in China to explore the American conflicts theory from the perspective of jurisprudence. It is also the first time to fully examine Lorenzen, Yntema and Reese's conflicts theories. The Chinese translations of "governmental interest analysis", "unprovided-for case" and "nonrule" are innovative. The introductions and reviews on "local law theory", "the theory of governmental interest analysis", "the theory of lex fori" are unique compared with the prevailing views about them. Certainly, whether these new points are right or hold water needs to be testified by the future research.
引文
[1]荣格将冲突法的真正起点定于12世纪罗马法在意大利的复兴,最早的冲突法学者就是研究罗马法的注释法学者。但他同时谈到了古希腊和古罗马解决法律冲突的早期实践和零星规定。See,F.Juenger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,pp.6-11.
[2]Sec,O.Kahn-Freund,General Problems of Private International Law,Leyden:Sijhoff,1976,pp.128-136.
[3]See,J.Westbrook,Survey and Evaluation of Competing Choice-of-Law Methodologies:the Case for Eclecticism,40 Mo.L.Rev.411(1975).
[4]H.Kay,Ehrenzweig's Proper Law and Proper Forum,18 Okla.L.Rev.233(1965).
[5]意大利的巴托鲁斯、法国的杜摩兰和达让特莱、荷兰的胡伯、德国的维希特和萨维尼、意大利的孟西尼、英国的戴西这些中世纪和近代的欧洲冲突法学者奠定了现代冲突法大厦的根基。See,F.Juenger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrccht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,pp.11-42.
[6]美国第一部冲突法著作《论不同州和国家实体法差异带来的问题》为利乌摩尔(Livermore)所著,但由于该书企图引进欧洲开始抛弃的法则区别说,影响不大。美国冲突法理论构建真正开始于斯托雷的国际礼让说。See,ibid,pp.29-30.
[7]努斯鲍姆(Nussbaum)、劳伦森(Lorenzen)、纳德尔曼(Nadelmann)、拉贝尔(Rabel)等著名的美国冲突法学者都是来自欧洲。
[1]K.Siehr,Domestic Relations in Europe:European Equivalents to American Evolutions,30 Am.J.Comp.L.71(1982).
[2]如凯弗斯、艾伦茨威格、温特劳布(Weintraub)、里斯、彼得·海(Peter Hay)、凯(H.Kay)、布里梅耶(Brilmayer)、塞缪尼德斯(Symeionides)等美国学者均登上过海牙国际法演讲台。
[3]坊间可见的卢竣所著《国际私法之理论与实际》出版于1936年,现被列入“二十世纪中华法学文丛”重新出版。该书当年被郭云观教授称为“当代国际私法难得的佳作”,曹建明称卢峻对大陆法系和英美法系国际私法作出了“独到的比较研究”,但书中对美国斯托雷学说的介绍仅仅短短的四行字。参见卢峻:《国际私法之理论与实际》,中国政法大学出版社1998年版,第44-45页。
[1]建国后第一部关于美国冲突法研究的专著《现代美国国际私法学说研究》仅11.2万字,该书称:“以库克为代表的‘地方法理论',是美国资产阶级在刚刚经历了空前的世界经济大危机后,又被卷入了前所未有的世界大战,在被称作为(原文如此——笔者注)焦虑、多事和混乱年代中所产生的法律思想。”张翔雨编著:《现代美国国际私法学说研究》,武汉大学出版社1986年版,第23页。其实,库克于1924年3月在《耶鲁法律期刊》第33卷发表的“冲突法的逻辑与法律基础”一文中提出了“本地法说”,当时既没有世界经济危机,也没发生二战。这种结论完全是主观臆断。这种错误完全为第二部研究美国冲突法理论的专著《美国现代国际私法流派》所继承,邓正来同样宣称:“库克的‘本地法说'也可谓是美国当时风靡的保守主义思潮的产物。当时,美国刚刚从空前的经济大危机中摆脱出来,却又被卷入了第二次世界大战。在这个被称之为乱世之秋的年代中,美国为维护和稳定国内的法律秩序,竭力排斥外国或外州法律的适用。”见邓正来:《美国现代国际私法流派(修订版)》,中国政法大学出版社2006年版,第32-33页。此外,两部书中多处误解了美国的学说,如认为库克反对适用外国法或外州法,这绝非“本地法说”中的应有之义。李浩培先生于1992年在《中国国际法年刊》上所发表的“美国的国际私法革命”一文代表了当前相关研究中的最佳成果,但它只介绍了库克、凯弗斯、柯里和里斯的学说,不仅内容简短、缺乏详尽注释,而且一些结论略显仓促。参见李浩培:《李浩培文选》,法律出版社2000年版,第390-423页。
[2]B.Wardhaugh,From Natural Law to Legal Realism:Legal Philosophy,Legal Theory,and the Development of American Conflict of Laws since 1830.41 Me.L.Rev.307(1989).
[3]M.Green,Legal Realism,Lex Fori,and the Choice-of-Law Revolution,104 Yale L.J.967(1994-1995).
[4]L.Brilmayer,The Role of Substantive and Choice of Law Policies in the Formation and Application of Choice of Law Rules,252 Recueil des Cours 32(1995).
[5]普鲁瑟(Prosser)教授对冲突法的复杂和难以理解有一段令人捧腹的描述:“冲突法王国是一片令人沮丧的沼泽地,布满了陷人的泥淖,博学而古怪的教授驻住其中,他们用一种怪异而难以理解的行话将神秘的问题理论化。普通的法官或律师一旦卷入其中将彻底不知去向。”W.Prosser,Interstate Publication,51 Mich.L.Rev,.971(1952-1953).
[1]精选柯里的“支配兴趣分析说”、艾伦茨威格的“法院地法说”、凯弗斯的“优先选择原则说”、莱弗拉“五点考虑因素说”和里斯的冲突法思想作为美国现代冲突法理论的代表,是笔者反复比较和谨慎思考之后的判断。美国学者之间对现代冲突法理论的总结有所差异。现代美国最权威的教材读物思格尔斯(Scoles)等人所著《冲突法》一书选择了“支配兴趣分析说”、“法院地法说”、“功能分析方法”、“价值导向的方法(主要指莱弗拉的学说)”作为现代冲突法理论。See,E.Scoles,P.Hay,P Borchers,S.Symeonides。Conflict of Laws,St.Paul:Thomson,2004,pp.25-58.荣格选择了“适当法方法”、“兴趣分析方法”、“影响法律选择的考虑因素”和“《第二次冲突法重述》的折中主义方法”作为现代冲突法理论。See,F.Jurenger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,pp.96-106.莱弗拉、麦当格尔和菲利克斯的冲突法教材将“支配兴趣分析”、“优先选择原则”、“影响法律选择的考虑因素”、“最重要关系方法”和“全面的兴趣分析”作为现代美国冲突法理论。See,R.Leflar,L.McDougal Ⅲ,R.Felix,American Conflicts Law,Charlottesville:The Michie Company Law Publishers,1989,pp.276-285.布里梅耶和戈德斯密斯(Goldsmith)的冲突法教材选择了“兴趣分析”、“比较损害方法”、“较好规则方法”、“《第二次冲突法重述》和最重要关系方法”作为冲突法的新思维。参见布里迈耶(L.Brilmayer),戈德斯密斯(J.Goldsmith):《冲突法:案例与资料(Conflict of Laws:Cases and Materials)》,中信出版社2003年版(影印版),第215-277页。
[1]O.Holmes,The Path of the Law,1 Boston L.School Mag.1(1896-1897).
[2]艾伦茨威格较早采用“冲突法革命”一词,但他是在讽刺意味上使用的。See,A.Ehrenzweig,A Counter-revolution in Conflicts Law?From Beale to Cavers,80 Harv.L.Rev.377(1966-1967).德国的克格尔在1964年海牙演讲中也提到“冲突法革命(conflicts revolution)”一词,但他并不认为美国的理论变革为革命,而称其为“冲突法危机(crisis)”。See,G.Kegel.The Crisis of Conflict of Laws.112 Recueil des Cours 95(1964).
[3]B.Wardhaugh,From Natural Law to Legal Realism:Legal Philosophy,Legal Theory,and the Development of American Conflict of Laws since 1830.41 Me.L.Rev.307(1989).
[4]刘星:“法律的不确定性——美国现实主义法学述评”,《中山大学学报》1996年增刊,第199页。刘星认为“现实主义法学的主要观点之一是否认法律规则的存在”。
[5]朱景文:“对西方法律传统的挑战——评美国批判法律研究运动”,《中国法学》1995年第4期,第116页。
[6]See G.Aichele,Legal realism and twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the changing consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990,p4.
[1]K.Llewellyn,The Bramble Bush,Oceana Publications,Inc.,1960,p.89.
[2]See G.Aichele,Legal realism and twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the changing consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990,p.10.
[3]See A.Sutherland,The Law at Harvard,Cambridge:The Belknap Press,1967,p.174.
[4]J.Singer,Legal Realism Now,76 Cal.L.Rev.478-481(1988).
[5]R.Pound,Liberty of Contract,18 Yale L.J.466(1908-1909).
[6]W.W.Fisher III,M.J.Horwitz,T.A.Reed(editors),American Legal Realism,New York:Oxford University Press,1993,pp.130-132.
[1]Ibid,p.xi.
[2]M.Martin,Legal Realism:American and Scandinavian,New York:Peter Lang Publishing,Inc.,1997,p.22;G Aichele,Legal realism and twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the changing consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990,p.37.
[3]See H.Pihlajamaki,Against Metaphysics in Law:The Historical Background of American and Scandinavian Legal Realism compared,52 Am.J.Comp.L.474(2004).
[4]F.Cohen,Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,35 Col.L.Rev.809(1935).
[5]J.Dewey,Logical Method and Law,10 Cornell L.Q.26(1914-1925).
[6]M.Martin,Legal Realism:American and Scandinavian,New York:Peter Lang Publishing,Inc.,1997,p.12.
[7]O.Holmes,The Common Law,Boston:Little,Brown,and Company,1923,p.1.
[8]O.Holmes,The Path of the Law,1 Boston L.School Mag.4(1896-1897).
[9]R.Pound,Law in Books and Law in Action,44 Am.L.Rev.15(1910).
[1]L.Kalman,Legal realism at Yale,1927-1960,Chapel Hill and London:The University of North Carolina Press,1986,pp.14-16.
[2]U.Moore,Rational Basis of Legal Institutions,23 Colum.L.Rev.613(1923).
[3]美国在19世纪40年代就已有25种法律制度,而当时的人口比英国少.See H.Pihlajamaki.The Historical Background of American and Scandinavian Legal Realism compared,52 Am.J.Comp.L.483(2004).
[4]T.Arnold,Institute Priests and Yale Observers-A Reply to Dean Goodrich,84 U.Pa.L.Rev.818(1935-1936).
[5]J.Johnson,American Legal Culture,1908-1940,Westport:Greenwood Press,1981,p.59.
[1]M.Martin,Legal Realism:American and Scandinavian,New York:Peter Lang Publishing,Inc.,1997,p.10.
[2]See W.W.Fisher Ⅲ,M.J.Horwitz,T.A.Reed(editors),American Legal Realism,New York:1993,p.xiv.
[3]G.E.White,From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism:Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-century America,58 Va.L.Rev.999(1972).
[4]K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism——Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1233-34,1251(1930-1931).卢埃林为反驳庞德对现实主义的指责,在文章第一部分罗列了庞德可能针对的20个人:在第二份具体陈述现实主义者的观点时,他罗列了大约65人作为他个人认定的现实主义者。这也不是一个完整的名单,“他们的人数是变化的”。被罗列其中的人反映也不一,他们有人并不认为自己是现实主义者,如L.Green说,“如果我是一位现实主义者,我自己一直不知道这回事。……据我所能地回忆,我从没有在我的作品中用过现实主义一词。”Innocent Misrepresentation,19 Va.L.Rev.247(1932-1933).后来的学者在总结这场运动时罗列的人数也差距甚大。由于是一场新思想运动,而非学派,这似乎注定了有关它的参加者和观点的争议会一直不断。
[5]K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism——Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1235(1930-1931).
[1]对法律现实主义认识和评价很大程度上取决于资料的选取。本文观点的形成依赖的法律现实主义原始资料有:K.Llewellyn,A Realistic Jurisprudence--The Next Step,30 Colum.L.Rev.431(1930);K.Llewellyn,The Bramble Bush,Oceana Publications,Inc.,1960;K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1222,(1930-1931);K.Llewellyn,On What Is Wrong with So-called Legal Education,35 Colum.L.Rev.651(1935;W.Cook,Scientific Method and the Law,13 A.B.A.J.303(1927);W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942;F.Cohen,Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,35 Col.L.Rev.809,(1935);M.Cohen,Property and Sovereignty,13 Cornell L.Q.8(1927-1928);O.Holmes,The Common Law,Boston:Little,Brown,and Company,1923;O.Holmes,The Path of the Law,1 Boston L.School Mag.1,(1896-1897);U.Moore,Rational Basis of Legal Institutions,23 Colum.L.Rev.609(1923);T.Arnold,Institute Priests and Yale Observers-A Reply to Dean Goodrich,84 U.Pa.L.Rev.811(1935-1936);T.Arnold,The Jurisprudence of Edward S.Robinson,46 Yale L.J.1282(1936-1937);T.Arnold,The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process,45 Harv.L.Rev.617(1931-1932);J.Gray,The Nature and Sources of the Law,edited by D.Campbell and P.Thomas,Aldershot:Ashgate & Dartmouth,1997;B.Cardozo,The Nature of the Judicial Process,New Haven:Yale University Press,1921;J.Frank,Law and the Modern Mind,New York:Brentano's Publishers,1930;J.Frank,Are Judges Human? 80 Pa.L.Rev.17(1931-1932);J.Frank,Why not a Clinical Lawyer-school? 81 U.Pa.L.Rev.907(1932-1933);J.Frank,What Constitutes a Good Legal Education? 19 A.B.A.J.723(1933);J.C.Hutcheson,The Judgment Intuitive:The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision,14 Cornell L.Q.274(1928-1929);H.Oliphant,A Return to Stare Decisis,14 A.B.A.J.71(1928);W.Sturges and S.Clark,Legal Theory and Real Property Mortgages,37 Yale L.J.691(1927-1928);H.Yntema,The Hornbook Method ana he Conflict of Laws,37 Yale L.J.468(1928);L.Green,The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases,28 Colum.L.Rev.1014(1928);A.Corbin,Offer and Acceptance,and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations,26 Yale L.J.169(1916-1917);H.Laski,The Basis of Vicarious Liability,26 Yale L.J.105(1916-1917);N.Isaacs,The Standardizing of Contracts,27 Yale L.J.34(1917-1918);W.Douglas,A Functional Approach to the Law of Business Associations,23 Ill.L.Rev.673(1928-1929);W.Hohfeld,Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,23 Yale L.J.16(1913);C.Clark,Relations,Legal and Otherwise,5 Ill.L.Q.26(1922-1923);E.Lorenzen & R.Heilman,The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws,83 U.Pa.L.Rev.555(1934-1935)。本文选取的研究法律现实主义的二手资料主要有:L.Kalman,Legal realism at Yale,1927-1960,Chapel Hill and London:The University of North Carolina Press,1986;G.Aichele,Legal realism and twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the changing consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990;J.Singer,Legal Realism Now,76 Cal.L.Rev.465,(1988);W.W.Fisher III,M.J.Horwitz,T.A.Reed(editors),American Legal Realism,New York:Oxford University Press,1993;M.Martin,Legal Realism:American and Scandinavian,New York:Peter Lang Publishing,Inc.,1997;W.Twining,Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement,Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1973;H.Pihlajamaki,Against Metaphysics in Law:The Historical Background of American and Scandinavian Legal Realism compared,52 Am.J.Comp.L.469,(2004);G.Gilmore,Legal Realism:Its Cause and Cure,70 Yale L.J.1037(1960-1961);M.White,Social Thought in America:the Revolt against Formalism,Boston:Beacon Press,1957;H.Jones,Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism,61 Coum.L.Rev.799(1961)。(本注释中论文的页码均为起始页码——笔者注。)
[2]“法学教育的革新”是法律现实主义者将理论运用于社会现实的重要实践,是法律现实主义运动的重要内容。但由于这部分内容与美国冲突法理论演变没有直接的关联,因此后文将其省略。法律现实主义者变革法学教育的具体情况可参见许庆坤:“重读美国法律现实主义”,《比较法研究》,2007年第4期,第10-11页;许庆坤:“美国法学教育透视”,《山东大学法律评论(第四辑)》,山东大学出版社2007年版,第248-250页。
[1]Vegelahn v.Guntner,167 Mass.92,44 N.E.1077(1896).
[2]See Singer,Legal Realism Now,76 Cal.L.Rev.499(1988).
[3]在Lochner v.New York一案中,美国最高法院宣告纽约州的限制工时的劳动法违宪,霍姆斯对此提出异议。See,198 U.S.45,75(1905),25 S.Ct.539.在Muller v.Oregon一案中,法律现实主义者布兰迪斯(Brandeis)和戈德马克(Goldmark)为限制妇女每日工时的立法辩解。See,208 U.S.412,419(1908).
[4]K.Llewellyn,A Realistic Jurisprudence--The Next Step,30 Colum.L.Rev.439(1930).卢埃林观察发现,纸面规则(Paper Rules)是告诉官员的应然规则,其中有的官员置之不理,有的官员表里不一,也有的官员死守规则。
[1]J.Gray,The Nature and Sources of the Law,edited by D.Campbell and P.Thomas,Aldershot:Ashgate & Dartmouth,1997,p.65.
[2]Ibid.p.63.
[3]B.Cardozo,The Nature of the Judicial Process,New Haven:Yale University Press,1921,pp.10,69.
[4]G.Aichele,Legal realism and twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the changing consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990,p.40.
[5]W.Cook,Scientific Method and the Law,13 A.B.A.J.308(1927).
[6]O.Holmes,The Path of the Law,1 Boston L.School Mag.3(1896-1897).
[7]K.Llewellyn,The Bramble Bush,Oceana Publications,Inc.,1960,p.3.
[8]See J.Frank,Law and the Modern Mind,New York:Brentano's Publishers,1930,p.55.
[9]H.Oliphant,A Return to Stan Decisis,14 A.B.A.J.161(1928).
[1]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,p.29.
[2]F.S.Cohen,Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,35 Colum.L.Rev.840(1935).
[3]K.Llewellyn,A Realistic Jurisprudence--The Next Step,30 Colum.L.Rev.444(1930).
[4]W.Sturges and S.Clark,Legal Theory and Real Property Mortgages,37 Yale L.J.706(1927-1928).
[5]H.Yntema,The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws,37 Yale L.J.480(1928).
[6]See J.Frank,Law and the Modern Mind,New York:Brentano's Publishers,1930,p.131.
[7]J.Frank,Are Judges Human? 80 Pa.L.Rev.28(1931-1932).
[8]L.Kalman,Legal realism at Yale,1927-1960,Chapel Hill and London:The University of North Carolina Press,1986,p.8.
[9]K.Llewellyn,The Bramble Bush,Oceana Publications,Inc.,1960,p.74.
[1]W.Cook,Scientific Method and the Law,13 A.B.A.J.306(1927).
[2]See O.Holmes,The Common Law,Boston:Little,Brown,and Company,1923,p.1.
[3]O.Holmes,The Path of the Law,1 Boston L.School Mag.10(1896-1897).
[4]柯恩发现,1910年英国开始对土地征税和取消贵族院的特权,正是由于这次公法领域的斗争胜利才使得私法领域的革命最终完成。See M.Cohen,Property and Sovereignty,13 Cornell L.Q.9-11(1927-1928).
[5]See J.Frank,Law and the Modern Mind,New York:Brentano's Publishers,1930,p.248.
[6]Lochner v.New York,198 U.S.45,25 S.Ct.539(1905).
[7]See J.Frank,Law and the Modern Mind,New York:Brentano's Publishers,1930,p.111.
[8]J.Hutcheson,The Judgment Intuitive:The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision,14 Cornell L.Q.278(1928-1929).
[9]See W.W.Fisher Ⅲ,M.J.Horwitz,T.A.Reed(editors),American Legal Realism,New York:1993,p.165.
[1]这是卢埃林在同庞德论战中提出的两个法律现实主义者的共同出发点,但他同时指出,它们虽然是法律现实主义的突出特点,但并不是法律现实主义所独有。See K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1236,1238(1930-1931).
[2]Sec J.Frank,Law and the Modern Mind,New York:Brentano's Publishers,1930,p.246.
[3]R.Pound,Law in Books and Law in Action,44 Am.L.Rev.22(1910).
[4]W.Twining,Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement,Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1973,p.27.
[5]W.Cook,Walter Wheeler Cook,in My Philosophy of Law,Littleton:Fred B.Rothman & Co.,1987,pp.62-63.
[1]See K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1236(1930-1931).
[2]W.Cook,Scientific Method and the Law,13 A.B.A.J.308(1927).
[3]L.Green,The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases,28 Colum.L.Rev.1015(1928).
[4]K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1236-1237(1930-1931).
[5]K.Llewellyn,A Realistic Jurisprudence--The Next Step,30 Colum.L.Rev.443-444(1930).
[6]Moore,Rational Basis of Legal Institutions,23 Colum.L.Rev.612(1923).
[1]K.Llewellyn,The Bramble Bush,Oceana Publications,Inc.,1960,p.52.
[2]O.W.Holmes,The Common Law,Boston:Little,Brown,and Company,1923,p.1.
[3]Vegelahn v.Guntner,167 Mass.92,44 N.E.1077(1896).
[4]A.Corbin,Offer and Acceptance,and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations,26 Yale L.J.206(1916-1917).
[5]K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1252(1930-1931).
[1]H.Laski,The Basis of Vicarious Liability,26 Yale L.J.122,112(1916-1917).
[2]O.Holmes,The Path of the Law,1 Boston L.School Mag.9(1896-1897).
[3]J.Singer,Legal Realism Now,76 Cal.L.Rev.482-483(1988).
[4]N.Isaacs,The Standardizing of Contracts,27 Yale L.J.37-38(1917-1918).
[5]M.Cohen,Property and Sovereignty,13 Cornell L.Q.21(1927-1928).
[1]T.Arnold,The Jurisprudence of Edward S.Robinson,46 Yale L.J.1282(1936-1937).
[2]T.Arnold,The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process.45 Harv.L.Rev.645(1931-1932).
[3]K.Llewellyn,The Bramble Bush,Oceana Publications,Inc.,1960,p.94.
[4]A.Gulliver,Book Review,41 Yale L.J.787(1931-1932).
[5]W.Douglas,A Functional Approach to the Law of Business Associations,23 Ill.L.Rev.673-675(1928-1929).
[6]W.W.Fisher III,M.J.Horwitz,T.A.Reed(editors),American Legal Realism,New York:1993,pp.98-99.
[7]J.Singer,Legal Realism Now,76 Cal.L.Rev.483-485(1988).
[1]Ibid,pp.487-488,494.
[2]Ibid,p.491.
[1]E.Purcell,The Crisis of Democratic Theory:Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value,Lexington,Kentucky:The University Press of Kentucky,1973,pp.22-23.
[2]Lochner v.New York,198 U.S.45,25 S.Ct.539(1905).
[3]W.Sturges and S.Clark,Legal Theory and Real Property Mortgages,37 Yale L.J.706(1927-1928).
[4]F.Cohen,Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,35 Col.L.Rev.839(1935).
[1]W.Hohfeld,Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,23 Yale L.J.28-29,58(1913).
[2]W.Cook,Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life,27 Yale L.J.789-790(1918).
[3]See C.Clark,Relations,Legal and Otherwise,5 Ill.L.Q.26(1922-1923);W.Cook,Hohfeld's Contributions to the Science of Law,28 Yale L.J.721(1919);A.Corbin,Legal Analysis and Terminology 29 Yale L.J.163(1919);K.Llewellyn,The Bramble Bush,Oceana Publications,Inc.,1960,pp.97-101,etc..
[4]K.Llewellyn,A Realistic Jurisprudence--The Next Step,30 Colum.L.Rev.453-454(1930).
[5]K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1237(1930-1931).
[1]A.Corbin,Jural Relations and their Classification,30 Yale L.J.237-238(1920-1921).
[2]E.Lorenzen & R.Heilman,The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws,83 U.Pa.L.Rev.561(1934-1935).
[3]W.W.Fisher III,M.J.Horwitz,T.A.Reed(editors),American Legal Realism,New York:Oxford University Press,1993,pp.166-167.
[4]G.Gilmore,Legal Realism:Its Cause and Cure,70 Yale L.J.1047(1960-1961).
[1]Sec G.Aichele,Legal realism and twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the changing consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990,p.56.
[2]K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1255(1930-1931).
[3]G.Gilmore,Legal Realism:Its Cause and Cure,70 Yale L.J.1045(1960-1961).
[4]R.Stevens,Law School:Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s,Chapel Hill and London:The University of North Carolina Press,1983,p.156.
[1]See G.Aichele,Legal realism and twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the changing consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990,p.76.
[2]Ibid,p.77.
[3]M.Martin,Legal Realism:American and Scandinavian,New York:Peter Lang Publishing,Inc.,1997,pp.70,76.
[4]See W.W.Fisher III,M.J.Horwitz,T.A.Reed(editors),American Legal Realism,New York:1993,p.164.此外,辛格(Singer)认为Frank只是法律现实主义运动的边缘角色,他用心理学解释司法判决和对弗洛伊德主义的推崇没有得到其他现实主义者采纳;法律现实主义者并不认为法院判决只是由法官的心理特性决定,也并不因为法律规则的不确定性就认为所有归纳全无意义。See,J.W.Singer,Legal Realism Now,76 Cal.L.Rev.470(1988);卡尔曼(Kalman)认为,法律现实主义者本质上并不反对法律规则和概念,他们相信规则和概念在预测司法判决中有用,但他们发现其他因素在理解司法过程中同样发挥作用。See L.Kalman,Legal realism at Yale,1927-1960,Chapel Hill and London:The University of North Carolina Press,1986,p.6.
[5]M.White,Social Thought in America:the Revolt against Formalism,Boston:Beacon Press,1957,pp.61-62.
[6]K.Llewellyn,On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence,40 Colum.L.Rev.593,599(1940).
[7]K.Llewellyn,The Bramble Bush,Oceana Publications,Inc.,1960,p.xi.
[1]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,p.30,note52a.
[2]See J.Frank,Law and the Modern Mind,New York:Brentano's Publishers,1930,p.252.
[3]J.Singer,Legal Realism Now,76 Cal.L.Rev.474-475(1988).
[4]H.Jones,Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism,61 Coum.L.Rev.803(1961).
[5]See G Aichele,Legal realism and twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the changing consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990,pp.97-101.
[6]W.Twining,Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement,Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1973,p.382.
[1]C.Langdell,A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts,Boston:Little,Brown,and Company,1871,p.vi,Preface.
[2]See The American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,St Paul:American Law Institute Publishers,1934,p.ix.
[3]L.Kalman,Legal realism at Yale,1927-1960,Chapel Hill and London:The University of North Carolina Press,1986,
[4]See The American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,St Paul:American Law Institute Publishers,1934,p.ix.
[1]Ibid,pp.x-xiii.
[2]See American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,§121,§135,§137,§142,§149,(1934).
[3]See American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,§155,§165,(1934).
[4]Ibid,§208,§211,§215,§245,§216,§249,§255,§257,§306(1934).
[5]See American Law Institute,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws,§283结婚;§285离婚:§287子女是否婚生,这一部分增加了适用子女住所地法;§289收养,虽然此处规定适用法院地法,但根据第78条,享有管辖权的法院为养父母或养子女的住所地法院,实际适用的法律与《重述(一)》相同:§296公司成立;§301公司的权利和责任;§223土地转让;§231土地转让人的责任;§255动产转让人的能力;§236土地的无遗嘱继承;§239有关土地继承的遗嘱有效性和效果;§260动产无遗嘱继承;§263有关动产继承的遗嘱有效性和效果,(1969).
[6]Smith v.Condry,42U.S.28.11 L.Ed.350843).
[1]See Morse,Torts in Private International Law,North-Holland Publishing Company,1978,pp.11-13.
[2]Slater v.Mexican National R.R.,194 U.S.120,126(1904).
[3]《重述(一)》第9章“不法行为”并非只是简单规定侵权适用侵权行为最后结果发生地法,它涵盖了“侵权(Torts§§377-383)”、“死亡案件的诉讼(Actions for Death§§391-397)”、“工人赔偿(Workman's Compensation §§398-403)”、“海事侵权(Maritime Torts §§404-411)”、“赔偿金(Damages §§412-424)”和“犯罪(Crime §§425-428)”六个小节。在这一章中,基本原理是一致的,即行为适用行为地的法律和保护既得权,但并非所有的条文都是如此。在“工人赔偿”一节中,基本原则是各州的工人赔偿行政裁判所(administrative tribunal)只适用本州的工人赔偿法。See American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,St.Paul:American Law Institute Publishers,1934,pp.485-486.这一原则基本上为《第二次重述》所吸收。Cf.American Law Institute,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws,Chapter 7,Topic 3“Workman's Compensation”,“Introductory Note”,(1969)。在“海事侵权”部分有两个侵权行为地法的例外,一是在公海上发生的船上的侵权行为以及在公海上发生的船舶碰撞且船舶属于共同的船旗国时,适用船舶的船旗国法律(§406,§410a);二是在公海上发生的船舶碰撞且船舶不属于同一船旗国时,以及海事赔偿责任限制适用的是法院地法(§410b,§411)。See American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,§§377-428,(1934).
[1]See American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,§§332-347,§358(1934).
[2]J.Beale,2 ATreatise on the Conflict of Laws 1079-1085,§332.2,New York:Baker,Voorhis & Co.,1935.
[3]Ibid,§332.3,pp.1086-1089.
[1]Ibid,§332.4,pp.1090-1092.
[2]Ibid,§332.5,§332.7,§332.57,pp.1095-1174.
[3]Ibid,§332.57,p.1174.
[4]J.Beale,3 A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 1925-1947,§§51-61,New York:Baker,Voorhis ＆ Co.,1935.
[1]Ibid,§68,pp.1960-1961.
[2]Ibid,§71,pp.1964-1965.
[3]Ibid,§73,p.1967.
[1]J.Beale,3 A Selection of Cases on the Conflict of Laws 501,Summary of the Conflict of Laws,§§1-5,Cambridge:The Harvard Law Review-Publishing Association,(1902).
[2]J.Beale,Dicey's "Conflict of Law",10 Harv.L.Rev.168(1896-1897).
[3]J.Beale,1 A Selection of Cases on the Conflict of Laws v,preface,Cambridge:The Harvard Law Review Publishing Association,(1900).
[4]J.Beale,2 A Selection of Cases on the Conflict of Laws 3,Cambridge:The Harvard Law Review Publishing Association,(1901).
[5]See J.Beale,3 ATreatise on the Conflict of Laws 1904,§34,New York:Baker,Voorhis & Co.,1935.
[6]See H.Yntema,The Historic Bases of Private international Law,2 Am.J.Comp.L.308,Note29(1953).文中提到戴西通过其好友霍兰德(Holland)的著作《法理学》吸收了胡伯理论中的既得权成分。
[7]F.C.von Savigny(translated by W.Guthrie),ATreatise on the Conflict of Laws,2nd Edition,South Hackensack,N.J.:Rothman Reprints,Inc.,1972,p.147.
[8]W.Samuels,Joseph Henry Beale's Lectures on Jurisprudence,1909,29 U.Miami L.Rev.261-280(1974-1975).
[1]M.Cohen,A Critical Sketch of Legal Philosophy,in Law:A Century of Progress,1835-1935,New York:New York University Press,1937,pp.290-291.
[2]J.Beaie,The Necessity for a Study of Legal System,14 Ass'n.of Am.L.Schools,Proceedings 32(1914).
[3]C.Langdell,A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts,Boston:Little,Brown,and Company,1871,pp.vi-vii,Preface.
[4]J.Beale,The Necessity for a Study of Legal System,14 Ass'n.of Am.L.Schools,Proceedings 32(1914).
[1]H.Yntema,The Historic Bases of Private International Law,2 Am.J.Comp.L.313(1953).
[2]J.Beale,The Necessity for a Study of Legal System,14 Ass'n.of Am.L.Schools,Proceedings 38(1914).
[3]J.Beale,1 ATreatise on the Conflict of Laws 24-25,§3.4.New York:Baker,Voorhis&Co.,1935.
[4]Ibid,§4.10,p.43.
