中国房地产开发企业投资行为研究
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摘要
自20世纪80年代以来,中国城市化率快速增长,为房地产业提供了广阔的发展空间。近年来,中国房地产业呈现高速增长态势,已成为国民经济增长的支柱产业,房地产经济研究也受到了理论界的关注,但房地产开发企业投资方面的研究时间较短,还处于比较初级的阶段。大部分的相关研究都是从传统的投资分析方法入手,研究房地产开发企业投资的成本、收益、风险。房地产开发企业投资涉及到诸多行业,受国家政策、地区经济和外部环境影响很大,存在着很大的不确定性；另外,随着市场经济的不断深入推进,房地产开发企业之间的竞争也日趋激烈。如何利用现代投资理论、博弈论及信息经济等理论综合研究房地产开发企业投资行为,是推进房地产投资理论和房地产开发企业研究一个极为重要的课题。对于提高房地产开发企业的投资管理能力和企业竞争能力,实现企业在市场竞争环境中的生存与发展,保障企业稳定地、可持续地增长,具有重要的意义。
基于这样的背景,本文选择了“房地产开发企业投资行为”作为研究主题。在内容方面,首先,在回顾了相关理论的基础上,对房地产开发企业投资动机与决策行为作了研究,明确了开发企业投资行为的指导思想和行为基础。其次,运用博弈论、实物期权、经济分析、统计等方法对房地产开发企业的投资行为进行了较为全面的分析。最后,在以上分析的基础上,并结合当前的经济制度,提出了现阶段以及今后一段时间规范中国房地产开发企业投资行为的建议。
在投资动机和决策行为方面,非国有开发企业的投资动机一方面具有企业投资动机的一般性,即以利润最大化为支配性的投资动机,呈现多元化的发展趋势,另一方面又具有自身的特殊性,即相对于其他企业,开发企业的投资动机更易于受到外部影响。国有开发企业投资动机与政府的多重目标密切相关。无论非国有企业还是国有企业,其代理人的决策影响力都在投资决策中起着重要的作用。
在投资筹集行为方面,从信息不对称角度来看,由于开发企业内部经营者与外部投资者之间的信息掌握状况不同,企业有可能产生投资过度或投资不足行为。为避免这种情况,房地产开发企业通常的融资次序遵循这样的基本原则,先内源融资,后外源融资；在外源融资中,先债权融资,后股权融资。从代理成本角度来看,股权融资与债权融资都具有一定的代理成本,通过选择合理的债权融资契约企业能够有效地降低整个代理成本。从外部约束角度来看,股权融资的外部约束整体比较严格,而债权融资中银行信贷的外部约束相对松弛,其他债权融资方式的外部约束也比较严格。通过以上的分析,得出了房地产开发企业融资行为的选择,优先选择内源融资,在内源融资不能满足自身需求的情况下,优先选择银行信贷融资。
在投资分配与实施行为方面,开发企业与土地相关的行为在其投资行为中非常重要,采用划拨、招标、拍卖、挂牌等不同方式取得土地使用权的行为及其交易价格形成都有其各自特点。开发企业的“囤地行为”是多种原因造成的结果。运用实物期权的方法对开发企业的土地开发时机问题作了分析。在开发企业投资的产品结构上,开发企业忽视经济适用房的建设,偏爱高品质住宅的建设。在开发企业投资的区域发展上,开发企业投资表现出极点扩张的模式。在项目的选址方面,由于中国土地制度的特殊性,开发企业选址空间较小。选址科学性不强,并且,开发企业在选址上表现出对交通设施便利性的偏好。开发企业投资行为与城市规划的协调性不强。尽管可持续发展对于房地产业的发展非常重要,但是多种因素使得房地产开发企业仍旧表现出了不可持续发展的迹象。
在投资回收行为方面,开发企业在投资回收过程中表现出的欺诈行为与政府利益、监控能力及市场力约束较差有关,开发企业可利用人的行为特点进行虚假需求的传导。对信息不对称条件下的开发企业与购房者之间的博弈行为做了研究。价格是投资回收中的一个重要因素,对开发企业投资回收中的价格竞争行为和价格歧视进行了研究。房地产代理是实现回收行为的一个重要途径,对开发企业与代理商之间的委托-代理行为作了研究,分析了其中存在的道德风险。
在对房地产开发企业的投资动机、决策、资金筹集、分配与实施、回收等予以深入分析后,本文最后提出了当前及今后一段时间内规范房地产开发企业投资行为的建议。总体来看,本文的创新之处主要包括：
1.提出了决策影响力系数的概念。并在委托-代理模型中引入了决策影响力系数,分析了决策影响力系数及其他一些重要变量在开发企业投资决策中的作用。结果表明,决策影响力系数对非国有与国有房地产开发企业最优投资额的决定起着至关重要的作用。
2.指出房地产开发企业投资的区位发展遵循极点扩张模式,即在发达地区饱和之后,围绕发达地区的周边展开扩张。对2002-2006国内房地产开发投资区位熵进行了测算,运用投资区位熵对房地产开发企业投资区域发展的极点扩张模式做了实证研究,证明了结论的正确性。
The rapid increase of rate of urbanization had provided wide development space for the real estate industry since 1980, The real estate industry grows vigorously and displays the state of high-speed increase in recent years. It has already turned into the pillar industry of economic increase in our country. The research on real estate economics draws attention of academic circle. However, the history of research on real estate enterprises is comparatively short in our country, still in elementary stage. Most of the research on real estate focuses, starting from the methods of traditional investment analysis, on the investor's cost, income and risks. But the real estate industry, concerning other every industry and having big influence on state policy, regional economy, environment and culture, exists great uncertainty.In addition, with day by day intense market competition resulting from unceasing development of market economy in our country, how to utilize modern investment theory, option, game theory and information economics theory to comprehensively research the investment acts of real estate enterprises is a project with great significance about promoting the research on the investment theory of real estate and real estate enterprises. It is significant to improve the enterprises' ability of investment management and strategic investment and competition in order for enterprises to keep subsistence, development and sustainable and stable increase in the market competitive environment.
Based on such background, this dissertation selects "the investment acts of real estate enterprises" as subject of research.As to its contents, firstly, on the basis of relative theory, the motive of investment and acts of decision making of real estate enterprises are researched, and the guiding principles and the starting points of investment acts definitely put forward. Secondly, the investment acts of real estate enterprises in the moving course of investment are analyzed by the methods of game theory, real option, economics and statistics, and then all respects of the investment acts of real estate enterprises are revealed, and their rationalization is declared. Finally, considering the irrational investment acts of real estate enterprises and the economic systems of China, the suggestions for normalizing the investment acts of real estate enterprises put forward.
In respect of the motive and decision making of real estate enterprises, the investment motive of civilian-run enterprises on the one hand submit themselves to the general rules of enterprises, that is the investment motive is multi-factor and making profit is dominated motive of civilian-run enterprises which also tend to realize other aims, on the other they also have peculiarity, that is they are more objected to outsider factors. The investment motive of state enterprises is more concerned with government's aims. The agent's impact of decision making is very important in decision making of investment of both enterprises.
In respect of the acts of financing, from the respect of asymmetric information, because of asymmetric information existing between investor and operator, real estate enterprises may invest excessively or inadequately. In order to prevent them from emerging, real estate enterprises will follow the law, first, internal financing is chosen, and then external financing, if external financing is necessary, first, debt financing is chosen, and then equity financing. From the respect of agency cost, both financing will have agency cost, but enterprises can reduce total agency cost by choosing debt covenants. From the respect of external constrains, constrains of bank financing are slack, while constrains of equity financing and other debt financing are tight. Finally, the financing law of real estate enterprises is put forward, first, internal financing is chosen, and then external financing, if external financing is necessary, bank financing is chosen.
In respect of the acts of allocating and implementing investment, the acts of real estate enterprises related land are the core acts. The acts for acquiring the land and the pricing such as allocation, biding, auction, list, have their characteristics., Some reasons make real estate enterprises tend to store up land.The timing of land development is researched by way of real options. As to the structure of product, real estate enterprises tend to build the high-quality buildings. As to the development of the investment in the space, real estate enterprises tend to invest in the pattern of radiation from points. As to site selection, real estate enterprises have not many choices, site selection of commercial property and residence does not correspond to reality, and real estate enterprises tend to select the sites where the infrastructure is in good conditions. The investment acts of real estate enterprises do not harmonized with the city programme. Even though sustainable Development is very important for real estates, many reasons make the real estate unsustainable.
In respect of the acts of getting back of investment, the cheating acts of real estate enterprises in the getting back course relate to the government's interests, the abilities to monitor, the bad constrain of market forces. Real estate enterprises can deliver the false demand by exploiting the human behavior. The interactions between real estate enterprises and clients are also researched from the respect of asymmetric information. The price is an important factor in getting back of investment, and price competition and price discrimination are researched. Agent is an important way for realizing the acts of getting back of investment, the principal-agent acts between real estate enterprises and agent are also researched, especially the mortal hazard. seller's credit of real estate enterprises is an act for promoting their getting back of investment, not only promoting the efficiency, but also innovating the way of financing.
After analyzing the acts of real estate enterprises' impulse, making policy, financing, allocation and implementing, getting back of investment, we put forward the suggestions for normalizing the investment acts of real estate enterprises.