[1]Ibid,§5.2,p.52.
[2]Ibid,§1.12,p.16.
[3]Ibid,§5.1,p.51,§5.3,,p.52.
[4]J.Beale,2 A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 1078,§332.1.New York:Baker,Voorhis & Co.,1935.
[1]Ibid.§332.9.,pp.1105-1109.
[2]Ibid,§332.1.,p.1077.
[1]F.Sloovere,On Looking into Mr.Beale's Conflict of Laws,13 N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev.342-344(1935-1936).
[2]比尔第一次完整地阐述既得权理论是在1902年。See J.Beale,3 A Selection of Cases on the Conflict of Laws 501,Summary of the Conflict of Laws,§§1-5,Cambridge:The Harvard Law Review Publishing Association,(1902).
[3]L.Kalman,Legal realism at Yale,1927-1960,Chapel Hill and London:The University of North Carolina Press,1986,p.45.
[4]在1935年出版的《冲突法专论》序言中他提到“一支流行但短命的法哲学学派”批评他的法律原则是“概念式和法条主义的”。See J.Beale,1 A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws xiii.Apologia,New York:Baker,Voorhis & Co.,1935.
[5]S.Symeonides(ed.),Private International Law at the End of 20~(th)Century:Progress or Regress? Kluwer Law International,2000,p.22.
[6]A.Harding,Joseph Henry Beale:Pioneer,2 M.L.Rev.131(1937).
[1]J.Beale.1 ATreatise on the Conflict of Laws 56,§7.3,New York:Baker,Voorhis & Co.,1935.
[2]《重述(一)》第八条“关于土地所有权或离婚问题的规则”:(1)土地所有权的所有问题适用土地所在地法,包括该国的冲突法规则;(2)关于离婚判决有效性的所有问题适用当事人住所地的法律,包括该国的冲突法规则。See American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,§8,(1934).
[3]J.Beale,1 A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 39,§4.7,New York:Baker,Voorhis & Co.,1935,
[4]Ibid,p.49,§4.13.
[5]W,Samuels,Joseph Henry Beale's Lectures on Jurisprudence,1909,29 U.Miami L.Rev.266,270(1974-1975).
[1]Ibid,pp.50-51,§4.13(Citation omitted).
[1]Ibid,preface iv,apologia,p.xiii.
[2]A.Harding,Joseph Henry Beale:Pioneer,2 M.L.Rev.134(1937).
[3]Ibid,p.134.
[4]F.Sloovere,On Looking into Mr.Beale's Conflict of Laws,13 N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev.345(1935-1936).
[1]A.Harding,Joseph Henry Beale:Pioneer,2 M.L.Rev.160(1937)
[1]凯格尔是较早关注美国冲突法理论演变的欧洲学者,并使用了冲突法“革命”一词。但是,他本人最终的结论并不认为冲突法领域存在革命,而是认定传统的制度依然占据主流,批判者不过是处在边缘的少数派。See,G.Kegel,The Crisis of Conflict of Laws.112 Recueil des Cours 95,263(1964).
[2]塞缪尼德斯认为冲突法革命开始于20世纪60年代早期。See,S.Symeonides(ed.),Private International Law at the End of 20~(th)Century:Progress or Regress?Kluwer Law Int'l,2000,p.22.布里梅耶认为美国冲突法革命有两次,第一次发生于20世纪30和40年代,以凯弗斯(D.Cavers)和库克(W Cook)对比尔和《第一次重述》中的属地理论的批判为标志;第二次开始于50年代后期和60年代,以柯里(B.Currie)提出“支配兴趣分析(governmental interest analysis)说”为标志。See,L.Brilmayer,The Role of Substantive and Choice of Law Policies in the Formation and Application of Choice of Law Rules,1995,pp.19-20.欧洲的学者对此也认识不一,舍尔(K.Siehr)认为是富德法官在贝柯克案中的推理“搅起了美国冲突法革命”。See,K.Siehr,Revolution and Evolution in Conflicts Law,60 La.L.Rev.1353(1999-2000).维塔(E.Vitta)则认为冲突法革命“从50年代开始主导美国实践”。See,E.Vitta,The Impact in Europe of the American“Conflicts Revolution”,30Am.J.Comp.L.1(1982).韩德培主编的教材认为,“自20世纪60年代以来,美国兴起了一场‘冲突法革命',”但该书随后的内容却从介绍库克20年代的“本地法说”和凯弗斯30年代的“规则和结果选择说”开始。参见韩德培主编:《国际私泫》,高等教育出版社和北京大学出版社2000年版,第48-49页。
[3]库克的代表作“冲突法的逻辑和法律基础”发表在1924年的《耶鲁法律评论》上,安特马的批判主张主要体现在发表于1927-1928年卷同一杂志上的“角帖书方法和冲突法”一文中,劳伦森的批判观点主要见于1923-1924年卷同一杂志上的“属地性、公共政策和冲突法”一文中。
[4]凯弗斯在1943年关于库克论文集的书评中指出,虽然库克对比尔的理论批判不遗余力,但其效果渺渺。See,D.Cavers,Review of Walter Wheeler Cook.The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,in The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,pp.40-41.
[1]K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1222(1930-1931).在这篇法律现实主义代表作的附录中,卢埃林罗列了20位他所认可的法律现实主义者及其代表作,库克、劳伦森和安特马的名字分别出现在第1257、1258和1259页。
[2]L.Kakman,Legal Realism at Yale,1927-1960,Chapel Hill and London:the University of North Carolina Press,1986,p.113.
[3]D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.4.
[1]C.Clark,H.Carey,Walter Wheeler Cook 38 Ill.L.Rev.342-343,346(1943-1944).
[2]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,p.x.
[3]Ibid,p.ix.
[4]库克在晚年的“我的法律哲学”一文简要总结了自己的法律观,并称自己的思想是“科学经验主义”。See,Walter Wheeler Cook,in My Philosophy of Law,Boston:Boston Law Book Co.,1941,p.56.下文对其法理思想介绍部分没有注明出处的均来自该文。
[1]安特马将库克对冲突法的贡献总结为两方面:一是“本地法原理”;二是“法律术语和规则的含义相对于其内容和目的可变性原理”。See,H.Yntema,Walter Wheeler Cook,38 Ill.L.Rev.351(1943-1944).
[2]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,pp.3-5,29.
[3]Ibid,pp.188,159.
[1]Walter Wheeler Cook,in My Philosophy of Law,Boston:Boston Law Book Co.,1941,pp.60-61.
[2]W.Cook,An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,37 Ill.L.Rev.420(1942-1943).
[3]Ibid.
[4]Ibid,pp.419-422.
[1]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,pp.71-72,78.
[2]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,33 Yale L.J.469-470(1923-1924).W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,pp.20-21(斜体为原文所加——笔者注).
[1]Guinness v Miller,291 Fed.790,(S.D.N.Y 1923).
[2]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,p.32(斜体为原文所加——笔者注).
[3]Ibid,p.33.
[1]Ibid,pp.60,71-72,78.
[2]《第一次冲突法重述》第7条“法院适用的法律”:“除非第8条规定的情况,当争议问题涉及的法律所属的两个国家冲突法规定存在不同时,应当适用法院地的冲突法规则;(a)作为决定法律选择的前提,需要决定法律概念的性质和特点,在所有情况下由法院根据自己的法律决定这些问题;(b)在作出支配特定案情的法律选择时,如果适用另一国家的法律,因为判决案件唯一采用的冲突法是法院地的冲突法,所以适用的外国法就是适用于手头案情的法律,而不是外国的冲突法。”American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,§7,(1934).
[3]《第一次冲突法重述》第378条“支配原告损害的法律”:“侵权地的法律决定一个人是否遭受了法律上的伤害。”按照库克的观点,该条应该改为:“侵权地的国内规则决定一个人是否遭受了法律上的伤害。”American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,§378,(1934).本段引用的库克的论述分别见于其著作的第319页、331页、335页和342页。
[1]第66条“从一州发向另一州的通讯”:“当通讯从一州发向另一州时,每个州都对通讯享有管辖权。”“评论”(c):“法律选择问题的产生。如果一项交易是以从一州发向另一州的通讯方式达成,一个州的法律对这种信息赋予债务效力,但另一州的法律则不然,在这种情况下,法院处在第三州,如果在那里提出这个问题,法院可以挑选一州或另一州的法律支配交易,并相应地赋予或不赋予信息以债务效力。因此,同样,如果信息发出或受到的州对此赋予了不同的债务,第三国的法院可以选择第一个州或第二个州的法律决定赋予的债务内容。”American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,§66,Commentc.(1934).
[2]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,p.366.
[3]W.Cook,An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,37 Ill.L.Rev.420(1942-1943).
[4]Ibid,p.422.
[5]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,pp.95,105,136.
[1]Ibid,pp.215,188,239,441,454.
[2]W.Cook,An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,37 Ill.L.Rev.418-419(1942-1943).
[3]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,p.47.
[4]Ibid,p.ix,Preface.
[1]Ibid,pp.345-346.
[2]Ibid,pp.389,398-399,416-417.
[3]D.Cavers,The Two "Local Law" Theories,in The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,pp.46-47.
[1]R.Leflar,Choice-influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.Lawgev.268(1966).
[2]E.Sykes and M.Plyles,Australian Private International Law,The Law Book Company Limited,2~(nd)Edition,1987,p10.
[3]在安特马的纪念文集后面附有其生平和学术成果清单。See,K.Nadelmann,A.von Mehren,J.Hazard(ed.),XX~(th)Century Comparative and Conflicts Law,Legal Essays in Honor of Hessele Yntema,A.W.Sythoff-Leyden,(1961),pp.533-544.
[4]安特马有较大影响的冲突法论文包括:The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws,37 Yale L.J.468(1927-1928);The Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,36 Colum.L.Rev.183(1936):“Autonomy”in choice of law,1 Am.J.Comp.L.341(1952);The Historic Bases of Private International Law,2 Am.J.Comp.L.297(1953);Contract and Conflict of Laws:“Autonomy”in Choice of Law in the United States,1 N.Y.L.F.46(1955)。
[1]H.Yntema,The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws,37 Yale L.J.477,480-481(1927-1928).
[2]Ibid.pp.474-475.
[1]Ibid,p.477.
[2]H.Yntema,The Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,36 Colum.L.Rev.191,192,194(1936).
[3]Ibid,p.209.
[4]Ibid,p.222.
[5]Ibid,p.223.
[1]H.Yntema,Contract and Conflict of Laws:"Autonomy" in Choice of Law in the United States,1 N.Y.L.F.55-57(1955).
[2]Ibid,p.47.
[3]Ibid,pp.65-66.
[1]H.Yntema,The Historic Bases of Private International Law,2 Am.J.Comp.L.315-317(1953)
[2]A.Corbin,Ernest Gustav Lorenzen,60 Yale L.J.579(1951).
[3]E.Lorenzen,Territoriality,Public Policy,and the Conflict of Laws,33 Yale L.J.738-743(1923-1924).
[4]E.Lorenzen,R.Heilman,The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws,83 U.Pa.L.Rev.556(1934-1935)
[5]Ibid,p.560.
[6]Ibid,p.556 infra.
[1]E.Lorenzen,Territoriality,Public Policy,and the Conflict of Laws,33 Yale L.J.748(1923-1924)
[2]E.Lorenzen,Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws(II),30 Yale L.J.658,673(1920-1921).
[3]适用于合同效果的规则可以总结如下:(1)合同效果适用当事人选择的任何国家的法律;(2)如果没有当事人明示的意图,则合同效果适用指定的履行地的法律;(3)如果没有显示当事人的意图而且没有指定合同履行地,则适用合同签订地的法律;(4)如此适用的法律不仅决定产生于合同的初始权利和义务,而且适用于产生于违约的派生权利;但是,没有付款导致的法定利率适用支付地的法律;(5)履行的模式适用履行地的法律和惯例;(6)如果合同效果依赖于指定价格、重量或方式或履行时间的特定术语的含义时,则指定适用的是履行地的术语,除非情况表明当事人在不同意义上适用这些术语。E.Lorenzen,Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws(III),72 Yale L.J.53(1921-1922).
[4]E.Lorenzen,Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws,in Selected Articles on the Conflict of Laws,New Haven:Yale University Press,1947,pp.364,378.This article first appeared in 47 Law Quarterly Review 483(1931).
[1]H.Yntema,The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws,37 Yale L.J.478,481(1927-1928).
[1]目前国内国际私法学界普遍将Jurisdiction-selecting rule翻译为“管辖权选择规则”。这种翻译虽然并非完全错误,但至少并不能准确表明凯弗斯的思路。分配立法管辖权可以说是比尔既得权说的核心内容,但凯弗斯揭示比尔及其批判者犯了共同的错误,把“法律”选择(choice-of-law)错当成“法域”选择(choose between jurisdictions)。在凯弗斯晚年的论文集中,他非常鲜明地表明了自己1933年论文的主题思想之一:他虽然认同法律现实主义者对《第一次冲突法重述》的批判观点,但发现抛弃比尔规则的法院依然欠缺指引规则。反复审视这一困境,凯弗斯找到了问题的症结:“我开始确信问题的根本是这样一个事实,即《重述》及其批判者呼吁法院解决的是一个错误的问题:在法律选择案件中要求法院在法域(jurisdictions)——援用的法律所属的州(states)或国家(nations)——之间作出选择,这种做法并不考虑相冲突的法律的内容。籍此,一个法律选择(choice-of-law)问题就转换成了国家(州)选择(choice-of-state)问题。”D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.xii.从后文所述凯弗斯1933年论文相关部分,也可以看出这种翻译更为合理。王承志博士注意到了这个问题,认为将“jurisdiction-selection”翻译为“法域选择”“可能更便于理解”。但他没有对此论证,而且在正文中继续使用“管辖权选择”。参见王承志:《美国冲突法重述之晚近发展》,法律出版社2006年版,第27页,注①。
[2]凯弗斯一生冲突法著述少而精,代表作品有:A Critique of the Choice-of-law Problem,47 Harv.L.Rev.173(1933-1934):The Choice-of-law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965.前者提出了“规则和结果选择说”,后者提出“优先选择原则”。在5年后的海牙演讲中,凯弗斯全面阐述了自己的冲突法理念和制度设计。See,Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective,131 Recueil des Cours 75-308(1970).
[3]D.Cavers,Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective,131 Recueil des Cours 80(1970).
[1]D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.4.
[2]D.Cavers,A Critique of the Choice-of-law Problem,47 Harv.L.Rev.178(1933-1934)
[3]Ibid,pp.178-179.
[1]Ibid,pp.181-182.
[2]Ibid,p.186.
[1]Ibid,pp.182-187.
[2]Ibid,pp.157-188.
[3]Ibid,p.191.
[1]Ibid,p.189.
[2]Ibid,pp.192-193.
[3]Ibid,pp.193-194.
[4]凯弗斯认为,“强调社会和经济因素的重要性不可避免地导致细化问题和限制规则的范丽”。如果“演绎方法反对者的观点如果得到全面发展”,人们或许期待对应保险合同有条规则,对应可转让票据有另一条规则,而对应雇佣合同是第三种规则,其他交易还有其它的规则。Ibid.,p.189,note34.
[1]Ibid,pp.197-203.
[1]Ibid,p.176.
[2]D.Cavers,The Choice-of-law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.9,note 22.
[3]Ibid,pp.8-9.
[4]A.von Mehren,K.Nadelmann,D.Trautman,A Greeting to David F.Cavers,41 Law & Contemp.Probs.v(1977).
[5]R.de Nova,Historical and Comparative Introduction to Conflict of Laws,118 Recueil des Cours 597(1966).
[1]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 334(1964)
[2]Ibid,p.599.
[3]D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.4.
[4]A.E.Anton,Private International Law,1967,p.40,cited from E.Scoles,P.Hay,Conflict of Laws,2~(nd)ed.,St Paul:West Publishing Co,1992,p.28.
[1]B.Currie,Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,1959 Duke L.J.177(1959);also in B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.183.
[2]柯里(1912-1965)的冲突法论文绝大部分编撰在其冲突法论文集中,该论文集共收录了十四篇论文,其中前13篇发表于1958至1961年间,最后一篇发表在1963年。See,B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963.除了这部论文集之外,柯里的其他论文还有Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws,22 U.Chi.L.Rev.405(1955).但该论文的观点被他自己1960年发表在同一杂志上的论文彻底推翻,1960年的论文被录入其论文集中。还有两篇论文发表在1963年,分别是The Disinterested Third State,28 Law & Contemp.Probs.754(1963);Comments on Babcock v.Jackson,A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,63 Colum.L.Rev.1233(1963).柯里发表的最后一篇冲突法论文是1964年的Full Faith and Credit,Chiefly to Judgments:A Role for Congress,1964 Sup.Ct.Rev.89(1964).
[1]将governmental interest analysis翻译成“政府利益分析”是目前国内学界难以准确理解柯里学说的主要原因之一。柯里在其文中对州及其立法机关的描述多处采用了拟人化手法,如“将案件的列表摆在马萨诸塞州立法机关的化身面前,…几乎可以肯定会面临不耐烦和回绝(place this array before our personification of the Massachusetts General Assembly,…almost certainly meet with impatience and rebuif)”、“只对短期‘所获'感兴趣(interested only in short-run‘gains')”、 “希望(desire)适用自己的法律”、“无情地(ruthless)”、 “理性利他主义(rational altruism)”、“自我中心(egocentricity)”、“短视而自私(short-sighted,selfish)”上述比喻分别见于B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,pp.83-84,89,108,185,186,593,616.柯里认为,如果审理案件的法官认为一个州与案件存在密切的联系,将该州的法律适用于案件可合理地实现其立法政策,便认定该州具有“支配兴趣”。Ibid,p.228.Government在英文中不仅具有“政府”的意思,还有“管理或支配行为(act of governing)”的含义。“支配兴趣”在一些地方可被替换为“管理兴趣”或“法律适用的兴趣”。美国学者普遍正确把握了柯里的这一观点,如反对柯里学说的荣格(Junger)教授认为柯里相信,“通过将法律适用于跨州和纯州内交易中,各州具有实现法律背后的目的的兴趣(interest)——类似于人的愿望(desire)。”F.Junger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,p.98.另一位批评“支配兴趣分析”的布里梅耶教授也在一篇论文中谈到:“…因为在理论上辨明‘兴趣(interests)'决定了立法者是否希望适用其法律(wish to have its law applied),‘兴趣'是下文批判性探讨中的核心概念。”L.Brilmayer,Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent,78 Mich.L.Rev.394(1979-1980).支持柯里学说的塞德勒(Sedler)将“支配兴趣”理解为:“当州法体现了一种强烈的政策和通过把法律适用到特定案件中将促进这种政策时,州法确实‘希望适用(wish to be applied)'到私人之间的诉讼中。”R.Sedler,Professor Juenger's Challenge to the Interest Analysis Approach to Choice-of-law:An Appreciation and a Response,23 U.C.Davis L.Rev.878(1989-1990).由于“支配兴趣”意味着一个州对和自己利益攸关的案件具有适用自己的法律以实现立法目的的兴趣,因此“兴趣”一词有时可以替换为“利益”。李浩培先生对“支配兴趣”的理解接近了柯里的原意,他将此表述为:“柯氏认为,任何国家的实体法规则都是根据一定的政策制定的。国家正如个人有其愿望一样,‘关心'于将其实体法规则在适当的情形下适用于涉外案件,以实施其实体法规则所采取的政策。当国家有这样的‘关心'时,它对于其法律规则的适用于本案就具有‘利益'。这种国家的利益,柯氏称为‘政府的利益'。”李浩培:《李浩培文选》,法律出版社2000年版,第402-403页。
[2]Editor's Note," 34 Mercer L.Rev.469(1983),cited from F.Juenger,Conflict of Laws:A Critique of Interest Analysis,32 Am.J.Comp.L.1(1984).
[3]D.Cavers,A Correspondence with Brainerd Currie,1957-1958,34 Mercer L.Rev.471(1982-1983).
[4]F.Junger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,p.103.
[5]L.Brilmayer,Conflict of laws,foundations and future directions,Little,Brown and Company,1991,p.60.
[6]反对柯里学说的学者主要有Hill、Juenger、Twerski、Evrigenis、Kegel、Bodenheimer、Borchers、Brilmayer、Hay、Kozyris、Rosenberg、Singer、Trautman、Tushnet、von Mehren等,赞同柯里学术的主要有Kay、Posnak、Sedler、Allo、Baade、Kramer、Weinberg、Weintraub等。See,E.Stoles,P.Hay,P.Borchers,S.Symeonides,Conflict of Laws,4~(th)ed.,Thomson,2004,pp.34-35,nn.47-48.
[1]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.585.
[2]B.Currie,Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws,22 U.Chi.L.Rev.405(1955).
[3]Klaxon Co.v.Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,313 U.S.487,61 S.Ct.1020,85 L.Ed.1477(1941).该案将Erie案中的原理引入冲突法,要求联邦法院在涉及多州居民的诉讼中适用所在州的冲突法。
[4]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.438.
[5]Ibid,p.586.H.Kay,A Defence of Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis,215 Recueil des Cours 19-21(1989).
[6]柯里在文中区分州(state)和国家(country/nation),绝大部分地方他只是分析涉及州际法律冲突的判例,个别地方分析国际法律冲突的判例时,他使用“国家”一词。如在分析涉及西班牙法律的“罗莫洛(Romero)案”时,他说“当法官知道其本国的法律(政策和兴趣)和另一国的发生冲突时,他的责任看起来十分清楚。”此处使用的即为“country”。需要指出的是,柯里解决国际法律冲突和州际法律冲突采用同样的分析方法。B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.371.
[7]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.64.
[1]“法庭之友(amicus curiae)”是美国诉讼法中的一种制度,一个组织或个人虽然不是案件当事人,但他同案件具有利害关系,他可以自己要求或应法院要求在法庭上表达意见。See B.Garner(editor in chief),Black's Law Dictionary(Abridged 8~(th)Edit.),Thomson,2005,p.71.
[2]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press.1963,pp.228,621,624.
[3]Ibid,p.52.
[4]Ibid,pp.138,161.
[1]Ibid,p.101.
[2]Ibid,p.608.
[3]Ibid,p.776.
[4]Ibid,p.53.
[5]Ibid,p.170.
[6]Ibid,p.180.
[1]Ibid,pp.180-181,183.
[2]柯里自己的表述为“当我们学会了问正确的问题我们才更可能获得正确的答案。”Ibid,p.617.这里他借用了弗鲁恩
[3]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws Durham:Duke University Press,1963,pp.178,617.
[4]Ibid,pp.64,756.
[5]Ibid,p.443.
[6]在回答马萨诸塞州保护妇女的立法及于哪些人时,柯里的回答是:“什么样的已婚妇女?嘿,当然是那些其福利受到马萨诸塞州关注的妇女——也就是马州的已婚妇女。”同样,“纽约州的政策不是为保护所有在纽约买票或登机的人。它是为保护纽约人。”Ibid,pp.85,705.
[7]该案的案情大致如下:住所在马萨诸塞州的普拉特夫人为促成其丈夫与米利肯的合伙关系,对丈夫的信用出具了一份担保书。她将担保书交给丈夫,她丈夫在缅因州将担保书交给米利肯。依赖该担保书并应普拉特先生的要求,米利肯向其发送了货物,但普拉特先生最后没有偿还货款。为此,米利肯向马州的法院起诉,要求普拉特夫人承担担 保责任。根据缅因州法律,已婚妇女有缔约能力,合同有效;而马州法律规定相反,合同无效。但在起诉前不久,马州已废除了已婚妇女无缔约能力的规定。马州最高法院最后依据合同缔结地(缅因州)法认定合同有效,推翻原审判决,判决米利肯胜诉。Milliken v.Pratt,125 Mass.374(1878),cited from ibid,p.78.
[1]柯里这篇论文为Married Women's Contracts:A Study in Conflict-of-laws Method,最初发表在25 U.Chil L.Rev.227(1961).该文被录入柯里的论文集第77-127页。对该案分析后出现的真假冲突的结论见于该书第107页。柯里自己并没有提出“真实冲突”或“虚假冲突”的概念,他分别称为真正的问题(real problems)和没有真实冲突的问题(noreal conflicts problem)。
[2]Ibid.p.108.B.Currie,The Disinterested Third State,28 Law & Contemp.Probs.756(1963).
[3]B.Currie.Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.82.
[4]Ibid,pp.117,123,125,278.
[1]Ibid,pp.47,119.
[2]Ibid,pp.271,616.
[3]B.Currie,The Disinterested Third State,28 Law & Contemp.Probs.757(1963).
[4]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,pp.153-156.
[1]B.Currie,The Disinterested Third State.28 Law & Contemp.Probs.767,768,778-780(1963).
[2]Ibid,pp.765,773.
[3]这是柯里为里斯(W.Reese)和罗森伯格(M.Rosenberg)所编判例法教材所做的综述,转引自H.Kay,A Defense of
Carrie's Governmental Interest Analysis,215 Recueil des Cours 76-77(1989).在此之前,柯里还曾三次综述过自己的思想。前两次的综述基本一致,第三次综述出现较大变化,增加了有关“表面冲突”和“无兴趣第三州”的内容,第四次增加了通过比较兴趣大小解决“无兴趣案件”的内容。比较他最早所作的一次综述:(1)通常,即使在涉外案件中,法院应该理所当然地将法院地法作为裁决规则的来源。(2)当情况表明,外州的法律而不是法院地的法律应当提供裁决规则,法院应当首先决定法院地法表明的管理政策(govornmental policy)——或许说社会、经济或行政政策有所帮助。然后法院应当查明,法院地州和在审案件的关系——即和当事人、交易、争议事项,诉讼的关系——是否如此密切以致将案件置于该州管理关注的范围,并为声明该州具有一种将其政策适用于这种情况的兴趣提供了合理基础。(3)如果有必要,法院应当同样决定提供的外州法表明的政策,以及外州是否对将其政策适用于在审案件具有一种合理的兴趣。(4)如果法院发现法院地州对适用自己的法律和政策没有兴趣,但外州具有这样一种兴趣,它就应当适用外州法。(5)如果法院发现法院地州在适用自己的法律和政策上具有兴趣,它就应当适用法院地法,即使外州同样具有这种兴趣;而且,如果外州没有这种兴趣,它就更应当适用法院地法。B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,pp.188-189.
[1]特雷纳是加利福尼亚州的法官,是柯里方法的坚定支持者,但他不赞同柯里反对衡量兴趣大小的立场,认为不仅联邦最高法院在许多案件中直接衡量相关州的政策和兴趣的大小,而且.“州法院每天在普通法和成文法解释的案件中衡量相冲突的兴趣”。 See,M.Traynor,Conflict of Laws:Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum.49 Cal.L.Rev.845(1961).
[2]See G.Aichele,Legal Realism and Twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the Changing Consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990,p.76.
[3]W.Twining,Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement,Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1973,p.382.
[4]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.183.
[1]D.Cavers,A Correspondence with Brainerd Currie,1957-1958,34 Mercer L.Rev.489(1982-1983).
[2]比如,在1958年发表的第一篇运用“支配兴趣分析说”的论文中,他指出库克和凯弗斯已经在当代两部“最具煽动性的作品”中对米利肯(Milliken v.Pratt)案作了充分探讨;库克、凯弗斯和劳伦森等人提出的解决方案代表了解决法律冲突的“最佳批判性尝试的成果”。他在1961年的论文中表示:“就像其他人那样,我在库克、凯弗斯以及先前获得普遍承认的那些人的著述中找到了灵感。”See,B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,pp.77,104,585-586.
[3]凯弗斯承认实践证明他的1933年论文在思想表述上“非常不成功(singularly unsuccessful)”。因为它造成的广泛印象是,它所关心的个案正义要求“法律选择过程是直觉判断和个案分析(intuitive and atomized)。”D.Cavers,The Conditional Seller's Remedies and the Choice-of-Law Process-Some Notes on Shanahan,35N.Y.U.L.Rev.1139(1960),note34.
[4]See.B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,pp.105,586,133.
[1]Ibid,pp.596-597,585,601,592,608.
[2]Ibid,pp.271,600.
[3]Ibid,pp.613-614.
[4]Alaska Packers Ass'n v.Industrial Accident Commission of California,294 U.S.537(1935).该案的主要案情如下:1932年年初,墨西哥人帕尔玛(Palma)和在加利福尼亚州(以下简称加州)营业的上诉人阿拉斯加包装工人委员会在加利福尼亚州签订了一份书面雇佣合同。帕尔玛同意在大马哈鱼罐头生产季节到阿拉斯加州(以下简称阿州)为上诉人工作,上诉人将他送到阿州,工作完成后将他送回加州,并在加州支付约定工资。合同约定双方选择适用《阿州工人赔偿法》。但《加州工人赔偿法》强制性规定加州赔偿委员会对所有受害人为加州居民并且签订于加州的合同享有管辖权。后来,加州最高法院在判例法中将这一法律扩展适用于非加州居民。同年8月,帕尔玛在工作中受伤,在返回加州后向加州赔偿委员会提出赔偿请求,并在后来获得了赔偿。上诉人提请美国最高法院审查加州赔偿法,主张该法违背了“正当程序”宪法条款,加州最高法院的判决违背了“充分信任与诚信”宪法条款。
[1]Pacific Employers Ins.Co.v.Industrial Accident commission of California,306 U.S.493,59 S.Ct.629(1939).
[2]P.Freund,Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws.59 Harv.L.Rev.1225(1945-1946).
[3]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.88.
[4]比较荣格总结的柯里理论的三个特征:采用分割方法、属人关系比属地关系更重要和存有疑问时优先考虑法院地法。See,F.Junger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,p.102.
[5]塞缪尼德斯对单边方法总结如下:“这种方法直接关注潜在冲突的国家法的内容,并试图根据他们隐含的法律目的(实际上的或推导出的)推测其意欲的范围来确定适用何地法律。”S.Symeionides(ed.),Private Internatioal Law at the end of the 20~(th)Century:Progress or Regress? Kluwer Law Int'l,1999,pp.11,13.与中世纪的“法则区别说”不同的是,柯里没有采用法律分类的方法,而是采用了具有鲜明普通法特色的个案分析方法。
[6]为了避免违反《美国宪法》中的“平等保护条款”,柯里主张各州可将特权与豁免权给予其他采取同样保护措施州的居民,但可拒绝保护未采取这类保护措施州的居民。See,B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.113.
[1]F.Junger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,p.27.
[2]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.627.
[3]凯弗斯充分理解了柯里的努力方向,他在冲突法革命后期回顾与柯里之间的通信时说:“柯里努力将理性的精确与对现实的关切相结合,并阻止司法擅断作为废弃规则的替代品,这种努力从这些信件中鲜明地浮现出来。”D.Cavers.A Correspondence with Brainerd Currie,1957-1958,34 Mercer L.Rev.499(1982-1983).
[4]D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p..
[5]See,B.Currie,The Disinterested Third State,28 Law & Contemp.Probs.754(1963).
[1]比如柯里认为有关人身伤害赔偿的法律可能表达了多方面的政策:“对受害人或其扶养人赔偿、保护当地债权人、阻止不法行为,等等。”B.Cuttle,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.371.
[2]F.Juengcr,Conflict of Laws:A Critique of Interest Analysis 32 Am.J.Comp.L.5(1984).
[3]在1935年Alaska Packers案中,法官比较了两州兴趣大小,但同时采用了Clapper案中提出的“公共政策损害”标准。在1939年Pacific Employers Insurance Co.案中,法官虽然审查了两州的兴趣,但只是主张“充分信任与诚信条款”并未要求一个州为了执行它州的法律而忽略其自己的政策。在1947年Cardillo案中,法官看似已经放弃了衡量兴趣大小的做法,认为只要雇佣合同和一个州存在“某种实质性联系”,适用这个州的法律就符合宪法要求。E.Scoles,P.Hay,P.Borchers,S.Symeonides,Conflict of Laws,4~(th)ed.,Thomson,2004,pp.150,162.
[4]F.Juenger,Conflict of Laws:A Critique of Interest Analysis,32 Am.J.Comp.L.33-42(1984).
[5]Lea Brilmayer,Conflict of laws,foundations and future directions,Little,Brown and Company,1991,pp.60,74-75,89.
[1]E.Scoles,P.Hay,P.Borchers,S.Symeonides,Conflict of Laws,4~(th)ed.,Thomson,2004,p.34.
[2]F.Juenger,Conflict of Laws:A Critique of Interest Analysis,32 Am.J.Comp.L.45(1984).
[3]E.Scoles,P.Hay,P.Borchers,S.Symeonides,Conflict of Laws,4~(th)ed.,Thomson,2004,pp.29,38.
[4]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.585.
[1]C.Wachter,On the Collision of Private Laws of Different States,13 Am.J.Comp.L.423(translated by K.Nadelmann1964).
[2]他在哥伦比亚大学获得法学博士(S.J.D.)学位时已经46岁。See,A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,Biographical Note,124 Recueil des Cours 169(1968).
[3]他在哥伦比亚大学获得法学硕士和博士学位。Ibid.在法律现实主义运动中,哥伦比亚大学法学院始终是法律现实主义者的乐土。卢埃林从1924年在哥大任职,一直到1951年才辞职去芝加哥大学法学院。See,W.Twining,Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement,London:Willmer Brothers Ltd.,1973,pp.41-56,104-112
[4]艾伦茨威格毫不掩饰对维希特的推崇和自己的思想同维希特理论的类似性。他称维希特为“一位杰出的法院地法的倡导者”,断定“维希特会同意本书中的理论”。A.Ehrenzweig,The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,58 Mich.L.Rev.659(1959-1960);A.Ehrenzweig,Private International Law:A Comparative Treatise on American International Conflicts Law,Including the law of Admiralty,General Part,Leyden:Sijthoff,1967,p.104.马卡罗夫(Makarov)甚至称艾伦茨威格为维希特的复活。F.Juenger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1992,p.34,note223.
[1]艾伦茨威格一生的主要研究领域为冲突法,但他同时在侵权和保险等实体法领域以及法理学和比较法领域也颇有成就。他在冲突法领域的代表性著述有:A.Ehrenzweig,The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,58 Mich.L.Rev.637(1959-1960);A.Ehrenzweig,Lex Fori in the Conflict of Laws,32 Rocky Mntn.L.Rev.13(1959-1960);A.Ehrenzweig,Choice of Law:Current Doctrine and "True Rules",49 Cal.L.Rev.240(1961);A.Ehrenzweig,A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws,St.Paul:West Publishing Co.,1962;A.Ehrenzweig,A Proper Law in a Proper Forum:A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori Approach",18 Okla.L.Rev.340(1965);A.Ehrenzweig,A Counter-revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers,80 Harv.L.Rev.377(1966-1967);A.Ehrenzweig,Private International Law:A Comparative Treatise on American International Conflicts Law,Including the law of Admiralty,General Part,Leyden:Sijthoff,1967;A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 167(1968);A.Ehrenzweig & E.Jayme,Private International Law:A Comparative Treatise on American International Conflicts Law,Including the law of Admiralty,Special Part,Leyden:Sijthoff,1973;A.Ehrenzweig,Conflicts in a Nutshell,3~(rd)ed.(1974).
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,Choice of Law:Current Doctrine and "True Rules",49 Cal.L.Rev.240(1961).
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,The Lex Fori - Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,58 Mich.L.Rev.639(1959-1960).
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 269-270(1968).
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,Lex Fori in the Conflict of Laws,32 Rocky Mntn.L.Rev.13(1959-1960).
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,Choice of Law:Current Doctrine and "True Rules",49 Cal.L.Rev.249(1961).
[4]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 216(1968).
[1]“真实规则(True Rule)”一词并非其独创,而是他对卢埃林(Llewellyn)“关于阅读和运用更新颖的法理学”一文用语的直接引用。艾伦茨威格大段引用了卢埃林的原话来显示对卢埃林精彩论述的推崇,并借以揭示“真实规则”的含义:“它关注真正的问题;它列明事实;用这种方式表述它有助于你更准确地预见什么将要发生;它帮助法官更清楚该做什么以及为什么。它就是这种情况中的‘真实规则'。”A.Ehrenzweig,Choice of Law:Current Doctrine and“True Rules”,49 Cal.L.Rev.250(1961).卢埃林这段原话出自K.Llewellyn,On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence,40 Colum.L.Rev.608(1940).
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,Choice of Law:Current Doctrine and "True Rules",49 Cal.L.Rev.241(1961).
[3]Klaxon Co.v.Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,313 U.S.487,61 S.Ct.1020,85 L.Ed.1477(1941).该案将Erie案中的原理引入冲突法,要求联邦法院在涉及多州居民的诉讼中适用所在州的冲突法。
[4]A.Ehrenzweig,Private International Law:A Comparative Treatise on American International Conflicts Law,Including the law of Admiralty,General Part,Leyden:Sijthoff,1967,p.89.
[5]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 204(1968)
[1]Ibid,pp.208-209.
[2]Ibid,pp.205-206.
[3]Ibid,pp.210-213.
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,Private International Law:A Comparative Treatise on American International Conflicts Law,Including the law of Admiralty,General Part,Leyden:Sijthoff,1967,pp.25,90.
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,Lex Fori in the Conflict of Laws,32 Rocky Mntn.L.Rev.18(1959-1960).
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,A Proper Law in a Proper Forum:A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori Approach ",18 Okla.L Rev.341-342(1965).
[4]A.Ehrenzweig,Lex Fori in the Conflict of Laws,32 Rocky Mntn.L.Rev.14(1959-1960).
[5]Ibid.
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 182(1968).
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,The Lex Fori - Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,58 Mich.L.Rev.648-649(1959-1960).
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,Beale's Translation of Bartolus,12 Am.J.Comp.L.384(1963).
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,The Lex Fori - Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,58 Mich.L.Rev.650-660(1959-1960).
[2]Ibid,p.644.
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,A Counter-revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers,80 Harv.L.Rev.379(1966-1967).
[4]A.Ehrenzweig,Lex Fori in the Conflict of Laws,32 Rocky Mntn.L.Rev.15(1959-1960).
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 239-249(1968).
[2]比如他在1960年的一篇论文中指出:“将法院地法作为基本原则,同时将传统的冲突规则降到适合于特定案情的例外位置,这种安排不会实质性地改变他们的范围和内容。物之所在地法、行为地法和属人法,而不是法院地法,将被用以更好地实现冲突法正义。但是,法官不必再依赖定性、反致或公共政策来论证他们对当地或外地适当法的偏爱,在每一种新案情下适用外国法必须按照他认为合适的标准加以确定。”A.Ehrenzweig,The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,58 Mich.L.Rev.643(1959-1960).
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 258-259(1968).
[4]A.Ehrenzweig,Choice of Law:Current Doctrine and "True Rules",49 Cal.L.Rev.241(1961).
[5]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 259(1968).
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,Choice of Law:Current Doctrine and "True Rules",49 Cal.L.Rev.245-247(1961)..
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recucil des Cours 252(1968).
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,Private International Law:A Comparative Treatise on American International Conflicts Law,Including the law of Admiralty,General Part,Leyden:Sijthoff,1967,pp.107-109.
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 214-215(1968)(Footnote and cross-references omitted).艾伦茨威格在1960年的“法院地法——冲突法中的基本规则”论文和《国际私法(概论)》(第93页)中也曾对自己的观点作过系统归纳,基本观点大同小异。但他在1960年的归纳中包含了“适当法院”的思想:(1)美国法院事实上在冲突法案件判决中几乎总是优先适用自己的法律,只有这种优先适用违背当事人意志或因为其他原因带来麻烦时才会适用外国法.由于当事人意思自治的例外已经被如此牢固地确立下来,以至于可以将其作为第二个基本原则。(2)将法院地法作为先定命题的例外这种相反做法,是冲突法历史上学术反常的遗产。在美国国内外,这种学术反常的最新形式是国际法学派或普遍主义的思想。当前对这种思想的排斥有助于抛弃这些学术做法和重新将法院地法定为基本原则。(3)有意识地承认这个基本原则将使我们将努力集中在寻求国际和州际 管辖权设计上,这种设计会根据法院与当事人或事实的实质性联系确保法院地法得到适用。(4)一旦查明适当的法院成为冲突法的主要目的,在宪法限制或国际公约没有规定的情况下,冲突规范会在以下两方面发挥主要作用:决定被告是否在法院地法下受到了公正待遇和政府利益要求替换法院地法.A.Ehrenzweig,The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,58 Mich.L.Rev.643-645(1959-1960).此外,为H.Kay教授讲课所需所撰写的对自己学说的综述,是他对自己学说的最后一次总结。这次总结加上了大量对批评者的反驳,篇幅较长。See,R.Cramton,D.Curtie,H.Kay,Conflict of Laws:Cases-Comments-Questions,St.Paul:West Publishing Co.,1975,pp.303-305.
[1]确实,在库克(Cook)和劳伦森(Lorenzen)的带领下,包括柯里(B.Currie).鲍尔森(Paul sen)、雷恩斯坦(Rheinstein)和安特马(Yntema)这些人,或许我该加上有些不同的切特海姆(Cheatham)和斯道克(Storke),他们可能不愿意被置于偶像破坏者之中被提及——(至少不是我的标牌)——我们当代的冲突法教师们同意,将我们从近来的教条主义影响下充分解放出来的时机已经来到。我乐意添加的所有内容是这种解放将恢复历史的寓意。A.Ehrenzweig,Lex Fori in the Conflict of Laws,32 Rocky Mntn.L.Rev.16(1959-1960).
[2]比较维希特晚年对自己理论的完整总结:(1)毫无疑问(而且萨维尼也承认这一点),对于在各国适用哪种法律的问题,各国自己的法律具有绝对的决定性;换言之,如果且只要我国法律规定了一个法律关系适用何种法律的问题——比如规定了在特定案件中法官应根据外国法裁判,或在特定涉外案件中根据我们的法律裁判,法官就必须因此照章处理。(2)如果我们的法律没有做出这样的决断,那么必须尝试从我们法律的精神以及法律的基本原则和法律关系的本质发现和确立这种决断,原因是这些因素是法官在其本国法出现空缺时一般情况下要据以考虑的。(3)但是,当法官从这些考虑因素中无法做出关于这个问题的决定时,那么一般原则开始发挥作用,即在存在疑问时,法官必须对涉外关系也适用其本国法.C.Wachter,Pandekten(translated by Nadelmann),§31,13 Am.J.Comp.L.427-428(1964).
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,A Counter-revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers,80 Harv.L.Rev.381,388(1966-1967).
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,Choice of Law:Current Doctrine and "True Rules",49 Cal.L.Rev.242(1961).
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 227,286(1968).
[4]R.Leflar,Ehrenzweig and the Courts,18 Okla L.Rev.367(1965).
[5]美国冲突法学界的知名学者柯里、凯弗斯、莱弗拉(Leflar)、雷恩斯坦、凯(H.Kay)参加了这次圆桌会议,并发表了相关评论文章。B.Currie,Ehrenzweig and The Statute of Fraud:An Inquiry into the “Rule of Validation”,18 Okla.L.Rev.243(1965);D.Cavers,Some of Ehrenzweig's Choice-of-law Generalizations,18 Okla.L.Rev.357(1965);R.Leflar,Ehrenzweig and the Courts,18 Okla L.Rev.366(1965);M.Rheinstein,Ehrenzweig on the Law of Conflict of Laws,18 Okla L.Rev.238(1965);H.Kay,Ehrenzweig's Proper Law and Proper Forum,18 Okla L.Rev.233(1965).
[6]M.Rheinstein,Ehrenzweig on the Law of Conflict of Laws,18 Okla L.Rev.242(1965).
[7]H.Kay,Ehrenzweig's Proper Law and Proper Forum,18 Okla L.Rev.236(1965).
[8]这次的演讲于1969年出版。A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 167-370(1968).
[9]卢埃林在晚年承认法律现实主义的主要立场——预测法官行为,并不适用于法官或普通公民,而只是针对律师或案件当事人;虽然不能说这是看待法律的“有害或错误的方式”,但它“是一种不完整的看待法律的方式。”K.Llewellyn,On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence,40 Colum.L.Rev.593(1940).
[1]M.Davies,S.Richetson,G.Lindell,Conflict of Laws:Commentary and Materials,Sydney:Butterworths,1997,p.34.
[2]E.Scoles,P.Hay,P.Borchers,S.Symeionides,Conflict of Laws,4~(th)ed.,Thomson West,2004,pp.41-42.
[3]R.Leflar,Ehrenzweig and the Courts,18 Okla.L.Rev.369-372(1965).
[4]最典型的是凯(H.Kay)和他人合写的判例法教材,在1975年的版本中对艾伦茨威格的学说详细介绍,但笔者在美国找到的晚近两版教材中,发现已经不见了该学说的踪影。See,R.Cramton,D.Currie,H.Kay,Conflict of Laws:Cases-Comments-Questions,St.Paul:West Publishing Co.,1975,pp.303-305.
[5]这一论断得到了笔者在美国访学时的指导教授彼得·海(Peter Hay)的赞同。他认为,其实艾伦茨威格和柯里的结论非常类似,但是美国学者不习惯他大陆风格的论证方式。
[6]R.Leflar,Ehrenzweig and the Courts,18 Okla.L.Rev.374(1965).
[1]斜体为原文所加。G.Kegel,The Crisis of Conflict of Laws,112 Recueil des Cours 184-185,(1964).
[2]See,D.Cavers,A Critique of the Choice-of-law Problem,47 Harv.L.Rev.178(1933-1934).
[3]凯弗斯长期担任罗斯福政府中的要职占用了他宝贵的冲突法研究时间。罗斯福新政吸收了许多法学教授参与政府管理工作,凯弗斯也不例外。他每周两天在华盛顿从事行政工作,同时还担负教学工作,这使得他在1933年后的10年中几乎没有再研究法律选择问题。等到他1943年撰写对库克《冲突法的逻辑与法律基础》的书评时,他已经丧失了对批判比尔冲突法的兴趣。一直到了20世纪50年代后期,凯弗斯才从全力关注公法问题转到重新研究法律选择问题。柯里的“支配兴趣分析说”和《第二次冲突法重述》的起草激发他重新审视自己在1933年论文中的立场和观点。D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,pp.xii-xiii,introduction.凯弗斯身体力行法律现实主义方法,大力倡导从各种社会科学视角研究社会热点问题,这也在一定程度上分散了他对冲突法研究的热情和精力。在1930年代初主编《法律和当代问题》时,凯弗斯积极主持了由法学者、执业律师、官员和社会科学家参加的研讨会。当时新的社会问题层出不穷,他沉醉其中,对法律选择问题慢慢冷淡下来,开始怀疑冲突法理论是否那么重要。尽管学者们对《第一次重述》的批判取得重要进展,凯弗斯的论文被广泛引用,但这一切已经引不起他的兴趣。特别是二战之后,凯弗斯自称成为了一个“疲倦的现实主义者(tired realist)”。See,D.Cavets,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor;The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.10.
[4]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.xii-xiii,preface.
[1]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.9.
[2]“冲突法正义”是凯弗斯借用的德国冲突法学者凯格尔的用语。D.Cavers,Cipolla and Conflicts Justice,9 Duq.L.Rev.360(1970-1971).凯格尔在1964年的海牙演讲中率先明确提出这两种正义的区分,他认为:“根据内容(即实体法上)判断是最好的法律,可能远不是空间上(即把法律放在发生于国外的情况中)最好的法律。…因此,你必须乐于接受一种特别的冲突法正义(justice of conflict of laws),以有别于实体法正义(justice of substantive law)。”(斜体为原文所有)G.Kegel,The Crisis of Conflict of Laws,112 Recueil des Cours 184-185,(1964).
[3]他在1965年再次指出比尔的规则无法保证公平的结果:“毫无疑问,我的观点是,《第一次重述》主张考虑的法律选择规则并没有打算实现个案中的公平。不能被指望用来实现个案公平的规则在我看来,无论过去还是现在,都不能是公平的规则。”See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965.p.79.
[4]他在1965年的著作中埋怨其批评者没有注意1933年论文中主张的根据法院的判例逐渐总结出新的符合公平要求的规则、原则和标准.See,D.Cavers,The Choica-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.78.
[5]为了与柯里的“支配兴趣分析说”相区分,避免引起他人误解,凯弗斯在1965年著作中将政策分析改成了“立法目的”分析,并主张属于虚假冲突或可避免冲突的先例最终可演化为适用范围狭窄的法律细则;对于主要用于解决“真实冲突”的优先选择原则,他也不排除将来随着人们认识的深化,将这些宽泛的原则进一步细化的可能。See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.89-90,137.
[1]See,D.Cavers,Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective,131 Recueil des Cours 151-152(1971).
[2]See,D.Cavers,A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Process:Addendum 1972,17 Harv.Int'l.L.J.653(1976).
[3]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.11.
[1]Ibid,pp.65-66,77.
[2]凯弗斯观察到,尽管纽约和加利福尼亚州是领头者,但背离《第一次重述》的判决也正在全国其他地方涌现。联邦最高法院在诠释《联邦侵权请求法》中鼓励各州挑战冲突法传统的新潮流。Ibid,p.62.
[3]Ibid,pp.89-90.
[4]D.Cavers,The Value of Principled Preference,in The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,pp.206-208.
[1]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.85-86.
[2]凯弗斯在晚年明确指出了优先选择原则的价值取向及其特征:在《法律选择过程》中,我提出了一系列的我所称的“优先选择原则”,来例证一种方法,这种方法基于“冲突法正义”,能够为法院和评论家们所接纳,而不管在特定案件中一个原则是选择了法院地的实体法还是评论家们喜爱的一种法律.D.Cavers,The Proper Law of Producer's Liability,in The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.305.
[3]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.206-208.
[4]Ibid,p.14.在1969年美国法学院联合会(AALS)冲突法圆桌会议上,凯弗斯再次表明反对个案分析的态度。See,D.Cavers,The Value of Principled Preference,in The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.206.
[5]D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.113,121.
[1]除了直接继承凯弗斯学说衣钵的柯里之外,凯弗斯罗列的采用内容和政策分析的学者还有:哈佛的弗鲁恩德(Frcund),他或许是第一位主张从相关州的兴趣和政策视角解决法律选择问题的学者,此外还有莫里斯(Morris)、艾伦茨威格、汉考克(Moffat Hancock)、温特劳布(Russell Weintraub)、巴克斯特(William E Baxter)、冯·迈伦(Arthur yon Mehtcn)、特劳特曼(Donald Trautman)和布里格斯(Edwin W.Briggs)。See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.91-92.
[2]Ibid,p.122.
[3]Ibid,p.79.
[4]Ibid,p.215.
[5]Ibid,pp.114-115.
[1]Ibid,pp.113,132-133.
[2]凯弗斯在1933年谈到如何评判法律选择的结果时主张:“站在对诉讼当事人公平或相冲突的法律可能引发的更广泛的社会政策考虑因素的角度,按照与这个或那个法律联系的事件或交易中的事实情况,评价法律适用的结果;…”D.Cavers,A Critique of the Choice-of-law Problem,47 Harv.L.Rev.192-193(1933-1934).
[3]D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.122.
[4]凯弗斯直到1971年才在一篇关于西博拉(Cipolla)案件的评论中借用凯格尔的“冲突法正义”一词。See,D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.xiii,introduction.
[5][美]约翰·罗尔斯著,何怀宏、何包钢、廖申白译:《正义论》。中国社会科学出版社1988年版,第12页。凯弗斯在1965年的著作中引用了两句罗尔斯关于正义的论述。一是关于无知之幕下的正义观:“一项惯例如果符合下列原则就是公正的,所有参与者都可以被合理假定,当他们在同样处境下会相互提议或承认这种规则,而且在事先不知道他们自己特定境况的条件下就要求作出确定的承诺。”二是符合正义标准的自由观:“参与一项制度或受它影响的每个人都有同样的权利享受最大限度的自由,这种自由要与所有人的同样自由并行不悖。”D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.130-131.
[1]D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.130.
[2]Ibid,p.132.
[3]Ibid,p.120.
[4]D.Cavers,Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective,131 Recueil des Cours 153(1971)
[1]Ibid,pp.134-136.
[2]这是卢埃林在同庞德论战中总结的法律现实主义者的共同出发点之一。See K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1236,1238(1930-1931).
[3]Sec,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.136-137.
[4]D.Cavers,Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective.131 Recueil des Cours 152-153(1971).
[5]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.136.
[1]Ibid,p.137.
[2]为了避免更精确的术语导致的复杂,凯弗斯有意采用“家庭所在地(home)”一词来取代“住所(domicile)”或其他术语,其含义等同于“固定住所(settled residence)”。See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.154-155.
[3]Ibid,pp.139-141.
[1]Ibid,pp.146-147.
[2]Ibid,pp.150-158.
[3]Ibid,pp.159-160.
[4]凯弗斯从萨维尼那里临时借用了“本座”一词。See,Ibid,p.166.
[1]Ibid,pp.166-176.
[2]Ibid,p.177.
[3]Ibid,pp.181-183.
[1]Ibid,pp.194-196.
[2]D.Cavers,The Proper Law of Producer's Liability,in The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.315.
[1]D.Cavers,Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective,131 Recueil des Cours 153-158(1971).
[2]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor.The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.88-89,137.
[3]柯里使用的“支配兴趣(governmental interest)”一词引起了许多学者的强烈反对。这种兴趣的存在与否令人生疑。有学者认为私法规则中不存在这种兴趣,而只有公法中存有这种国家的兴趣。莱恩斯坦(Rheinstein)、凯格尔(Kegel)和艾伦茨威格教授基本上都属于这类反对者。凯弗斯并不赞同这种批评。在凯弗斯看来,柯里教授在分析中只是感到需要找到一个词,用以描述成文法或普通法通过适用于特定事实促进其立法目的,他使用了interest来表示这种需要。规则出自国家,凯弗斯相信“规则的目的可以合理地归于国家,尽管规则只是立法或司法机关的决定,表明在诉讼私方当事人之间达致公平的最佳方式。”但凯弗斯同时又指出,即使在私法领域,私法通常不仅用来解决纠纷,而且用以规范人们的日常行为。值得注意的是,在现代社会中公法的目的正日益通过注入私法中得以实现。即使对 于带有最有限的公共目标的法律,当法律适用可以促进这种目标的实现时,将国家在这种情况下使立法目的实现“归于国家的一种愿望(desire)”,这样做并非不合理。“在这种情形下用governmental或state修饰interest来辨别这种愿望在我看来并无不妥,尽管最后生成的术语不无害处。”这一用语的主要害处来自“兴趣”一词导致的实质性的误解。它表明了国家的关心(concern)可以类比于“国家政府实现公共目标中的兴趣”。同样重要的是特定国内法规则的目的并不是国家解决涉外问题的恰当目标。另一种麻烦来自于对“国家兴趣”和“个人兴趣”的比较。冯·迈伦(von Mehren)和特劳特曼(Trautman)教授试图比较国家作为国际社会成员对保护个人的关切和个人对交易另一方承诺的关切。其实,这两种关切都在柯里所言的“支配兴趣”之下。See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.99-101.
[1]凯弗斯认为,柯里反对的是所有非成文法形式的冲突规范。柯里希望去除所有的判例法形式的冲突规范可能更多地反映了他的一种避免适用所有现有冲突法的策略,而不是永远反对冲突规范。See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.74.
[2]See.D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.73-74,97,109.
[3]凯弗斯指出,从相冲突的法律目的出发寻求法律选择的答案,其难度要比柯里认为的大得多。See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.108.
[4]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.161,note29.
[5]H.Baade,Counter-revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections on Reading Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process.46 Tax.L.Rev.151-156(1967-1968).
[6]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.136,202.
[1]D.Cavers,Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective,131 Recueil des Cours 152(1971).
[2]Ibid,p.153.
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,A Counter-revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers,80 Harv.L.Rev.378(1966-1967).
[4]D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.204,author's note.
[5]Cipolla v.Shaposka,439 Pa.563,267 A.2d 854(1970).
[6]D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.150,author's note.
[1]李浩培:《李浩培文选》,法律出版社2000年版,第402页。不过,如果考虑到优先选择原则的示范性和凯弗斯有意使其具有足够的灵活性,优先选择原则的存在模糊之处在所难免。
[2]里斯认为凯弗斯优先原则方法面临的主要困难在于难于提炼原则。See,W Reese,American Trends in Private International Law:Academic and Judicial Manipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases,33 Vand.L.Rev.732(1980).
[1]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,p.8.
[2]F.Kenison,The Continuing Contribution of Robert A.Leflar to the Judicial Education of Appellate Judges,25 Ark.L.Rev.95(1971-1972).
[3]J.Barrett,Vignette of Robert A.Leflar,25 Ark.L.Rev.144-145(1971-1972).
[4]W.Reynolds & W.Richman,Robert Leflar,Judicial Process,and Choice of Law,52 Ark.L.Rev.135(1999).
[5]R.Bischoff,Robert A.Leflar:Torts Realist,25 Ark.L.Rev.34,38(1971-1972).
[6]R.Leflar,The Nature of Conflicts Law,81 Colum.L.Rev.1095(1981).
[7]莱弗拉的研究领域横跨了冲突法、侵权法、法学教育(包括法官继续教育)等。在冲突法领域,除了多次再版的
《美国冲突法》以外,最有名的成果当属1966年面世的“冲突法中影响法律选择的考虑因素”(Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.267(1966))和“冲突法:再论影响法律选择的考虑因素”(Conflicts Law:More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 Cal.L.Rev.1584(1966))。此后,他又发表了多篇论文对自己的理论进一步加以阐明,如The “New”Choice of Law,21 Am.U.L.Rev.457(1972):Choice of Law:A Well-watered Plateau,41 Law & Contemp.Probs.10(1977);The Nature of Conflicts Law,81 Colum.L.Rev.1080(1981).从40年代到80年代,他还持之以恒地撰写了美国和阿肯色州的冲突法司法实践报告。
[1]E.Scolcs,P.Hay,P.Borchers,S.Symeonides,Conflict of Laws,St.Paul:Thomson/West,2004.pp.52-53.
[2]莱弗拉自称:“这些法律选择政策(policies)——我称之为影响法律选择的考虑因素,…”。R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.281(1966).
[3]早期进行法律选择政策分析的论文主要有:Goodrich,Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws,20 W.Va.L.Q.156(1930).
[4]E.Cheatham and W.Reese,Choice of the Applicable Law,52 Colum.L.Rev.959(1952).
[5]H.Yntema,The Objectives of Private International Law,35 Can.Bar Rev.735(1957).
[6]R.Leflar,Conflicts Law:More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 Cal.L.Rev.1585(1966).
[7]莱弗拉指出:“影响法律选择的考虑因素不是永久不变的,它们带来的结果也一样如此。”其研究的唯一意义在于“考虑到了法律选择法中发生的主要变化”。R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.325,327(1966).
[1]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.282(1966).
[2]Ibid,pp.282-285.
[3]Ibid,pp.285-286.
[1]Ibid,pp.286-287.
[2]Ibid,p.288.
[3]Ibid,pp.288-289.
[1]Ibid,p.289.
[2]安特马将选择法律需要考虑的因素归纳为十七项,其中最后一项为“最终求助于法院地法”。但他认为这一项“显然是一种绝望的建议”,因此在设计冲突法政策时应将其排除在外。H.Yntema,The Objectives of Private International Law,35 Can.Bar Rev.735(1957).
[3]莱弗拉指出:“只要能将‘本地公共政策'这种模棱两可的观念和本地实体法联系起来,它就构成了一个法院优先适用本地法而不是任何外地法的确定的吸引力。这是一种法院地法偏好的合理基石。它和那种‘绝望的建议'截然不同,…”R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.290-291(1966).
[4]Ibid,p.291.
[5]比较柯里界定“支配兴趣”的方法:“当同时存在两个条件时,一个州有理由适用它的法律。首先,必须存在一种可以确定的政策,这种政策妥当地表现在该州的法律中。第二,该州和当事人、交易、争议事项或诉讼的关系如此密切,以致在将其政策适用于这种案情的兴趣(interest)方面赋予该州一种合理的基础;争议问题必须在该州合理的管理关心(governmental concerns)的范围之内。”B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.228.
[1]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.291-292(1966).
[2]柯里主张,只要法院地存在“支配兴趣”,就可以适用法院地法。See,B.Currie,Comments on Babcock v.Jackson,A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,63 Colum.L.Rev.1242-1243(1963).
[3]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.293(1966).
[4]柯里在“支配兴趣”的界定上表现出强烈的属人主义倾向——各州首先考虑保护本州居民。See,B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,pp.85,705.
[5]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.291,294(1966).
[6]Ibid,p.293.
[1]Ibid,p.295.
[2]R.Leflar,Conflicts Law:More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 Cal.L.Rev.1587(1966).
[3]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.303(1966).
[1]Ibid,pp.300-302.
[2]Ibid,pp.296-298.
[3]Ibid,pp.298-300.
[1]R.Letter,Conflicts Law:More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 Cal.L.Rev.1588(1966).
[2]Ibid,pp.1593-1595.
[1]Ibid,pp.1595-1596.
[2]除了这九项政策之外,他们还提出了一条首要政策,即“法院必须遵循立法机关合乎宪法的规定”。由于大量的立法并未对法律适用问题作出明确的规定,他们没有将这一政策单列。See,E.Cheatham and W.Reese,Choice of the Applicable Law,52 Colum.L.Rev.959,962-980(1952).
[3]See.R.Leflar,The Nature of Conflicts Law,81 Colum.L.Rev.1082-1083(1981)
[4]戚特海姆和里斯认为,法官通过司法发展法律要经过三个步骤。首先,理解和把握相关的社会政策:其次,将从社会政策得出的结论充分和清楚地表述为法律规则;第三,将规则用于具体的情况。一旦清楚地把握住了社会政策并将其表述成相应的规则,通过援引这些规则就很容易得出特定问题的合意答案。法律选择依然处于法律发展的第一个关注基本政策的阶段。See,E.Cheathamand W.Reese,Choice of the Applicable Law,52 Colum.L.Rev.960(1952).
[5]安特马罗列的十七项考虑因素包括:法律结果的一致性、法律冲突的最少化、法律结果的可预见性、当事人的正当期望、社会和经济结果的一致性、交易的有效性、连接点的相对重要性、认可“更强有力的(stronger)”法律、州 际之间的合作、尊重他州的利益、最终结果的公平、尊重州内法的政策、要适用的实体规则的内部和谐、交易的地点或本质、私人的益处、国内法的同质性、最终求助于法院地法等。不过,他不赞成最后一项考虑因素,主张在设计冲突法政策时将其排除在外。H.Yntema,The Objectives of Private International Law,35 Can.Bar Rev.734-735(1957):
[1]Ibid,pp.723-742.
[2]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.318(1966).
[3]R.Leflar,Conflicts Law:More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 Cal.L.Rev.1585(1966).
[1]R.Leflar,The "New" Choice of Law,21 Am.U.L.Rev.459(1972).
[2]R.Leflar,Conflicts Law:More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 Cal.L.Rev.1586(1966).
[3]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.325(1966).
[4]卢埃林在同庞德论战中提出动态的法律观是法律现实主义者的共同出发点之一。See K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1236(1930-1931).
[5]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.325(1966).
[6]Ibid,pp.325-326.
[1]W.Reynolds & W.Richman,Robert Leflar,Judicial Process,and Choice of Law,52 Ark.L.Rev.134(1999).
[2]莱弗拉认为这篇论文指出了价值判断而不是纯粹的机械分析会影响到法律选择。这在一定意义上是对霍姆斯名言的认可:“对法官事实上将如何行为的预测,而不是更多的伪饰,就是我所意指的法律。”从更广泛意义上讲,这是对司法过程现实的认可。法院,尤其是上诉法院,能够通览案情,法官很难对法律内容视而不见。“有些法官企图忽略它,其他法官承认他们无法、也没有忽视法律内容。”R.Leflar,The Nature of Conflicts Law,81 Colum.L.Rev.1081-1082(1981)
[3]R.Leflar,Choice of Law:A Well-watered Plateau,41 Law & Contemp.Probs.10(1977).
[4]R.Leflar,Choice of Law:Torts:Current Trends,6 Vand.L.Rev.461(1952-1953).
[5]R.Leflar,Ehrenzweig and the Courts,18 Okla.L.Rev.374(1965).
[6]R.Leflar,Choice of Law:A Well-watered Plateau,41 Law & Contemp.Probs.11(1977).
[7]R.Leflar,Conflict of Laws,Contracts,and the New Restatement,15 Ark.L.Rev.172(1960-1961).
[1]R.Leflar,The "New" Choice of Law,21 Am.U.L.Rev.459-460(1972).
[2]R.Leflar,Ehrenzweig and the Courts,18 Okla.L.Rev.374(1965).
[3]R.Leflar,Honest Judicial Opinions,74 Nw.U.L.Rev.735(1979-1980).
[4]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.271-276(1966).