As a whole, the main innovations of this dissertation are as follows:
Firstly, the concept of impact coefficient of decision making put forward, and the impact coefficient is added to the principal-agent model. The role of impact coefficient of decision making and other important factors is illustrated. The results are that impact coefficient of decision making play an important role in determination of optimum investment of the two kinds of enterprises.
Secondly, the pattern of expanding from points in the development of investment of real estate enterprises put forward, after the investment saturated in the developed regions, the enterprises increase the investment in the surrounding region of them. 2003-2006 Location Quotient is measured and calculated, which is used to researched normatively the development of investment in the distribution of region. The result is satisfactory.
基于这样的背景,本文选择了“房地产开发企业投资行为”作为研究主题。在内容方面,首先,在回顾了相关理论的基础上,对房地产开发企业投资动机与决策行为作了研究,明确了开发企业投资行为的指导思想和行为基础。其次,运用博弈论、实物期权、经济分析、统计等方法对房地产开发企业的投资行为进行了较为全面的分析。最后,在以上分析的基础上,并结合当前的经济制度,提出了现阶段以及今后一段时间规范中国房地产开发企业投资行为的建议。
在投资动机和决策行为方面,非国有开发企业的投资动机一方面具有企业投资动机的一般性,即以利润最大化为支配性的投资动机,呈现多元化的发展趋势,另一方面又具有自身的特殊性,即相对于其他企业,开发企业的投资动机更易于受到外部影响。国有开发企业投资动机与政府的多重目标密切相关。无论非国有企业还是国有企业,其代理人的决策影响力都在投资决策中起着重要的作用。
在投资筹集行为方面,从信息不对称角度来看,由于开发企业内部经营者与外部投资者之间的信息掌握状况不同,企业有可能产生投资过度或投资不足行为。为避免这种情况,房地产开发企业通常的融资次序遵循这样的基本原则,先内源融资,后外源融资；在外源融资中,先债权融资,后股权融资。从代理成本角度来看,股权融资与债权融资都具有一定的代理成本,通过选择合理的债权融资契约企业能够有效地降低整个代理成本。从外部约束角度来看,股权融资的外部约束整体比较严格,而债权融资中银行信贷的外部约束相对松弛,其他债权融资方式的外部约束也比较严格。通过以上的分析,得出了房地产开发企业融资行为的选择,优先选择内源融资,在内源融资不能满足自身需求的情况下,优先选择银行信贷融资。
在投资分配与实施行为方面,开发企业与土地相关的行为在其投资行为中非常重要,采用划拨、招标、拍卖、挂牌等不同方式取得土地使用权的行为及其交易价格形成都有其各自特点。开发企业的“囤地行为”是多种原因造成的结果。运用实物期权的方法对开发企业的土地开发时机问题作了分析。在开发企业投资的产品结构上,开发企业忽视经济适用房的建设,偏爱高品质住宅的建设。在开发企业投资的区域发展上,开发企业投资表现出极点扩张的模式。在项目的选址方面,由于中国土地制度的特殊性,开发企业选址空间较小。选址科学性不强,并且,开发企业在选址上表现出对交通设施便利性的偏好。开发企业投资行为与城市规划的协调性不强。尽管可持续发展对于房地产业的发展非常重要,但是多种因素使得房地产开发企业仍旧表现出了不可持续发展的迹象。
在投资回收行为方面,开发企业在投资回收过程中表现出的欺诈行为与政府利益、监控能力及市场力约束较差有关,开发企业可利用人的行为特点进行虚假需求的传导。对信息不对称条件下的开发企业与购房者之间的博弈行为做了研究。价格是投资回收中的一个重要因素,对开发企业投资回收中的价格竞争行为和价格歧视进行了研究。房地产代理是实现回收行为的一个重要途径,对开发企业与代理商之间的委托-代理行为作了研究,分析了其中存在的道德风险。
在对房地产开发企业的投资动机、决策、资金筹集、分配与实施、回收等予以深入分析后,本文最后提出了当前及今后一段时间内规范房地产开发企业投资行为的建议。总体来看,本文的创新之处主要包括：
1.提出了决策影响力系数的概念。并在委托-代理模型中引入了决策影响力系数,分析了决策影响力系数及其他一些重要变量在开发企业投资决策中的作用。结果表明,决策影响力系数对非国有与国有房地产开发企业最优投资额的决定起着至关重要的作用。
2.指出房地产开发企业投资的区位发展遵循极点扩张模式,即在发达地区饱和之后,围绕发达地区的周边展开扩张。对2002-2006国内房地产开发投资区位熵进行了测算,运用投资区位熵对房地产开发企业投资区域发展的极点扩张模式做了实证研究,证明了结论的正确性。
The rapid increase of rate of urbanization had provided wide development space for the real estate industry since 1980, The real estate industry grows vigorously and displays the state of high-speed increase in recent years. It has already turned into the pillar industry of economic increase in our country. The research on real estate economics draws attention of academic circle. However, the history of research on real estate enterprises is comparatively short in our country, still in elementary stage. Most of the research on real estate focuses, starting from the methods of traditional investment analysis, on the investor's cost, income and risks. But the real estate industry, concerning other every industry and having big influence on state policy, regional economy, environment and culture, exists great uncertainty.In addition, with day by day intense market competition resulting from unceasing development of market economy in our country, how to utilize modern investment theory, option, game theory and information economics theory to comprehensively research the investment acts of real estate enterprises is a project with great significance about promoting the research on the investment theory of real estate and real estate enterprises. It is significant to improve the enterprises' ability of investment management and strategic investment and competition in order for enterprises to keep subsistence, development and sustainable and stable increase in the market competitive environment.