[5]R.Leflar,The Nature of Conflicts Law,81 Colum.L.Rev.1080(1981)
[6]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.304-305(1966).
[7]R.Leflar,Conflicts Law:More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 Cal.L.Rev.1588(1966).
[1]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.324-325(1966).
[2]L.McDougal III,Leflar's Choice-influencing Considerations:Revisited,Refined and Reaffirmed,52 Ark.L.Rev.106,121(1999).
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,Private International Law:A Comparative Treatise on American International Conflicts Law,Including the law of Admiralty,General Part,Leyden:Sijthoff,1967,p.97.
[4]F.Juenger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,pp.104-105.
[5]D.Cavers,The Value of Principled Preference,in The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.206.
[6]A.Ehrenzweig,Private International Law:A Comparative Treatise on American International Conflicts Law,Including the law of Admiralty,General Part,Leyden:Sijthoff,1967,p.97.
[1]W.Reese,American Trends in Private International Law:Academic and Judicial Manipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases,33 Vand.L.Rev.725(1980).
[2]E.Scoles,P.Hay,P.Borchers,S.Symeonides,Conflict of Laws,St.Paul:Thomson/West,2004,pp.53-55.
[3]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.302,304(1966).
[4]R.Leflar,Choice of Law:A Well-watered Plateau,41 Law & Contemp.Probs.10(1977).
[1]S.Fuld,Willis L.M.Reese,81 Colum.L.Rev.935(1981).
[2]里斯的同事斯密特(Smit)教授称里斯的写作风格简明直接、切中要害,颇具海明威的精湛技巧。See,H.Smit,In Memoriam,Willis Livingston Mesier Reese,91 Colum.L.Rev.3(1991).
[3]这篇论文为“准据法的选择”,为里斯和戚特海姆合写.See,E.Cheatham and W.Reese,Choice of the Applicable Law,52 Colum.L.Rev.959(1952).里斯一生作品的列表可见于H.Smit,In Memoriam,Willis Livingston Mesier Reese,91 Colum.L.Rev.5-9(1991).
[4]回里斯冲突法论文的代表作有:Choice of the Applicable Law(with E.Cheatham),52 Colum.L.Rev.959(1952);Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,Second,9 Int'l & Comp.L.Quarterly 531(1960);Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.679(1963);Choice of Law:Rules or Approach,57 Cornell L.Rev.315(1971-1972);Dépe(?)ge:A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law,73 Colum.L.Rev.58(1973);Choice of Law in the United States:The Past,the Present and Some Prophecies for the Future,in Law in the United States of America in Social and Technological Revolution,Brussels:Etablissements Emile Bruylant,(J.Hazard,W.Wagner,ed.),(1974);Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the Future,16 Colum.J.Transnat'l L.1(1977);American Trends in Private International Law:Academic and Judicial Manipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases,33 Vand.L.Rev.717(1980);The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited,34 Mercer L.Rev.501(1982-1983);Substantive Policies and Choice of Law,2 Touro L.Rev.1(1986);A Suggested Approach to Choice-of-Law,14 Vt.L.Rev.1(1989).他在海牙国际法学院的两次演讲都以《第二次重述》的内容为核心。See,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 309(1964);General Course on Private Internotional Law,150 Recueil des Cours 1(1976).
[1]Resolution of the Faculty,81 Colum.L.Rev.933(1981).
[2]里斯生于1913年,这篇论文发表于1952年。See,W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 311(Biographical Note),314(Principal Publications)(1964).
[3]里斯在1976年的海牙演讲中开篇谦虚地谈到:“如果我还算懂得一点法律的话,它就是美国法。”W.Reese,General Course on Private International Law,150 Recueil des Cours 1(1976).不过,里斯对英国冲突法及其理论比较关注,在《第二次重述》“合同”部分他吸收了英国的“适当法原理(proper law doctrine)”。他还指出,在起草第二次冲突法重述的过程中,对英国冲突法判例的重视几乎和对美国判例的重视可以等量齐观;重述的草案应该大致上合乎英国法律,因为人们认为在英国和美国占主导地位的冲突法规则没有本质上的差异。W.Reese,Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,Second,9 Int'l & Comp.L.Quarterly 537,541(1960).
[1]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 332(1964).
[2]Ibid,pp.332-333.
[3]Ibid,pp.333-334.
[1]Ibid,pp.334-337.
[2]W.Reese,American Trends in Private International Law:Academic and Judicial Manipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases,33 Vand.L.Rev.732-733(1980).
[3]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 338(1964).
[1]Ibid,pp.338-339.
[2]W.Reese,American Trends in Private International Law:Academic and Judicial Manipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases,33 Vand.L.Rev.7725-726(1980).
[3]这篇论文为“法律选择:规则还是方法”。See,W.Reese,Choice of Law:Rules or Approach,57 Cornell L.Rev.315(1971-1972).
[1]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 340(1964).
[2]W.Reese,Choice of Law:Rules or Approach,57 Cornell L.Rev.318(1971-1972).
[3]E.Cheatham and W.Reese,Choice of the Applicable Law,52 Colum.L.Rev.960(1952).
[4]Ibid.
[5]在里斯和戚特海姆合著的1952年论文中,第一项首要政策——法院必须遵循立法机关合乎宪法的规定,没有和其他一般政策相并列。但他们是将这项政策排在一般政策之前首先阐明的。See,ibid,p.961.里斯在1963年的“冲突法和《第二次重述》”一文中对这十项政策在措词上稍作修改。修改后的十项政策为:(1)法院必须遵循其所在地的立法机关合乎宪法的规定;(2)法律选择规则应被设计为使国际和州际制度运作良好;(3)除非存在相反的适当理由,法院应当适用其当地的实体法;(4)法院在决定是适用其本地法还是另一法域的法律时,应当考虑相关实体法规则的目的;(5)法律选择规则应当寻求取得结果的确定性、可预见性和一致性;(6)法院应当寻求保护当事人的正当期望;(7)法院应当寻求适用具有主要兴趣(dominant interest)的法域的法律;(8)法律选择规则应当简单并容易适用;(9)法院应当寻求促进相关实体法领域中的基本政策;(10)法院应当寻求取得个案公平。实质内容的改变有两处。一是补充了第四项政策的运用方法。里斯结合1961年Traynor法官审理的Bernkrant v.Fowler案具体指明了两种权衡相关实体法政策的方法,一是公开承认其拥有“裁断的权力(power of decision)”,然后探究,是否实现其当地实体法的政策不如“其他法律选择政策和其他法域的(实体法)政策”更重要;第二种方法是,“假装其唯一的任务就是成文法解释,或换而言之,它只需探究立法机关是否确实想要(intend)将这部成文法用于特定的事实情况。”这两种方法形式不同,而考虑因素和结果一致。第二处实质性修改是关于“州际和国际秩序的需要”的地位。在1952年的论文中,里斯认为这一政策最为重要(overriding),后面的几个政策可以说是他的推论。而在1963年的论文中,里斯将其修改为,除了第一个政策——法院遵循立法机关的指示,其余政策之间无主次之分。See,W Reese,Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.682-690(1963).1964年海牙演讲中法律选择政策部分基本照搬了1963年论文中的内容。See,W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 340-352(1964).为简洁起见,正文中的十项政策还是采用1952年论文中的表述。
[1]E.Cheatham and W.Reese,Choice of the Applicable Law,52 Colum.L.Rev.961(1952)
[2]Ibid,pp.962-963.
[3]Ibid,p.964.
[1]Ibid,pp.965-966.
[2]Ibid,pp.969-970.
[3]Ibid,pp.970-972.
[4]Ibid,p.972.
[1]Ibid,pp.976-977.
[2]Ibid,pp.978-980.
[3]Ibid,pp.980-981.
[4]这是里斯在1963年论文中修正后的观点。See,W.Reese,Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.690(1963).在1952年论文中,里斯将第二项政策(州际和国际秩序的需要)的重要性列在后面其他政策之前。See,E.Cheatham and W.Reese,Choice of the Applicable Law,52 Colum.L.Rev.981(1952).
[5]See,W.Reese,Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.692(1963).
[1]Sec,W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 355-356(1964).
[2]里斯将“规则(rule)”界定为:“一种可见于大多数法律领域的现象,即一旦适用一个准则(formula),就会引导法院得出一个结论。”他将“方法(approach)”界定为:“只是表述得出一个结论所应考虑的哪个因素或哪些因素。”“方法”的典型例子是《冲突法重述(第二次)》的第6条,它列出了选择法律应考虑的因素,但是既没有说如何根据这些考虑因素做出法律选择,也没有说各个考虑因素的相对重要性。还有一种与规则相对的方法,就是根据一种考虑因素选择法律,比如不少法院和学者经常主张的适用对特定问题最关心(have the greatest concern)的法域的法律。采用这种方法需要首先辨别出相关法域法律背后的政策,而采用“同样措辞的成文法或判例法规则”可能隐含着不同的或轻重有别的政策。显然,这是一种要求个案分析的方法。W.Reese,Choice of Law:Rules or Approach,57 Cornell L.Rev.315-316(1971-1972).
[3]Ibid,p.319.
[4]Ibid,pp.316-318.
[1]Ibid,pp.318-319.
[2]Ibid,pp.319-320.
[3]Ibid,pp.321,325.
[1]Ibid,p.325.
[2]Ibid,323,325.
[3]分割法有三种含义。广义上分割法指“在同一案件中针对不同的争点适用不同法域的规则。”这种定义的缺陷在于涵盖了无可争议的一种问题,这就是程序问题适用法院地法,而实体问题适用其他的法律。狭义上的分割法指“通过适用不同法域的规则调整不同的问题,这样取得的结果无法通过绝对地适用任何一个相关法域的法律来获得。”这种定义“太受限了”,容易掩盖一些“相关的基本因素和价值”。里斯采用了折中的含义:“只是指适用不同法域的规则调整不同的实体法争点(substantive issues)。”See,W.Reese,Dépe(?)ge:A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law,73 Colum.L.Rev.58-59(1973).
[4]Ibid,pp.59-60.
[5]W.Rease,Choice of Law:Rules or Approach,57 Cornell L.Rev.323-324(1971-1972).
[1]Ibid,p.324.
[2]W.Reese,Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.699(1963).
[3]See,W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 375(1964).
[4]Ibid,pp.391,393.
[5]W.Reese,Choice of Law:Rules or Approach 57 Cornell L.Rev.320(1971-1972).
[1]关于法律现实主义的具体内容请参见许庆坤:“重读美国法律现实主义”,《比较法研究》2007年第4期,第4-11页。
[2]W.Reese,Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,Second,9 Int'l & Comp.L.Quarterly 541(1960).
[3]W.Reese,Choice of Law:Rules or Approach,57 Cornell L.Rev.333-334(1971-1972).
[4]W.Reese,Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the Future,16 Colum.J.Transnat'l L.5(1977).
[5]Ibid,p.18.
[1]W.Reese,Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.681(1963).
[2]See,E.Cheatham and W.Reese,Choice of the Applicable Law,52 Colum.L.Rev.959(1952).
[3]See,W.Reese,Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,Second,9 Int'l & Comp.L.Quarterly 532(I960);W.Reese,Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.681(1963).
[4]W.Reese,General Course on Private International Law,150 Recueil des Cours 9(1976).
[5]W.Reese,Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.681(1963).
[6]W.Reese,Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the Future,16 Colum.J.Transnat'l L.40(1977).
[1]《第二次重述》共14章,423条,内容涵盖了涉外管辖、法律选择和涉外判决的执行等,本文只涉及其中的法律选择部分(主要包括第1章和第6-13章,其余章节个别条文涉及法律选择)。这14章依次为:引言(第1-10条)、住所(第11-23条)、司法管辖(第24-79条)、对司法管辖权行使的限制(第80-91条)、判决(第92-121条)、程序问题(第122-144条)、不法行为(第145-185条)、合同(第186-221条)、财产(第222-266)、信托(第267-282条)、身份(第283-290条)、代理与合伙(第291-295条)、商业公司(第296-313条)、财产处置(administration of estates)(第314-423)。
[2]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 320(1964).
[3]American Law Institute,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws,St.Paul:American Law Institute Publishers,1971,p.ix,introduction.
[4]W.Reese,Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.681(1963).
[1]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 357-358(1964).
[2]W.Reese,The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited,34 Mercer L.Rev.519(1982-1983).
[3]W.Reese,Choice of Law in the United Sates:The Past,the Present and Some Prophecies for the Future,in Law in the United States of America in Social and Technological Revolution,Brussels:Etablissements Emile Bruylant,(J.Hazard,W.Wagner,ed.),1974,pp.201-202.
[4]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 360-363(1964).
[5]比如对于婚姻有效性,《第二次重述》一方面规定符合婚姻缔结地法要求的婚姻,其有效性应获得普遍承认,另一方面规定婚姻有效性原则上适用“根据第6条所述原则对于特定争点与配偶和婚姻具有最重要关系法域的实体法”。 See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §283(1971).
[1]第8章“合同”分6部分:合同的有效性和据此创设的权利、合同权利的转让、依当事人一方或双方的行为废除合同、流通票据、商事仲裁、复原(restitution),共35条(第186-221条)。最重要的是第一部分,共22条(第186-207条),具体包括:A、一般原则:§186准据法、§187当事人所选法域的法律、§188当事人没有做出有效选择时适用的法律;B、特定的合同:§189转让土地权益的合同、§190产生于转让土地权益的合同义务、§191出售动产(chattel)利益的合同、§192人寿保险合同、§193火灾、失信或意外事故保险合同、§194保证合同、§195偿还借款合同、§196提供服务的合同、§197运输合同;C、特定的争点:§198缔约能力(capacity to contract)、§199书面要求——形式、§200当事人能力和合同形式以外事项的合同有效性、§201虚假陈述、胁迫、不当影响和误解(misrepresentation,duress,undue influence and mistake)、§202非法(illegality)、§203高利贷(usury)、§204对合同中所角词语的依法解释(construction)、§205合同债务(contractual obligations)的性质和范围、§206履行的细节、§207救济标准(measure of recovery)。
[2]Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws,Chapter 8,Introductory Note(1971).
[3]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 366(1964).
[4]W.Reese,Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,Second,9 Int'l & Comp.L.Quarterly 534(1960).
[1]Ibid,pp.534-536.
[2]这一限制条件并没有出现在正文中,而是在“评论d”中。See,Restatement,Second,Confict of Laws §187 Comment d(1971).
[3]这一限制条件并没有出现在正文中,而是在“评论b”中。See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §187 Comment b(1971).
[4]Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §187(1971).
[5]W.Reese,Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,Second,9 Int'l & Comp.L.Quarterly 537(1960).
[6]这些相关的连接点包括:签订地,合同谈判地,履行地,合同标的(subject matter)(既包括有形财产,也包括风险risk)所在地;以及当事人的住所、居所、国籍、公司成立地和营业地。这些连接点要根据其对于特定争点的相对重要性加以衡量。See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §188(1971).
[7]Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §188(1971).
[8]W.Reese,Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,Second,9 Int'l & Comp.L.Quarterly 540(1960).
[9]See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §206 Comment b(1971).
[10]这两类合同都是格式合同,因此排除了保险人单方面指定准据法的情况,直接规定适用“申请保单时被保险人?所地法域”或“当事人所理解的、保险期间所保风险的主要所在地法域”的实体法,“除非对于特定争点,其他法域根据第6条所述原则与交易和当事人存在更重要的关系;在这种情况下,适用其他法域的实体法。”不过,对于人寿保险合同,被保险人在投保申请中有权做出有效的法律选择。See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §§192-193(1971).
[1]对于转让土地权益的合同以及产生于转让土地权益的合同义务,土地所在地是最重要的连接点;对于出售动产权益的合同,卖方交付动产的所在地是最重要的连接点;保证合同适用的是主合同的准据法;对于付款合同的有效性,支付地法是最重要的连接点;服务的提供地是服务合同的最重要的连接点;乘客出发地或货物发送地是运输合同最主要的连接点。See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §§189-191,194-197(1971).
[2]Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §203(1971).
[3]侵权是第7章“不法行为(Wrongs)”中最重要的部分。第7章分三部分:侵权、侵权所致死亡之诉(actions for death)和工人赔偿,共41条(从145至185条),其中侵权部分30条(从145条至174条)。关于侵权所致死亡之诉和工人赔偿,《第二次重述》在一定程度上保留了原来的规则,同时适当地增加了灵活性。如对于侵权所致死亡之诉权,《第二次重述》第175条继续规定适用损害发生地的实体法,“除非对于特定争点,其他法域根据第6条所述原则与事件和当事人存在更重要的关系;在这种情况下,将适用其他法域的实体法。”
[4]《第二次重述》区分的侵权类型有:人身伤害、损害有形财产、欺诈和虚假陈述、诽谤(defamation)、多法域的诽谤(multistate defamation)、造成金钱损失的说谎(injurious falsehood)、隐私权(right of privacy)、在多法域侵犯隐私权(multistate invasion of privacy)、干涉婚姻关系、恶意诉讼和滥用程序。See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §§146-155,(1971).《第二次重述》区分的重要争点有:行为的侵权性、谨慎标准、享受法律保护的利益、向原告承担的义务、法定成因(legal cause)、抗辩、责任的特定先决条件、行为的义务或特免、原告自负的过错(contributory fault)、风险承担(assumption of risk)、归咎于另一方的过失(imputed negligence)、诉讼的存续(survival of actions)、慈善免责(charitable immunity)、家庭成员之间的免责(intra-family immunity)、放弃起诉或协议不起诉(release or covenant not to sue)、赔偿金(damages)、共同侵权、侵权人之间的分担和补偿(contribution and indemnity among tortfeasors)、替代责任。See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §§156-174,(1971):
[1]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 386-393(1964).
[2]Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §§146-147(1971).
[3]Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §148(1971).
[1]Restatement,Second,Connict of Laws §§149-153,(1971).
[2]Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §§154-155,(1971).
[3]§161抗辩、§163行为的义务或特免、§167诉讼的存续、§168慈善免责、§171赔偿金、§173侵权人之间的分担和补偿、§174替代责任。
[4]第169条“家庭成员之间的免责”规定“准据法通常为当事人住所地所在法域的实体法”。其余同类条款有:§156行为的侵权性、§157谨慎标准、§158享受法律保护的利益、§159向原告承担的义务、§160法定成因、§162责任的特定先决条件、§164原告自负的过错、§165风险承担、§166归咎于另一方的过失、§170放弃起诉或协议不起诉、§172共同侵权。
[5]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 327(1964).
[1]American Law Institute,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §St Paul:American Law Institute Publishers,1971,p.viii,Introduction.
[2]比如,对于人身伤害,第146条正文中只是简单规定了适用损害结果发生地法,除非另一法域根据第6条所述原则与事件和当事人存在更重要的关系。这是一条很难在个案中适用的规定,因为它对什么情况属于“除非”情形并不明确。但在“评论”部分对此给予了相当明确的解释和说明。如果侵权结果发生地和行为地出现在同一法域,那么这个法域的法律通常应该得到适用。同时,在两种情况下不适用侵权行为地和结果发生地的法律。一是根据涉及的具体问题,其他的法域具有更重要的关系,家庭成员之间的免责属于这类问题;第二种情况是,侵权行为地和结果发生地与当事人和事件之间存在很少的联系,如飞机在飞越大陆时导致的侵权。“评论”还指出,当行为地和结果发生地位于不同的法域时,通常适用侵权结果发生地法,除非另一法域与当事人和事件存在更重要的关系。See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §146 Comment d-e.(1971).
[3]W.Reese,The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited,34 Mercer L.Rev.516(1982-1983).
[4]第6条法律选择原则
(1)在接受宪法约束的前提下,法院应遵循其所在法域关于法律选择的成文法规定.
(2)在不存在这种规定时,有关选择准据法规则的因素包括:
(a)州际和国际制度的需要;
(b)法院地的相关政策;
(c)其他感兴趣的法域的相关政策,以及在决定特定争点上这些法域的相对兴趣;
(d)对正当期望的保护;
(e)特定法律领域的基本政策;
(f)结果的确定性、可预见性和一致性;以及
(g)容易确定和适用准据法.Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §6.(1971).
[5]W.Reese,The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited,34 Mercer L.Rev.508-509(1982-1983).
[1]Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §6 Comment c.(1971).
[2]H.Kay,A Defense of Currie's governmental interest analysis,215 Recueil des Cours 36(1990).
[3]比如,对于转让土地权益的有效性和效力,适用土地所在地法院将适用的法律,而土地所在地法院通常适用其自己的实体法决定这类问题(第223条);对于无遗嘱的动产权益的移交,“适用死者死亡时住所地法域的法院将适用的法律”(第260条);“起诉所在的当事人住所地法域的实体法,得用以决定离婚权。”(第251条)Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §§223,251,260(1971).
[4]比如第145条对侵权法律适用的一般原则的规定: (1)关于一个侵权争点(issue)的当事人权利和责任,在第6条表述的原则指导下,适用就该争点与事件和当事人存在最重要关系的法域的实体法。
(2)在适用第6条的原则决定一个争点的准据法时,应当考虑的连接点包括:
(a)损害发生地;
(b)加害地;
(c)当事人的住所、居所、国籍、成立地和营业地;以及
(d)假如存在的当事人之间关系的集中地。
这些连接点要根据它们对于特定争点的相对重要性来衡量.Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §145(1971).
[1]比如第192条对人寿保险合同适用法律的规定:在被保险人投保申请中没有做出有效的法律选择时,基于其申请签发的人寿保险合同的有效性和由此创设的权利,适用申请保单时被保险人住所地法域的实体法;除非对于特定争点,其他法城根据第6条所述原则与交易和当事人存在更重要的关系;在这种情况下,适用其他法域的实体法。Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §192(1971).
[2]比如第157条对谨慎标准法律适用的规定:“(1)适用第145条的规则选择的法律决定判断行为人行为的谨慎标准。(2)准据法通常为损害发生地所在法域的实体法。”
[3]See,W.Reese,Choice of Law:Rules or Approach,57 Cornell L.Rev.325(1971-1972).
[4]A.Ehrenzweig,A Counter-revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers,80 Harv.L.Rev.385(1966-1967).
[1]B.Currie,Comments onBabcock v.Jackson,A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,63 Colum.L.Rev.1241(1963).
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,A Counter-revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers,80 Harv.L.Rev.385(1966-1967).
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,The Second Conflicts Restatement:A Last Appeal for its Withdrawal,113 U.Pa.L.Rev.1241(1964-1965).
[4]A.Ehrenzweig,The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts,Law and Reason versus the Restatement Second,28 Law & Contemp.Probs.701,705(1963).
[5]这是柯里评判“重力中心(center of gravity)”和“连结点聚集(grouping of contacts)”理论时的评论。See,B.Currie,Comments on Babcock v.Jackson,A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,63 Colum.L.Rov.1233(1963).“最重要连结点”、“重力中心”、“连结点聚集”是可以互换的概念。See,S.Symeonides,The American Choice-of-law Revolution in the Courts:Today and Tomorrow,298 Recueil des Cours 129(2003).
[6]F.Juenger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,pp.58,129.
[7]K.Nadelmann,Impressionism and Unification of Law:The EEC Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual and Non-Contractual Obligations,24 Am.J.Comp.L.11(1976).
[8]E.g.Ehrenzweig,American Conflicts Law in its Historical Perspective:Should the Restatement Be "Continued"? 103 U.Pa.L.Rev.133(1954);Ehrenzweig,American Private International Law and the "Restatement",28 Nordisk Tidsskrift for Int'l Ret 229(1958);Ehrenzweig,The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts,Law and Reason versus the Restatement Second,28 Law & Contemp.Probs.700(1963);Ehrenzweig,The Second Conflicts Restatement:A Last Appeal for its Withdrawal,113 U.Pa.L.Rev.1230(1964-1965).
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,The Second Conflicts Restatement:A Last Appeal for its Withdrawal,113 U.Pa L.Rev.1233-1238(1964-1965).
[2]B.Currie,The Disinterested Third Sate,28 Law & Contemp.Probs.754-755(1963).
[3]H.Kay,Theory into Practice:Choice of Law in the Courts,34 Mercer L.Rev.562(1982-1983).
[4]R.Weintraub,"At least,to do no harm ":does the Second Restatement of Conflicts Meet the Hippocratic Standard? 56 Md.L.Rev.1315(1997).
[5]P.Hay,Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology,32 Hastings L.J.1667(1980-1981).
[6]B.Currie,The Disinterested Third State,28 Law & Contemp.Probs.766(1963).
[7]A.Ehrenzweig,The Second Conflicts Restatement:A Last Appeal for its Withdrawal,113 U.Pa.L.Rev.1235(1964-1965).
[1]J.Morris,Law and Reason Triumphant or How not Review a Restatement,21 Am.J.Comp.L.326(1973).
[2]R.Weintraub,"At least,to do no harm ":does the Second Restatement of Conflicts Meet the Hippocratic Standard? 56 Md.L.Rev.1291,1297,1299,1309(1997).
[3]J.Morris,Law and Reason Triumphant or How not Review a Restatement,21 Am.J.Comp.L.328(1973).
[4]Ibid,p.330.
[5]R.Leflar,Conflict of Laws,Contracts,and the New Restatement,15 Ark.L.Rev.164(1960-1961).
[6]R.Weintraub,"At least,to do no harm ":does the Second Restatement of Conflicts Meet the Hippocratic Standard? 56 MA L.Rev.1312(1997).
[7]See,S.Symeonides,The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement:A Mixed Blessing,56 Md.L.Rev.1277-1278(1997).
[1]J.Westbrook,Survey and Evaluation of Competing Choice-of-Law Methodologies:the Case for Eclecticism,40 Mo.L.Rev.433,439,463,466(1975).
[2]S.Fuid,Willis L.M.Reese,81 Colum.L.Rev.936-937(1981).
[3]H.Kay,Theory into Practice:Choice of Law in the Courts,34 Mercer L.Rev.556(1982-1983).
[4]这是塞缪尼德斯截止于2003年年底统计的数据。See.E.Seoles,P.Hay,P.Borchers,S.Symeonides,Conflict of Laws,4~(th)ed.,St.Paul:Thomson,2004,pp.79,85.
[5]S.Symeonides,The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement:A Mixed Blessing,56 Md.L.Rev.1269,1272-1276(1997).
[6]R.Weintraub,"At least,to do no harm ":does the Second Restatement of Conflicts Meet the Hippocratic Standard? 56 Md.L.Rev.1287(1997).
[7]S.Symeonides,The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement:A Mixed Blessing,56 Md.L.Rev.1269,1262-1263(1997).
[1]W.Reese,The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited,34 Mercer L.Rev.502(1982-1983).
[2]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 414(1964).
[3]S.Fuld,Willis L.M.Reese,81 Colum.L.Rev.935(1981).
[1]W.Reese,The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited,34 Mercer L.Rev.508(1982-1983).
[2]H.Southerland,A Plea for the Proper Use of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws 27 Vt L.Rev.40(2002-2003).
[3]W.Reese,American Trends in Private International Law:Academic and Judicial Manipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases.33 Vand.L.Rev.734(1980).
[4]S.Symeonides,The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement:A Mixed Blessing,56 Md.L.Rev.1280-1281(1997).
[1]C.Langdell,A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts,Boston:Little,Brown,and Company,1871,p.vi,preface.
[2]S.Symeonides(ed.),Private International Law at the End of 20~(th)Century:Progress or Regress? Kluwer Law International,2000,p22.
[3]W.Reynolds & W.Richman,Robert Leflar,Judicial Process,and Choice of Law,52 Ark.L.Rev.135(1999).
[1]R.Leflar,Choice of Law:A Well-watered Plateau,41 Law & Contemp.Probs.10(1977).
[2]W.Reese,The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited,34 Mercer L.Rev.502(1982-1983).
[3]H.Kay,A Defense of Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis,215 Recueil des Cours 179(1990).
[4]R.Stevens,Law School:Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s,Chapel Hill and London:The University of North Carolina Press,1983,p.156. 确定了相关的法域之后,第二步是为每一个法域解释调整特定问题的规则。这种规则可以是某个法域一般的国内法,或者是专门调整涉外问题的特别法。在解释规则时,不仅要考虑国内法政策,而且还要考虑涉外政策。(3)对于大多数案件,前两步就可以解决问题,因为常常是所有相关法域具有同样的调整规则(尽管他们的国内法规则不同)。余下的未解决的案件,是最麻烦的,出现了要在竞相适用的规则之间进行选择的问题。相当大比例的这种“真实”冲突能够通过适用主要关心案件的法域的规则得到解决。在有的案件中,有一个法域对案件拥有最终的有效控制权;有的案件中,所有关心案件的法域同意其中一个法域最关心案件。在这两类案件中,这种技巧是可行的。(4)如果不能通过上述界定最关切法域的办法解决冲突,解决方案应该借助于分析相关法域的隐含的国内和涉外政策予以解决。对政策的分析经常显示,尽管存在冲突,但其中一个法域的主张如此明显突出,以至于这个法域的规则应该得到遵守。(5)如果通过上述步骤不能发现各方的政策主张明显不同,此时应该降低差异的要求,适用政策主张稍微强烈一方的法律,因为诉讼争议最终要得到解决。这种细微差异可以是一方的政策相对更有利于促进涉外交往或维护当事人正当期望;也可能是一方的法律属于新型制度,而另一方属于落后的制度;如果法院是相关的一方,适用法院地的法律;如果法院是中立法院,适用与法院地法最接近的规则,因为法院更熟悉这类规则,少犯错误;法院可以不方便法院为由拒绝管辖;如果是方便法院,可以适用有利于阻止挑选法院一方的法律。See,A.von Mehren & D.Trautman,The Law of Multistate Problems,Boston:Little,Brown and Company,1965,pp.76-78,407-408.
[1]R.Weintraub,Functional Developments in Choice of Law for Contracts,187 Recueil des Cours 252(1985).
[2]R.Weintraub,Commentary on the Conflict of Laws,Mineola:Foundation Press,1971,p.208.
[3]D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.132-133.
[4]W.Reese,Choice of Law:Rules or Approach,57 Cornell L.Rev.325(1971-1972).
[5]鲍沃斯将形式主义判决的优点总结为:(1)容易预测,方便私人安排事务和减少诉讼;(2)容易应用,因为需要处理的信息有限;(3)将责任由裁判者转给立法者;(4)帮助立法者将他们的价值传达给可能不被信任的裁判者;(5)促进形式上的正义,同类案件同样判决;(6)通过避免主观臆断和裁判者的困境促进自由。See,W.Powers,Formalism and Nonformalism in Choice of Law Methodology,52 Wash.L.Rev.29-30(1976-1977).
[1]设计难题是因为规则并不能总是完美地将其赖以产生的政策转化为个案中的结果。因为形式主义的规则在裁判中过滤掉了其他信息,导致的结果可能与其支持的政策背道而驰。当设计问题出现时,有必要考虑形式主义的优点超过不适当的结果带来的危害。当形式主义的规则将裁决过程冻结在反映一个时代价值的一系列规则上,而这种价值在下一个时代已经不复存在时,冻结问题便出现了。Ibid,pp.30-31.
[2]彼得森将20世纪美国法律选择的历史分为三个时期——既得权时代、冲突法革命时代和折中主义时代。See,C.Peterson,Private International Law at the End of the Twentieth Century:Progress or Regress?46 Am.J.Comp.L.Supp.199(1998).
[3]对20世纪美国冲突法发展的整体回顾可参见:C.Peterson,Private International Law at the End of the Twentieth Century:Progress or Regress? 46 Am.J.Comp.L.Supp.197(1998).
[4]关于第三次重述,不仅学者们对具体重述什么观点不一,而且对是否该做些什么众说纷纭。在关于第三次冲突法重述的研讨会上,塞缪尼德斯(Symeonides)主张开始新的重述,并且起草了部分条文。荣格教授则认为此时重述冲突法无异于浪费纸墨。利茨曼(Richman)教授认为此时开始重述时机不成熟,但美国法学会应该成立一个研究小组为未来的工作奠定基础。温伯格(Weinberg)教授不主张彻底抛弃《第二次重述》,而主张通过大手术对其清理,包括法律移植。彼得森教授也认为开始新重述的时机并不成熟。See,C.Peterson,Restating Conflicts Again:A Cure for Schizophrenia? 75 Ind.L.J.554-555(2000).
[5]See,G.Kegel,The Crisis of Conflict of Laws,112 Recueil des Cours 108(1964).这也是许多学者的共识,如荣格(F.Juenger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,p.21.)、维舍尔(F.Vischer,General Course on Private International Law,232 Recueil des Cours 21(1993).)
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[2]Sec,O.Kahn-Freund,General Problems of Private International Law,Leyden:Sijhoff,1976,pp.128-136.
[3]See,J.Westbrook,Survey and Evaluation of Competing Choice-of-Law Methodologies:the Case for Eclecticism,40 Mo.L.Rev.411(1975).
[4]H.Kay,Ehrenzweig's Proper Law and Proper Forum,18 Okla.L.Rev.233(1965).
[5]意大利的巴托鲁斯、法国的杜摩兰和达让特莱、荷兰的胡伯、德国的维希特和萨维尼、意大利的孟西尼、英国的戴西这些中世纪和近代的欧洲冲突法学者奠定了现代冲突法大厦的根基。See,F.Juenger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrccht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,pp.11-42.
[6]美国第一部冲突法著作《论不同州和国家实体法差异带来的问题》为利乌摩尔(Livermore)所著,但由于该书企图引进欧洲开始抛弃的法则区别说,影响不大。美国冲突法理论构建真正开始于斯托雷的国际礼让说。See,ibid,pp.29-30.
[7]努斯鲍姆(Nussbaum)、劳伦森(Lorenzen)、纳德尔曼(Nadelmann)、拉贝尔(Rabel)等著名的美国冲突法学者都是来自欧洲。
[1]K.Siehr,Domestic Relations in Europe:European Equivalents to American Evolutions,30 Am.J.Comp.L.71(1982).
[2]如凯弗斯、艾伦茨威格、温特劳布(Weintraub)、里斯、彼得·海(Peter Hay)、凯(H.Kay)、布里梅耶(Brilmayer)、塞缪尼德斯(Symeionides)等美国学者均登上过海牙国际法演讲台。
[3]坊间可见的卢竣所著《国际私法之理论与实际》出版于1936年,现被列入“二十世纪中华法学文丛”重新出版。该书当年被郭云观教授称为“当代国际私法难得的佳作”,曹建明称卢峻对大陆法系和英美法系国际私法作出了“独到的比较研究”,但书中对美国斯托雷学说的介绍仅仅短短的四行字。参见卢峻:《国际私法之理论与实际》,中国政法大学出版社1998年版,第44-45页。
[1]建国后第一部关于美国冲突法研究的专著《现代美国国际私法学说研究》仅11.2万字,该书称:“以库克为代表的‘地方法理论',是美国资产阶级在刚刚经历了空前的世界经济大危机后,又被卷入了前所未有的世界大战,在被称作为(原文如此——笔者注)焦虑、多事和混乱年代中所产生的法律思想。”张翔雨编著:《现代美国国际私法学说研究》,武汉大学出版社1986年版,第23页。其实,库克于1924年3月在《耶鲁法律期刊》第33卷发表的“冲突法的逻辑与法律基础”一文中提出了“本地法说”,当时既没有世界经济危机,也没发生二战。这种结论完全是主观臆断。这种错误完全为第二部研究美国冲突法理论的专著《美国现代国际私法流派》所继承,邓正来同样宣称:“库克的‘本地法说'也可谓是美国当时风靡的保守主义思潮的产物。当时,美国刚刚从空前的经济大危机中摆脱出来,却又被卷入了第二次世界大战。在这个被称之为乱世之秋的年代中,美国为维护和稳定国内的法律秩序,竭力排斥外国或外州法律的适用。”见邓正来:《美国现代国际私法流派(修订版)》,中国政法大学出版社2006年版,第32-33页。此外,两部书中多处误解了美国的学说,如认为库克反对适用外国法或外州法,这绝非“本地法说”中的应有之义。李浩培先生于1992年在《中国国际法年刊》上所发表的“美国的国际私法革命”一文代表了当前相关研究中的最佳成果,但它只介绍了库克、凯弗斯、柯里和里斯的学说,不仅内容简短、缺乏详尽注释,而且一些结论略显仓促。参见李浩培:《李浩培文选》,法律出版社2000年版,第390-423页。
[2]B.Wardhaugh,From Natural Law to Legal Realism:Legal Philosophy,Legal Theory,and the Development of American Conflict of Laws since 1830.41 Me.L.Rev.307(1989).
[3]M.Green,Legal Realism,Lex Fori,and the Choice-of-Law Revolution,104 Yale L.J.967(1994-1995).
[4]L.Brilmayer,The Role of Substantive and Choice of Law Policies in the Formation and Application of Choice of Law Rules,252 Recueil des Cours 32(1995).
[5]普鲁瑟(Prosser)教授对冲突法的复杂和难以理解有一段令人捧腹的描述:“冲突法王国是一片令人沮丧的沼泽地,布满了陷人的泥淖,博学而古怪的教授驻住其中,他们用一种怪异而难以理解的行话将神秘的问题理论化。普通的法官或律师一旦卷入其中将彻底不知去向。”W.Prosser,Interstate Publication,51 Mich.L.Rev,.971(1952-1953).
[1]精选柯里的“支配兴趣分析说”、艾伦茨威格的“法院地法说”、凯弗斯的“优先选择原则说”、莱弗拉“五点考虑因素说”和里斯的冲突法思想作为美国现代冲突法理论的代表,是笔者反复比较和谨慎思考之后的判断。美国学者之间对现代冲突法理论的总结有所差异。现代美国最权威的教材读物思格尔斯(Scoles)等人所著《冲突法》一书选择了“支配兴趣分析说”、“法院地法说”、“功能分析方法”、“价值导向的方法(主要指莱弗拉的学说)”作为现代冲突法理论。See,E.Scoles,P.Hay,P Borchers,S.Symeonides。Conflict of Laws,St.Paul:Thomson,2004,pp.25-58.荣格选择了“适当法方法”、“兴趣分析方法”、“影响法律选择的考虑因素”和“《第二次冲突法重述》的折中主义方法”作为现代冲突法理论。See,F.Jurenger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,pp.96-106.莱弗拉、麦当格尔和菲利克斯的冲突法教材将“支配兴趣分析”、“优先选择原则”、“影响法律选择的考虑因素”、“最重要关系方法”和“全面的兴趣分析”作为现代美国冲突法理论。See,R.Leflar,L.McDougal Ⅲ,R.Felix,American Conflicts Law,Charlottesville:The Michie Company Law Publishers,1989,pp.276-285.布里梅耶和戈德斯密斯(Goldsmith)的冲突法教材选择了“兴趣分析”、“比较损害方法”、“较好规则方法”、“《第二次冲突法重述》和最重要关系方法”作为冲突法的新思维。参见布里迈耶(L.Brilmayer),戈德斯密斯(J.Goldsmith):《冲突法:案例与资料(Conflict of Laws:Cases and Materials)》,中信出版社2003年版(影印版),第215-277页。
[1]O.Holmes,The Path of the Law,1 Boston L.School Mag.1(1896-1897).
[2]艾伦茨威格较早采用“冲突法革命”一词,但他是在讽刺意味上使用的。See,A.Ehrenzweig,A Counter-revolution in Conflicts Law?From Beale to Cavers,80 Harv.L.Rev.377(1966-1967).德国的克格尔在1964年海牙演讲中也提到“冲突法革命(conflicts revolution)”一词,但他并不认为美国的理论变革为革命,而称其为“冲突法危机(crisis)”。See,G.Kegel.The Crisis of Conflict of Laws.112 Recueil des Cours 95(1964).
[3]B.Wardhaugh,From Natural Law to Legal Realism:Legal Philosophy,Legal Theory,and the Development of American Conflict of Laws since 1830.41 Me.L.Rev.307(1989).
[4]刘星:“法律的不确定性——美国现实主义法学述评”,《中山大学学报》1996年增刊,第199页。刘星认为“现实主义法学的主要观点之一是否认法律规则的存在”。
[5]朱景文:“对西方法律传统的挑战——评美国批判法律研究运动”,《中国法学》1995年第4期,第116页。
[6]See G.Aichele,Legal realism and twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the changing consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990,p4.
[1]K.Llewellyn,The Bramble Bush,Oceana Publications,Inc.,1960,p.89.
[2]See G.Aichele,Legal realism and twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the changing consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990,p.10.
[3]See A.Sutherland,The Law at Harvard,Cambridge:The Belknap Press,1967,p.174.
[4]J.Singer,Legal Realism Now,76 Cal.L.Rev.478-481(1988).
[5]R.Pound,Liberty of Contract,18 Yale L.J.466(1908-1909).
[6]W.W.Fisher III,M.J.Horwitz,T.A.Reed(editors),American Legal Realism,New York:Oxford University Press,1993,pp.130-132.
[1]Ibid,p.xi.
[2]M.Martin,Legal Realism:American and Scandinavian,New York:Peter Lang Publishing,Inc.,1997,p.22;G Aichele,Legal realism and twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the changing consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990,p.37.
[3]See H.Pihlajamaki,Against Metaphysics in Law:The Historical Background of American and Scandinavian Legal Realism compared,52 Am.J.Comp.L.474(2004).
[4]F.Cohen,Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,35 Col.L.Rev.809(1935).
[5]J.Dewey,Logical Method and Law,10 Cornell L.Q.26(1914-1925).
[6]M.Martin,Legal Realism:American and Scandinavian,New York:Peter Lang Publishing,Inc.,1997,p.12.
[7]O.Holmes,The Common Law,Boston:Little,Brown,and Company,1923,p.1.
[8]O.Holmes,The Path of the Law,1 Boston L.School Mag.4(1896-1897).
[9]R.Pound,Law in Books and Law in Action,44 Am.L.Rev.15(1910).
[1]L.Kalman,Legal realism at Yale,1927-1960,Chapel Hill and London:The University of North Carolina Press,1986,pp.14-16.
[2]U.Moore,Rational Basis of Legal Institutions,23 Colum.L.Rev.613(1923).
[3]美国在19世纪40年代就已有25种法律制度,而当时的人口比英国少.See H.Pihlajamaki.The Historical Background of American and Scandinavian Legal Realism compared,52 Am.J.Comp.L.483(2004).
[4]T.Arnold,Institute Priests and Yale Observers-A Reply to Dean Goodrich,84 U.Pa.L.Rev.818(1935-1936).
[5]J.Johnson,American Legal Culture,1908-1940,Westport:Greenwood Press,1981,p.59.
[1]M.Martin,Legal Realism:American and Scandinavian,New York:Peter Lang Publishing,Inc.,1997,p.10.
[2]See W.W.Fisher Ⅲ,M.J.Horwitz,T.A.Reed(editors),American Legal Realism,New York:1993,p.xiv.
[3]G.E.White,From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism:Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-century America,58 Va.L.Rev.999(1972).
[4]K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism——Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1233-34,1251(1930-1931).卢埃林为反驳庞德对现实主义的指责,在文章第一部分罗列了庞德可能针对的20个人:在第二份具体陈述现实主义者的观点时,他罗列了大约65人作为他个人认定的现实主义者。这也不是一个完整的名单,“他们的人数是变化的”。被罗列其中的人反映也不一,他们有人并不认为自己是现实主义者,如L.Green说,“如果我是一位现实主义者,我自己一直不知道这回事。……据我所能地回忆,我从没有在我的作品中用过现实主义一词。”Innocent Misrepresentation,19 Va.L.Rev.247(1932-1933).后来的学者在总结这场运动时罗列的人数也差距甚大。由于是一场新思想运动,而非学派,这似乎注定了有关它的参加者和观点的争议会一直不断。
[5]K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism——Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1235(1930-1931).
[1]对法律现实主义认识和评价很大程度上取决于资料的选取。本文观点的形成依赖的法律现实主义原始资料有:K.Llewellyn,A Realistic Jurisprudence--The Next Step,30 Colum.L.Rev.431(1930);K.Llewellyn,The Bramble Bush,Oceana Publications,Inc.,1960;K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1222,(1930-1931);K.Llewellyn,On What Is Wrong with So-called Legal Education,35 Colum.L.Rev.651(1935;W.Cook,Scientific Method and the Law,13 A.B.A.J.303(1927);W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942;F.Cohen,Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,35 Col.L.Rev.809,(1935);M.Cohen,Property and Sovereignty,13 Cornell L.Q.8(1927-1928);O.Holmes,The Common Law,Boston:Little,Brown,and Company,1923;O.Holmes,The Path of the Law,1 Boston L.School Mag.1,(1896-1897);U.Moore,Rational Basis of Legal Institutions,23 Colum.L.Rev.609(1923);T.Arnold,Institute Priests and Yale Observers-A Reply to Dean Goodrich,84 U.Pa.L.Rev.811(1935-1936);T.Arnold,The Jurisprudence of Edward S.Robinson,46 Yale L.J.1282(1936-1937);T.Arnold,The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process,45 Harv.L.Rev.617(1931-1932);J.Gray,The Nature and Sources of the Law,edited by D.Campbell and P.Thomas,Aldershot:Ashgate & Dartmouth,1997;B.Cardozo,The Nature of the Judicial Process,New Haven:Yale University Press,1921;J.Frank,Law and the Modern Mind,New York:Brentano's Publishers,1930;J.Frank,Are Judges Human? 80 Pa.L.Rev.17(1931-1932);J.Frank,Why not a Clinical Lawyer-school? 81 U.Pa.L.Rev.907(1932-1933);J.Frank,What Constitutes a Good Legal Education? 19 A.B.A.J.723(1933);J.C.Hutcheson,The Judgment Intuitive:The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision,14 Cornell L.Q.274(1928-1929);H.Oliphant,A Return to Stare Decisis,14 A.B.A.J.71(1928);W.Sturges and S.Clark,Legal Theory and Real Property Mortgages,37 Yale L.J.691(1927-1928);H.Yntema,The Hornbook Method ana he Conflict of Laws,37 Yale L.J.468(1928);L.Green,The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases,28 Colum.L.Rev.1014(1928);A.Corbin,Offer and Acceptance,and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations,26 Yale L.J.169(1916-1917);H.Laski,The Basis of Vicarious Liability,26 Yale L.J.105(1916-1917);N.Isaacs,The Standardizing of Contracts,27 Yale L.J.34(1917-1918);W.Douglas,A Functional Approach to the Law of Business Associations,23 Ill.L.Rev.673(1928-1929);W.Hohfeld,Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,23 Yale L.J.16(1913);C.Clark,Relations,Legal and Otherwise,5 Ill.L.Q.26(1922-1923);E.Lorenzen & R.Heilman,The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws,83 U.Pa.L.Rev.555(1934-1935)。本文选取的研究法律现实主义的二手资料主要有:L.Kalman,Legal realism at Yale,1927-1960,Chapel Hill and London:The University of North Carolina Press,1986;G.Aichele,Legal realism and twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the changing consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990;J.Singer,Legal Realism Now,76 Cal.L.Rev.465,(1988);W.W.Fisher III,M.J.Horwitz,T.A.Reed(editors),American Legal Realism,New York:Oxford University Press,1993;M.Martin,Legal Realism:American and Scandinavian,New York:Peter Lang Publishing,Inc.,1997;W.Twining,Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement,Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1973;H.Pihlajamaki,Against Metaphysics in Law:The Historical Background of American and Scandinavian Legal Realism compared,52 Am.J.Comp.L.469,(2004);G.Gilmore,Legal Realism:Its Cause and Cure,70 Yale L.J.1037(1960-1961);M.White,Social Thought in America:the Revolt against Formalism,Boston:Beacon Press,1957;H.Jones,Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism,61 Coum.L.Rev.799(1961)。(本注释中论文的页码均为起始页码——笔者注。)
[2]“法学教育的革新”是法律现实主义者将理论运用于社会现实的重要实践,是法律现实主义运动的重要内容。但由于这部分内容与美国冲突法理论演变没有直接的关联,因此后文将其省略。法律现实主义者变革法学教育的具体情况可参见许庆坤:“重读美国法律现实主义”,《比较法研究》,2007年第4期,第10-11页;许庆坤:“美国法学教育透视”,《山东大学法律评论(第四辑)》,山东大学出版社2007年版,第248-250页。
[1]Vegelahn v.Guntner,167 Mass.92,44 N.E.1077(1896).
[2]See Singer,Legal Realism Now,76 Cal.L.Rev.499(1988).
[3]在Lochner v.New York一案中,美国最高法院宣告纽约州的限制工时的劳动法违宪,霍姆斯对此提出异议。See,198 U.S.45,75(1905),25 S.Ct.539.在Muller v.Oregon一案中,法律现实主义者布兰迪斯(Brandeis)和戈德马克(Goldmark)为限制妇女每日工时的立法辩解。See,208 U.S.412,419(1908).
[4]K.Llewellyn,A Realistic Jurisprudence--The Next Step,30 Colum.L.Rev.439(1930).卢埃林观察发现,纸面规则(Paper Rules)是告诉官员的应然规则,其中有的官员置之不理,有的官员表里不一,也有的官员死守规则。
[1]J.Gray,The Nature and Sources of the Law,edited by D.Campbell and P.Thomas,Aldershot:Ashgate & Dartmouth,1997,p.65.
[2]Ibid.p.63.
[3]B.Cardozo,The Nature of the Judicial Process,New Haven:Yale University Press,1921,pp.10,69.
[4]G.Aichele,Legal realism and twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the changing consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990,p.40.
[5]W.Cook,Scientific Method and the Law,13 A.B.A.J.308(1927).
[6]O.Holmes,The Path of the Law,1 Boston L.School Mag.3(1896-1897).
[7]K.Llewellyn,The Bramble Bush,Oceana Publications,Inc.,1960,p.3.
[8]See J.Frank,Law and the Modern Mind,New York:Brentano's Publishers,1930,p.55.
[9]H.Oliphant,A Return to Stan Decisis,14 A.B.A.J.161(1928).
[1]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,p.29.
[2]F.S.Cohen,Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,35 Colum.L.Rev.840(1935).
[3]K.Llewellyn,A Realistic Jurisprudence--The Next Step,30 Colum.L.Rev.444(1930).
[4]W.Sturges and S.Clark,Legal Theory and Real Property Mortgages,37 Yale L.J.706(1927-1928).
[5]H.Yntema,The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws,37 Yale L.J.480(1928).
[6]See J.Frank,Law and the Modern Mind,New York:Brentano's Publishers,1930,p.131.
[7]J.Frank,Are Judges Human? 80 Pa.L.Rev.28(1931-1932).
[8]L.Kalman,Legal realism at Yale,1927-1960,Chapel Hill and London:The University of North Carolina Press,1986,p.8.
[9]K.Llewellyn,The Bramble Bush,Oceana Publications,Inc.,1960,p.74.
[1]W.Cook,Scientific Method and the Law,13 A.B.A.J.306(1927).
[2]See O.Holmes,The Common Law,Boston:Little,Brown,and Company,1923,p.1.
[3]O.Holmes,The Path of the Law,1 Boston L.School Mag.10(1896-1897).
[4]柯恩发现,1910年英国开始对土地征税和取消贵族院的特权,正是由于这次公法领域的斗争胜利才使得私法领域的革命最终完成。See M.Cohen,Property and Sovereignty,13 Cornell L.Q.9-11(1927-1928).
[5]See J.Frank,Law and the Modern Mind,New York:Brentano's Publishers,1930,p.248.
[6]Lochner v.New York,198 U.S.45,25 S.Ct.539(1905).
[7]See J.Frank,Law and the Modern Mind,New York:Brentano's Publishers,1930,p.111.
[8]J.Hutcheson,The Judgment Intuitive:The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision,14 Cornell L.Q.278(1928-1929).
[9]See W.W.Fisher Ⅲ,M.J.Horwitz,T.A.Reed(editors),American Legal Realism,New York:1993,p.165.
[1]这是卢埃林在同庞德论战中提出的两个法律现实主义者的共同出发点,但他同时指出,它们虽然是法律现实主义的突出特点,但并不是法律现实主义所独有。See K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1236,1238(1930-1931).
[2]Sec J.Frank,Law and the Modern Mind,New York:Brentano's Publishers,1930,p.246.
[3]R.Pound,Law in Books and Law in Action,44 Am.L.Rev.22(1910).
[4]W.Twining,Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement,Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1973,p.27.
[5]W.Cook,Walter Wheeler Cook,in My Philosophy of Law,Littleton:Fred B.Rothman & Co.,1987,pp.62-63.
[1]See K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1236(1930-1931).
[2]W.Cook,Scientific Method and the Law,13 A.B.A.J.308(1927).
[3]L.Green,The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases,28 Colum.L.Rev.1015(1928).
[4]K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1236-1237(1930-1931).
[5]K.Llewellyn,A Realistic Jurisprudence--The Next Step,30 Colum.L.Rev.443-444(1930).
[6]Moore,Rational Basis of Legal Institutions,23 Colum.L.Rev.612(1923).
[1]K.Llewellyn,The Bramble Bush,Oceana Publications,Inc.,1960,p.52.
[2]O.W.Holmes,The Common Law,Boston:Little,Brown,and Company,1923,p.1.
[3]Vegelahn v.Guntner,167 Mass.92,44 N.E.1077(1896).
[4]A.Corbin,Offer and Acceptance,and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations,26 Yale L.J.206(1916-1917).
[5]K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1252(1930-1931).
[1]H.Laski,The Basis of Vicarious Liability,26 Yale L.J.122,112(1916-1917).
[2]O.Holmes,The Path of the Law,1 Boston L.School Mag.9(1896-1897).
[3]J.Singer,Legal Realism Now,76 Cal.L.Rev.482-483(1988).
[4]N.Isaacs,The Standardizing of Contracts,27 Yale L.J.37-38(1917-1918).
[5]M.Cohen,Property and Sovereignty,13 Cornell L.Q.21(1927-1928).
[1]T.Arnold,The Jurisprudence of Edward S.Robinson,46 Yale L.J.1282(1936-1937).
[2]T.Arnold,The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process.45 Harv.L.Rev.645(1931-1932).
[3]K.Llewellyn,The Bramble Bush,Oceana Publications,Inc.,1960,p.94.
[4]A.Gulliver,Book Review,41 Yale L.J.787(1931-1932).
[5]W.Douglas,A Functional Approach to the Law of Business Associations,23 Ill.L.Rev.673-675(1928-1929).
[6]W.W.Fisher III,M.J.Horwitz,T.A.Reed(editors),American Legal Realism,New York:1993,pp.98-99.
[7]J.Singer,Legal Realism Now,76 Cal.L.Rev.483-485(1988).
[1]Ibid,pp.487-488,494.
[2]Ibid,p.491.
[1]E.Purcell,The Crisis of Democratic Theory:Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value,Lexington,Kentucky:The University Press of Kentucky,1973,pp.22-23.
[2]Lochner v.New York,198 U.S.45,25 S.Ct.539(1905).
[3]W.Sturges and S.Clark,Legal Theory and Real Property Mortgages,37 Yale L.J.706(1927-1928).
[4]F.Cohen,Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,35 Col.L.Rev.839(1935).
[1]W.Hohfeld,Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,23 Yale L.J.28-29,58(1913).
[2]W.Cook,Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life,27 Yale L.J.789-790(1918).
[3]See C.Clark,Relations,Legal and Otherwise,5 Ill.L.Q.26(1922-1923);W.Cook,Hohfeld's Contributions to the Science of Law,28 Yale L.J.721(1919);A.Corbin,Legal Analysis and Terminology 29 Yale L.J.163(1919);K.Llewellyn,The Bramble Bush,Oceana Publications,Inc.,1960,pp.97-101,etc..
[4]K.Llewellyn,A Realistic Jurisprudence--The Next Step,30 Colum.L.Rev.453-454(1930).
[5]K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1237(1930-1931).
[1]A.Corbin,Jural Relations and their Classification,30 Yale L.J.237-238(1920-1921).
[2]E.Lorenzen & R.Heilman,The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws,83 U.Pa.L.Rev.561(1934-1935).
[3]W.W.Fisher III,M.J.Horwitz,T.A.Reed(editors),American Legal Realism,New York:Oxford University Press,1993,pp.166-167.
[4]G.Gilmore,Legal Realism:Its Cause and Cure,70 Yale L.J.1047(1960-1961).
[1]Sec G.Aichele,Legal realism and twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the changing consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990,p.56.
[2]K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1255(1930-1931).
[3]G.Gilmore,Legal Realism:Its Cause and Cure,70 Yale L.J.1045(1960-1961).
[4]R.Stevens,Law School:Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s,Chapel Hill and London:The University of North Carolina Press,1983,p.156.
[1]See G.Aichele,Legal realism and twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the changing consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990,p.76.
[2]Ibid,p.77.
[3]M.Martin,Legal Realism:American and Scandinavian,New York:Peter Lang Publishing,Inc.,1997,pp.70,76.
[4]See W.W.Fisher III,M.J.Horwitz,T.A.Reed(editors),American Legal Realism,New York:1993,p.164.此外,辛格(Singer)认为Frank只是法律现实主义运动的边缘角色,他用心理学解释司法判决和对弗洛伊德主义的推崇没有得到其他现实主义者采纳;法律现实主义者并不认为法院判决只是由法官的心理特性决定,也并不因为法律规则的不确定性就认为所有归纳全无意义。See,J.W.Singer,Legal Realism Now,76 Cal.L.Rev.470(1988);卡尔曼(Kalman)认为,法律现实主义者本质上并不反对法律规则和概念,他们相信规则和概念在预测司法判决中有用,但他们发现其他因素在理解司法过程中同样发挥作用。See L.Kalman,Legal realism at Yale,1927-1960,Chapel Hill and London:The University of North Carolina Press,1986,p.6.
[5]M.White,Social Thought in America:the Revolt against Formalism,Boston:Beacon Press,1957,pp.61-62.
[6]K.Llewellyn,On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence,40 Colum.L.Rev.593,599(1940).
[7]K.Llewellyn,The Bramble Bush,Oceana Publications,Inc.,1960,p.xi.
[1]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,p.30,note52a.
[2]See J.Frank,Law and the Modern Mind,New York:Brentano's Publishers,1930,p.252.
[3]J.Singer,Legal Realism Now,76 Cal.L.Rev.474-475(1988).
[4]H.Jones,Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism,61 Coum.L.Rev.803(1961).
[5]See G Aichele,Legal realism and twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the changing consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990,pp.97-101.
[6]W.Twining,Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement,Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1973,p.382.
[1]C.Langdell,A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts,Boston:Little,Brown,and Company,1871,p.vi,Preface.
[2]See The American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,St Paul:American Law Institute Publishers,1934,p.ix.
[3]L.Kalman,Legal realism at Yale,1927-1960,Chapel Hill and London:The University of North Carolina Press,1986,
[4]See The American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,St Paul:American Law Institute Publishers,1934,p.ix.
[1]Ibid,pp.x-xiii.
[2]See American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,§121,§135,§137,§142,§149,(1934).
[3]See American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,§155,§165,(1934).
[4]Ibid,§208,§211,§215,§245,§216,§249,§255,§257,§306(1934).
[5]See American Law Institute,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws,§283结婚;§285离婚:§287子女是否婚生,这一部分增加了适用子女住所地法;§289收养,虽然此处规定适用法院地法,但根据第78条,享有管辖权的法院为养父母或养子女的住所地法院,实际适用的法律与《重述(一)》相同:§296公司成立;§301公司的权利和责任;§223土地转让;§231土地转让人的责任;§255动产转让人的能力;§236土地的无遗嘱继承;§239有关土地继承的遗嘱有效性和效果;§260动产无遗嘱继承;§263有关动产继承的遗嘱有效性和效果,(1969).
[6]Smith v.Condry,42U.S.28.11 L.Ed.350843).
[1]See Morse,Torts in Private International Law,North-Holland Publishing Company,1978,pp.11-13.
[2]Slater v.Mexican National R.R.,194 U.S.120,126(1904).
[3]《重述(一)》第9章“不法行为”并非只是简单规定侵权适用侵权行为最后结果发生地法,它涵盖了“侵权(Torts§§377-383)”、“死亡案件的诉讼(Actions for Death§§391-397)”、“工人赔偿(Workman's Compensation §§398-403)”、“海事侵权(Maritime Torts §§404-411)”、“赔偿金(Damages §§412-424)”和“犯罪(Crime §§425-428)”六个小节。在这一章中,基本原理是一致的,即行为适用行为地的法律和保护既得权,但并非所有的条文都是如此。在“工人赔偿”一节中,基本原则是各州的工人赔偿行政裁判所(administrative tribunal)只适用本州的工人赔偿法。See American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,St.Paul:American Law Institute Publishers,1934,pp.485-486.这一原则基本上为《第二次重述》所吸收。Cf.American Law Institute,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws,Chapter 7,Topic 3“Workman's Compensation”,“Introductory Note”,(1969)。在“海事侵权”部分有两个侵权行为地法的例外,一是在公海上发生的船上的侵权行为以及在公海上发生的船舶碰撞且船舶属于共同的船旗国时,适用船舶的船旗国法律(§406,§410a);二是在公海上发生的船舶碰撞且船舶不属于同一船旗国时,以及海事赔偿责任限制适用的是法院地法(§410b,§411)。See American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,§§377-428,(1934).
[1]See American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,§§332-347,§358(1934).
[2]J.Beale,2 ATreatise on the Conflict of Laws 1079-1085,§332.2,New York:Baker,Voorhis & Co.,1935.
[3]Ibid,§332.3,pp.1086-1089.
[1]Ibid,§332.4,pp.1090-1092.
[2]Ibid,§332.5,§332.7,§332.57,pp.1095-1174.
[3]Ibid,§332.57,p.1174.
[4]J.Beale,3 A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 1925-1947,§§51-61,New York:Baker,Voorhis ＆ Co.,1935.
[1]Ibid,§68,pp.1960-1961.
[2]Ibid,§71,pp.1964-1965.
[3]Ibid,§73,p.1967.
[1]J.Beale,3 A Selection of Cases on the Conflict of Laws 501,Summary of the Conflict of Laws,§§1-5,Cambridge:The Harvard Law Review-Publishing Association,(1902).
[2]J.Beale,Dicey's "Conflict of Law",10 Harv.L.Rev.168(1896-1897).
[3]J.Beale,1 A Selection of Cases on the Conflict of Laws v,preface,Cambridge:The Harvard Law Review Publishing Association,(1900).
[4]J.Beale,2 A Selection of Cases on the Conflict of Laws 3,Cambridge:The Harvard Law Review Publishing Association,(1901).
[5]See J.Beale,3 ATreatise on the Conflict of Laws 1904,§34,New York:Baker,Voorhis & Co.,1935.
[6]See H.Yntema,The Historic Bases of Private international Law,2 Am.J.Comp.L.308,Note29(1953).文中提到戴西通过其好友霍兰德(Holland)的著作《法理学》吸收了胡伯理论中的既得权成分。
[7]F.C.von Savigny(translated by W.Guthrie),ATreatise on the Conflict of Laws,2nd Edition,South Hackensack,N.J.:Rothman Reprints,Inc.,1972,p.147.
[8]W.Samuels,Joseph Henry Beale's Lectures on Jurisprudence,1909,29 U.Miami L.Rev.261-280(1974-1975).
[1]M.Cohen,A Critical Sketch of Legal Philosophy,in Law:A Century of Progress,1835-1935,New York:New York University Press,1937,pp.290-291.
[2]J.Beaie,The Necessity for a Study of Legal System,14 Ass'n.of Am.L.Schools,Proceedings 32(1914).
[3]C.Langdell,A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts,Boston:Little,Brown,and Company,1871,pp.vi-vii,Preface.
[4]J.Beale,The Necessity for a Study of Legal System,14 Ass'n.of Am.L.Schools,Proceedings 32(1914).
[1]H.Yntema,The Historic Bases of Private International Law,2 Am.J.Comp.L.313(1953).
[2]J.Beale,The Necessity for a Study of Legal System,14 Ass'n.of Am.L.Schools,Proceedings 38(1914).
[3]J.Beale,1 ATreatise on the Conflict of Laws 24-25,§3.4.New York:Baker,Voorhis&Co.,1935.
[4]Ibid,§4.10,p.43.
[1]Ibid,§5.2,p.52.
[2]Ibid,§1.12,p.16.
[3]Ibid,§5.1,p.51,§5.3,,p.52.
[4]J.Beale,2 A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 1078,§332.1.New York:Baker,Voorhis & Co.,1935.
[1]Ibid.§332.9.,pp.1105-1109.
[2]Ibid,§332.1.,p.1077.
[1]F.Sloovere,On Looking into Mr.Beale's Conflict of Laws,13 N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev.342-344(1935-1936).
[2]比尔第一次完整地阐述既得权理论是在1902年。See J.Beale,3 A Selection of Cases on the Conflict of Laws 501,Summary of the Conflict of Laws,§§1-5,Cambridge:The Harvard Law Review Publishing Association,(1902).