Based on such background, this dissertation selects "the investment acts of real estate enterprises" as subject of research.As to its contents, firstly, on the basis of relative theory, the motive of investment and acts of decision making of real estate enterprises are researched, and the guiding principles and the starting points of investment acts definitely put forward. Secondly, the investment acts of real estate enterprises in the moving course of investment are analyzed by the methods of game theory, real option, economics and statistics, and then all respects of the investment acts of real estate enterprises are revealed, and their rationalization is declared. Finally, considering the irrational investment acts of real estate enterprises and the economic systems of China, the suggestions for normalizing the investment acts of real estate enterprises put forward.
In respect of the motive and decision making of real estate enterprises, the investment motive of civilian-run enterprises on the one hand submit themselves to the general rules of enterprises, that is the investment motive is multi-factor and making profit is dominated motive of civilian-run enterprises which also tend to realize other aims, on the other they also have peculiarity, that is they are more objected to outsider factors. The investment motive of state enterprises is more concerned with government's aims. The agent's impact of decision making is very important in decision making of investment of both enterprises.
In respect of the acts of financing, from the respect of asymmetric information, because of asymmetric information existing between investor and operator, real estate enterprises may invest excessively or inadequately. In order to prevent them from emerging, real estate enterprises will follow the law, first, internal financing is chosen, and then external financing, if external financing is necessary, first, debt financing is chosen, and then equity financing. From the respect of agency cost, both financing will have agency cost, but enterprises can reduce total agency cost by choosing debt covenants. From the respect of external constrains, constrains of bank financing are slack, while constrains of equity financing and other debt financing are tight. Finally, the financing law of real estate enterprises is put forward, first, internal financing is chosen, and then external financing, if external financing is necessary, bank financing is chosen.
In respect of the acts of allocating and implementing investment, the acts of real estate enterprises related land are the core acts. The acts for acquiring the land and the pricing such as allocation, biding, auction, list, have their characteristics., Some reasons make real estate enterprises tend to store up land.The timing of land development is researched by way of real options. As to the structure of product, real estate enterprises tend to build the high-quality buildings. As to the development of the investment in the space, real estate enterprises tend to invest in the pattern of radiation from points. As to site selection, real estate enterprises have not many choices, site selection of commercial property and residence does not correspond to reality, and real estate enterprises tend to select the sites where the infrastructure is in good conditions. The investment acts of real estate enterprises do not harmonized with the city programme. Even though sustainable Development is very important for real estates, many reasons make the real estate unsustainable.
In respect of the acts of getting back of investment, the cheating acts of real estate enterprises in the getting back course relate to the government's interests, the abilities to monitor, the bad constrain of market forces. Real estate enterprises can deliver the false demand by exploiting the human behavior. The interactions between real estate enterprises and clients are also researched from the respect of asymmetric information. The price is an important factor in getting back of investment, and price competition and price discrimination are researched. Agent is an important way for realizing the acts of getting back of investment, the principal-agent acts between real estate enterprises and agent are also researched, especially the mortal hazard. seller's credit of real estate enterprises is an act for promoting their getting back of investment, not only promoting the efficiency, but also innovating the way of financing.
After analyzing the acts of real estate enterprises' impulse, making policy, financing, allocation and implementing, getting back of investment, we put forward the suggestions for normalizing the investment acts of real estate enterprises.
As a whole, the main innovations of this dissertation are as follows:
Firstly, the concept of impact coefficient of decision making put forward, and the impact coefficient is added to the principal-agent model. The role of impact coefficient of decision making and other important factors is illustrated. The results are that impact coefficient of decision making play an important role in determination of optimum investment of the two kinds of enterprises.
Secondly, the pattern of expanding from points in the development of investment of real estate enterprises put forward, after the investment saturated in the developed regions, the enterprises increase the investment in the surrounding region of them. 2003-2006 Location Quotient is measured and calculated, which is used to researched normatively the development of investment in the distribution of region. The result is satisfactory.
引文
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