[3]L.Kalman,Legal realism at Yale,1927-1960,Chapel Hill and London:The University of North Carolina Press,1986,p.45.
[4]在1935年出版的《冲突法专论》序言中他提到“一支流行但短命的法哲学学派”批评他的法律原则是“概念式和法条主义的”。See J.Beale,1 A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws xiii.Apologia,New York:Baker,Voorhis & Co.,1935.
[5]S.Symeonides(ed.),Private International Law at the End of 20~(th)Century:Progress or Regress? Kluwer Law International,2000,p.22.
[6]A.Harding,Joseph Henry Beale:Pioneer,2 M.L.Rev.131(1937).
[1]J.Beale.1 ATreatise on the Conflict of Laws 56,§7.3,New York:Baker,Voorhis & Co.,1935.
[2]《重述(一)》第八条“关于土地所有权或离婚问题的规则”:(1)土地所有权的所有问题适用土地所在地法,包括该国的冲突法规则;(2)关于离婚判决有效性的所有问题适用当事人住所地的法律,包括该国的冲突法规则。See American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,§8,(1934).
[3]J.Beale,1 A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 39,§4.7,New York:Baker,Voorhis & Co.,1935,
[4]Ibid,p.49,§4.13.
[5]W,Samuels,Joseph Henry Beale's Lectures on Jurisprudence,1909,29 U.Miami L.Rev.266,270(1974-1975).
[1]Ibid,pp.50-51,§4.13(Citation omitted).
[1]Ibid,preface iv,apologia,p.xiii.
[2]A.Harding,Joseph Henry Beale:Pioneer,2 M.L.Rev.134(1937).
[3]Ibid,p.134.
[4]F.Sloovere,On Looking into Mr.Beale's Conflict of Laws,13 N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev.345(1935-1936).
[1]A.Harding,Joseph Henry Beale:Pioneer,2 M.L.Rev.160(1937)
[1]凯格尔是较早关注美国冲突法理论演变的欧洲学者,并使用了冲突法“革命”一词。但是,他本人最终的结论并不认为冲突法领域存在革命,而是认定传统的制度依然占据主流,批判者不过是处在边缘的少数派。See,G.Kegel,The Crisis of Conflict of Laws.112 Recueil des Cours 95,263(1964).
[2]塞缪尼德斯认为冲突法革命开始于20世纪60年代早期。See,S.Symeonides(ed.),Private International Law at the End of 20~(th)Century:Progress or Regress?Kluwer Law Int'l,2000,p.22.布里梅耶认为美国冲突法革命有两次,第一次发生于20世纪30和40年代,以凯弗斯(D.Cavers)和库克(W Cook)对比尔和《第一次重述》中的属地理论的批判为标志;第二次开始于50年代后期和60年代,以柯里(B.Currie)提出“支配兴趣分析(governmental interest analysis)说”为标志。See,L.Brilmayer,The Role of Substantive and Choice of Law Policies in the Formation and Application of Choice of Law Rules,1995,pp.19-20.欧洲的学者对此也认识不一,舍尔(K.Siehr)认为是富德法官在贝柯克案中的推理“搅起了美国冲突法革命”。See,K.Siehr,Revolution and Evolution in Conflicts Law,60 La.L.Rev.1353(1999-2000).维塔(E.Vitta)则认为冲突法革命“从50年代开始主导美国实践”。See,E.Vitta,The Impact in Europe of the American“Conflicts Revolution”,30Am.J.Comp.L.1(1982).韩德培主编的教材认为,“自20世纪60年代以来,美国兴起了一场‘冲突法革命',”但该书随后的内容却从介绍库克20年代的“本地法说”和凯弗斯30年代的“规则和结果选择说”开始。参见韩德培主编:《国际私泫》,高等教育出版社和北京大学出版社2000年版,第48-49页。
[3]库克的代表作“冲突法的逻辑和法律基础”发表在1924年的《耶鲁法律评论》上,安特马的批判主张主要体现在发表于1927-1928年卷同一杂志上的“角帖书方法和冲突法”一文中,劳伦森的批判观点主要见于1923-1924年卷同一杂志上的“属地性、公共政策和冲突法”一文中。
[4]凯弗斯在1943年关于库克论文集的书评中指出,虽然库克对比尔的理论批判不遗余力,但其效果渺渺。See,D.Cavers,Review of Walter Wheeler Cook.The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,in The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,pp.40-41.
[1]K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1222(1930-1931).在这篇法律现实主义代表作的附录中,卢埃林罗列了20位他所认可的法律现实主义者及其代表作,库克、劳伦森和安特马的名字分别出现在第1257、1258和1259页。
[2]L.Kakman,Legal Realism at Yale,1927-1960,Chapel Hill and London:the University of North Carolina Press,1986,p.113.
[3]D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.4.
[1]C.Clark,H.Carey,Walter Wheeler Cook 38 Ill.L.Rev.342-343,346(1943-1944).
[2]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,p.x.
[3]Ibid,p.ix.
[4]库克在晚年的“我的法律哲学”一文简要总结了自己的法律观,并称自己的思想是“科学经验主义”。See,Walter Wheeler Cook,in My Philosophy of Law,Boston:Boston Law Book Co.,1941,p.56.下文对其法理思想介绍部分没有注明出处的均来自该文。
[1]安特马将库克对冲突法的贡献总结为两方面:一是“本地法原理”;二是“法律术语和规则的含义相对于其内容和目的可变性原理”。See,H.Yntema,Walter Wheeler Cook,38 Ill.L.Rev.351(1943-1944).
[2]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,pp.3-5,29.
[3]Ibid,pp.188,159.
[1]Walter Wheeler Cook,in My Philosophy of Law,Boston:Boston Law Book Co.,1941,pp.60-61.
[2]W.Cook,An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,37 Ill.L.Rev.420(1942-1943).
[3]Ibid.
[4]Ibid,pp.419-422.
[1]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,pp.71-72,78.
[2]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,33 Yale L.J.469-470(1923-1924).W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,pp.20-21(斜体为原文所加——笔者注).
[1]Guinness v Miller,291 Fed.790,(S.D.N.Y 1923).
[2]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,p.32(斜体为原文所加——笔者注).
[3]Ibid,p.33.
[1]Ibid,pp.60,71-72,78.
[2]《第一次冲突法重述》第7条“法院适用的法律”:“除非第8条规定的情况,当争议问题涉及的法律所属的两个国家冲突法规定存在不同时,应当适用法院地的冲突法规则;(a)作为决定法律选择的前提,需要决定法律概念的性质和特点,在所有情况下由法院根据自己的法律决定这些问题;(b)在作出支配特定案情的法律选择时,如果适用另一国家的法律,因为判决案件唯一采用的冲突法是法院地的冲突法,所以适用的外国法就是适用于手头案情的法律,而不是外国的冲突法。”American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,§7,(1934).
[3]《第一次冲突法重述》第378条“支配原告损害的法律”:“侵权地的法律决定一个人是否遭受了法律上的伤害。”按照库克的观点,该条应该改为:“侵权地的国内规则决定一个人是否遭受了法律上的伤害。”American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,§378,(1934).本段引用的库克的论述分别见于其著作的第319页、331页、335页和342页。
[1]第66条“从一州发向另一州的通讯”:“当通讯从一州发向另一州时,每个州都对通讯享有管辖权。”“评论”(c):“法律选择问题的产生。如果一项交易是以从一州发向另一州的通讯方式达成,一个州的法律对这种信息赋予债务效力,但另一州的法律则不然,在这种情况下,法院处在第三州,如果在那里提出这个问题,法院可以挑选一州或另一州的法律支配交易,并相应地赋予或不赋予信息以债务效力。因此,同样,如果信息发出或受到的州对此赋予了不同的债务,第三国的法院可以选择第一个州或第二个州的法律决定赋予的债务内容。”American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,§66,Commentc.(1934).
[2]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,p.366.
[3]W.Cook,An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,37 Ill.L.Rev.420(1942-1943).
[4]Ibid,p.422.
[5]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,pp.95,105,136.
[1]Ibid,pp.215,188,239,441,454.
[2]W.Cook,An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,37 Ill.L.Rev.418-419(1942-1943).
[3]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,p.47.
[4]Ibid,p.ix,Preface.
[1]Ibid,pp.345-346.
[2]Ibid,pp.389,398-399,416-417.
[3]D.Cavers,The Two "Local Law" Theories,in The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,pp.46-47.
[1]R.Leflar,Choice-influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.Lawgev.268(1966).
[2]E.Sykes and M.Plyles,Australian Private International Law,The Law Book Company Limited,2~(nd)Edition,1987,p10.
[3]在安特马的纪念文集后面附有其生平和学术成果清单。See,K.Nadelmann,A.von Mehren,J.Hazard(ed.),XX~(th)Century Comparative and Conflicts Law,Legal Essays in Honor of Hessele Yntema,A.W.Sythoff-Leyden,(1961),pp.533-544.
[4]安特马有较大影响的冲突法论文包括:The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws,37 Yale L.J.468(1927-1928);The Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,36 Colum.L.Rev.183(1936):“Autonomy”in choice of law,1 Am.J.Comp.L.341(1952);The Historic Bases of Private International Law,2 Am.J.Comp.L.297(1953);Contract and Conflict of Laws:“Autonomy”in Choice of Law in the United States,1 N.Y.L.F.46(1955)。
[1]H.Yntema,The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws,37 Yale L.J.477,480-481(1927-1928).
[2]Ibid.pp.474-475.
[1]Ibid,p.477.
[2]H.Yntema,The Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,36 Colum.L.Rev.191,192,194(1936).
[3]Ibid,p.209.
[4]Ibid,p.222.
[5]Ibid,p.223.
[1]H.Yntema,Contract and Conflict of Laws:"Autonomy" in Choice of Law in the United States,1 N.Y.L.F.55-57(1955).
[2]Ibid,p.47.
[3]Ibid,pp.65-66.
[1]H.Yntema,The Historic Bases of Private International Law,2 Am.J.Comp.L.315-317(1953)
[2]A.Corbin,Ernest Gustav Lorenzen,60 Yale L.J.579(1951).
[3]E.Lorenzen,Territoriality,Public Policy,and the Conflict of Laws,33 Yale L.J.738-743(1923-1924).
[4]E.Lorenzen,R.Heilman,The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws,83 U.Pa.L.Rev.556(1934-1935)
[5]Ibid,p.560.
[6]Ibid,p.556 infra.
[1]E.Lorenzen,Territoriality,Public Policy,and the Conflict of Laws,33 Yale L.J.748(1923-1924)
[2]E.Lorenzen,Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws(II),30 Yale L.J.658,673(1920-1921).
[3]适用于合同效果的规则可以总结如下:(1)合同效果适用当事人选择的任何国家的法律;(2)如果没有当事人明示的意图,则合同效果适用指定的履行地的法律;(3)如果没有显示当事人的意图而且没有指定合同履行地,则适用合同签订地的法律;(4)如此适用的法律不仅决定产生于合同的初始权利和义务,而且适用于产生于违约的派生权利;但是,没有付款导致的法定利率适用支付地的法律;(5)履行的模式适用履行地的法律和惯例;(6)如果合同效果依赖于指定价格、重量或方式或履行时间的特定术语的含义时,则指定适用的是履行地的术语,除非情况表明当事人在不同意义上适用这些术语。E.Lorenzen,Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws(III),72 Yale L.J.53(1921-1922).
[4]E.Lorenzen,Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws,in Selected Articles on the Conflict of Laws,New Haven:Yale University Press,1947,pp.364,378.This article first appeared in 47 Law Quarterly Review 483(1931).
[1]H.Yntema,The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws,37 Yale L.J.478,481(1927-1928).
[1]目前国内国际私法学界普遍将Jurisdiction-selecting rule翻译为“管辖权选择规则”。这种翻译虽然并非完全错误,但至少并不能准确表明凯弗斯的思路。分配立法管辖权可以说是比尔既得权说的核心内容,但凯弗斯揭示比尔及其批判者犯了共同的错误,把“法律”选择(choice-of-law)错当成“法域”选择(choose between jurisdictions)。在凯弗斯晚年的论文集中,他非常鲜明地表明了自己1933年论文的主题思想之一:他虽然认同法律现实主义者对《第一次冲突法重述》的批判观点,但发现抛弃比尔规则的法院依然欠缺指引规则。反复审视这一困境,凯弗斯找到了问题的症结:“我开始确信问题的根本是这样一个事实,即《重述》及其批判者呼吁法院解决的是一个错误的问题:在法律选择案件中要求法院在法域(jurisdictions)——援用的法律所属的州(states)或国家(nations)——之间作出选择,这种做法并不考虑相冲突的法律的内容。籍此,一个法律选择(choice-of-law)问题就转换成了国家(州)选择(choice-of-state)问题。”D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.xii.从后文所述凯弗斯1933年论文相关部分,也可以看出这种翻译更为合理。王承志博士注意到了这个问题,认为将“jurisdiction-selection”翻译为“法域选择”“可能更便于理解”。但他没有对此论证,而且在正文中继续使用“管辖权选择”。参见王承志:《美国冲突法重述之晚近发展》,法律出版社2006年版,第27页,注①。
[2]凯弗斯一生冲突法著述少而精,代表作品有:A Critique of the Choice-of-law Problem,47 Harv.L.Rev.173(1933-1934):The Choice-of-law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965.前者提出了“规则和结果选择说”,后者提出“优先选择原则”。在5年后的海牙演讲中,凯弗斯全面阐述了自己的冲突法理念和制度设计。See,Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective,131 Recueil des Cours 75-308(1970).
[3]D.Cavers,Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective,131 Recueil des Cours 80(1970).
[1]D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.4.
[2]D.Cavers,A Critique of the Choice-of-law Problem,47 Harv.L.Rev.178(1933-1934)
[3]Ibid,pp.178-179.
[1]Ibid,pp.181-182.
[2]Ibid,p.186.
[1]Ibid,pp.182-187.
[2]Ibid,pp.157-188.
[3]Ibid,p.191.
[1]Ibid,p.189.
[2]Ibid,pp.192-193.
[3]Ibid,pp.193-194.
[4]凯弗斯认为,“强调社会和经济因素的重要性不可避免地导致细化问题和限制规则的范丽”。如果“演绎方法反对者的观点如果得到全面发展”,人们或许期待对应保险合同有条规则,对应可转让票据有另一条规则,而对应雇佣合同是第三种规则,其他交易还有其它的规则。Ibid.,p.189,note34.
[1]Ibid,pp.197-203.
[1]Ibid,p.176.
[2]D.Cavers,The Choice-of-law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.9,note 22.
[3]Ibid,pp.8-9.
[4]A.von Mehren,K.Nadelmann,D.Trautman,A Greeting to David F.Cavers,41 Law & Contemp.Probs.v(1977).
[5]R.de Nova,Historical and Comparative Introduction to Conflict of Laws,118 Recueil des Cours 597(1966).
[1]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 334(1964)
[2]Ibid,p.599.
[3]D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.4.
[4]A.E.Anton,Private International Law,1967,p.40,cited from E.Scoles,P.Hay,Conflict of Laws,2~(nd)ed.,St Paul:West Publishing Co,1992,p.28.
[1]B.Currie,Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,1959 Duke L.J.177(1959);also in B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.183.
[2]柯里(1912-1965)的冲突法论文绝大部分编撰在其冲突法论文集中,该论文集共收录了十四篇论文,其中前13篇发表于1958至1961年间,最后一篇发表在1963年。See,B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963.除了这部论文集之外,柯里的其他论文还有Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws,22 U.Chi.L.Rev.405(1955).但该论文的观点被他自己1960年发表在同一杂志上的论文彻底推翻,1960年的论文被录入其论文集中。还有两篇论文发表在1963年,分别是The Disinterested Third State,28 Law & Contemp.Probs.754(1963);Comments on Babcock v.Jackson,A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,63 Colum.L.Rev.1233(1963).柯里发表的最后一篇冲突法论文是1964年的Full Faith and Credit,Chiefly to Judgments:A Role for Congress,1964 Sup.Ct.Rev.89(1964).
[1]将governmental interest analysis翻译成“政府利益分析”是目前国内学界难以准确理解柯里学说的主要原因之一。柯里在其文中对州及其立法机关的描述多处采用了拟人化手法,如“将案件的列表摆在马萨诸塞州立法机关的化身面前,…几乎可以肯定会面临不耐烦和回绝(place this array before our personification of the Massachusetts General Assembly,…almost certainly meet with impatience and rebuif)”、“只对短期‘所获'感兴趣(interested only in short-run‘gains')”、 “希望(desire)适用自己的法律”、“无情地(ruthless)”、 “理性利他主义(rational altruism)”、“自我中心(egocentricity)”、“短视而自私(short-sighted,selfish)”上述比喻分别见于B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,pp.83-84,89,108,185,186,593,616.柯里认为,如果审理案件的法官认为一个州与案件存在密切的联系,将该州的法律适用于案件可合理地实现其立法政策,便认定该州具有“支配兴趣”。Ibid,p.228.Government在英文中不仅具有“政府”的意思,还有“管理或支配行为(act of governing)”的含义。“支配兴趣”在一些地方可被替换为“管理兴趣”或“法律适用的兴趣”。美国学者普遍正确把握了柯里的这一观点,如反对柯里学说的荣格(Junger)教授认为柯里相信,“通过将法律适用于跨州和纯州内交易中,各州具有实现法律背后的目的的兴趣(interest)——类似于人的愿望(desire)。”F.Junger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,p.98.另一位批评“支配兴趣分析”的布里梅耶教授也在一篇论文中谈到:“…因为在理论上辨明‘兴趣(interests)'决定了立法者是否希望适用其法律(wish to have its law applied),‘兴趣'是下文批判性探讨中的核心概念。”L.Brilmayer,Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent,78 Mich.L.Rev.394(1979-1980).支持柯里学说的塞德勒(Sedler)将“支配兴趣”理解为:“当州法体现了一种强烈的政策和通过把法律适用到特定案件中将促进这种政策时,州法确实‘希望适用(wish to be applied)'到私人之间的诉讼中。”R.Sedler,Professor Juenger's Challenge to the Interest Analysis Approach to Choice-of-law:An Appreciation and a Response,23 U.C.Davis L.Rev.878(1989-1990).由于“支配兴趣”意味着一个州对和自己利益攸关的案件具有适用自己的法律以实现立法目的的兴趣,因此“兴趣”一词有时可以替换为“利益”。李浩培先生对“支配兴趣”的理解接近了柯里的原意,他将此表述为:“柯氏认为,任何国家的实体法规则都是根据一定的政策制定的。国家正如个人有其愿望一样,‘关心'于将其实体法规则在适当的情形下适用于涉外案件,以实施其实体法规则所采取的政策。当国家有这样的‘关心'时,它对于其法律规则的适用于本案就具有‘利益'。这种国家的利益,柯氏称为‘政府的利益'。”李浩培:《李浩培文选》,法律出版社2000年版,第402-403页。
[2]Editor's Note," 34 Mercer L.Rev.469(1983),cited from F.Juenger,Conflict of Laws:A Critique of Interest Analysis,32 Am.J.Comp.L.1(1984).
[3]D.Cavers,A Correspondence with Brainerd Currie,1957-1958,34 Mercer L.Rev.471(1982-1983).
[4]F.Junger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,p.103.
[5]L.Brilmayer,Conflict of laws,foundations and future directions,Little,Brown and Company,1991,p.60.
[6]反对柯里学说的学者主要有Hill、Juenger、Twerski、Evrigenis、Kegel、Bodenheimer、Borchers、Brilmayer、Hay、Kozyris、Rosenberg、Singer、Trautman、Tushnet、von Mehren等,赞同柯里学术的主要有Kay、Posnak、Sedler、Allo、Baade、Kramer、Weinberg、Weintraub等。See,E.Stoles,P.Hay,P.Borchers,S.Symeonides,Conflict of Laws,4~(th)ed.,Thomson,2004,pp.34-35,nn.47-48.
[1]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.585.
[2]B.Currie,Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws,22 U.Chi.L.Rev.405(1955).
[3]Klaxon Co.v.Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,313 U.S.487,61 S.Ct.1020,85 L.Ed.1477(1941).该案将Erie案中的原理引入冲突法,要求联邦法院在涉及多州居民的诉讼中适用所在州的冲突法。
[4]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.438.
[5]Ibid,p.586.H.Kay,A Defence of Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis,215 Recueil des Cours 19-21(1989).
[6]柯里在文中区分州(state)和国家(country/nation),绝大部分地方他只是分析涉及州际法律冲突的判例,个别地方分析国际法律冲突的判例时,他使用“国家”一词。如在分析涉及西班牙法律的“罗莫洛(Romero)案”时,他说“当法官知道其本国的法律(政策和兴趣)和另一国的发生冲突时,他的责任看起来十分清楚。”此处使用的即为“country”。需要指出的是,柯里解决国际法律冲突和州际法律冲突采用同样的分析方法。B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.371.
[7]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.64.
[1]“法庭之友(amicus curiae)”是美国诉讼法中的一种制度,一个组织或个人虽然不是案件当事人,但他同案件具有利害关系,他可以自己要求或应法院要求在法庭上表达意见。See B.Garner(editor in chief),Black's Law Dictionary(Abridged 8~(th)Edit.),Thomson,2005,p.71.
[2]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press.1963,pp.228,621,624.
[3]Ibid,p.52.
[4]Ibid,pp.138,161.
[1]Ibid,p.101.
[2]Ibid,p.608.
[3]Ibid,p.776.
[4]Ibid,p.53.
[5]Ibid,p.170.
[6]Ibid,p.180.
[1]Ibid,pp.180-181,183.
[2]柯里自己的表述为“当我们学会了问正确的问题我们才更可能获得正确的答案。”Ibid,p.617.这里他借用了弗鲁恩
[3]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws Durham:Duke University Press,1963,pp.178,617.
[4]Ibid,pp.64,756.
[5]Ibid,p.443.
[6]在回答马萨诸塞州保护妇女的立法及于哪些人时,柯里的回答是:“什么样的已婚妇女?嘿,当然是那些其福利受到马萨诸塞州关注的妇女——也就是马州的已婚妇女。”同样,“纽约州的政策不是为保护所有在纽约买票或登机的人。它是为保护纽约人。”Ibid,pp.85,705.
[7]该案的案情大致如下:住所在马萨诸塞州的普拉特夫人为促成其丈夫与米利肯的合伙关系,对丈夫的信用出具了一份担保书。她将担保书交给丈夫,她丈夫在缅因州将担保书交给米利肯。依赖该担保书并应普拉特先生的要求,米利肯向其发送了货物,但普拉特先生最后没有偿还货款。为此,米利肯向马州的法院起诉,要求普拉特夫人承担担 保责任。根据缅因州法律,已婚妇女有缔约能力,合同有效;而马州法律规定相反,合同无效。但在起诉前不久,马州已废除了已婚妇女无缔约能力的规定。马州最高法院最后依据合同缔结地(缅因州)法认定合同有效,推翻原审判决,判决米利肯胜诉。Milliken v.Pratt,125 Mass.374(1878),cited from ibid,p.78.
[1]柯里这篇论文为Married Women's Contracts:A Study in Conflict-of-laws Method,最初发表在25 U.Chil L.Rev.227(1961).该文被录入柯里的论文集第77-127页。对该案分析后出现的真假冲突的结论见于该书第107页。柯里自己并没有提出“真实冲突”或“虚假冲突”的概念,他分别称为真正的问题(real problems)和没有真实冲突的问题(noreal conflicts problem)。
[2]Ibid.p.108.B.Currie,The Disinterested Third State,28 Law & Contemp.Probs.756(1963).
[3]B.Currie.Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.82.
[4]Ibid,pp.117,123,125,278.
[1]Ibid,pp.47,119.
[2]Ibid,pp.271,616.
[3]B.Currie,The Disinterested Third State,28 Law & Contemp.Probs.757(1963).
[4]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,pp.153-156.
[1]B.Currie,The Disinterested Third State.28 Law & Contemp.Probs.767,768,778-780(1963).
[2]Ibid,pp.765,773.
[3]这是柯里为里斯(W.Reese)和罗森伯格(M.Rosenberg)所编判例法教材所做的综述,转引自H.Kay,A Defense of
Carrie's Governmental Interest Analysis,215 Recueil des Cours 76-77(1989).在此之前,柯里还曾三次综述过自己的思想。前两次的综述基本一致,第三次综述出现较大变化,增加了有关“表面冲突”和“无兴趣第三州”的内容,第四次增加了通过比较兴趣大小解决“无兴趣案件”的内容。比较他最早所作的一次综述:(1)通常,即使在涉外案件中,法院应该理所当然地将法院地法作为裁决规则的来源。(2)当情况表明,外州的法律而不是法院地的法律应当提供裁决规则,法院应当首先决定法院地法表明的管理政策(govornmental policy)——或许说社会、经济或行政政策有所帮助。然后法院应当查明,法院地州和在审案件的关系——即和当事人、交易、争议事项,诉讼的关系——是否如此密切以致将案件置于该州管理关注的范围,并为声明该州具有一种将其政策适用于这种情况的兴趣提供了合理基础。(3)如果有必要,法院应当同样决定提供的外州法表明的政策,以及外州是否对将其政策适用于在审案件具有一种合理的兴趣。(4)如果法院发现法院地州对适用自己的法律和政策没有兴趣,但外州具有这样一种兴趣,它就应当适用外州法。(5)如果法院发现法院地州在适用自己的法律和政策上具有兴趣,它就应当适用法院地法,即使外州同样具有这种兴趣;而且,如果外州没有这种兴趣,它就更应当适用法院地法。B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,pp.188-189.
[1]特雷纳是加利福尼亚州的法官,是柯里方法的坚定支持者,但他不赞同柯里反对衡量兴趣大小的立场,认为不仅联邦最高法院在许多案件中直接衡量相关州的政策和兴趣的大小,而且.“州法院每天在普通法和成文法解释的案件中衡量相冲突的兴趣”。 See,M.Traynor,Conflict of Laws:Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum.49 Cal.L.Rev.845(1961).
[2]See G.Aichele,Legal Realism and Twentieth-century American Jurisprudence:the Changing Consensus,New York:Garland Publishing,Inc.,1990,p.76.
[3]W.Twining,Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement,Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1973,p.382.
[4]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.183.
[1]D.Cavers,A Correspondence with Brainerd Currie,1957-1958,34 Mercer L.Rev.489(1982-1983).
[2]比如,在1958年发表的第一篇运用“支配兴趣分析说”的论文中,他指出库克和凯弗斯已经在当代两部“最具煽动性的作品”中对米利肯(Milliken v.Pratt)案作了充分探讨;库克、凯弗斯和劳伦森等人提出的解决方案代表了解决法律冲突的“最佳批判性尝试的成果”。他在1961年的论文中表示:“就像其他人那样,我在库克、凯弗斯以及先前获得普遍承认的那些人的著述中找到了灵感。”See,B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,pp.77,104,585-586.
[3]凯弗斯承认实践证明他的1933年论文在思想表述上“非常不成功(singularly unsuccessful)”。因为它造成的广泛印象是,它所关心的个案正义要求“法律选择过程是直觉判断和个案分析(intuitive and atomized)。”D.Cavers,The Conditional Seller's Remedies and the Choice-of-Law Process-Some Notes on Shanahan,35N.Y.U.L.Rev.1139(1960),note34.
[4]See.B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,pp.105,586,133.
[1]Ibid,pp.596-597,585,601,592,608.
[2]Ibid,pp.271,600.
[3]Ibid,pp.613-614.
[4]Alaska Packers Ass'n v.Industrial Accident Commission of California,294 U.S.537(1935).该案的主要案情如下:1932年年初,墨西哥人帕尔玛(Palma)和在加利福尼亚州(以下简称加州)营业的上诉人阿拉斯加包装工人委员会在加利福尼亚州签订了一份书面雇佣合同。帕尔玛同意在大马哈鱼罐头生产季节到阿拉斯加州(以下简称阿州)为上诉人工作,上诉人将他送到阿州,工作完成后将他送回加州,并在加州支付约定工资。合同约定双方选择适用《阿州工人赔偿法》。但《加州工人赔偿法》强制性规定加州赔偿委员会对所有受害人为加州居民并且签订于加州的合同享有管辖权。后来,加州最高法院在判例法中将这一法律扩展适用于非加州居民。同年8月,帕尔玛在工作中受伤,在返回加州后向加州赔偿委员会提出赔偿请求,并在后来获得了赔偿。上诉人提请美国最高法院审查加州赔偿法,主张该法违背了“正当程序”宪法条款,加州最高法院的判决违背了“充分信任与诚信”宪法条款。
[1]Pacific Employers Ins.Co.v.Industrial Accident commission of California,306 U.S.493,59 S.Ct.629(1939).
[2]P.Freund,Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws.59 Harv.L.Rev.1225(1945-1946).
[3]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.88.
[4]比较荣格总结的柯里理论的三个特征:采用分割方法、属人关系比属地关系更重要和存有疑问时优先考虑法院地法。See,F.Junger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,p.102.
[5]塞缪尼德斯对单边方法总结如下:“这种方法直接关注潜在冲突的国家法的内容,并试图根据他们隐含的法律目的(实际上的或推导出的)推测其意欲的范围来确定适用何地法律。”S.Symeionides(ed.),Private Internatioal Law at the end of the 20~(th)Century:Progress or Regress? Kluwer Law Int'l,1999,pp.11,13.与中世纪的“法则区别说”不同的是,柯里没有采用法律分类的方法,而是采用了具有鲜明普通法特色的个案分析方法。
[6]为了避免违反《美国宪法》中的“平等保护条款”,柯里主张各州可将特权与豁免权给予其他采取同样保护措施州的居民,但可拒绝保护未采取这类保护措施州的居民。See,B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.113.
[1]F.Junger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,p.27.
[2]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.627.
[3]凯弗斯充分理解了柯里的努力方向,他在冲突法革命后期回顾与柯里之间的通信时说:“柯里努力将理性的精确与对现实的关切相结合,并阻止司法擅断作为废弃规则的替代品,这种努力从这些信件中鲜明地浮现出来。”D.Cavers.A Correspondence with Brainerd Currie,1957-1958,34 Mercer L.Rev.499(1982-1983).
[4]D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p..
[5]See,B.Currie,The Disinterested Third State,28 Law & Contemp.Probs.754(1963).
[1]比如柯里认为有关人身伤害赔偿的法律可能表达了多方面的政策:“对受害人或其扶养人赔偿、保护当地债权人、阻止不法行为,等等。”B.Cuttle,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.371.
[2]F.Juengcr,Conflict of Laws:A Critique of Interest Analysis 32 Am.J.Comp.L.5(1984).
[3]在1935年Alaska Packers案中,法官比较了两州兴趣大小,但同时采用了Clapper案中提出的“公共政策损害”标准。在1939年Pacific Employers Insurance Co.案中,法官虽然审查了两州的兴趣,但只是主张“充分信任与诚信条款”并未要求一个州为了执行它州的法律而忽略其自己的政策。在1947年Cardillo案中,法官看似已经放弃了衡量兴趣大小的做法,认为只要雇佣合同和一个州存在“某种实质性联系”,适用这个州的法律就符合宪法要求。E.Scoles,P.Hay,P.Borchers,S.Symeonides,Conflict of Laws,4~(th)ed.,Thomson,2004,pp.150,162.
[4]F.Juenger,Conflict of Laws:A Critique of Interest Analysis,32 Am.J.Comp.L.33-42(1984).
[5]Lea Brilmayer,Conflict of laws,foundations and future directions,Little,Brown and Company,1991,pp.60,74-75,89.
[1]E.Scoles,P.Hay,P.Borchers,S.Symeonides,Conflict of Laws,4~(th)ed.,Thomson,2004,p.34.
[2]F.Juenger,Conflict of Laws:A Critique of Interest Analysis,32 Am.J.Comp.L.45(1984).
[3]E.Scoles,P.Hay,P.Borchers,S.Symeonides,Conflict of Laws,4~(th)ed.,Thomson,2004,pp.29,38.
[4]B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.585.
[1]C.Wachter,On the Collision of Private Laws of Different States,13 Am.J.Comp.L.423(translated by K.Nadelmann1964).
[2]他在哥伦比亚大学获得法学博士(S.J.D.)学位时已经46岁。See,A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,Biographical Note,124 Recueil des Cours 169(1968).
[3]他在哥伦比亚大学获得法学硕士和博士学位。Ibid.在法律现实主义运动中,哥伦比亚大学法学院始终是法律现实主义者的乐土。卢埃林从1924年在哥大任职,一直到1951年才辞职去芝加哥大学法学院。See,W.Twining,Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement,London:Willmer Brothers Ltd.,1973,pp.41-56,104-112
[4]艾伦茨威格毫不掩饰对维希特的推崇和自己的思想同维希特理论的类似性。他称维希特为“一位杰出的法院地法的倡导者”,断定“维希特会同意本书中的理论”。A.Ehrenzweig,The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,58 Mich.L.Rev.659(1959-1960);A.Ehrenzweig,Private International Law:A Comparative Treatise on American International Conflicts Law,Including the law of Admiralty,General Part,Leyden:Sijthoff,1967,p.104.马卡罗夫(Makarov)甚至称艾伦茨威格为维希特的复活。F.Juenger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1992,p.34,note223.
[1]艾伦茨威格一生的主要研究领域为冲突法,但他同时在侵权和保险等实体法领域以及法理学和比较法领域也颇有成就。他在冲突法领域的代表性著述有:A.Ehrenzweig,The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,58 Mich.L.Rev.637(1959-1960);A.Ehrenzweig,Lex Fori in the Conflict of Laws,32 Rocky Mntn.L.Rev.13(1959-1960);A.Ehrenzweig,Choice of Law:Current Doctrine and "True Rules",49 Cal.L.Rev.240(1961);A.Ehrenzweig,A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws,St.Paul:West Publishing Co.,1962;A.Ehrenzweig,A Proper Law in a Proper Forum:A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori Approach",18 Okla.L.Rev.340(1965);A.Ehrenzweig,A Counter-revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers,80 Harv.L.Rev.377(1966-1967);A.Ehrenzweig,Private International Law:A Comparative Treatise on American International Conflicts Law,Including the law of Admiralty,General Part,Leyden:Sijthoff,1967;A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 167(1968);A.Ehrenzweig & E.Jayme,Private International Law:A Comparative Treatise on American International Conflicts Law,Including the law of Admiralty,Special Part,Leyden:Sijthoff,1973;A.Ehrenzweig,Conflicts in a Nutshell,3~(rd)ed.(1974).
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,Choice of Law:Current Doctrine and "True Rules",49 Cal.L.Rev.240(1961).
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,The Lex Fori - Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,58 Mich.L.Rev.639(1959-1960).
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 269-270(1968).
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,Lex Fori in the Conflict of Laws,32 Rocky Mntn.L.Rev.13(1959-1960).
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,Choice of Law:Current Doctrine and "True Rules",49 Cal.L.Rev.249(1961).
[4]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 216(1968).
[1]“真实规则(True Rule)”一词并非其独创,而是他对卢埃林(Llewellyn)“关于阅读和运用更新颖的法理学”一文用语的直接引用。艾伦茨威格大段引用了卢埃林的原话来显示对卢埃林精彩论述的推崇,并借以揭示“真实规则”的含义:“它关注真正的问题;它列明事实;用这种方式表述它有助于你更准确地预见什么将要发生;它帮助法官更清楚该做什么以及为什么。它就是这种情况中的‘真实规则'。”A.Ehrenzweig,Choice of Law:Current Doctrine and“True Rules”,49 Cal.L.Rev.250(1961).卢埃林这段原话出自K.Llewellyn,On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence,40 Colum.L.Rev.608(1940).
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,Choice of Law:Current Doctrine and "True Rules",49 Cal.L.Rev.241(1961).
[3]Klaxon Co.v.Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,313 U.S.487,61 S.Ct.1020,85 L.Ed.1477(1941).该案将Erie案中的原理引入冲突法,要求联邦法院在涉及多州居民的诉讼中适用所在州的冲突法。
[4]A.Ehrenzweig,Private International Law:A Comparative Treatise on American International Conflicts Law,Including the law of Admiralty,General Part,Leyden:Sijthoff,1967,p.89.
[5]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 204(1968)
[1]Ibid,pp.208-209.
[2]Ibid,pp.205-206.
[3]Ibid,pp.210-213.
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,Private International Law:A Comparative Treatise on American International Conflicts Law,Including the law of Admiralty,General Part,Leyden:Sijthoff,1967,pp.25,90.
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,Lex Fori in the Conflict of Laws,32 Rocky Mntn.L.Rev.18(1959-1960).
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,A Proper Law in a Proper Forum:A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori Approach ",18 Okla.L Rev.341-342(1965).
[4]A.Ehrenzweig,Lex Fori in the Conflict of Laws,32 Rocky Mntn.L.Rev.14(1959-1960).
[5]Ibid.
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 182(1968).
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,The Lex Fori - Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,58 Mich.L.Rev.648-649(1959-1960).
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,Beale's Translation of Bartolus,12 Am.J.Comp.L.384(1963).
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,The Lex Fori - Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,58 Mich.L.Rev.650-660(1959-1960).
[2]Ibid,p.644.
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,A Counter-revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers,80 Harv.L.Rev.379(1966-1967).
[4]A.Ehrenzweig,Lex Fori in the Conflict of Laws,32 Rocky Mntn.L.Rev.15(1959-1960).
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 239-249(1968).
[2]比如他在1960年的一篇论文中指出:“将法院地法作为基本原则,同时将传统的冲突规则降到适合于特定案情的例外位置,这种安排不会实质性地改变他们的范围和内容。物之所在地法、行为地法和属人法,而不是法院地法,将被用以更好地实现冲突法正义。但是,法官不必再依赖定性、反致或公共政策来论证他们对当地或外地适当法的偏爱,在每一种新案情下适用外国法必须按照他认为合适的标准加以确定。”A.Ehrenzweig,The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,58 Mich.L.Rev.643(1959-1960).
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 258-259(1968).
[4]A.Ehrenzweig,Choice of Law:Current Doctrine and "True Rules",49 Cal.L.Rev.241(1961).
[5]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 259(1968).
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,Choice of Law:Current Doctrine and "True Rules",49 Cal.L.Rev.245-247(1961)..
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recucil des Cours 252(1968).
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,Private International Law:A Comparative Treatise on American International Conflicts Law,Including the law of Admiralty,General Part,Leyden:Sijthoff,1967,pp.107-109.
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 214-215(1968)(Footnote and cross-references omitted).艾伦茨威格在1960年的“法院地法——冲突法中的基本规则”论文和《国际私法(概论)》(第93页)中也曾对自己的观点作过系统归纳,基本观点大同小异。但他在1960年的归纳中包含了“适当法院”的思想:(1)美国法院事实上在冲突法案件判决中几乎总是优先适用自己的法律,只有这种优先适用违背当事人意志或因为其他原因带来麻烦时才会适用外国法.由于当事人意思自治的例外已经被如此牢固地确立下来,以至于可以将其作为第二个基本原则。(2)将法院地法作为先定命题的例外这种相反做法,是冲突法历史上学术反常的遗产。在美国国内外,这种学术反常的最新形式是国际法学派或普遍主义的思想。当前对这种思想的排斥有助于抛弃这些学术做法和重新将法院地法定为基本原则。(3)有意识地承认这个基本原则将使我们将努力集中在寻求国际和州际 管辖权设计上,这种设计会根据法院与当事人或事实的实质性联系确保法院地法得到适用。(4)一旦查明适当的法院成为冲突法的主要目的,在宪法限制或国际公约没有规定的情况下,冲突规范会在以下两方面发挥主要作用:决定被告是否在法院地法下受到了公正待遇和政府利益要求替换法院地法.A.Ehrenzweig,The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,58 Mich.L.Rev.643-645(1959-1960).此外,为H.Kay教授讲课所需所撰写的对自己学说的综述,是他对自己学说的最后一次总结。这次总结加上了大量对批评者的反驳,篇幅较长。See,R.Cramton,D.Curtie,H.Kay,Conflict of Laws:Cases-Comments-Questions,St.Paul:West Publishing Co.,1975,pp.303-305.
[1]确实,在库克(Cook)和劳伦森(Lorenzen)的带领下,包括柯里(B.Currie).鲍尔森(Paul sen)、雷恩斯坦(Rheinstein)和安特马(Yntema)这些人,或许我该加上有些不同的切特海姆(Cheatham)和斯道克(Storke),他们可能不愿意被置于偶像破坏者之中被提及——(至少不是我的标牌)——我们当代的冲突法教师们同意,将我们从近来的教条主义影响下充分解放出来的时机已经来到。我乐意添加的所有内容是这种解放将恢复历史的寓意。A.Ehrenzweig,Lex Fori in the Conflict of Laws,32 Rocky Mntn.L.Rev.16(1959-1960).
[2]比较维希特晚年对自己理论的完整总结:(1)毫无疑问(而且萨维尼也承认这一点),对于在各国适用哪种法律的问题,各国自己的法律具有绝对的决定性;换言之,如果且只要我国法律规定了一个法律关系适用何种法律的问题——比如规定了在特定案件中法官应根据外国法裁判,或在特定涉外案件中根据我们的法律裁判,法官就必须因此照章处理。(2)如果我们的法律没有做出这样的决断,那么必须尝试从我们法律的精神以及法律的基本原则和法律关系的本质发现和确立这种决断,原因是这些因素是法官在其本国法出现空缺时一般情况下要据以考虑的。(3)但是,当法官从这些考虑因素中无法做出关于这个问题的决定时,那么一般原则开始发挥作用,即在存在疑问时,法官必须对涉外关系也适用其本国法.C.Wachter,Pandekten(translated by Nadelmann),§31,13 Am.J.Comp.L.427-428(1964).
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,A Counter-revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers,80 Harv.L.Rev.381,388(1966-1967).
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,Choice of Law:Current Doctrine and "True Rules",49 Cal.L.Rev.242(1961).
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 227,286(1968).
[4]R.Leflar,Ehrenzweig and the Courts,18 Okla L.Rev.367(1965).
[5]美国冲突法学界的知名学者柯里、凯弗斯、莱弗拉(Leflar)、雷恩斯坦、凯(H.Kay)参加了这次圆桌会议,并发表了相关评论文章。B.Currie,Ehrenzweig and The Statute of Fraud:An Inquiry into the “Rule of Validation”,18 Okla.L.Rev.243(1965);D.Cavers,Some of Ehrenzweig's Choice-of-law Generalizations,18 Okla.L.Rev.357(1965);R.Leflar,Ehrenzweig and the Courts,18 Okla L.Rev.366(1965);M.Rheinstein,Ehrenzweig on the Law of Conflict of Laws,18 Okla L.Rev.238(1965);H.Kay,Ehrenzweig's Proper Law and Proper Forum,18 Okla L.Rev.233(1965).
[6]M.Rheinstein,Ehrenzweig on the Law of Conflict of Laws,18 Okla L.Rev.242(1965).
[7]H.Kay,Ehrenzweig's Proper Law and Proper Forum,18 Okla L.Rev.236(1965).
[8]这次的演讲于1969年出版。A.Ehrenzweig,Specific Principles of Private Transnational Law,124 Recueil des Cours 167-370(1968).
[9]卢埃林在晚年承认法律现实主义的主要立场——预测法官行为,并不适用于法官或普通公民,而只是针对律师或案件当事人;虽然不能说这是看待法律的“有害或错误的方式”,但它“是一种不完整的看待法律的方式。”K.Llewellyn,On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence,40 Colum.L.Rev.593(1940).
[1]M.Davies,S.Richetson,G.Lindell,Conflict of Laws:Commentary and Materials,Sydney:Butterworths,1997,p.34.
[2]E.Scoles,P.Hay,P.Borchers,S.Symeionides,Conflict of Laws,4~(th)ed.,Thomson West,2004,pp.41-42.
[3]R.Leflar,Ehrenzweig and the Courts,18 Okla.L.Rev.369-372(1965).
[4]最典型的是凯(H.Kay)和他人合写的判例法教材,在1975年的版本中对艾伦茨威格的学说详细介绍,但笔者在美国找到的晚近两版教材中,发现已经不见了该学说的踪影。See,R.Cramton,D.Currie,H.Kay,Conflict of Laws:Cases-Comments-Questions,St.Paul:West Publishing Co.,1975,pp.303-305.
[5]这一论断得到了笔者在美国访学时的指导教授彼得·海(Peter Hay)的赞同。他认为,其实艾伦茨威格和柯里的结论非常类似,但是美国学者不习惯他大陆风格的论证方式。
[6]R.Leflar,Ehrenzweig and the Courts,18 Okla.L.Rev.374(1965).
[1]斜体为原文所加。G.Kegel,The Crisis of Conflict of Laws,112 Recueil des Cours 184-185,(1964).
[2]See,D.Cavers,A Critique of the Choice-of-law Problem,47 Harv.L.Rev.178(1933-1934).
[3]凯弗斯长期担任罗斯福政府中的要职占用了他宝贵的冲突法研究时间。罗斯福新政吸收了许多法学教授参与政府管理工作,凯弗斯也不例外。他每周两天在华盛顿从事行政工作,同时还担负教学工作,这使得他在1933年后的10年中几乎没有再研究法律选择问题。等到他1943年撰写对库克《冲突法的逻辑与法律基础》的书评时,他已经丧失了对批判比尔冲突法的兴趣。一直到了20世纪50年代后期,凯弗斯才从全力关注公法问题转到重新研究法律选择问题。柯里的“支配兴趣分析说”和《第二次冲突法重述》的起草激发他重新审视自己在1933年论文中的立场和观点。D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,pp.xii-xiii,introduction.凯弗斯身体力行法律现实主义方法,大力倡导从各种社会科学视角研究社会热点问题,这也在一定程度上分散了他对冲突法研究的热情和精力。在1930年代初主编《法律和当代问题》时,凯弗斯积极主持了由法学者、执业律师、官员和社会科学家参加的研讨会。当时新的社会问题层出不穷,他沉醉其中,对法律选择问题慢慢冷淡下来,开始怀疑冲突法理论是否那么重要。尽管学者们对《第一次重述》的批判取得重要进展,凯弗斯的论文被广泛引用,但这一切已经引不起他的兴趣。特别是二战之后,凯弗斯自称成为了一个“疲倦的现实主义者(tired realist)”。See,D.Cavets,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor;The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.10.
[4]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.xii-xiii,preface.
[1]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.9.
[2]“冲突法正义”是凯弗斯借用的德国冲突法学者凯格尔的用语。D.Cavers,Cipolla and Conflicts Justice,9 Duq.L.Rev.360(1970-1971).凯格尔在1964年的海牙演讲中率先明确提出这两种正义的区分,他认为:“根据内容(即实体法上)判断是最好的法律,可能远不是空间上(即把法律放在发生于国外的情况中)最好的法律。…因此,你必须乐于接受一种特别的冲突法正义(justice of conflict of laws),以有别于实体法正义(justice of substantive law)。”(斜体为原文所有)G.Kegel,The Crisis of Conflict of Laws,112 Recueil des Cours 184-185,(1964).
[3]他在1965年再次指出比尔的规则无法保证公平的结果:“毫无疑问,我的观点是,《第一次重述》主张考虑的法律选择规则并没有打算实现个案中的公平。不能被指望用来实现个案公平的规则在我看来,无论过去还是现在,都不能是公平的规则。”See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965.p.79.
[4]他在1965年的著作中埋怨其批评者没有注意1933年论文中主张的根据法院的判例逐渐总结出新的符合公平要求的规则、原则和标准.See,D.Cavers,The Choica-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.78.
[5]为了与柯里的“支配兴趣分析说”相区分,避免引起他人误解,凯弗斯在1965年著作中将政策分析改成了“立法目的”分析,并主张属于虚假冲突或可避免冲突的先例最终可演化为适用范围狭窄的法律细则;对于主要用于解决“真实冲突”的优先选择原则,他也不排除将来随着人们认识的深化,将这些宽泛的原则进一步细化的可能。See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.89-90,137.
[1]See,D.Cavers,Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective,131 Recueil des Cours 151-152(1971).
[2]See,D.Cavers,A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Process:Addendum 1972,17 Harv.Int'l.L.J.653(1976).
[3]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.11.
[1]Ibid,pp.65-66,77.
[2]凯弗斯观察到,尽管纽约和加利福尼亚州是领头者,但背离《第一次重述》的判决也正在全国其他地方涌现。联邦最高法院在诠释《联邦侵权请求法》中鼓励各州挑战冲突法传统的新潮流。Ibid,p.62.
[3]Ibid,pp.89-90.
[4]D.Cavers,The Value of Principled Preference,in The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,pp.206-208.
[1]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.85-86.
[2]凯弗斯在晚年明确指出了优先选择原则的价值取向及其特征:在《法律选择过程》中,我提出了一系列的我所称的“优先选择原则”,来例证一种方法,这种方法基于“冲突法正义”,能够为法院和评论家们所接纳,而不管在特定案件中一个原则是选择了法院地的实体法还是评论家们喜爱的一种法律.D.Cavers,The Proper Law of Producer's Liability,in The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.305.
[3]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.206-208.
[4]Ibid,p.14.在1969年美国法学院联合会(AALS)冲突法圆桌会议上,凯弗斯再次表明反对个案分析的态度。See,D.Cavers,The Value of Principled Preference,in The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.206.
[5]D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.113,121.
[1]除了直接继承凯弗斯学说衣钵的柯里之外,凯弗斯罗列的采用内容和政策分析的学者还有:哈佛的弗鲁恩德(Frcund),他或许是第一位主张从相关州的兴趣和政策视角解决法律选择问题的学者,此外还有莫里斯(Morris)、艾伦茨威格、汉考克(Moffat Hancock)、温特劳布(Russell Weintraub)、巴克斯特(William E Baxter)、冯·迈伦(Arthur yon Mehtcn)、特劳特曼(Donald Trautman)和布里格斯(Edwin W.Briggs)。See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.91-92.
[2]Ibid,p.122.
[3]Ibid,p.79.
[4]Ibid,p.215.
[5]Ibid,pp.114-115.
[1]Ibid,pp.113,132-133.
[2]凯弗斯在1933年谈到如何评判法律选择的结果时主张:“站在对诉讼当事人公平或相冲突的法律可能引发的更广泛的社会政策考虑因素的角度,按照与这个或那个法律联系的事件或交易中的事实情况,评价法律适用的结果;…”D.Cavers,A Critique of the Choice-of-law Problem,47 Harv.L.Rev.192-193(1933-1934).
[3]D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.122.
[4]凯弗斯直到1971年才在一篇关于西博拉(Cipolla)案件的评论中借用凯格尔的“冲突法正义”一词。See,D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.xiii,introduction.
[5][美]约翰·罗尔斯著,何怀宏、何包钢、廖申白译:《正义论》。中国社会科学出版社1988年版,第12页。凯弗斯在1965年的著作中引用了两句罗尔斯关于正义的论述。一是关于无知之幕下的正义观:“一项惯例如果符合下列原则就是公正的,所有参与者都可以被合理假定,当他们在同样处境下会相互提议或承认这种规则,而且在事先不知道他们自己特定境况的条件下就要求作出确定的承诺。”二是符合正义标准的自由观:“参与一项制度或受它影响的每个人都有同样的权利享受最大限度的自由,这种自由要与所有人的同样自由并行不悖。”D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.130-131.
[1]D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.130.
[2]Ibid,p.132.
[3]Ibid,p.120.
[4]D.Cavers,Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective,131 Recueil des Cours 153(1971)
[1]Ibid,pp.134-136.
[2]这是卢埃林在同庞德论战中总结的法律现实主义者的共同出发点之一。See K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1236,1238(1930-1931).
[3]Sec,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.136-137.
[4]D.Cavers,Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective.131 Recueil des Cours 152-153(1971).
[5]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.136.
[1]Ibid,p.137.
[2]为了避免更精确的术语导致的复杂,凯弗斯有意采用“家庭所在地(home)”一词来取代“住所(domicile)”或其他术语,其含义等同于“固定住所(settled residence)”。See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.154-155.
[3]Ibid,pp.139-141.
[1]Ibid,pp.146-147.
[2]Ibid,pp.150-158.
[3]Ibid,pp.159-160.
[4]凯弗斯从萨维尼那里临时借用了“本座”一词。See,Ibid,p.166.
[1]Ibid,pp.166-176.
[2]Ibid,p.177.
[3]Ibid,pp.181-183.
[1]Ibid,pp.194-196.
[2]D.Cavers,The Proper Law of Producer's Liability,in The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.315.
[1]D.Cavers,Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective,131 Recueil des Cours 153-158(1971).
[2]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor.The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.88-89,137.
[3]柯里使用的“支配兴趣(governmental interest)”一词引起了许多学者的强烈反对。这种兴趣的存在与否令人生疑。有学者认为私法规则中不存在这种兴趣,而只有公法中存有这种国家的兴趣。莱恩斯坦(Rheinstein)、凯格尔(Kegel)和艾伦茨威格教授基本上都属于这类反对者。凯弗斯并不赞同这种批评。在凯弗斯看来,柯里教授在分析中只是感到需要找到一个词,用以描述成文法或普通法通过适用于特定事实促进其立法目的,他使用了interest来表示这种需要。规则出自国家,凯弗斯相信“规则的目的可以合理地归于国家,尽管规则只是立法或司法机关的决定,表明在诉讼私方当事人之间达致公平的最佳方式。”但凯弗斯同时又指出,即使在私法领域,私法通常不仅用来解决纠纷,而且用以规范人们的日常行为。值得注意的是,在现代社会中公法的目的正日益通过注入私法中得以实现。即使对 于带有最有限的公共目标的法律,当法律适用可以促进这种目标的实现时,将国家在这种情况下使立法目的实现“归于国家的一种愿望(desire)”,这样做并非不合理。“在这种情形下用governmental或state修饰interest来辨别这种愿望在我看来并无不妥,尽管最后生成的术语不无害处。”这一用语的主要害处来自“兴趣”一词导致的实质性的误解。它表明了国家的关心(concern)可以类比于“国家政府实现公共目标中的兴趣”。同样重要的是特定国内法规则的目的并不是国家解决涉外问题的恰当目标。另一种麻烦来自于对“国家兴趣”和“个人兴趣”的比较。冯·迈伦(von Mehren)和特劳特曼(Trautman)教授试图比较国家作为国际社会成员对保护个人的关切和个人对交易另一方承诺的关切。其实,这两种关切都在柯里所言的“支配兴趣”之下。See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.99-101.
[1]凯弗斯认为,柯里反对的是所有非成文法形式的冲突规范。柯里希望去除所有的判例法形式的冲突规范可能更多地反映了他的一种避免适用所有现有冲突法的策略,而不是永远反对冲突规范。See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.74.
[2]See.D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.73-74,97,109.
[3]凯弗斯指出,从相冲突的法律目的出发寻求法律选择的答案,其难度要比柯里认为的大得多。See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.108.
[4]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,p.161,note29.
[5]H.Baade,Counter-revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections on Reading Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process.46 Tax.L.Rev.151-156(1967-1968).
[6]See,D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.136,202.
[1]D.Cavers,Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective,131 Recueil des Cours 152(1971).
[2]Ibid,p.153.
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,A Counter-revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers,80 Harv.L.Rev.378(1966-1967).
[4]D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.204,author's note.
[5]Cipolla v.Shaposka,439 Pa.563,267 A.2d 854(1970).
[6]D.Cavers,The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.150,author's note.
[1]李浩培:《李浩培文选》,法律出版社2000年版,第402页。不过,如果考虑到优先选择原则的示范性和凯弗斯有意使其具有足够的灵活性,优先选择原则的存在模糊之处在所难免。
[2]里斯认为凯弗斯优先原则方法面临的主要困难在于难于提炼原则。See,W Reese,American Trends in Private International Law:Academic and Judicial Manipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases,33 Vand.L.Rev.732(1980).
[1]W.Cook,The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1942,p.8.
[2]F.Kenison,The Continuing Contribution of Robert A.Leflar to the Judicial Education of Appellate Judges,25 Ark.L.Rev.95(1971-1972).
[3]J.Barrett,Vignette of Robert A.Leflar,25 Ark.L.Rev.144-145(1971-1972).
[4]W.Reynolds & W.Richman,Robert Leflar,Judicial Process,and Choice of Law,52 Ark.L.Rev.135(1999).
[5]R.Bischoff,Robert A.Leflar:Torts Realist,25 Ark.L.Rev.34,38(1971-1972).
[6]R.Leflar,The Nature of Conflicts Law,81 Colum.L.Rev.1095(1981).
[7]莱弗拉的研究领域横跨了冲突法、侵权法、法学教育(包括法官继续教育)等。在冲突法领域,除了多次再版的
《美国冲突法》以外,最有名的成果当属1966年面世的“冲突法中影响法律选择的考虑因素”(Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.267(1966))和“冲突法:再论影响法律选择的考虑因素”(Conflicts Law:More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 Cal.L.Rev.1584(1966))。此后,他又发表了多篇论文对自己的理论进一步加以阐明,如The “New”Choice of Law,21 Am.U.L.Rev.457(1972):Choice of Law:A Well-watered Plateau,41 Law & Contemp.Probs.10(1977);The Nature of Conflicts Law,81 Colum.L.Rev.1080(1981).从40年代到80年代,他还持之以恒地撰写了美国和阿肯色州的冲突法司法实践报告。
[1]E.Scolcs,P.Hay,P.Borchers,S.Symeonides,Conflict of Laws,St.Paul:Thomson/West,2004.pp.52-53.
[2]莱弗拉自称:“这些法律选择政策(policies)——我称之为影响法律选择的考虑因素,…”。R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.281(1966).
[3]早期进行法律选择政策分析的论文主要有:Goodrich,Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws,20 W.Va.L.Q.156(1930).
[4]E.Cheatham and W.Reese,Choice of the Applicable Law,52 Colum.L.Rev.959(1952).
[5]H.Yntema,The Objectives of Private International Law,35 Can.Bar Rev.735(1957).
[6]R.Leflar,Conflicts Law:More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 Cal.L.Rev.1585(1966).
[7]莱弗拉指出:“影响法律选择的考虑因素不是永久不变的,它们带来的结果也一样如此。”其研究的唯一意义在于“考虑到了法律选择法中发生的主要变化”。R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.325,327(1966).
[1]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.282(1966).
[2]Ibid,pp.282-285.
[3]Ibid,pp.285-286.
[1]Ibid,pp.286-287.
[2]Ibid,p.288.
[3]Ibid,pp.288-289.
[1]Ibid,p.289.
[2]安特马将选择法律需要考虑的因素归纳为十七项,其中最后一项为“最终求助于法院地法”。但他认为这一项“显然是一种绝望的建议”,因此在设计冲突法政策时应将其排除在外。H.Yntema,The Objectives of Private International Law,35 Can.Bar Rev.735(1957).
[3]莱弗拉指出:“只要能将‘本地公共政策'这种模棱两可的观念和本地实体法联系起来,它就构成了一个法院优先适用本地法而不是任何外地法的确定的吸引力。这是一种法院地法偏好的合理基石。它和那种‘绝望的建议'截然不同,…”R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.290-291(1966).
[4]Ibid,p.291.
[5]比较柯里界定“支配兴趣”的方法:“当同时存在两个条件时,一个州有理由适用它的法律。首先,必须存在一种可以确定的政策,这种政策妥当地表现在该州的法律中。第二,该州和当事人、交易、争议事项或诉讼的关系如此密切,以致在将其政策适用于这种案情的兴趣(interest)方面赋予该州一种合理的基础;争议问题必须在该州合理的管理关心(governmental concerns)的范围之内。”B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,p.228.
[1]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.291-292(1966).
[2]柯里主张,只要法院地存在“支配兴趣”,就可以适用法院地法。See,B.Currie,Comments on Babcock v.Jackson,A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,63 Colum.L.Rev.1242-1243(1963).
[3]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.293(1966).
[4]柯里在“支配兴趣”的界定上表现出强烈的属人主义倾向——各州首先考虑保护本州居民。See,B.Currie,Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws,Durham:Duke University Press,1963,pp.85,705.
[5]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.291,294(1966).
[6]Ibid,p.293.
[1]Ibid,p.295.
[2]R.Leflar,Conflicts Law:More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 Cal.L.Rev.1587(1966).
[3]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.303(1966).
[1]Ibid,pp.300-302.
[2]Ibid,pp.296-298.
[3]Ibid,pp.298-300.
[1]R.Letter,Conflicts Law:More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 Cal.L.Rev.1588(1966).
[2]Ibid,pp.1593-1595.
[1]Ibid,pp.1595-1596.
[2]除了这九项政策之外,他们还提出了一条首要政策,即“法院必须遵循立法机关合乎宪法的规定”。由于大量的立法并未对法律适用问题作出明确的规定,他们没有将这一政策单列。See,E.Cheatham and W.Reese,Choice of the Applicable Law,52 Colum.L.Rev.959,962-980(1952).
[3]See.R.Leflar,The Nature of Conflicts Law,81 Colum.L.Rev.1082-1083(1981)
[4]戚特海姆和里斯认为,法官通过司法发展法律要经过三个步骤。首先,理解和把握相关的社会政策:其次,将从社会政策得出的结论充分和清楚地表述为法律规则;第三,将规则用于具体的情况。一旦清楚地把握住了社会政策并将其表述成相应的规则,通过援引这些规则就很容易得出特定问题的合意答案。法律选择依然处于法律发展的第一个关注基本政策的阶段。See,E.Cheathamand W.Reese,Choice of the Applicable Law,52 Colum.L.Rev.960(1952).
[5]安特马罗列的十七项考虑因素包括:法律结果的一致性、法律冲突的最少化、法律结果的可预见性、当事人的正当期望、社会和经济结果的一致性、交易的有效性、连接点的相对重要性、认可“更强有力的(stronger)”法律、州 际之间的合作、尊重他州的利益、最终结果的公平、尊重州内法的政策、要适用的实体规则的内部和谐、交易的地点或本质、私人的益处、国内法的同质性、最终求助于法院地法等。不过,他不赞成最后一项考虑因素,主张在设计冲突法政策时将其排除在外。H.Yntema,The Objectives of Private International Law,35 Can.Bar Rev.734-735(1957):
[1]Ibid,pp.723-742.
[2]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.318(1966).
[3]R.Leflar,Conflicts Law:More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 Cal.L.Rev.1585(1966).
[1]R.Leflar,The "New" Choice of Law,21 Am.U.L.Rev.459(1972).
[2]R.Leflar,Conflicts Law:More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 Cal.L.Rev.1586(1966).
[3]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.325(1966).
[4]卢埃林在同庞德论战中提出动态的法律观是法律现实主义者的共同出发点之一。See K.Llewellyn,Some Realism about Realism--Responding to Dean Pound,44 Harv.L.Rev.1236(1930-1931).
[5]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.325(1966).
[6]Ibid,pp.325-326.
[1]W.Reynolds & W.Richman,Robert Leflar,Judicial Process,and Choice of Law,52 Ark.L.Rev.134(1999).
[2]莱弗拉认为这篇论文指出了价值判断而不是纯粹的机械分析会影响到法律选择。这在一定意义上是对霍姆斯名言的认可:“对法官事实上将如何行为的预测,而不是更多的伪饰,就是我所意指的法律。”从更广泛意义上讲,这是对司法过程现实的认可。法院,尤其是上诉法院,能够通览案情,法官很难对法律内容视而不见。“有些法官企图忽略它,其他法官承认他们无法、也没有忽视法律内容。”R.Leflar,The Nature of Conflicts Law,81 Colum.L.Rev.1081-1082(1981)
[3]R.Leflar,Choice of Law:A Well-watered Plateau,41 Law & Contemp.Probs.10(1977).
[4]R.Leflar,Choice of Law:Torts:Current Trends,6 Vand.L.Rev.461(1952-1953).
[5]R.Leflar,Ehrenzweig and the Courts,18 Okla.L.Rev.374(1965).
[6]R.Leflar,Choice of Law:A Well-watered Plateau,41 Law & Contemp.Probs.11(1977).
[7]R.Leflar,Conflict of Laws,Contracts,and the New Restatement,15 Ark.L.Rev.172(1960-1961).
[1]R.Leflar,The "New" Choice of Law,21 Am.U.L.Rev.459-460(1972).
[2]R.Leflar,Ehrenzweig and the Courts,18 Okla.L.Rev.374(1965).
[3]R.Leflar,Honest Judicial Opinions,74 Nw.U.L.Rev.735(1979-1980).
[4]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.271-276(1966).
[5]R.Leflar,The Nature of Conflicts Law,81 Colum.L.Rev.1080(1981)
[6]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.304-305(1966).
[7]R.Leflar,Conflicts Law:More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 Cal.L.Rev.1588(1966).
[1]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.324-325(1966).
[2]L.McDougal III,Leflar's Choice-influencing Considerations:Revisited,Refined and Reaffirmed,52 Ark.L.Rev.106,121(1999).
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,Private International Law:A Comparative Treatise on American International Conflicts Law,Including the law of Admiralty,General Part,Leyden:Sijthoff,1967,p.97.
[4]F.Juenger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,pp.104-105.
[5]D.Cavers,The Value of Principled Preference,in The Choice of Law,Selected Essays,1933-1983,Durham:Duke University Press,1985,p.206.
[6]A.Ehrenzweig,Private International Law:A Comparative Treatise on American International Conflicts Law,Including the law of Admiralty,General Part,Leyden:Sijthoff,1967,p.97.
[1]W.Reese,American Trends in Private International Law:Academic and Judicial Manipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases,33 Vand.L.Rev.725(1980).
[2]E.Scoles,P.Hay,P.Borchers,S.Symeonides,Conflict of Laws,St.Paul:Thomson/West,2004,pp.53-55.
[3]R.Leflar,Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,41 N.Y.U.L.Rev.302,304(1966).
[4]R.Leflar,Choice of Law:A Well-watered Plateau,41 Law & Contemp.Probs.10(1977).
[1]S.Fuld,Willis L.M.Reese,81 Colum.L.Rev.935(1981).
[2]里斯的同事斯密特(Smit)教授称里斯的写作风格简明直接、切中要害,颇具海明威的精湛技巧。See,H.Smit,In Memoriam,Willis Livingston Mesier Reese,91 Colum.L.Rev.3(1991).
[3]这篇论文为“准据法的选择”,为里斯和戚特海姆合写.See,E.Cheatham and W.Reese,Choice of the Applicable Law,52 Colum.L.Rev.959(1952).里斯一生作品的列表可见于H.Smit,In Memoriam,Willis Livingston Mesier Reese,91 Colum.L.Rev.5-9(1991).
[4]回里斯冲突法论文的代表作有:Choice of the Applicable Law(with E.Cheatham),52 Colum.L.Rev.959(1952);Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,Second,9 Int'l & Comp.L.Quarterly 531(1960);Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.679(1963);Choice of Law:Rules or Approach,57 Cornell L.Rev.315(1971-1972);Dépe(?)ge:A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law,73 Colum.L.Rev.58(1973);Choice of Law in the United States:The Past,the Present and Some Prophecies for the Future,in Law in the United States of America in Social and Technological Revolution,Brussels:Etablissements Emile Bruylant,(J.Hazard,W.Wagner,ed.),(1974);Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the Future,16 Colum.J.Transnat'l L.1(1977);American Trends in Private International Law:Academic and Judicial Manipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases,33 Vand.L.Rev.717(1980);The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited,34 Mercer L.Rev.501(1982-1983);Substantive Policies and Choice of Law,2 Touro L.Rev.1(1986);A Suggested Approach to Choice-of-Law,14 Vt.L.Rev.1(1989).他在海牙国际法学院的两次演讲都以《第二次重述》的内容为核心。See,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 309(1964);General Course on Private Internotional Law,150 Recueil des Cours 1(1976).
[1]Resolution of the Faculty,81 Colum.L.Rev.933(1981).
[2]里斯生于1913年,这篇论文发表于1952年。See,W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 311(Biographical Note),314(Principal Publications)(1964).
[3]里斯在1976年的海牙演讲中开篇谦虚地谈到:“如果我还算懂得一点法律的话,它就是美国法。”W.Reese,General Course on Private International Law,150 Recueil des Cours 1(1976).不过,里斯对英国冲突法及其理论比较关注,在《第二次重述》“合同”部分他吸收了英国的“适当法原理(proper law doctrine)”。他还指出,在起草第二次冲突法重述的过程中,对英国冲突法判例的重视几乎和对美国判例的重视可以等量齐观;重述的草案应该大致上合乎英国法律,因为人们认为在英国和美国占主导地位的冲突法规则没有本质上的差异。W.Reese,Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,Second,9 Int'l & Comp.L.Quarterly 537,541(1960).
[1]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 332(1964).
[2]Ibid,pp.332-333.
[3]Ibid,pp.333-334.
[1]Ibid,pp.334-337.
[2]W.Reese,American Trends in Private International Law:Academic and Judicial Manipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases,33 Vand.L.Rev.732-733(1980).
[3]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 338(1964).
[1]Ibid,pp.338-339.
[2]W.Reese,American Trends in Private International Law:Academic and Judicial Manipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases,33 Vand.L.Rev.7725-726(1980).
[3]这篇论文为“法律选择:规则还是方法”。See,W.Reese,Choice of Law:Rules or Approach,57 Cornell L.Rev.315(1971-1972).
[1]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 340(1964).
[2]W.Reese,Choice of Law:Rules or Approach,57 Cornell L.Rev.318(1971-1972).
[3]E.Cheatham and W.Reese,Choice of the Applicable Law,52 Colum.L.Rev.960(1952).
[4]Ibid.
[5]在里斯和戚特海姆合著的1952年论文中,第一项首要政策——法院必须遵循立法机关合乎宪法的规定,没有和其他一般政策相并列。但他们是将这项政策排在一般政策之前首先阐明的。See,ibid,p.961.里斯在1963年的“冲突法和《第二次重述》”一文中对这十项政策在措词上稍作修改。修改后的十项政策为:(1)法院必须遵循其所在地的立法机关合乎宪法的规定;(2)法律选择规则应被设计为使国际和州际制度运作良好;(3)除非存在相反的适当理由,法院应当适用其当地的实体法;(4)法院在决定是适用其本地法还是另一法域的法律时,应当考虑相关实体法规则的目的;(5)法律选择规则应当寻求取得结果的确定性、可预见性和一致性;(6)法院应当寻求保护当事人的正当期望;(7)法院应当寻求适用具有主要兴趣(dominant interest)的法域的法律;(8)法律选择规则应当简单并容易适用;(9)法院应当寻求促进相关实体法领域中的基本政策;(10)法院应当寻求取得个案公平。实质内容的改变有两处。一是补充了第四项政策的运用方法。里斯结合1961年Traynor法官审理的Bernkrant v.Fowler案具体指明了两种权衡相关实体法政策的方法,一是公开承认其拥有“裁断的权力(power of decision)”,然后探究,是否实现其当地实体法的政策不如“其他法律选择政策和其他法域的(实体法)政策”更重要;第二种方法是,“假装其唯一的任务就是成文法解释,或换而言之,它只需探究立法机关是否确实想要(intend)将这部成文法用于特定的事实情况。”这两种方法形式不同,而考虑因素和结果一致。第二处实质性修改是关于“州际和国际秩序的需要”的地位。在1952年的论文中,里斯认为这一政策最为重要(overriding),后面的几个政策可以说是他的推论。而在1963年的论文中,里斯将其修改为,除了第一个政策——法院遵循立法机关的指示,其余政策之间无主次之分。See,W Reese,Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.682-690(1963).1964年海牙演讲中法律选择政策部分基本照搬了1963年论文中的内容。See,W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 340-352(1964).为简洁起见,正文中的十项政策还是采用1952年论文中的表述。
[1]E.Cheatham and W.Reese,Choice of the Applicable Law,52 Colum.L.Rev.961(1952)
[2]Ibid,pp.962-963.
[3]Ibid,p.964.
[1]Ibid,pp.965-966.
[2]Ibid,pp.969-970.
[3]Ibid,pp.970-972.
[4]Ibid,p.972.
[1]Ibid,pp.976-977.
[2]Ibid,pp.978-980.
[3]Ibid,pp.980-981.
[4]这是里斯在1963年论文中修正后的观点。See,W.Reese,Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.690(1963).在1952年论文中,里斯将第二项政策(州际和国际秩序的需要)的重要性列在后面其他政策之前。See,E.Cheatham and W.Reese,Choice of the Applicable Law,52 Colum.L.Rev.981(1952).
[5]See,W.Reese,Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.692(1963).
[1]Sec,W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 355-356(1964).
[2]里斯将“规则(rule)”界定为:“一种可见于大多数法律领域的现象,即一旦适用一个准则(formula),就会引导法院得出一个结论。”他将“方法(approach)”界定为:“只是表述得出一个结论所应考虑的哪个因素或哪些因素。”“方法”的典型例子是《冲突法重述(第二次)》的第6条,它列出了选择法律应考虑的因素,但是既没有说如何根据这些考虑因素做出法律选择,也没有说各个考虑因素的相对重要性。还有一种与规则相对的方法,就是根据一种考虑因素选择法律,比如不少法院和学者经常主张的适用对特定问题最关心(have the greatest concern)的法域的法律。采用这种方法需要首先辨别出相关法域法律背后的政策,而采用“同样措辞的成文法或判例法规则”可能隐含着不同的或轻重有别的政策。显然,这是一种要求个案分析的方法。W.Reese,Choice of Law:Rules or Approach,57 Cornell L.Rev.315-316(1971-1972).
[3]Ibid,p.319.
[4]Ibid,pp.316-318.
[1]Ibid,pp.318-319.
[2]Ibid,pp.319-320.
[3]Ibid,pp.321,325.
[1]Ibid,p.325.
[2]Ibid,323,325.
[3]分割法有三种含义。广义上分割法指“在同一案件中针对不同的争点适用不同法域的规则。”这种定义的缺陷在于涵盖了无可争议的一种问题,这就是程序问题适用法院地法,而实体问题适用其他的法律。狭义上的分割法指“通过适用不同法域的规则调整不同的问题,这样取得的结果无法通过绝对地适用任何一个相关法域的法律来获得。”这种定义“太受限了”,容易掩盖一些“相关的基本因素和价值”。里斯采用了折中的含义:“只是指适用不同法域的规则调整不同的实体法争点(substantive issues)。”See,W.Reese,Dépe(?)ge:A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law,73 Colum.L.Rev.58-59(1973).
[4]Ibid,pp.59-60.
[5]W.Rease,Choice of Law:Rules or Approach,57 Cornell L.Rev.323-324(1971-1972).
[1]Ibid,p.324.
[2]W.Reese,Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.699(1963).
[3]See,W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 375(1964).
[4]Ibid,pp.391,393.
[5]W.Reese,Choice of Law:Rules or Approach 57 Cornell L.Rev.320(1971-1972).
[1]关于法律现实主义的具体内容请参见许庆坤:“重读美国法律现实主义”,《比较法研究》2007年第4期,第4-11页。
[2]W.Reese,Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,Second,9 Int'l & Comp.L.Quarterly 541(1960).
[3]W.Reese,Choice of Law:Rules or Approach,57 Cornell L.Rev.333-334(1971-1972).
[4]W.Reese,Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the Future,16 Colum.J.Transnat'l L.5(1977).
[5]Ibid,p.18.
[1]W.Reese,Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.681(1963).
[2]See,E.Cheatham and W.Reese,Choice of the Applicable Law,52 Colum.L.Rev.959(1952).
[3]See,W.Reese,Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,Second,9 Int'l & Comp.L.Quarterly 532(I960);W.Reese,Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.681(1963).
[4]W.Reese,General Course on Private International Law,150 Recueil des Cours 9(1976).
[5]W.Reese,Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.681(1963).
[6]W.Reese,Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the Future,16 Colum.J.Transnat'l L.40(1977).
[1]《第二次重述》共14章,423条,内容涵盖了涉外管辖、法律选择和涉外判决的执行等,本文只涉及其中的法律选择部分(主要包括第1章和第6-13章,其余章节个别条文涉及法律选择)。这14章依次为:引言(第1-10条)、住所(第11-23条)、司法管辖(第24-79条)、对司法管辖权行使的限制(第80-91条)、判决(第92-121条)、程序问题(第122-144条)、不法行为(第145-185条)、合同(第186-221条)、财产(第222-266)、信托(第267-282条)、身份(第283-290条)、代理与合伙(第291-295条)、商业公司(第296-313条)、财产处置(administration of estates)(第314-423)。
[2]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 320(1964).
[3]American Law Institute,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws,St.Paul:American Law Institute Publishers,1971,p.ix,introduction.
[4]W.Reese,Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,28 Law & Comtemp.Probs.681(1963).
[1]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 357-358(1964).
[2]W.Reese,The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited,34 Mercer L.Rev.519(1982-1983).
[3]W.Reese,Choice of Law in the United Sates:The Past,the Present and Some Prophecies for the Future,in Law in the United States of America in Social and Technological Revolution,Brussels:Etablissements Emile Bruylant,(J.Hazard,W.Wagner,ed.),1974,pp.201-202.
[4]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 360-363(1964).
[5]比如对于婚姻有效性,《第二次重述》一方面规定符合婚姻缔结地法要求的婚姻,其有效性应获得普遍承认,另一方面规定婚姻有效性原则上适用“根据第6条所述原则对于特定争点与配偶和婚姻具有最重要关系法域的实体法”。 See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §283(1971).
[1]第8章“合同”分6部分:合同的有效性和据此创设的权利、合同权利的转让、依当事人一方或双方的行为废除合同、流通票据、商事仲裁、复原(restitution),共35条(第186-221条)。最重要的是第一部分,共22条(第186-207条),具体包括:A、一般原则:§186准据法、§187当事人所选法域的法律、§188当事人没有做出有效选择时适用的法律;B、特定的合同:§189转让土地权益的合同、§190产生于转让土地权益的合同义务、§191出售动产(chattel)利益的合同、§192人寿保险合同、§193火灾、失信或意外事故保险合同、§194保证合同、§195偿还借款合同、§196提供服务的合同、§197运输合同;C、特定的争点:§198缔约能力(capacity to contract)、§199书面要求——形式、§200当事人能力和合同形式以外事项的合同有效性、§201虚假陈述、胁迫、不当影响和误解(misrepresentation,duress,undue influence and mistake)、§202非法(illegality)、§203高利贷(usury)、§204对合同中所角词语的依法解释(construction)、§205合同债务(contractual obligations)的性质和范围、§206履行的细节、§207救济标准(measure of recovery)。
[2]Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws,Chapter 8,Introductory Note(1971).
[3]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 366(1964).
[4]W.Reese,Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,Second,9 Int'l & Comp.L.Quarterly 534(1960).
[1]Ibid,pp.534-536.
[2]这一限制条件并没有出现在正文中,而是在“评论d”中。See,Restatement,Second,Confict of Laws §187 Comment d(1971).
[3]这一限制条件并没有出现在正文中,而是在“评论b”中。See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §187 Comment b(1971).
[4]Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §187(1971).
[5]W.Reese,Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,Second,9 Int'l & Comp.L.Quarterly 537(1960).
[6]这些相关的连接点包括:签订地,合同谈判地,履行地,合同标的(subject matter)(既包括有形财产,也包括风险risk)所在地;以及当事人的住所、居所、国籍、公司成立地和营业地。这些连接点要根据其对于特定争点的相对重要性加以衡量。See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §188(1971).
[7]Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §188(1971).
[8]W.Reese,Contracts and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,Second,9 Int'l & Comp.L.Quarterly 540(1960).
[9]See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §206 Comment b(1971).
[10]这两类合同都是格式合同,因此排除了保险人单方面指定准据法的情况,直接规定适用“申请保单时被保险人?所地法域”或“当事人所理解的、保险期间所保风险的主要所在地法域”的实体法,“除非对于特定争点,其他法域根据第6条所述原则与交易和当事人存在更重要的关系;在这种情况下,适用其他法域的实体法。”不过,对于人寿保险合同,被保险人在投保申请中有权做出有效的法律选择。See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §§192-193(1971).
[1]对于转让土地权益的合同以及产生于转让土地权益的合同义务,土地所在地是最重要的连接点;对于出售动产权益的合同,卖方交付动产的所在地是最重要的连接点;保证合同适用的是主合同的准据法;对于付款合同的有效性,支付地法是最重要的连接点;服务的提供地是服务合同的最重要的连接点;乘客出发地或货物发送地是运输合同最主要的连接点。See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §§189-191,194-197(1971).
[2]Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §203(1971).
[3]侵权是第7章“不法行为(Wrongs)”中最重要的部分。第7章分三部分:侵权、侵权所致死亡之诉(actions for death)和工人赔偿,共41条(从145至185条),其中侵权部分30条(从145条至174条)。关于侵权所致死亡之诉和工人赔偿,《第二次重述》在一定程度上保留了原来的规则,同时适当地增加了灵活性。如对于侵权所致死亡之诉权,《第二次重述》第175条继续规定适用损害发生地的实体法,“除非对于特定争点,其他法域根据第6条所述原则与事件和当事人存在更重要的关系;在这种情况下,将适用其他法域的实体法。”
[4]《第二次重述》区分的侵权类型有:人身伤害、损害有形财产、欺诈和虚假陈述、诽谤(defamation)、多法域的诽谤(multistate defamation)、造成金钱损失的说谎(injurious falsehood)、隐私权(right of privacy)、在多法域侵犯隐私权(multistate invasion of privacy)、干涉婚姻关系、恶意诉讼和滥用程序。See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §§146-155,(1971).《第二次重述》区分的重要争点有:行为的侵权性、谨慎标准、享受法律保护的利益、向原告承担的义务、法定成因(legal cause)、抗辩、责任的特定先决条件、行为的义务或特免、原告自负的过错(contributory fault)、风险承担(assumption of risk)、归咎于另一方的过失(imputed negligence)、诉讼的存续(survival of actions)、慈善免责(charitable immunity)、家庭成员之间的免责(intra-family immunity)、放弃起诉或协议不起诉(release or covenant not to sue)、赔偿金(damages)、共同侵权、侵权人之间的分担和补偿(contribution and indemnity among tortfeasors)、替代责任。See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §§156-174,(1971):
[1]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 386-393(1964).
[2]Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §§146-147(1971).
[3]Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §148(1971).
[1]Restatement,Second,Connict of Laws §§149-153,(1971).
[2]Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §§154-155,(1971).
[3]§161抗辩、§163行为的义务或特免、§167诉讼的存续、§168慈善免责、§171赔偿金、§173侵权人之间的分担和补偿、§174替代责任。
[4]第169条“家庭成员之间的免责”规定“准据法通常为当事人住所地所在法域的实体法”。其余同类条款有:§156行为的侵权性、§157谨慎标准、§158享受法律保护的利益、§159向原告承担的义务、§160法定成因、§162责任的特定先决条件、§164原告自负的过错、§165风险承担、§166归咎于另一方的过失、§170放弃起诉或协议不起诉、§172共同侵权。
[5]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 327(1964).
[1]American Law Institute,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §St Paul:American Law Institute Publishers,1971,p.viii,Introduction.
[2]比如,对于人身伤害,第146条正文中只是简单规定了适用损害结果发生地法,除非另一法域根据第6条所述原则与事件和当事人存在更重要的关系。这是一条很难在个案中适用的规定,因为它对什么情况属于“除非”情形并不明确。但在“评论”部分对此给予了相当明确的解释和说明。如果侵权结果发生地和行为地出现在同一法域,那么这个法域的法律通常应该得到适用。同时,在两种情况下不适用侵权行为地和结果发生地的法律。一是根据涉及的具体问题,其他的法域具有更重要的关系,家庭成员之间的免责属于这类问题;第二种情况是,侵权行为地和结果发生地与当事人和事件之间存在很少的联系,如飞机在飞越大陆时导致的侵权。“评论”还指出,当行为地和结果发生地位于不同的法域时,通常适用侵权结果发生地法,除非另一法域与当事人和事件存在更重要的关系。See,Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §146 Comment d-e.(1971).
[3]W.Reese,The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited,34 Mercer L.Rev.516(1982-1983).
[4]第6条法律选择原则
(1)在接受宪法约束的前提下,法院应遵循其所在法域关于法律选择的成文法规定.
(2)在不存在这种规定时,有关选择准据法规则的因素包括:
(a)州际和国际制度的需要;
(b)法院地的相关政策;
(c)其他感兴趣的法域的相关政策,以及在决定特定争点上这些法域的相对兴趣;
(d)对正当期望的保护;
(e)特定法律领域的基本政策;
(f)结果的确定性、可预见性和一致性;以及
(g)容易确定和适用准据法.Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §6.(1971).
[5]W.Reese,The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited,34 Mercer L.Rev.508-509(1982-1983).
[1]Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §6 Comment c.(1971).
[2]H.Kay,A Defense of Currie's governmental interest analysis,215 Recueil des Cours 36(1990).
[3]比如,对于转让土地权益的有效性和效力,适用土地所在地法院将适用的法律,而土地所在地法院通常适用其自己的实体法决定这类问题(第223条);对于无遗嘱的动产权益的移交,“适用死者死亡时住所地法域的法院将适用的法律”(第260条);“起诉所在的当事人住所地法域的实体法,得用以决定离婚权。”(第251条)Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §§223,251,260(1971).
[4]比如第145条对侵权法律适用的一般原则的规定: (1)关于一个侵权争点(issue)的当事人权利和责任,在第6条表述的原则指导下,适用就该争点与事件和当事人存在最重要关系的法域的实体法。
(2)在适用第6条的原则决定一个争点的准据法时,应当考虑的连接点包括:
(a)损害发生地;
(b)加害地;
(c)当事人的住所、居所、国籍、成立地和营业地;以及
(d)假如存在的当事人之间关系的集中地。
这些连接点要根据它们对于特定争点的相对重要性来衡量.Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §145(1971).
[1]比如第192条对人寿保险合同适用法律的规定:在被保险人投保申请中没有做出有效的法律选择时,基于其申请签发的人寿保险合同的有效性和由此创设的权利,适用申请保单时被保险人住所地法域的实体法;除非对于特定争点,其他法城根据第6条所述原则与交易和当事人存在更重要的关系;在这种情况下,适用其他法域的实体法。Restatement,Second,Conflict of Laws §192(1971).
[2]比如第157条对谨慎标准法律适用的规定:“(1)适用第145条的规则选择的法律决定判断行为人行为的谨慎标准。(2)准据法通常为损害发生地所在法域的实体法。”
[3]See,W.Reese,Choice of Law:Rules or Approach,57 Cornell L.Rev.325(1971-1972).
[4]A.Ehrenzweig,A Counter-revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers,80 Harv.L.Rev.385(1966-1967).
[1]B.Currie,Comments onBabcock v.Jackson,A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,63 Colum.L.Rev.1241(1963).
[2]A.Ehrenzweig,A Counter-revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers,80 Harv.L.Rev.385(1966-1967).
[3]A.Ehrenzweig,The Second Conflicts Restatement:A Last Appeal for its Withdrawal,113 U.Pa.L.Rev.1241(1964-1965).
[4]A.Ehrenzweig,The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts,Law and Reason versus the Restatement Second,28 Law & Contemp.Probs.701,705(1963).
[5]这是柯里评判“重力中心(center of gravity)”和“连结点聚集(grouping of contacts)”理论时的评论。See,B.Currie,Comments on Babcock v.Jackson,A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,63 Colum.L.Rov.1233(1963).“最重要连结点”、“重力中心”、“连结点聚集”是可以互换的概念。See,S.Symeonides,The American Choice-of-law Revolution in the Courts:Today and Tomorrow,298 Recueil des Cours 129(2003).
[6]F.Juenger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,pp.58,129.
[7]K.Nadelmann,Impressionism and Unification of Law:The EEC Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual and Non-Contractual Obligations,24 Am.J.Comp.L.11(1976).
[8]E.g.Ehrenzweig,American Conflicts Law in its Historical Perspective:Should the Restatement Be "Continued"? 103 U.Pa.L.Rev.133(1954);Ehrenzweig,American Private International Law and the "Restatement",28 Nordisk Tidsskrift for Int'l Ret 229(1958);Ehrenzweig,The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts,Law and Reason versus the Restatement Second,28 Law & Contemp.Probs.700(1963);Ehrenzweig,The Second Conflicts Restatement:A Last Appeal for its Withdrawal,113 U.Pa.L.Rev.1230(1964-1965).
[1]A.Ehrenzweig,The Second Conflicts Restatement:A Last Appeal for its Withdrawal,113 U.Pa L.Rev.1233-1238(1964-1965).
[2]B.Currie,The Disinterested Third Sate,28 Law & Contemp.Probs.754-755(1963).
[3]H.Kay,Theory into Practice:Choice of Law in the Courts,34 Mercer L.Rev.562(1982-1983).
[4]R.Weintraub,"At least,to do no harm ":does the Second Restatement of Conflicts Meet the Hippocratic Standard? 56 Md.L.Rev.1315(1997).
[5]P.Hay,Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology,32 Hastings L.J.1667(1980-1981).
[6]B.Currie,The Disinterested Third State,28 Law & Contemp.Probs.766(1963).
[7]A.Ehrenzweig,The Second Conflicts Restatement:A Last Appeal for its Withdrawal,113 U.Pa.L.Rev.1235(1964-1965).
[1]J.Morris,Law and Reason Triumphant or How not Review a Restatement,21 Am.J.Comp.L.326(1973).
[2]R.Weintraub,"At least,to do no harm ":does the Second Restatement of Conflicts Meet the Hippocratic Standard? 56 Md.L.Rev.1291,1297,1299,1309(1997).
[3]J.Morris,Law and Reason Triumphant or How not Review a Restatement,21 Am.J.Comp.L.328(1973).
[4]Ibid,p.330.
[5]R.Leflar,Conflict of Laws,Contracts,and the New Restatement,15 Ark.L.Rev.164(1960-1961).
[6]R.Weintraub,"At least,to do no harm ":does the Second Restatement of Conflicts Meet the Hippocratic Standard? 56 MA L.Rev.1312(1997).
[7]See,S.Symeonides,The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement:A Mixed Blessing,56 Md.L.Rev.1277-1278(1997).
[1]J.Westbrook,Survey and Evaluation of Competing Choice-of-Law Methodologies:the Case for Eclecticism,40 Mo.L.Rev.433,439,463,466(1975).
[2]S.Fuid,Willis L.M.Reese,81 Colum.L.Rev.936-937(1981).
[3]H.Kay,Theory into Practice:Choice of Law in the Courts,34 Mercer L.Rev.556(1982-1983).
[4]这是塞缪尼德斯截止于2003年年底统计的数据。See.E.Seoles,P.Hay,P.Borchers,S.Symeonides,Conflict of Laws,4~(th)ed.,St.Paul:Thomson,2004,pp.79,85.
[5]S.Symeonides,The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement:A Mixed Blessing,56 Md.L.Rev.1269,1272-1276(1997).
[6]R.Weintraub,"At least,to do no harm ":does the Second Restatement of Conflicts Meet the Hippocratic Standard? 56 Md.L.Rev.1287(1997).
[7]S.Symeonides,The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement:A Mixed Blessing,56 Md.L.Rev.1269,1262-1263(1997).
[1]W.Reese,The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited,34 Mercer L.Rev.502(1982-1983).
[2]W.Reese,Discussion of Major Areas of Choice of Law,111 Recueil des Cours 414(1964).
[3]S.Fuld,Willis L.M.Reese,81 Colum.L.Rev.935(1981).
[1]W.Reese,The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited,34 Mercer L.Rev.508(1982-1983).
[2]H.Southerland,A Plea for the Proper Use of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws 27 Vt L.Rev.40(2002-2003).
[3]W.Reese,American Trends in Private International Law:Academic and Judicial Manipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases.33 Vand.L.Rev.734(1980).
[4]S.Symeonides,The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement:A Mixed Blessing,56 Md.L.Rev.1280-1281(1997).
[1]C.Langdell,A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts,Boston:Little,Brown,and Company,1871,p.vi,preface.
[2]S.Symeonides(ed.),Private International Law at the End of 20~(th)Century:Progress or Regress? Kluwer Law International,2000,p22.
[3]W.Reynolds & W.Richman,Robert Leflar,Judicial Process,and Choice of Law,52 Ark.L.Rev.135(1999).
[1]R.Leflar,Choice of Law:A Well-watered Plateau,41 Law & Contemp.Probs.10(1977).
[2]W.Reese,The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited,34 Mercer L.Rev.502(1982-1983).
[3]H.Kay,A Defense of Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis,215 Recueil des Cours 179(1990).
[4]R.Stevens,Law School:Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s,Chapel Hill and London:The University of North Carolina Press,1983,p.156. 确定了相关的法域之后,第二步是为每一个法域解释调整特定问题的规则。这种规则可以是某个法域一般的国内法,或者是专门调整涉外问题的特别法。在解释规则时,不仅要考虑国内法政策,而且还要考虑涉外政策。(3)对于大多数案件,前两步就可以解决问题,因为常常是所有相关法域具有同样的调整规则(尽管他们的国内法规则不同)。余下的未解决的案件,是最麻烦的,出现了要在竞相适用的规则之间进行选择的问题。相当大比例的这种“真实”冲突能够通过适用主要关心案件的法域的规则得到解决。在有的案件中,有一个法域对案件拥有最终的有效控制权;有的案件中,所有关心案件的法域同意其中一个法域最关心案件。在这两类案件中,这种技巧是可行的。(4)如果不能通过上述界定最关切法域的办法解决冲突,解决方案应该借助于分析相关法域的隐含的国内和涉外政策予以解决。对政策的分析经常显示,尽管存在冲突,但其中一个法域的主张如此明显突出,以至于这个法域的规则应该得到遵守。(5)如果通过上述步骤不能发现各方的政策主张明显不同,此时应该降低差异的要求,适用政策主张稍微强烈一方的法律,因为诉讼争议最终要得到解决。这种细微差异可以是一方的政策相对更有利于促进涉外交往或维护当事人正当期望;也可能是一方的法律属于新型制度,而另一方属于落后的制度;如果法院是相关的一方,适用法院地的法律;如果法院是中立法院,适用与法院地法最接近的规则,因为法院更熟悉这类规则,少犯错误;法院可以不方便法院为由拒绝管辖;如果是方便法院,可以适用有利于阻止挑选法院一方的法律。See,A.von Mehren & D.Trautman,The Law of Multistate Problems,Boston:Little,Brown and Company,1965,pp.76-78,407-408.
[1]R.Weintraub,Functional Developments in Choice of Law for Contracts,187 Recueil des Cours 252(1985).
[2]R.Weintraub,Commentary on the Conflict of Laws,Mineola:Foundation Press,1971,p.208.
[3]D.Cavers,The Choice-of-Law Process,Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,1965,pp.132-133.
[4]W.Reese,Choice of Law:Rules or Approach,57 Cornell L.Rev.325(1971-1972).
[5]鲍沃斯将形式主义判决的优点总结为:(1)容易预测,方便私人安排事务和减少诉讼;(2)容易应用,因为需要处理的信息有限;(3)将责任由裁判者转给立法者;(4)帮助立法者将他们的价值传达给可能不被信任的裁判者;(5)促进形式上的正义,同类案件同样判决;(6)通过避免主观臆断和裁判者的困境促进自由。See,W.Powers,Formalism and Nonformalism in Choice of Law Methodology,52 Wash.L.Rev.29-30(1976-1977).
[1]设计难题是因为规则并不能总是完美地将其赖以产生的政策转化为个案中的结果。因为形式主义的规则在裁判中过滤掉了其他信息,导致的结果可能与其支持的政策背道而驰。当设计问题出现时,有必要考虑形式主义的优点超过不适当的结果带来的危害。当形式主义的规则将裁决过程冻结在反映一个时代价值的一系列规则上,而这种价值在下一个时代已经不复存在时,冻结问题便出现了。Ibid,pp.30-31.
[2]彼得森将20世纪美国法律选择的历史分为三个时期——既得权时代、冲突法革命时代和折中主义时代。See,C.Peterson,Private International Law at the End of the Twentieth Century:Progress or Regress?46 Am.J.Comp.L.Supp.199(1998).
[3]对20世纪美国冲突法发展的整体回顾可参见:C.Peterson,Private International Law at the End of the Twentieth Century:Progress or Regress? 46 Am.J.Comp.L.Supp.197(1998).
[4]关于第三次重述,不仅学者们对具体重述什么观点不一,而且对是否该做些什么众说纷纭。在关于第三次冲突法重述的研讨会上,塞缪尼德斯(Symeonides)主张开始新的重述,并且起草了部分条文。荣格教授则认为此时重述冲突法无异于浪费纸墨。利茨曼(Richman)教授认为此时开始重述时机不成熟,但美国法学会应该成立一个研究小组为未来的工作奠定基础。温伯格(Weinberg)教授不主张彻底抛弃《第二次重述》,而主张通过大手术对其清理,包括法律移植。彼得森教授也认为开始新重述的时机并不成熟。See,C.Peterson,Restating Conflicts Again:A Cure for Schizophrenia? 75 Ind.L.J.554-555(2000).
[5]See,G.Kegel,The Crisis of Conflict of Laws,112 Recueil des Cours 108(1964).这也是许多学者的共识,如荣格(F.Juenger,Choice of Law and Multistate Justice,Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993,p.21.)、维舍尔(F.Vischer,General Course on Private International Law,232 Recueil des Cours 21(1993).)
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